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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that a non-dualistic understanding of embodied being must start from a theory 
of embodied practice. This allows us to think in terms of a body-subject, rather than seeing the body as 
object, and thus to consider embodiment as the basis of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Further to 
this, I contend that if we are to truly move away from dualism in our understanding of human being, we 
need not only to conceptualise embodiment adequately in philosophical terms, but also to engage with 
lived embodied practice.  
 
7KLVWKHVLVµIOHVKHVRXW¶HPERGLPHQWWKHRU\WKURXJKDQDSSURDFKZKLFKEULQJV0HUOHDX-3RQW\¶V
philosophy into conversation with the experiential accounts of professional contemporary dance 
practitioners, accessed through in-depth qualitative interviews. In bringing together a philosophy 
(Merleau-Ponty) which is rooted in the notion of embodied practice, and an embodied practice 
(contemporary dance) which both grounds and is grounded in philosophically interesting themes such 
as subjectivity, identity, intersubjectivity, expression and communication, this conversational method 
allows mutual illumination and opens up a new conceptual space for the exploration of the embodied 
basis of being.  This project therefore emphasises the seeking out of links and common ground between 
the two interlocutors rather than offering a reductive critique.  
 
7KHFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQSKLORVRSK\DQGSUDFWLFHFRYHUVIRXUPDLQDUHDVZKHUHWKHGDQFHUV¶
reflections on their (embodied capacities for) practical knowledge, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and 
representation are explored in relation to Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQs of the corporeal schema, 
intercorporeality and flesh [la chair]. It is argued that this conversational approach functions to open up 
a space which lies in-between the traditional dualisms of mind and body, philosophy and practice, and 
theory and data, and allows me to develop and explore new ideas, connections, perspectives and 
understandings of the embodied basis of being that a different methodological approach would not have 
facilitated to the same extent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Exploring the Embodied Basis of Being through Merleau-Ponty and Dance 
 
This project evolves from an interest in the concept of embodiment as it is articulated 
within the field of the Sociology of the Body and some branches of Continental 
PhLORVRSK\ 7KH IRFXV RI WKLV WKHVLV LV WKHUHIRUH RQ WKH µOLYHG-ERG\¶ RU µERG\-
VXEMHFW¶UDWKHUWKDQRQWKHVRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGREMHFWERG\ZKLFKGRPLQDWHVPXFK 
of socio-cultural body studies; and embodiment is understood, as I will discuss further 
in the following chapter, in non-dualist terms as a way of being or mode of subjective 
human existence.  
 
This engagement with the notion of embodiment could be conceptualised as a purely 
theoretical exercise, as has been the case in the philosophical and much of the 
sociological literature (VHH µ&RQWH[WXDOLVLQJ WKH &RQYHUVDWLRQ¶). The theorising of 
embodiment is, however, notably reliant on concepts of the active, lived body and of 
bodily behaviour and practice.  I therefore argue that if we are really to move away 
from dualism in our understanding of human being, then we need not only to 
conceptualise embodiment adequately in theoretical or philosophical terms, but also to 
engage directly with lived embodied practice. Thus the philosophy of embodiment, 
which I engage with through the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, is brought into 
conversation in this thesis, not with theories of practice, but with the actual practice 
  2 
of practice, which I access through in-depth qualitative interviews with professional 
contemporary dancers about their experiences of dance and being dancers. 
 
The thesis can therefore be understood as exploring the embodied basis of being 
through the dual lens of philosophy and practice. My approach brings together the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, which is rooted in the notion of embodied practice; and 
the embodied practice of professional contemporary dance, which both grounds and is 
grounded in philosophically interesting aspects of our existence such as subjectivity, 
identity, intersubjectivity, expression and communication. It is in bringing philosophy 
and practice WRJHWKHULQWKLVRULJLQDOZD\WRVHHKRZWKH\PLJKWµVSHDNWR¶HDFKRWKHU
± what common ground and potential for new understandings and mutual illumination 
emerges ± that I suggest I am able to open up a new conceptual space for the 
understanding of embodiment in non-dualist terms. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ RI HPERGLPHQW EHJLQV IURP D IRFXV RQ WKHSULPDF\ RI
pre-reflective embodied behaviour, as is exemplified in his writings on motility and 
perception. This entails notions of some kind of pre-reflective, practical, bodily 
knowledge and intentionality and allows us to think in terms of a body-subject, rather 
than seeing the body as an object. His work also extends to take in concepts of 
subjectivity, intersubjectivity, meaning and communication, where he again 
emphasises the importance of understanding these areas in terms of the embodied 
nature of human being.  
 
This thesis recognises the possibility of bringing GDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIWKe experience 
of dance to speak to these concepts. For example, philosophical ideas about tacit 
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bodily knowledge are brought WRJHWKHUZLWKGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIWKHLUH[SHULHQFHVRI
what they refer to as muscle memory and as remembering or having dance 
movemHQWV µLQ WKH ERG\¶ 0HUOHDX-3RQW\¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW PHDQLQJ DQG
communication are fundamentally embodied practices or capacities is also echoed in 
consideration of the practice of dance, allowing me to suggest that Merleau-Ponty can 
help illuminate this aspect of dance and that dance can help illuminate Merleau-
3RQW\¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOLGHDVDERXWLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\DQGODQJXDJH,WLVDOVRLQWHUHVWLQJ
to consider how self and the relationship with others are understood by the 
professional dancer as being closely related to a sense of being (embodied as) a 
dancer.  
 
This type of detailed sustained attention to one embodied practice is not central to 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V RZQ ZRUN DV KH XVHV D QXPEHU RI GLIIHUHQW H[DPSOHV WR LOOXVWUDWH
ideas about perception and motility and then discusses language and art in different 
works with a different focus. In bringing Merleau-Ponty and dance together in this 
way, I therefore suggest that it is possible to add to the fields of both dance studies 
and Merleau-Ponty studies. 
 
Engagement with contemporary dance also forces us beyond the dichotomy between 
materiality and representation as it is both a physical practice and an art-form. The 
focus on contemporary dance is therefore offered here as an approach which 
facilitates a non-dualist perspective through which I have been able to explore not 
only the embodied nature of self, but also embodiment as the grounds for 
intersubjective recognition and communication. Williams and Bendelow in fact 
suggest that embodied art-forms might be particularly interesting for engagement with 
  4 
a non-dualistic notion of embodiment as these practices are argued to blur the 
traditional boundaries between art and theory (Williams and Bendelow, 1998: 8).   
 
Dance is also particularly interesting and appropriate to take as an example of an 
embodied practice for this study because the (often pre-reflective or taken-for-granted 
in everyday life) sense of the body is phenomenologically foregrounded in dance. 
This is not unique to dance, with studies in the sociology of health and illness 
suggesting that this foregrounding can occur in instances of injury or illness. The 
importance of embodiment to our sense of self is also revealed at these moments 
when the body µlets us down¶ LQ the disruption to sense of self that can accompany 
physical illness. What is different about taking dance as an example, rather than 
illness or injury, is however, that the body in dance is foregrounded, not because it is 
dysfunctional or imposes limitations on our normally pre-reflective movements and 
bodily existence (although this can be true for dancers as for anyone else), but because 
the dancing body facilitates or enhances the possibilities for embodied being in the 
world. Thus my research, in contrast to the vast majority of work in the sociology of 
health and illness, is able to focus not solely on intervals of disruption to sense of self, 
but on how that sense of self actually develops and functions in the practice of dance. 
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The Voices of Philosophy and Practice 
 
While it is of fundamental importance to this project that Merleau-Ponty begins his 
philosophical speculation from thinking about practice rather than the reflective 
thought of the Cartesian cogito, the contribution of Merleau-Pontian philosophy to 
this thesis remains at the level of offering philosophical ideas or concepts. It is only in 
introducing interview accounts of the lived experience of contemporary dance to my 
discussion of these ideas, then, that I am able to actually move beyond the level of 
philosophical speculation, truly transcending dualism, to explore these theoretical 
concepts as they actually play out in practice. 
 
When I refer to Merleau-3RQW\¶V LGHDV , DP WKHUHIRUH SULPDULO\ HQJDJLQJ ZLWK his 
concepts at a broad level which I find useful for thinking about what they might 
actually feel like in practice, rather than offering a complex and in-depth discussion of 
how his ideas evolve in different individual texts. My understanding of these concepts 
grows out of my engagement both with Merleau-3RQW\¶V RZQ ZRrk, and with a 
number of commentaries on or readings of Merleau-3RQW\¶VZRUNE\RWKHUVFKRODUV
Furthermore, my understanding of these concepts has developed in constantly 
evolving connection with my researching of dance. 
 
It is also important to emphasise that my intention is not to situate or critique 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZRUN in relation to other thinkers, so I have not aimed to locate 
Merleau-Ponty within or outside different intellectual traditions. In place of this type 
of analysis I have taken the approach of engaging with and relating his work to an 
embodied practice. There are places in this thesis where I have appealed to other 
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thinkers, notably Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Lacan in my discussion of mirrors and the 
gaze, but this is with the intention of clarifying Merleau-3RQW\¶VSRVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQ
setting out to contextualise or critique it; although where I have found it lacking, such 
as in the dimension of gender, I have needed to go beyond Merleau-3RQW\¶VRULJLQDO
concepts to fully engage with (femaleGDQFHUV¶H[SHULHQFHV 
 
Socio-cultural body studies, and indeed Merleau-Ponty himself, often colour their 
work with examples of embodied practices, but the work presented here is an 
unusually extensive study of the interplay between these two manners ± philosophy 
and practice ± of engaging with embodiment. It is also true that many empirical 
studies on the body draw on the work of theorists such as Merleau-Ponty and 
especially the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu for their discussion of practice, but most of 
this theoretical engagement is limited to a few key concepts such as habitus or the 
corporeal schema, and, in the case of Merleau-Ponty, engagement is most commonly 
with his early work, ignoring later work on subjectivity, intersubjectivity, art and 
language. By contrast, although I do not set out in this thesis to cover and interpret 
every aspect of Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ neither do I limit myself to those 
concepts that are most well-known or most straight-forwardly linked to empirical 
work on the body. Rather I have attempted to engage with the overall spirit of 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VZRUNDQG, likewise, to take contemporary dance as a whole system 
of practice, being and meaning.  
 
The voice of dance appears in this thesis in the form of qualitative interview data from 
interviews I conducted with professional contemporary dancers. It is not a theory of 
dance or aesthetics, then, but an engagement with accounts of the lived experience of 
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being a dance artist or dancing body-subject. Thus while cultural and dance studies 
have tended to focus on dance and the dancing body as cultural objects or texts for 
analysis, I have focussed in my interviews RQ WKH DFWLYH µGRLQJ¶ RI GDQFH the 
embodied practice of dance; and the experiences of learning, remembering, 
performing and watching dance. This does not, however, limit my perspective on 
dance to seeing it as a physical (mechanical) activity. Indeed my work on dance is 
produced in reaction against both these trends towards reducing dance to either the 
textual or the mechanical.  
 
I look, rather, to explore dance in non-dualist terms, emphasising both materiality and 
representation. In starting from or prioritising a notion of embodied practice I do not 
ignore subjective and representational aspects, then, but rather suggest that I am able 
to use practice as a starting point for a non-dualist exploration of dance as an 
expressive and communicative art-form related to aspects of our understanding of 
what it is to be human such as identity, expression, representation, and intersubjective 
communication.  
 
Conceptualised in this non-dualistic manner, I therefore suggest that dance is 
particularly illuminating as a focus for an extended discussion of the experience of 
embodied practice in relation to Merleau-3RQW\¶VSKLORVRSKLFDO ideas about practice, 
subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the representational or meaningful capacities of 
language and art. In taking these broad, non-reductive approaches to Merleau-Ponty 
and dance, I attempt to draw out all the different ways these two perspectives on 
embodiment might speak to each other.  
  8 
The Conversation 
 
The notion of conversation refers to the relationship between philosophy and practice 
which I set up in the thesis, and, because of how I have approached and accessed 
Merleau-Ponty and dance, it can also be thought of as describing the relationship I 
establish between theory and data.  
 
Neither party in the conversation is held to hold intellectual priority over the other. 
The project is therefore neither theory(philosophy)-driven nor data(practice)-driven, 
but is rather driven by the desire to open up a space where the connections and 
interaction between the two interlocutors can generate new depth and possibilities for 
our understanding of embodiment. 
 
The conversation between philosophy and practice covers four main areas, as 
UHIOHFWHG LQ WKHFKDSWHU VWUXFWXUHZKHUH WKHGDQFHUV¶ UHIOHFWLRQVRQ WKHLU HPERGLHG
FDSDFLWLHV IRU µ3UDFWLFDO .QRZOHGJH¶ µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ DQG
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶DUHH[SORUHGLQUHODWLRQto Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKH
corporeal schema, intercorporeality and the reversible flesh of the world. For example 
LQ WKHFKDSWHU µ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶, I discuss WKHGDQFHUV¶H[SHULHQWLDOFRQFHSWs of 
JHWWLQJ RU KDYLQJ D PRYHPHQW µLQ WKH ERG\¶ LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK 0HUOHDX-3RQW\¶V
theorising of the corporeal schema. This allows me both to explore a new 
understanding of this aspect of dance and to see how Merleau-3RQW\¶V FRQFHSW
actually plays out in practice.  
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What happens when I bring this aspect of dance together with Merleau-Pontian theory 
is not that I am seeking to use the experience of dancers to prove, test or falsify 
(aspects of) Merleau-3RQW\¶V WKHRU\ 1HLWKHU GR I wish to use dance for merely 
illustrative purposes, nor to use philosophical concepts to encase the experience of 
dance within a rigid theoretical framework. There are, of course, elements of these 
interrogative, illustrative and reductive processes going on in the thesis, but the aim is 
not to set up the voices of philosophy and practice in opposition to each other, nor to 
reduce one to the other.  
 
Rather I suggest that Merleau-Ponty illuminates the practice of dance and the practice 
of dance illuminates Merleau-Ponty; and that in the process something new is 
generated. The conversational method not only allows me to offer different ways of 
understanding both Merleau-Ponty and dance, but this approach and the connections it 
produces open up a new, previously inaccessible and unexplored, space for 
understanding embodiment which lies in-between the traditional dualisms of 
philosophy and practice, theory and data, and mind and body. It is in this new space 
that interesting developments in our understanding of embodiment and human being 
can occur as new connections, ideas, perspectives and understandings are brought into 
play and developed through the course of the conversation. 
 
Thus although this project is fundamentally based in a critical position towards dualist 
understandings of body/self, rather than using the embodied practice of dance to test 
and critique dualist theories, my approach seeks to move beyond a reductive critique 
of what does not work to open up a space to make new connections and explore other 
ways of understanding human being. For me this is a far more exciting and interesting 
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project than showing the inadequacies of dualism, where a lot of work has already 
been done before as I will briefly review in µ&RQWH[WXDOLVLQJWKH&RQYHUVDWLRQ¶. 
 
The purpose of this conversation between philosophy and practice is therefore to 
produce an understanding of embodiment which is able to move away from the dualist 
undercurrents of traditional academic approaches, disciplines and concepts. This 
method requires a certain interdisciplinarity as I would suggest that a truly non-dualist 
approach to embodiment cannot be bound to one tradition such as philosophy or 
VRFLDO UHVHDUFK¶VJURXQGHG WKHRU\7KHDLP LVQRWKRZHYHU WRGHOLQHDWH or regulate 
this new in-between space, but rather to open it up and explore the possibilities that lie 
therein. 
 
This notion of a space being opened up is perhaps increasingly clear as we move on 
through the later chapters of the thesis on µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ DQG
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶)RUH[DPSOHLQµ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶,GLVFXVVWKHVHQVHRIVHOI entailed in 
the corporeal schema, exploring the constitution of this subjectivity through processes 
of engaging with reflections of the body from both mirrors and other people. This is 
theorised in Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZRUN SULPDULO\ LQ WHUPV RI GHYHORSPHQWDO stages, 
although he does emphasise that the corporeal schema is continually refined and 
developed throughout the life-course in processes of mirroring interaction. In my 
interviews with dancers it became apparent that not only is sense of self (as dancer) 
YHU\FORVHO\ERXQGXSZLWKDVHQVHRIRQH¶VRZQGDQFLQJERG\FRUSRUHDOVFKHPD
but that mirrors and mirroring interaction with fellow dancers are hugely important to 
WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKLV VHQVH RI RQH¶V RZQ GDQFLQJ ERG\ DQG of RQH¶V VHOI DV D
dancing body. The conversation between Merleau-Ponty and dance thus flows 
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between suggestive areas of connection between the two interlocutors, seeing what 
each has to say. 
 
The notion of using two voices in writing and reasoning has a long history in 
philosophy, dating back at least as far as 3ODWR¶V6RFUDWLF'LDORJXHV,QVXJJHVWLQJWKDW
ideas can be produced by bringing together two different voices in order to see what 
they generate between them, I must also acknowledge a long tradition of dialectical 
reasoning, to which Merleau-Ponty was himself not a stranger (see Merleau-Ponty, 
1974. Adventures of the Dialectic). The notion of conversation that I put forward here, 
however, perhaps differs from these traditions of dialogical and dialectical writing in 
that one of the voices in the conversation is derived from the accounts of the 
experience of practice rather than from an intellectual position.  
 
What I am proposing with the notion of conversation here is not something radically 
new then, but it is, I would suggest, notably different the formal traditions of 
dialogical or dialectical reasoning in that it is not formally or rigidly constructed, but 
rather emphasises free flow and interplay between the two voices. Thus it does not 
rely on the two interlocutors speaking from opposing positions or replying directly to 
the details of what the other has said. Indeed it is the resonances between the two 
voices that are emphasised, rather than their ability to directly prove or contradict 
what the other is saying. 
 
The reader can therefore expect this thesis to offer something exploratory and 
experimental which opens up a space rather than closing down our options through 
theoretical reduction or critique. In places the voice of philosophy is stronger, in other 
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places it is the voice of practice that we hear more clearly through engagement with 
the interview data, but overall the aim is to explore the new space for understanding 
embodiment that opens up when we bring philosophy and practice together to see 
what ideas and connections are produced. 
 
It would also be possible to add to this field of enquiry through an approach that 
specifically sought out the differences and discrepancies between the theoretical and 
the practical perspectives on the embodiment. I do not, however, believe that it would 
be entirely consistent with my aim to establish a non-hierarchical, non-dualist 
conversation ± setting the perspectives up in opposition to each other could easily 
serve to reify rather than blur the philosophy-practice and theory-data boundaries or 
dichotomies ± so it is not a path I have purposely pursued here, although it is, of 
course, impossible to let theory and data speak to each other without exploring areas 
of disagreement in part of the process of exploring areas of overall agreement or 
resonance. 
 
To summarise, in establishing my methodology for bringing together dance and 
Merleau-Ponty as a conversation, I emphasise that I do not intend to offer an 
exhaustive review of Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZRUN RU WR H[SORUH HYHU\ DVSHFW RI GDQce 
(issues beyond the scope of this work might include physiology, institutional aspects 
of dance companies, or differences between amateur and professional dance, or 
between different dance forms and their roles in different societies). Rather what I 
propose with the notion of conversation is a process which flows across different 
aspects of embodiment emphasising the seeking out of common ground between 
Merleau-Ponty and dance and the exploration of how bringing the two together in this 
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productive way can generate a new space for thinking about embodiment which is not 
confined by traditional academic disciplinary boundaries or dualist approaches to the 
body.  
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CONTEXTUALISING THE 
CONVERSATION 
 
 
 
Before the conversation starts, I wish to discuss the academic context of this 
conversation between Merleau-Ponty and dance, and both the academic and the 
practical conditions under which I orchestrate it. I will thus use this chapter to situate 
the conversation within recent developments in the academic field of body studies, 
examining the background to the conversation in relation firstly to problems with 
dualistic approaches to body and self, and then to the move in some areas of body 
studies towards an emphasis on practice, the lived-body and a non-dualist concept of 
embodiment.   
 
In addition to this I will discuss the two voices in the conversation ± Merleau-Ponty 
and dance ± examining the contexts within which those voices are produced and 
accessed.  This will involve contextualising Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWVZithin his 
SKLORVRSKLFDOZRUNDQGFRQWH[WXDOLVLQJGDQFHUV¶FRQFHSWVDQGH[SHULHQFHVLQUHODWLRQ
to their everyday practice of dance and how this was explored in the interview 
process. This chapter therefore serves to contextualise the conversation in terms of 
existing academic ideas and literature, and to discuss the methods and methodological 
approach which underpin this thesis, thus giving a picture of the overall conditions 
under which these interlocutors are brought together to speak to each other.
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Introducing the Academic Context 
 
Academic attention to the relationship between body and self can lead to the 
questioning of traditional dualisms such as those between body and mind and between 
materiality and representation. Woodward suggests that the theorising of self or 
identity can be traced historically in Western thought through stages firstly 
characterised by the absent body, then by the recognition and exploration of the 
mind/body (subject/object) dichotomy, and finally by a contemporary emphasis on the 
interrelationship of these realms often denoted by the use of the term embodiment 
UDWKHU WKDQ µWKH ERG\¶ :RRGZDUG  (PERGLPHQW LV QRW KRZHYHU D
straightforward or unproblematic concept (Leder, 1990:5), nor is it universally used as 
many theorists remain rooted in a dualist conceptualisation of mind and body. This 
exploratory conversation between philosophy and practice therefore emerges from a 
contested area of body studies which seeks to probe the relationship between body 
and self and to elucidate the notion of embodiment. 
 
The following section briefly reviews some contemporary dualist understandings of 
WKHERG\¶VUROHLQVHOI-identity before going on to explore some of the limitations or 
problems associated with this type of conceptualisation of the body and how these 
problems can perhaps be overcome through a shift to the notion of embodiment. I will 
then go on to discuss the central ideas and issues in the study of a non-dualistic 
concept of embodiment, before moving on to discuss how the conversation between 
Merleau-Ponty and dance arises from this context and what the two interlocutors 
potentially have to say to each other. I will also discuss the context in which the 
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voices of Merleau-Ponty and dance were produced and accessed. Finally I will give a 
brief overview of the logic of the conversation and how it is structured into chapters. 
  17 
Body and Self: Dualism and it Discontents 
 
Concern with self-identity is not new. It is, however, argued in much contemporary 
sociological thought that identity formation in late or high modernity is characterised 
by an increased level of reflexivity (including, importantly, the extension of 
UHIOH[LYLW\ WR WKH ERG\ DQG RI LQGLYLGXDOLVDWLRQ RI LGHQWLW\ µSURMHFWV¶ :RRGZDUG
2002:118; Bailey, 1999:355). Theorists of late modernity therefore describe how, with 
the loss of trans-personal meaning structures such as those offered by religious 
DXWKRULWLHV RU JUDQG SROLWLFDO QDUUDWLYHV ZKLFK µFRQVWUXFWHG DQG VXVWDLQHG H[LVWHQWLDO
and ontological certainties outside WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶ 6KLOOLQJHPSKDVLV LQ WKH
original), people have turned back on themselves in their search for meaning.   
 
Thus the individual body has become an increasingly important site or foundation for 
the work of late modern identity projects, apparently offering some certainty in the 
context of detraditionalisation and the dissolution of older forms of identity based in, 
for example, class systems (Woodward, 2002:105; Shilling, 2003:2) . The body is, 
LQGHHGµWKHRQO\WDQJLEOHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHSHUVRQ¶:RRGZDUGDQGLW
is argued that bodily appearance has been prioritised as a social and cultural sign of 
self in contemporary society.  
 
7KH LGHD RI WKH ERG\ DV RIIHULQJ FHUWDLQWLHV DERXW DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V LGHQWLW\ KDV
however, been undermined by the destabilisation of our knowledge about what bodies 
are, what they might become as new technologies have the potential to alter the 
boundaries of corporeality in the production of cyborgs (Haraway, 1991) and 
genetically modified organisms (Csordas, 1994:3; Shilling, 2003:3; Williams and 
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Bendelow, 1998:5). The proliferation and hence undetermining of meanings, values 
and possibilities associated with the body also raises a multiplicity of questions about 
how bodies should be controlled in the late modern context (Shilling, 2003:3; 
Williams and Bendelow, 1998:5). 
 
This wealth of possibilities opening up around the body has, however, allowed it to 
take a key role in the reflexive formation of self-identity in late modernity and in 
those new systems of signification associated with contemporary consumerist society. 
The blurring of boundaries as to what is a natural or given aspect of the body and 
what is open to choice in the affluent West has meant a freeing of self from bodily 
determinatiRQ VR WKDW WKH ERG\ EHFRPHV DQ µREMHFW RI KXPDQ GHWHUPLQDWLRQ DQG
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶DQGDVVXFKLQFUHDVLQJO\LPSRUWDQWWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVHOI-identity. 
(Budgeon, 2003:36). The young, firm, sexy body thus becomes a (highly valued) 
commodity in contemporary society. 
 
Reflexivity theorists suggest that self-identity is unfixed in late modernity and 
primarily constituted in constantly forming and reiterated narratives of self through 
SURFHVVHVRI V\PEROLF LGHQWLILFDWLRQRU WKH µFLWDWLRQ¶ %DLOH\RI symbolically 
meaningful sources. Thus although the body is considered central to these processes 
RILGHQWLW\IRUPDWLRQWKHHPSKDVLVRQUHIOH[LYLW\DVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSULPDU\PRGHRI
engagement with the body means that such theories implicitly reinforce a dichotomy 
between body and mind such that people are conceptualised as thinking minds 
working (reflexively) on body objects.  
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This privileging of the mind over the body, and of the socio-cultural realm over the 
material, also characterises contemporary social-constructivist accounts both of the 
discursive production or inscription of the body, as illuminated in the work of 
Foucault, and of contemporary self-identity as a performance. Sociological 
FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQV RI WKH µSHUIRUPLQJ VHOI¶ H[SORUH V\PEROLc meanings associated 
with bodily comportment and appearance and, as with the concept of the reflexive 
ERG\ SURMHFW WKH ERG\ LV XQGHUVWRRG DV D µUHODWLYHO\ IOH[LEOH \HW FHQWUDO DVSHFW RI
SHRSOH¶VVHOI-LGHQWLWLHV¶6KLOOLQJ 
 
It should be noted that performativity theories vary as to the degree of agency 
attributed to the self as a performer, and indeed do not always rely on there being a 
performer behind the performance. The key issue in the formation of gendered 
identity may, for example, be the social repetition of patterns or routines which serve 
to inscribe the surface of the body from birth onwards. This theoretical standpoint is 
H[HPSOLILHG LQ -XGLWK %XWOHU¶V DFFRXQW RI µJLUOLQJ WKH JLUO¶, where, as described by 
Woodward:   
 
The birth of a EDE\JLUOLVKHUDOGHGZLWKFULHVRIµLW¶VDJLUO¶DFU\ZKLFKLQLWLDWHV
a plethora of practices, rights and customs including clothes, making physical 
contact, holding and ways of speaking to and about the child. (Woodward, 
2002:112)  
 
Here the performance of identity is not traced back to some original (agentic) self, but 
LVUDWKHUEDVHGLQµUHSHDWDEOHPRGHOVRIVHOIKRRGDQGLGHQWLW\ZKLFKDUHDOUHDG\YHVWHG
ZLWKVRFLDODXWKRULW\¶%R\QH 
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In these accounts whether some pre-existing agency is implicated in the construction 
of identity in the social or discursive realm as in the reflexivity theorist accounts of 
the fashioning of identities in self-QDUUDWLYHV RU QRW DV LQ %XWOHU¶V SHUIRUPDWLYLW\
account of the repetition of socially meaningful practices, the body itself is understood 
to be socially determined and made meaningful as part of these essentially 
disembodied discursive processes. 
 
Those conceptualisations of the body which draw on the work of Foucault, himself 
primarily concerned with DQDO\VLQJ WKH µGLVFXUVLYH FRQGLWLRQV RI SRVVLELOLW\ IRU WKH
ERG\DVDQREMHFWRIGRPLQDWLRQ¶&VRUGDVKDYHDOVRWHQGHGWRIRFXVRQWKH
mutable aspects of identity, chiefly through concepts of regulation and practices of the 
self (McNay, 1999:96).  Such theories focus on the social construction and 
subjugation of the body, making them particularly useful for the examination of how 
the body is ordered or controlled and is therefore a location for the inscription of 
power relations, although arguably failing to adequately theorise those aspects of 
bodily identity which are determined materially as well as in the realm of discourse 
(McNay, 1999). 
 
Sociology of the body has in fact been generally concerned to answer the questions of 
what the body means and how it becomes meaningful in social situations (Shilling, 
2003:9). Thus sociological theorising has traditionally tended to distinguish between 
some original, essential self and the social self, prioritising the social self as a focus 
for enquiry and thus giving it priority within theories of self (Watson, 2002:510). The 
distinction between sex and gender has, for example, been central to and greatly 
facilitated much identity theorising, and social-constructivist theories have been very 
  21 
useful for the FULWLTXHRIVRPHHVVHQWLDOLVWQRWLRQVZKLFKKDYHFLWHGZRPHQ¶VERGLHV
as making them more suitable for certain things such as low paid domestic labour 
(Woodward, 2002:110; Budgeon, 2003:8). The social-constructivist emphasis on 
theorising gender has, however, meant that the concept of sex has remained largely 
untheorised.  
 
Indeed there are problems with understandings of identity, as a process of symbolic 
identification and thus wholly contained within the realm of representation, without 
consideration of LWV µPHGLDWLRQ LQ HPERGLHG SUDFWLFH¶ 0F1D\  7KHVH
accounts fail to acknowledge how the material body can be experienced as both 
facilitating and limiting the extent and nature of our engagement with the world. As 
Woodward argues: 
 
The body is not only represented and inscribed, it is also experienced and can 
present enormous restrictions to the range of that experience and to the ways in 
which we can negotiate our identities. (Woodward, 2002:133)  
 
Those theories which understand identity to be constituted through the citation and 
performative repetition of socially available models of self-hood also fail to account 
for intra-group variability, for example among women or disabled people, or to 
adequately address questions about the possibility of escaping discursive 
determination, or of intentionally (consciously) deceitful performance of identity 
(Boyne, 1999; McNay, 1999; Watson, 2002). 
 
Thus as Budgeon argues, the fact that: 
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«WKHERG\LWVHOIPLJKWKDYHHIIHFWVDQGPRGHVRIEHLQJWKDWDUHQRWreducible to 
LWVVWDWXVDVDQLPDJH«LVQRWWRVD\WKDWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQGRHVQRWLQVRPHZD\
work to constitute the body but that representation is only one space of 
negotiation among others. (Budgeon, 2003:50)  
 
This embodied aspect of existence is perhaps particularly salient in the lived 
experience of people other than healthy white heterosexual males in their middle 
years and there have been a variety of critiques of dualist and representationalist 
concepts of identity including those from feminist scholarship, from the sociology of 
health and illness especially in the study of aspects such as chronic pain, and from 
phenomenology (Csordas, 1994:9; Williams and Bendelow, 1998:22). For example, 
from a phenomenological position Jackson argues that: 
 
SubjugaWLRQRI WKHERGLO\ WR WKH VHPDQWLF LV HPSLULFDOO\XQWHQDEOH«PHDQLQJ
should not be reduced to a sign which, as it were, lies on a separate plane outside 
the immediate domain of the act. (Jackson, 1989:123, quoted in Csordas, 
1994:10) 
 
Nevertheless, while the body is not solely determined within the realm of 
representation, neither is it reducible to a physical object, contained in the realm of 
materiality.  The body is implicated in the negotiation of self-identity in ways that are 
not explained by understanding bodies as (signifying) objects. Indeed it is through the 
body that we both experience and act on the world; the body is the medium through 
which we present ourselves and make sense of our identities (Woodward, 2002:133). 
The body can, therefore, be understood as a border or borderline concept in that it 
straddles the subject/object, representation/materialism dichotomies, but it is also a 
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border where the material meets the socio-cultural, a site where these different realms 
come together in the negotiation of identity.  
 
The body does not therefore belong, and is not containable, wholly within the 
objective realm nor in the subjective (Williams and Bendelow, 1998:3). As McNay 
argues: 
 
7KH ERG\ LV WKH WKUHVKROG WKURXJK ZKLFK WKH VXEMHFW¶V OLYHG H[SHULence of the 
world is incorporated and realised and, as such, is neither pure object nor pure 
VXEMHFW,WLVQHLWKHUSXUHREMHFWVLQFHLWLVWKHSODFHRIRQH¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKH
world. Nor is it pure subject in that there is always a material residue that resists 
incorporation into dominant symbolic schema. (McNay, 1999:98)  
 
,QGHHGWKHUHLVDIXQGDPHQWDOµLUUHGXFLELOLW\EHWZHHQVXEMHFWDQGREMHFW¶ZKLFK
necessitates that we understand the body as neither determined in the realm of 
representation nor in thHPDWHULDOUHDOPEXWUDWKHUDVDQLQGHWHUPLQDWHµWUDQVLWLRQDO
HQWLW\¶*URV]SRLVHGEHWZHHQWKHVHUHDOPV
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Embodiment and Lived Experience 
 
It therefore becomes necessary to find a way of conceptualising embodied identity 
that goes beyond the dichotomies between subject and object and representation and 
materialism (Budgeon, 2003:36; Williams and Bendelow, 1998:8). Indeed Csordas 
DUJXHVWKDWDFRQFHUQZLWKµHPERGLPHQWDVWKHH[LVWHQWLDOEDVLVRIVHOIDQGFXOWXUH¶DV
opposed to the more traditional aims of sociology/anthropology of the body to explore 
the social meanings of the (objectified) body, is in fact necessarily characterised by a 
methodological and epistemological problematisation of such dualisms (Csordas, 
1994:6). 
  
It thus becomes approSULDWHWRPRYHDZD\IURPWKHWHUPµWKHERG\¶ZKLFKLVKHDYLO\
implicated in the body/mind, nature/culture (and indeed female/male) binaries to 
focus on a conceptual framework that allows us to transcend this dichotomous 
understanding of human existence. In exploring the nature of bodily being that is 
µVRPHZKHUH LQ EHWZHHQ¶ :LOOLDPV DQG %HQGHORZ  VXEMHFW DQG REMHFW ,
therefore turn to the notion of embodiment, following Csordas in understanding it not 
DV WKH LQFRUSRUDWLRQ RI FXOWXUH RU PLQG µLQWR D body that is already objectified and 
thing-like' but as an existential condition (Csordas, 1994:15). A focus on embodiment 
thus becomes a focus on a way of being in the world, a focus on embodied selves.  
 
7KLV µLQ EHWZHHQ¶ RU µWKLUG ZD\¶ EHWZHHQ VXEMHFW Dnd object is also captured in the 
WHUP µERG\-VXEMHFW¶ ZKLFK GHQRWHV WKH ERG\ QRW DV SXUH VXEMHFW EXW as a concept 
that lies between the notions of subjectivity and the objectivity usually attributed to 
the body (Crossley, 2005:11). The overlapping nature and fluidity of these two realms 
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LVIXUWKHULOOXVWUDWHGLQ*URV]¶VXVHRIWKHMöbius strip (see Figure 1) to illustrate the 
inflection of mind into body and body into mind (Grosz, 1994). Embodiment can thus 
perhaps be most profitably conceptualised, not as a fixed aspect of existence which 
can be understood as separate from the mind, but as a fluid process of continual flux 
or reversibility between subjectivity and objectivity. 
 
 
Figure 1: Möbius Strip 
 
This understanding of an embodied way of being in the world is not only theoretically 
viable, but also, importantly, reflected in interview accounts such as, for example, 
WKRVH GHWDLOHG LQ 6DORQVWDOO¶V  VWXG\ µ+HDOWK\ ERGLHV VRFLDO ERGLHV PHQ DQG
ZRPHQ¶V FRQFHSWV DQGSUDFWLFHVRIKHDOWK LQ HYHU\GD\ OLIH¶ ,QGHHG6DORQVWDOO QRWHV
that: 
 
When interviewees took stock of themselves as healthy, body and self were not 
H[SHULHQFHGDVGLYLGHGLQWRWZRSDUWVWKDWLVDVGLFKRWRPRXVµPLQG¶DQGµERG\¶
in the Cartesian positivist sense. (Salonstall, 1993:9) 
 
Salonstall also comments, revealing the importance of a notion of flux or reversibility, 
that:  
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When asked to describe health and being healthy, respondents moved back and 
forth between references to themselves as physical bodies and as sentient bodies. 
(Salonstall, 1993:8)  
 
The sociology of the body has been criticised for being overly theorised and lacking 
empirical grounding (Monaghan, 2003:29) which has resulted in discrepancies 
between lived bodily experience and the positions presented in dominant, particularly 
social constructivist, body theories. Attention to embodiment, as opposed to the body, 
has, by contrast, been advocated by writers such as Csordas (1994) as affording the 
researcher a means of accessing and introducing to analysis precisely that lived 
experience of the body without reducing it either to the realm of materialism or to that 
of representation. 
 
7KH LPSRUWDQW DVSHFW KHUH LV WKXV WKH QRWLRQ RI WKH µOLYHG-ERG\¶ DQG LW LV (GPXQG
Husserl, the father of phenomenology who first makes use of the distinction in the 
German language between Korper (the physical or physicalist body) and Leib (the 
lived body) (Welton, 1999:39). In fact Husserl cannot be described as a philosopher of 
the body, but rather as a philosopher of consciousness, however, in seeking to ground 
reason he invoked a phenomenological notion of the body that had not been seen in 
philosophy hitherto (Welton, 1999:39). Thus while Cartesianism has tended to reduce 
the body to Korper (the corpse) and thus see it as an object among other physical 
things, the notion of Leib allows for a far richer understanding of the role of the body. 
Furthermore, within the phenomenological tradition, Martin Heidegger, himself the 
student of Husserl, engages with the ontological question of being (in the world), 
making use of a new concept: Dasein OLWHUDOO\ µEHLQJ-WKHUH¶ ,Q+HLGHJJHU¶V ZRUN
the focus is therefore shifted from the question of the body as object to the question of 
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HPERGLHG H[LVWHQFH µZH GR QRW µKDYH¶ D ERG\ UDWKHU ZH µDUH¶ ERGLO\¶ :HOWRQ
1999:4).  
 
The shift to the concept of embodiment, understood in connection with the notion of 
the lived body or Leib, is not, however, unproblematic. Indeed Leder notes that in 
place of the mind/body dualism of Cartesianism, theorists of the lived-body are in 
danger of reifying the division between Korper and Leib, thus creating a new dualism 
(Leder, 1990:6). It is also important not to underestimate the extent to which dualist 
understandings of body and mind permeate Western thought and language, making it 
extremely difficult to move outside this framework.  
 
I therefore suggest that it is important to find a new way of opening up a conceptual 
space in between traditional dualisms for the discussion and understanding of the 
embodied nature of being. The philosopher who has perhaps done the most to 
systematically challenge the Cartesian dualist legacy is French existentialist 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Williams and Bendelow, 1998:51), and in 
the following section I will argue that it is possible to find in Merleau-3RQW\¶VZRUN
the makings of an alternative foundation for thinking about the body to that offered by 
the Cartesian tradition.  
 
This thesis, however, looks not only to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, but also to 
the lived experience of embodiment. It is, as I have argued in the introduction, 
through bringing the two voices of philosophy and embodied practice together in 
conversation that I suggest I am able to open up a new conceptual space between the 
traditional dualisms of mind and body, philosophy and practice, and theory and data. 
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%HIRUH H[SORULQJ WKH QRWLRQ RI µWKH YRLFH RI HPERGLHG SUDFWLFH¶ , ZLOO EULHIO\
introduce the body of Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZRUN IURP ZKLFK , DFFHVV DQG HQJDJH ZLWK
µWKHYRLFH¶ of his philosophy.  
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Introducing Merleau-Ponty as Interlocutor 
 
In bringing the voice of Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ LQWR FRQYHUVDWLRQ ZLWK WKH
embodied practice of contemporary dance, this thesis does not aim to provide an 
exhaustive, systematic or critical review of Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZRUN , DLP UDWKHU WR
draw on Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWVLQZD\VZKLFK,FRQVLGHUWREHLQ-keeping with the 
overall spirit of his work in books and essays such as The Structure of Behaviour 
(1965), The Phenomenology of Perception (2002), The Primacy of Perception (1964), 
Sense and Non-Sense (1964), Signs (1964) µ7KH &KLOG¶V 5HODWLRQV ZLWK 2WKHUV¶ 
(1964) DQG µ(\H DQG 0LQG¶ (1964). I also draw on some of the insights from the 
abandoned work The Prose of the World (1973), and engage with a number of ideas 
and concepts from his final book The Visible and the Invisible (1969) which was left 
unfinished at the time of his death.  
 
In this process I have engaged not only with Merleau-3RQW\¶VRZQZRUNEXWDOVRZLWK
a number of commentaries on and readings of his work and concepts which have been 
offered by other scholars from the fields of both Philosophy and Sociology. This has 
allowed me to engage with concepts emerging in unfinished work and to explore the 
practical utility of Merleau-3RQW\¶V FRQFHSWV ZLWKRXW JHWWLQJ FDXJKW XS LQ GHWDLOHG
textual exposition. This thesis does not purport to be a work on Merleau-Ponty¶VWH[WV
rather it engages with Merleau-Ponty, as it engages with the embodied practice of 
dance, to explore embodied being in terms of how dancers, situated in the field of 
dance as a system of embodied social practice, understand themselves in relation to 
others, others in relation to themselves, and both themselves and others in relation to 
that system of embodied (artistic) practice. 
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A further reason why I do not offer a close textual reading of Merleau-Ponty, with 
quotes from his work to back up every assertion that I make, is because I am working 
within a non-dualist framework where meaning is argued to be produced between 
interlocutors rather than being rigidly defined within the head of one Cartesian 
VXEMHFW $V , ZLOO GLVFXVV LQ WKH FKDSWHU RQ µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ 0HUOHDX-Ponty did not 
believe that words and text carried pure meaning from inside the head of an isolated 
Cartesian subject, rather that the capacity of words or text to mean something is an 
interpersonal phenomenon where meaning is essentially negotiated between two 
subjects who are both able to use language as an intermudane space where they have 
access to each other. My interest in the philosophical ideas of Merleau-Ponty 
therefore also entails an interest in what other people have understood by and what 
uses they have put his concepts to, and in what these concepts are capable of bringing 
to a conversation with the embodied practice of dance. I therefore believe it often 
makes more sense to support my understandings of Merleau-Ponty¶V FRQFHSWV ZLWK
UHIHUHQFHWRRWKHUDFDGHPLFV¶UHDGLQJVDQGVKDUHGRUFROODERUDWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI
Merleau-Ponty rather than reference to the exact wording of his texts in either English 
translation or the original French. 
 
The voice of Merleau-3RQW\¶VSKLORVRSK\ZKLFKDSSHDUVLQWKLVWKHVLVWKHUHIRUHDULVHV
from my reading of Merleau-3RQW\¶VZRUNLQDZD\WKDWHQJDJHVERWKZLWK individual 
texts and with my sense of the overall spirit of his work. This reading has, however, 
always been produced in tandem both with my reading of other academic sources 
which explore and in places make use of and elaborate Merleau-3RQW\¶V LGHDV DQG 
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SHUKDSV PRVW LPSRUWDQWO\ ZLWK P\ HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK GDQFHUV¶ OLYHG H[SHULHQFHV RI
embodiment. 
 
This section briefly introduces Merleau-Ponty as offering an alternative foundation 
for thinking about the body, giving a sense of what I have referred to as my 
understanding of the overall spirit of his work, and thus showing in what capacity the 
voice of his philosophy can be brought into and what it can offer to a conversation 
about the embodied nature of being.  
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VFKDOOHQJHWRGXDOLVPLVLQIDFW, two-fold in that he not only mounts a 
powerful critique on both mechanist and intellectualist conceptions of the body, but 
also challenges the concept of the subject as traditionally found in the philosophy of 
consciousness (Crossley, 2001). He thus moves away from the conceptualisation of 
the body as object while also disregarding the traditional notion of the ethereal subject 
in favour of a conceptualisation of subjectivity as rooted in (embodied) behaviour and 
KDELW7KXVZKLOH'HVFDUWHV¶cogito ± µ,WKLQNWKHUHIRUH,DP¶± conceptualises human 
subjectivity in terms of res cogitans (thinking substance) while rendering the body 
mere res extensia (extended or physical substance), Merleau-Ponty sees subjectivity 
and objectivity as constituted in the same realm.  
 
For Merleau-Ponty then, rather than two distinct and incommensurable types of 
PDWWHU WKHUH LV RQO\ RQH HOHPHQW ZKLFK KH WHUPV µIOHVK¶ [la chair]. Merleau-Ponty 
emphasises that it is intrinsic to lived embodiment that we are both subject and object 
(Leder, 1990:6 7KH QRWLRQ RI µIOHVK¶ WKHUHIRUH IXQFWLRQV WR VKRZ WKDW WKHVH WZR
aspects of existence, while not the same thing as each other, are always overlapping in 
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actual embodied experience. One of the key characteristics of flesh is thus its 
reversibility. The flesh of the human body has characteristics of both subjectivity and 
objectivity: it is both sentient and sensible ± it sees and can be seen, touches and can 
be touched.  
 
Reversibility is illustrated by the example of one hand touching the other, where the 
hand that touches (subject) can become the hand that is touched (object). Merleau-
Ponty also draws attention to the fact that the touching hand has to be part of the same 
realm as the touched in order to make contact with it, it has to itself be touchable. The 
touching and touched hands are not identical with each other, however, and Merleau-
Ponty emphasises that a distinction between touching and touched remains, the two do 
not meld into each other to fill both roles simultaneously. The distinction between the 
touching and the touched is, however, contingent and arises in the process of touching 
rather than being pre-defined.  
 
Merleau-Ponty also argues that, while the flesh of the human body is remarkable in 
that it is both sensible and also sentient, the flesh of the body is in fact also part of the 
flesh of the world. Interaction with the physical environment and other beings in the 
world can thus be understood by extension of the touching hands example. Perception 
LVDµIROGLQJ¶RIWKHIlesh of the world, out of which is constituted a perceiving subject 
and a perceived object. Both are materially situated in the world but at least one, both 
in the case of human interaction, has the capacity of sentience. Importantly, however, 
this sentienFH LVSRVVLEOHE\YLUWXHRI WKHSHUFHLYLQJVXEMHFW¶VHPERGLHGVLWXDWLRQ LQ
the world rather than belonging to the realm of ethereal consciousness. 
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Thus for Merleau-3RQW\SULRUWR'HVFDUWHV¶cogito ± µ,WKLQNWKHUHIRUH,DP¶ ± there is 
WKHµWDFLWcogito¶± µ,FDQ¶± the feel we have of our body and how it connects us to the 
world. This tacit sense of our existence does not involve conscious reflection on the 
body and does not (therefore) render the body a mere physical object. The original or 
most fundamenWDO VHQVH RI µ,¶ LV QRW WKHUHIRUH WKH UHIOHFWLYH WKLQNLQJ PLQG RI WKH
Cartesian tradition. Rather our most basic sense of self is a practical sense of the 
ERG\¶VDFWLYHSRVVLELOLWLHV%XUNLWW7KHRULJLQDOµ,¶LVWKHHPERGLHGµ,¶ 
 
The relationship I have with my body is, therefore, other than that of subject to 
(external) object. Indeed while moving an external object such as a book involves first 
locating it and reaching out my hand to grasp it, I do not, by contrast, need to do 
anything of this nature in order to move, for example, my arm. As Crossley describes:  
 
One thing occurs: my arm moves. The act, we might say, is intentional; but it is a 
single and unified whole: an intentional-action rather than an action added to or 
caused by an intention. And, as such, the intention need not be formulated either 
linguistically or reflectively. (Crossley, 2001:121) 
 
This pre-UHIOHFWLYH VHQVH RI WKH ERG\ FDQ DOVR EH H[WHQGHG WR DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
immediate environment so that action such as driving a car or typing on a keyboard 
does not (after some practice) require conscious reflection, but rather relies on a form 
of pre-reflective or tacit knowledge which is accessed in the embodied performance of 
the action.  
 
This type of (usually) tacit, embodied knowledge, also known as knowledge-how or 
know-how (Crossley, 2001:52), can be differentiated from propositional knowledge or 
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knowledge-WKDWZKLFK LV µUHSUHVHQWHG LQ D VHULHVRISURSRVLWLRQVRU VHQWHQFHV LQ WKH
PLQGRIWKHWKLQNLQJVXEMHFW¶(GZDUGV7hus I primarily relate to my body 
not through formulating propositional knowledge about it, although I can do this, but 
through a form of practical knowledge ± WKHµ,FDQ¶± which consists of a usually tacit 
VHQVHRIP\ERG\¶VSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUDFWLYHHQJDgement with the world, and may also 
encompass a pre-reflective grasp on my immediate environment such as the car that I 
am driving or the steps that I am climbing. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\ GHQRWHV WKLV IHHO WKDW ZH KDYH IRU RXU ERG\¶V SRVLWLRQLQJ DQG
possibilities for action with the term corporeal schema. My corporeal schema is thus 
P\SULPDU\VHQVHRIVHOIRUµ,¶LQWKHVHQVHRIWKHµ,FDQ¶)XUWKHUPRUHZHDUHDEOHWR
modify and expand our bodily sense or corporeal schema through the performance of 
habitual actions such as learning to swim or driving a car which are incorporated into 
our sense of our possibilities for action. The feeling that I have of myself may 
therefore include a tacit sense that if I get out of my depth in the swimming pool it 
should not be proEOHPRU WKDW ,GRQ¶WKDYH WKHDFFHOHUDWLRQFDSDFLW\ WRRYHUWDNH WKH
vehicle in front.  
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the self should therefore be understood in terms of engaged 
intentional action or behaviour, rather than as an isolated reflective consciousness. 
The consideration of habit and bodily knowledge further emphasises the need for a 
way of understanding the body that does not render it merely physical object but, 
equally, does not subsume it into a purely subjective (nonmaterial) consciousness. 
Indeed while it is valuable to emphasise that the body can function in many ways 
traditionally attributed to the mind, it is equally important to consider how these 
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aspects of bodily existence may be different to those attributed to the reflective 
subject. Thus while the body can now be understood as a site of knowledge in a way 
that was previously only attributed to the mind, it is equally important to emphasise 
WKDWSUDFWLFDOERGLO\NQRZOHGJHRUµNQRZOHGJH-KRZ¶LVGLIIHUHQWWRWKHSURSRVLWLRQDO
µNQRZOHGJH-WKDW¶RI reflective thought.  
 
In focussing on behaviour or practice, Merleau-Ponty is, therefore, able to move away 
from the traditional conceptualisations both of the body as object and of the Cartesian 
subject. The body actively and intentionally engaged with its environment defies 
categorisation as either material object or immaterial subject. In beginning his 
philosophy of embodiment from the concept of embodied practice, rather than the 
concept of the body in the role of the immobile (cultural) object in which it is so often 
cast by dominant body theories, Merleau-Ponty is thus able to offer an alternative 
foundation for thinking about the body which transcends the subject/object dualism 
that haunts socio-cultural body theory. 
 
Merleau-Ponty suggests, then, that we begin our thinking about embodiment from a 
philosophical position that prioritises the concept of embodied behaviour or practice, 
and this approach is the starting point for my exploration of the embodied basis of 
being in this thesis. As I have argued above, I do not, however, believe that 
philosophical speculation about practice is enough in itself to produce a truly non-
dualist understanding of embodiment. I therefore introduce the first-hand testimonies 
of the experience of doing an embodied practice into conversation with the voice of 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ LQ RUGHU WKDW WKLV WKHVLV FDQ HQJDJH ZLWK HPERGLHG
practice not only on a theoretical or conceptual level, but also as a lived experience. I 
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will now go on to discuss relevance and importance of taking professional 
contemporary dance as an example of embodied practice to be brought into 
conversation with Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ EHIRUH H[SODLQLQJ WKH FRQWH[W RU
FRQGLWLRQV XQGHU ZKLFK , DFFHVVHG µWKH YRLFH RI SUDFWLFH¶ LQ WKH IRUP RI GDQFHUV¶
reflections on the lived embodied practice of dance through in-depth qualitative 
interviews. 
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Introducing Dance as Interlocutor 
 
I have explored above the context for this conversation between philosophy and 
practice in terms of issues around body/self dualism and the shift to a non-dualist 
concept of embodiment which Merleau-Ponty suggests we approach through the 
notion of embodied practice. This section discusses how a focus on the lived 
experience of contemporary dance fits into this context and what it can potentially 
contribute to a conversation with Merleau-Ponty. 
 
Dance, in fact, has a history of being neglected by the discipline of philosophy: 
 
Plato and Aristotle ignored dance; Rousseau and Hegel dismissed it; 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger both lacked interest in it. Unlike other domains of 
human expression, such as music or visual art, dance has received very little 
philosophical attention, especially within the Western history of ideas. (Foster et 
al., 2005:3) 
 
The tradition of dance scholarship is also noted to have tended to lack integration with 
more mainstream academic concerns (Desmond, 2003:17KHGLVPLVVDORIGDQFHDVµD
VXEMHFW QRW GHVHUYLQJ RI VHULRXV LQWHOOHFWXDO DQDO\VLV¶ )RVWHU et al., 2005:3), has, 
however, recently begun to receive more critical attention with, for example, a themed 
issue publication of the philosophical journal Topoi (Vol. 24, 2005) being devoted 
entirely to dance.  
 
My focus on contemporary dance as an embodied practice, and on the lived-
experience and lived-body of the dancer is, however, different from the majority of 
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current work in this area which tends towards post-modern readings of dance as text 
(Wainwright and Turner, 2004b:99). My work also differs from the strongly 
autobiographical approaches to the experience of dance in, for example, the work of 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone ± see, for example, The Phenomenology of Dance (1966) ± 
or Sondra Fraleigh ± see, for example, Dancing Identity: Metaphysics in Motion 
(2004) which follows µ)UDOHLJK
V MRXUQH\ WRZDUG VHOI-definition as informed by art, 
ritual, feminism, phenomenology, poetry, autobiography, and ± always ± GDQFH¶ (from 
the back cover) ± because of my use of empirical data, as I will further detail in the 
following section. There have, in fact, been very few empirical sociological studies of 
Western theatre dance ± despite a long tradition of anthropological work which 
engages with (ritualistic) dance ± with contemporary dance being particularly 
neglected (Thomas, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, despite the potential of dance as a field of research for body studies, it is 
common to both dance studies and socio-cultural engagement with dance that the 
bodily basis of dance has received little specific attention, with dance most commonly 
being analysed in terms of symbolic or textual meaning. This neglect of the body in 
socio-cultural studies of Western theatre dance has begun to be addressed in work 
VXFK DV +HOHQ 7KRPDV¶V The Body, Dance and Cultural Theory, which makes an 
important contribution to bringing together dance studies and the sociology of the 
body (Thomas, 2003).  
 
Dance has also, more recently, begun to be explored as a focus for more mainstream 
sociology of the body, for example in the 2005 special issue of Body & Society 
MRXUQDORQµ'DQFLQJ%RGLHV¶ (Vol. 11(4)),WLVDOVRQRWDEOHWKDW$QQD$DOWHQ¶VSDSHU
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on pain, injury and disordered eating among professional dancers ± µ/LVWHQLQJWRWKH
GDQFHU¶V ERG\¶ ± is included in Embodying Sociology: Retrospect, Progress and 
Prospects, published by the Sociological Review (Shilling (ed.), 2007). Bryan Turner 
and Steven Wainwright have also conducted empirical work with (mainly retired) 
dancers from the Royal Ballet (London) using the sociology of the body and the work 
of Pierre Bourdieu in particular (see for example, Turner and Wainwright, 2003; 
Wainwright and Turner, 2004b). 
 
These authors, while acknowledging the critical power of social constructionism, 
contend that: 
 
&RQVWUXFWLRQLVPFDQEHSURSHUO\DSSOLHGWRµWKHERG\¶EXWLVOHVVDSSURSULDWHDV
DQDQDO\VLVRIµHPERGLPHQW¶¶7XUQHUDQG:DLQZULJKW-279)  
 
Pointing to the fact that research on the body has been FULWLFLVHG IRU µprivileging 
theorizing, bracketing out the individual, and for ignoring the practical experiences of 
HPERGLPHQW¶:DLQZULJKWDQG7XUQHU2004b WKH\WXUQ LQVWHDG WR%RXUGLHX¶V
concepts of habitus FDSLWDO DQG ILHOG WR H[SORUH µUHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ SHUVRQDO
LGHQWLW\WKHKXPDQERG\DQGVRFLDOSUDFWLFHV¶:DLQZULJKWDQG7XUQHU2004b:100).  
 
Thus in place of the generalised, abstracted, socially-constructed body common to 
many contemporary socio-cultural body theories, there is a need to focus on bodies 
situated in and engaged with the world as they are lived and experienced. In 
acknowledgment of the importance of examining the lived experience of being 
embodied, rather than focusing on the abstracted, generalised body, I consider 
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GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV RI WKHLU HYHU\GD\ H[SHULHQFH RI GDQFH DQG WKHLU H[SHULHQFHV DQG
understandings of their dancing bodies to be particularly illuminating for this project.  
 
7KLV DSSURDFKHQWDLOV D PRYHDZD\ IURP WKLQNLQJ DERXW WKH µVWDWLF LPPRELOHERG\¶
7KRPDVWRZDUGVWKLQNLQJDERXWZKDW&VRUGDVUHIHUVWRµVRPDWLFPRGHVRI
DWWHQWLRQ¶ZKLFKDUHSUDFWLFDOPRGHVRIDZDUHQHVVDQGEHLQJLQWKHZRUOGVXFh as the 
embodied practice of dance (Csordas, 1994). Indeed as Thomas points out, it is 
through a focus on the active, moving (dancing) body that we may 
 
« JHQHUDWH DQ DSSURDFK ZKLFK FRXOG SHUKDSV WUDQVFHQG WKH OLPLWV RI WKH
mind/body dichotomy inscribed in Cartesian philosophy and provide an antidote 
WR WKH µWKLQJ¶-like character of the body in much social and cultural research. 
(Thomas, 2003:78) 
 
Professional dance can also be a particularly enlightening arena for the study of the 
relationship between embodiment and identity or self, as the mutual inherence 
between body and self appears to be heightened or more accessible in this context. 
Wainwright and Turner argue that the idea that the body has become a project in 
contemporary society that should be worked at and accomplished as part of an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOI-LGHQWLW\LVLQIDFWµWRRPRGHUDWH¶IRUDSURIHVVLRQDOGDQFHU 
 
«VLQFHWREHFRPHD>SURIHVVLRQDO@EDOOHWGDQFHUUHTXLUHVWKHERG\WREHWKHYHU\
essence of self-identity. The discipline of ballet produces and maintains a 
particular type of body that cannot be separated from the identity of the dancer. 
(Wainwright and Turner, 2004b: 102) 
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Indeed:  
 
Professional ballet is in particular such an all-consuming and demanding career 
that it is inevitable that self-LGHQWLW\LVHVVHQWLDOO\GHWHUPLQHGE\LW«2EYLRXVO\
GDQFHLVVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKHEDOOHWGDQFHU¶VERG\FDQGREXWEHLQJDEDOOHWGDQFHU
is also embodied. In other words, being a ballet dancer is not just something that 
you do, it is something that you are. (Wainwright and Turner, 2004b:108)  
 
7XUQHU DQG :DLQZULJKW  ILQG GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV RI DJHLQJ DQG LQMXU\ DQ
important way to evidence their critique of those accounts of the body that understand 
it as socially constructed and thus reduce it to the realm of representation, ignoring its 
materiality. Similarly, Thomas notes that: 
 
7KHSURIHVVLRQDOGDQFHU¶VERG\ LQZHVWHUQ WKHDWUHGDQFH WUDLQHG WREH IOH[LEOH
DQGVWURQJDQGWRPRYHLQZD\VWKDWµRUGLQDU\¶KXPDQVFDQRQO\ZRQGHUDWFDQ
reveal the infinite possibilities of the body in movement and stillness. This could 
EHWKHVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQLVW¶VGUHDPFDVHVWXG\$WWKHVDPHWLPHKRZHYHUWKH
mostly young, finely honed, fit dancer encounters physical limitations and bodily 
recalcitrance on a daily basis, which, in turn, throws a dark shadow over the 
VRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQLVW¶VVWDQGSRLQW¶7KRPDV 
 
These accounts highlight the ways in which the physical body, whilst not usually the 
thematic object of our experience in everyday life, may become increasingly salient 
when it interrupts our focus on what we are doing through failure to serve our 
purposes. It is when the body does not function as we desire or expect it to function, 
then, that it becomes a focus of our attention, and the idea that the body is merely a 
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social or discursive construction can be called into question. The idea that our 
DZDUHQHVV RI RXU ERG\ LV VRPHKRZ µODWHQW¶ LQ HYHU\GD\ H[SHULHQFH ZKHQ ZH DUH
IRFXVVHGRQRUHQJDJHGLQDFWLRQLVDOVRFHQWUDOWR/HGHU¶VDUJXPHQWLQµ7KH
$EVHQW %RG\¶ ZKHUH LW LV VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH ERG\ QRW QRUPDOO\ WKH REMHFW RI RXU
attention, appears to us when it is dysfunctional in some way ± WKHµG\V-DSSHDUDQFH¶
of the body.  
 
Turner and Wainwright, following Bourdieu, similarly suggest that the fit between 
bodily habitus and field for the professional ballet dancer is generally unreflected or 
µWDNHQ-for-JUDQWHG¶ DV WKDWRI µD ILVK LQZDWHU¶ :DLQZULJKW DQG7XUQHU 2004b:101-
103). The occurrence of injury, however, disrupts this state, forcing the dancer to 
think about their ballet habitus (Wainwright and Turner, 2004b:103) and thus reveals 
DVSHFWVRIWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHGDQFHU¶VHPERGLPHQWDQGKLV
or her social context in the field of professional ballet.  
 
It is suggested by these authors, then, that the body may in fact be 
phenomenologically absent for individuals while they are engaged in rational 
purposeful action, as Klemola describes:  
 
When we handle objects, drive a car or perceive, for example, when we look out 
a window, we are seldom conscious of our bodies. We are only conscious of the 
object and we transcend our body. (Klemola, 1991:5)  
 
Klemola, however, goes on to argue, contra Wainwright and  Turner, that this is not 
WKHFDVHµZhen our experience is WLHGWRµERG\FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶± for example, in dance¶
.OHPROD  ,Q FRQWUDVW WR :DLQZULJKW DQG 7XUQHU¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW WKH
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SURIHVVLRQDO GDQFHU¶V EDOOHW habitus may be generally taken-for-granted, I would 
therefore argue that the embodied practice of dance (at a high level) in fact both 
facilitates and requires not only pre-reflective bodily-awareness but also some level of 
conscious awareness of or reflection on this pre-reflective aspect of embodiment.  
 
I therefore look to contemporary dance as a focus which allows the researcher to 
explore an activity where the embodiment is in the phenomenological foreground of 
lived experience, not because of a dysfunctional state, but because it is central to and 
foregrounded in the everyday practice of dance DW DQ DGYDQFHG OHYHO 'DQFHUV¶
accounts, as generated through qualitative interview, offer the researcher a perspective 
on embodied existence that is far more in-depth and sustained than is available from 
the glimpses we get through our own everyday lives where our bodies are not 
generally the thematic object of our experience. High-level contemporary dancers 
have, through their training, developed a heightened awareness of their own and other 
bodies, which means that they attend to those pre-reflective aspects of our 
embodiment that Merleau-Ponty argues must be considered primary if we are to 
understand the embodied basis of being in non-dualist terms.  
 
It is not the theory of dance that I engage with then, but the lived experience of being 
a dancing body, and the ways in which dancers negotiate and make sense of their 
embodied interaction with others and the environment. I am thus interested in how 
dancers perform and understand dance through their embodied engagement with it as 
both a practice and an art-form, as they create, learn, remember, perform and watch 
dance. Dance is not, therefore, approached from a third person perspective, often 
associated with the objectification of the body as Korper, but from the first person 
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perspective of the dance practitioner. I use the social research method of in-depth 
TXDOLWDWLYH LQWHUYLHZV WR KHDU µWKH YRLFH RI HPERGLHG SUDFWLFH¶ E\ HQJDJLQJ ZLWK
GDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIWKHOLYHGH[SHULHQFHRIGRLQJGDQFHDQGEHLQJDGDQFHU 
 
In asking dancers to reflect during the interview process on their experiences of their 
own and other bodies engaged in the practice of dance, I am thus tapping into this 
KHLJKWHQHGDZDUHQHVVPDGHDYDLODEOHWKURXJKWKHGDQFHUV¶WUDLQLQJDQGSUDFWLFHDQG
also drawing out aspects of this awareness that may be, even for dancers, tacit and not 
generally reflected on. In asking my interviewees to describe their experiences of 
being a dancing body I am, in fact, provoking reflection in the same way that 
Wainwright and Turner suggest that injury or aging requires the dancer to reflect. 
Unlike these authors, I do not, however, seek to engage my interviewees in a 
discussion of the dysfunctional dancing body but rather to ask them to reflect on the 
everyday functioning of their dancing bodies, including both things they find easy and 
straightforward, and things they find difficult or problematic.  
 
In this way I am able to engage dancers in discussions of aspects of dance such as 
identity, interpersonal interaction, meaning, understanding and communication, which 
are everyday aspects of the functioning of the high-level dancing body-subject. The 
pre-reflective elements of many of these features of dance means that at times 
:DLQZULJKWDQG7XUQHU¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWLWLVZKHQWKHVHWKLQJVEUHDNGRZQWKDWWKH\
become most salient and require reflection is undeniably true, but I do not seek to start 
from this negative state although in the course of the interviews such negative events 
may be drawn upon by interviewer or interviewee to help with the reflective process. I 
do, however, reject the idea that the everyday experience of dance, even at a 
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professional level, is routinely unproblematic and unreflected and that it is only in 
WLPHVRI µVRPHWUDXPDWLFHYHQWRUUDGLFDOFKDQJHRIFLUFXPVWDQFH¶:DLQZULJKWDQG
Turner, 2004b:103) that dancers reflect on their embodiment and habitus. 
 
The practice of dance as it is learned and performed by engaged, moving, dancing 
bodies is thus a particularly rich area for the exploration of how we can understand 
embodied existence in non-dualist terms, starting from a focus on intentional 
behaviour or practice: 
 
'DQFH«LVDIWHUDOODNLQGRIOLYLQJODERUDWRU\IRUWKHVWXG\RIWKHERG\± its 
training, its stories, its way of being and being seen in the world. (Daly, 1991:2) 
 
Dance functions well as an illustration of bodily knowledge or know-how in the same 
ZD\ WKDW H[DPSOHV VXFK DV GULYLQJ D FDU RU W\LQJ RQH¶V VKRH ODFHV FDQ EH XVHG WR
challenge the traditional view that all knowledge is represented in the mind of the 
thinking subject in a series of propositions (Edwards, 1998:51). Extended attention to 
GDQFH LQ WKHPDQQHU WKDW&VRUGDVFDOOV IRUZKHQKHDGYRFDWHV WKHVWXG\RIµVRPDWLF
PRGHV RI DWWHQWLRQ¶ KRZHYHU DOORZV PH WR DWWHQG WR DVSHFWV RI HPERGLHG
competencies, modes of attenWLRQ DQG RXU SUDFWLFDO VHQVH RI WKH ERG\¶V DFWLYH
possibilities in a more in-depth and sustained way than examples such as tying shoe 
laces. Thus as Desmond argues: 
 
The investigation of dance as an extremely under-analysed bodily practice may 
challenge or H[WHQGGRPLQDQWIRUPXODWLRQVRIZRUNRQ³WKHERG\´«'DQFHDV
an embodied social practice and highly visual aesthetic form, powerfully melds 
considerations of materiality and representation together. (Desmond, 2003:2) 
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Contemporary dance is not a disembodied text, nor is merely a set of mechanical 
physical movements.  Rather it is a meaningful embodied practice which blurs the 
boundaries between the subjectivity and objectivity of the dancing body-subject and 
between the realms of representation and materiality. Further to this there is a 
particularly well developed individual and interpersonal awareness of the body 
available to very experienced practitioners. As Block and Kissell suggest: 
 
The analysis of movement, and particularly dance, helps us to see in an 
extraordinarily effective way the meaning of embodiment ... It provides a 
XQLTXHO\SRZHUIXOLQVLJKWLQWRZKDWLWPHDQVIRUXVWREHµERG\-VXEMHFWV¶± body-
knowers and body-expressers ± wholly human.  (Block and Kissell, 2001:5) 
 
It is in the consideration of the everyday experience of the embodied activity of high-
level dance, then, that I suggest we can fully explore how Merleau-3RQW\¶VIRXQGDWLRQ
for thinking about the body might play out in practice. Thus for example, the priority 
of pre-reflectivH µ, FDQ¶ RYHU WKH UHIOHFWLYH µ, WKLQN¶ LV KLJKOLJKWHG LQ GDQFH ZKHUH
PXFK RI WKH GDQFHU¶V VSRQWDQHRXV HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK KLV RU KHU SUDFWLFH LV DW D SUH-
reflective or tacit level. Dance, for the professional dancer, is a situated, practical 
orientation towards or way of being in the world which primarily consists not of 
reflecting on the body as an object or thing, but of exploring and being aware of ± 
tacitly and, because of the requirements of being a high-level dancer, often to some 
extent explicitly ± their embodied possibilities for action. 
 
In contrast to Wainwright and Turner, I have chosen to focus on contemporary dance 
rather than classical ballet because while the rigours and bodily discipline of training 
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and practice are still apparent, contemporary dance has more of an emphasis on 
emotional expressionism through movement and often allows dancers more 
choreographic input and opportunity for improvisation than in classical ballet. This 
suggests that dancers in contemporary traditions may have more awareness of the 
links between communication and embodiment, the huge range of movement and 
meaning that the human body can perform, and the limitations to this ability. 
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$FFHVVLQJµthe Voice of PUDFWLFH¶ 
 
7KH µYRLFH¶RI WKHHPERGLHGSUDFWLFHRIGDQFHZKLFKappears in the thesis is drawn 
from qualitative interview data from interviews conducted with sixteen professional 
contemporary dancers.  Interviewees were recruited through their places of 
employment in the dance companies and were all interviewed at their place of work 
during the working day. The interviews were, however, conducted individually in a 
private room with the informed consent of the interviewees and assurance of 
confidentiality and anonymity. In one case, two of the dancers (Suzi and Michaela) 
requested that I interview them together during a thirty minute lunch break, which I 
agreed to. The character of the data produced in this joint interview showed no 
significant differences to that produced through the individual interviews and I have 
therefore included these data in my data analysis. 
 
All access negotiations were conducted through the rehearsal director of the dance 
company who notified dancers in advance that they had been asked to take part in the 
interviews on a certain day and that they would leave rehearsals for a period during 
which they were requested to spend about thirty minutes with the interviewer should 
they consent to do so. Interviews with all the dancers lasted between thirty and forty-
five minutes and followed the same semi-structured format where I, as interviewer, 
allowed conversation to flow while guiding the interviewee towards topic areas 
related to my interests in how dancers understand and experience the practice of dance 
and their own (and other) dancing bodies.  
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The interviewees were not given a list of questions in advance as it was felt that the 
emphasis should not be on answering questions but on taking time to reflect at length 
on certain aspects of dance. I also felt that while giving my interviewees advance 
warning of a list of questions or topics would have given them a chance to begin this 
reflective process prior to the interview, it was likely that the practice of dance at a 
professional level itself already required reflection on many of these topics as I have 
suggested above. In addition to this, I was interested in the possibility of hearing the 
dancers go through the process of reflection during the interview, finding what they 
were aware of and what they had not previously thought about or found difficult to 
express, rather than looking for them to articulate a previously rehearsed reflective 
statement. 
 
The sample of dancers with whom I conducted the interviews was composed entirely 
of individuals who were members of professional contemporary dance repertory 
companies. The sample was recruited from two different companies, one where I was 
able to interview all the dancers in the company (twelve) and one where I was able to 
interview a small number of dancers (four) whose availability was dictated by the 
rehearsal schedule. The sample was mixed in terms of gender (eight male: eight 
female), and the age range (approximately eighteen to forty-five years old) was as 
extensive as could be hoped for in a profession where training can last up to twenty 
years and many retire in their thirties. The sample was also mixed in terms of 
ethnicity, comprising eight white British and four black/Asian or mixed race British 
members, as well as a Scandinavian, a South American and two dancers from African 
countries, one of whom was black, the other white. 
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In-keeping with my aim to engage with the lived experience of dance as an embodied 
practice, the interviews encouraged dancers to reflect on aspects of doing dance and 
being a dancer that were integral to their daily lives as professional contemporary 
dancers. This focus influenced both my approach to the interviews, including what I 
initially told my interviewees about my interests and the purpose of the interview, and 
my analysis of the resulting data.  
 
The interview study should also be understood as having evolved through a series of 
overlapping stages of talking and reading where I was engaged in the processes both 
of a number of rounds of pilot interviewing and of reading Merleau-Ponty and related 
work. These processes were considered mutually informative and both fed back into 
my approaches to producing and reading the final interview data. Thus, for example, 
in the early stages of pilot interviewing I was actually interested in accounts of the 
lived experience of dance as a way of questioning and critiquing dualist theories of 
body and identity. As I read more Merleau-Ponty and conducted further pilot 
interviews, however, this interest evolved into a recognition that there was something 
more interesting to be said throuJKEULQJLQJGDQFHDQGSKLORVRSK\WRJHWKHULI,GLGQ¶W
limit myself to a reductive critique. Rather than seeking to test or falsify theory 
through empirical work, my project therefore took form as a generative process which 
brought Merleau-Ponty and dance together to see how each could illuminate the other. 
It is through this process that I suggest that I am able not only to contribute to our 
understanding of dance and Merleau-Ponty, but also to open up a new conceptual 
space for the discussion and understanding of embodied being.  
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It was initially through the process of pilot interviewing, then, that I developed and 
UHILQHG P\ DSSURDFK WR DFFHVVLQJ DQG DQDO\VLQJ GDQFHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHV DQG
understandings of the embodied practice of dance in iterative relation to my on-going 
reading and evolving understanding of Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ 7KH SLORW
interview stage of my project in fact evolved through three phases (detailed below) 
where I was able to speak to a number (eighteen in total) of different interviewees 
about their experiences of dance.  
 
This extensive pilot interviewing stage was considered necessary for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the nature of the project was such that I aimed to give neither 
philosophy nor practice intellectual priority at any stage. This meant that I considered 
it important that both preliminary readings of Merleau-Ponty and preliminary data 
from dancers influenced my evolving understanding of embodiment and the 
development of my conceptualisation of the project. 
 
There were also a number of pragmatic reasons for pilot interviewing throughout the 
early stages of the project. Although I was primarily interested in interviewing 
professional contemporary dancers for reasons explored above including their highly 
developed awareness of their own and other bodies and the importance of dance in 
their daily lives and as part of their identities, it became increasingly clear that gaining 
access to professional dancers was going to be difficult. I was aware from early access 
negotiations with a number of dance companies who did not feel that their dancers 
had time to talk to me and with a number of other professional dance organisations 
who were unable to offer me any viable method of contacting their members, that any 
access I would be able to have to professional dancers as interviewees would probably 
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be limited in terms of both number of participants and time spent with each. This 
limitation on the availability of professional dancers as interviewees for my project 
meant that I considered it necessary to have developed and refined both my research 
questions and my interview technique as much as possible before I spoke to the 
professional dancers.  
 
Existing empirical research relating to the context of Western theatre dance is almost 
exclusively framed in terms of a medical or physiological approach to the dancing 
ERG\DQGGRHVQRW WKHUHIRUH LQFOXGHTXDOLWDWLYHGDWDDERXW WKHGDQFHU¶VH[SHULHQFH
The production of data about the experience of dance at a very early exploratory 
phase was thus important for the development of my research through iteration 
between theory and data. During this first of the three phases of pilot interviewing I 
conducted seven exploratory pilot interviews, including transcription and primary 
thematic coding, with six members of a university dance society and one retired 
amateur dancer and professional choreographer.  
 
The second phase of pilot interviewing was conducted with five experienced, 
although non-professional, dancers who I contacted through a city dance agency, and 
had a narrower focus than the first phase of pilot work. The interviews in this phase 
were more specifically focussed on the practice of dance, the relationship between 
dance and identity and, in particular, on the relationship between body and mind in 
dance. The tradition of qualitative research, and semi-structures in-depth interviewing 
in particular, thus allowed me to explore these connections and aspects of 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ H[SHULHQFHV ZLWK WKHP DQG WR GHYHORS DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH
contextualised meanings they attribute to these experiences. This enabled me to 
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elaborate a picture of what it is to dance and be a dancing body from the perspective 
of the dancer by attending to how they articulate this experience in their own words.  
 
The interview process was also, however, particularly important to this project 
EHFDXVHRIWKHQHHGWRHOLFLWLQGLYLGXDOV¶H[SHULHQFHVDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIZKDWDUH
often pre-reflective aspects of embodiment. As I have suggested above, the problem 
of finding a way to get interviewees to reflect on the pre-reflective is in part solved by 
the use of (professional) dancers as interviewees for this research because their 
everyday practice of dance allows and requires certain levels of reflection and 
awareness. It was, however, also necessary to use the interview process to guide the 
conversation towards this reflection on the pre-reflective. This second phase of pilot 
interviews were therefore particularly important as pre-cursors to my interviews with 
professional dancers as they allowed me to spend an extended length of time with 
individual dancers ± pilot interviews lasted between forty-five and ninety minutes ± 
during which I was able to explore different strategies for engaging with these pre-
reflective aspects of dance and thus to refine my approach before I interviewed the 
professional dancers within the shorter time-frame. In particular I developed an 
approach of asking a number of questions about the practical details of learning and 
performing dance; asking for clarification or expansion where dancers seemed to fall 
EDFNRQWDFLWRUµWDNHQ-for-JUDQWHG¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIH[SHULHQFHRIWHQVLJQDOOHGE\
WKHXVHRIWKHSKUDVHV³\RXNQRZ´RU³GR\RXNQRZZKDW,PHDQ"´DQGTXHVWLRQLQJ
my interviewees not only about those aspects they were able to articulate but also 
about why they found it so difficult to articulate certain aspects of their experiences.  
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The pilot interviewees were all made aware that the research was at an exploratory 
stage when I conducted the interviews with them, and that I was interested in taking 
the research forward by interviewing professional dancers, although it was, at that 
stage, uncertain if I would be able to gain access to this elite group. Pilot interviewees 
were also aware that I was not an experienced dancer myself and that I was therefore 
asking for their help in understanding what it was like to dance and how I might or 
might not be able to understand that experience in terms of the body and mind. Thus I 
was not only asking my interviewees to describe their experiences to me, but also 
inviting them at certain points to take on the role of analyst by reflecting on both the 
role of the body (and mind) in knowing and remembering dance and the connection 
between dancing and a sense of who you are, in ways that they might not otherwise 
have explicitly thought about or addressed in their descriptions.  
 
When I later came to interview the professional dancers I continued to use this 
approach of presenting myself as a non-dancer asking for help understanding what it 
was like to dance in relation to some broader themes around the role of the body (and 
mind) and identity. While I did wish dancers to reflect on, for example, the processes 
that were in play when they remembered a piece if choreography and how this might 
or might not be different from what a non-dancer would understand by 
µUHPHPEHULQJ¶,ZDVKRZHYHUFDUHIXOQRWWRLQIOXHQFHP\LQWHUYLHZHHVLQWRWDONLQJ
in terms of a mind-body dichotomy. Thus while I mentioned the role of the body and 
the mind in the initial phases of many of the interviews I was careful always to leave 
room for descriptions that suggested dance relied on aspects of both body and mind 
DQGWRDWWHQGWRWKHGDQFHUV¶RZQFRQFHSWVLQFOXGLQJKRZWKH\PLJKWIDLOWRILWZLth 
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the traditional subject/object dualism and thus open up a space, in conjunction with 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VLGHDVIRUDQRQ-dualist understanding of embodiment.  
 
*LYHQWKLVLQWHUHVWLQH[SORULQJLQGLYLGXDOGDQFHUV¶RZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJVDQGFRQFHSWV
and the potential differences between my dance-professional interviewees and the 
amateur dancers I interviewed during the pilot work, I did not take my pilot interview 
data as a guide to what the professional dancers were likely to offer in terms of 
descriptions and understandings of dance. The pilot work rather allowed me to 
develop ways of approaching topics with my interviewees in ways that left the 
conversation open for these individual understandings and concepts to emerge. 
 
My third phase of pilot interviewing in fact occurred ± due to difficult access 
negotiations ± during the period when I was already involved in speaking to the 
professional dancer sample. This work with a company of mature (over forty-five) 
dancers from a range of different professional backgrounds including retired ballet 
and contemporary dancers, a choreographer, a vocal artist and a movement therapist, 
did not therefore lead to major changes in my approach to the interviews with the 
professional dancers (which were already underway). The experience of doing these 
interviews and the data derived from them did, however, feed into my overall 
understanding of the experience of dance and into my analysis of the professional 
dancer data. The interviews from this third phase of pilot work all lasted over an hour 
DQGLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶VSHFLILFLQWHUHVWVDQGFRQFHUQVSURGXFHGDUDQJH
of interesting data including ideas regarding the relationship between music and 
dance, and understandings of self-identity and self-expression in relation to movement 
and aging. Although at least three of the members of the group had been professional 
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dancers before retiring, the character of these interviewees and the interviews 
conducted with them were sufficiently different to those conducted with my main 
sample of dancers from the contemporary dance companies that I did not feel it 
appropriate to analyse data from these interviews alongside that of the sixteen 
professional contemporary dancers in the production of this thesis. 
 
In the same way that I have not sought to produce an exhaustive review of Merleau-
Ponty, I have not, then, sought to produce an exhaustive account of dance from all 
possible perspectives. I have focussed specifically on professional contemporary 
dance with the aim of being able to engage with a µYRLFH RI GDQFH¶ ZKLFK FDQ EH
productively brought into conversation with Merleau-3RQW\¶VSKLORVRSK\7KLVPHDQV
that I do not engage with the theory of dance or aesthetics, nor with the difference 
between different dance styles or between amateur and professional dance, nor with 
the different role of dance in different cultures or the relationship between dance and 
music.  
 
In place of these broad concerns I have chosen to focus on one particular field of 
dance, chosen because I consider it to be particular interesting and illuminating in 
relation to Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ ,Q XVLQJ LQ-depth qualitative interviews to 
HQJDJHZLWKWKLVµYRLFHRIGDQFH¶,KDYHHQJDJHGZLWKGDQFHUVIURPDSDUWLFXODUILHOG
and sought to produce detailed rich data about the experience of being a professional 
contemporary dancer for these individuals. It is, however, important for the depth and 
ULFKQHVVRI WKLVGHVFULSWLRQRIGDQFHUV¶H[SHULHQFHV to have conducted and analysed 
qualitative interviews with sixteen different professional dancers, as some individuals 
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offer variation or are able to articulate or clarify aspects that others were unable to or 
did not choose to discuss.  
 
7KH µYRLFH RI GDQFH¶ LV thus drawn from the transcripts of the interviews from all 
sixteen professional contemporary dancers through a process of thematic coding and 
analysis. In this process I identified common or recurring themes across the dataset 
ZLWK WKH LQWHQWLRQ RI SURGXFLQJ DQ DFFRXQW RU µYRLFH¶ RI GDQFH LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK
these tKHPHVDVDUWLFXODWHGLQWKHGDQFHUV¶RZQZRUGV7KLVGRHVQRWPHDQKRZHYHU
that I have assumed that the experience of the practice of dance is the same for all 
dancers, even within this relatively narrow sample. Indeed in seeking to engage with 
both similarities and areas of difference across the dataset, I was able to explore 
common aspects of the experience of dance, but also to highlight differences along 
such lines as gender, thus refining the picture of the experience of dance I have been 
able to produce. 
 
At the early stage of thematic coding I was primarily interested in working with the 
data to identify emerging themes rather than seeking to impose a theoretical 
framework on the data. The process of coding data did, however, require that I began 
to think about how the different themes fitted together, particularly with reference to 
whether some themes could be understood as sub-themes of others. I therefore worked 
towards the production of a tree or branching diagram which showed both how 
broader themes might be broken down to allow more precision in the coding process, 
and how smaller themes might be grouped together under one broader heading. This 
LQYROYHG FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH ORJLF RI KRZ WKH GLIIHUHQW DVSHFWV RI WKH GDQFHUV¶
accounts could fit together to build up a picture of dance, but it was also influenced by 
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my research aims and interests as they had evolved in my pilot work and my reading 
of Merleau-Ponty. 
 
Having established this primary coding framework, I used the computer software 
package NVivo which allowed me to highlight and produce a report of those parts of 
the transcripts which related to individual themes. The production of these coding 
reports and subsequent production of further tree or branching diagrams then allowed 
me to consiGHUKRZWKHHPHUJLQJDFFRXQWRUµYRLFH¶RIGDQFHPLJKWEHEURXJKWLQWR
conversation with Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO FRQFHSWV 7KXV ZKLOH , KDYH XVHG
the thematic coding of qualitative interview data to elicit an account of dance that is 
sensitive to the GDQFHUV¶ RZQ ZRUGV DQG H[SHULHQFHV WKH ZD\ , KDYH JRQH RQ WR
structure my understanding of how these themes might fit together has also been 
influenced by the intention that this voice of dance should enter into conversation with 
the voice of Merleau-PonW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ 7KLV LV mirrored in the way I have 
approached Merleau-Ponty with particular interest in those aspects of his philosophy 
that might be profitably brought into conversation with dance. 
 
It is also acknowledged that the interview process itself produces data that are 
necessarily influenced by the specific social situation of the interview and by the 
background and expectations of interviewer and interviewee. Thus while qualitative 
research is recognised as being particularly good for in-depth engagement with 
SHRSOH¶VH[SHULHQFHVLWLVQHYHUWKHOHVVDIRUPRIDFWLYHHQJDJHPHQWZKLFKVKDSHVWKH
data produced and it is not possible to conceive of this access to experience as a 
straight-forward process (Gray, 2003: chps1,2 & 5).  
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Merleau-Ponty suggests that we should actively try to reflect on the pre-reflective to 
further philosophical understanding of embodied being in the world, and I have often 
sought to engage my interviewees in this process during the course of the interviews 
by asking them to describe in detail processes that are normally pre-reflective. The 
capacity of these interviewees to reflect on and articulate pre-reflective processes is 
argued to be enhanced by their training and practice in dance and by the types of 
questions asked in the interview. Again, however, we obviously cannot assume that 
reflective statements made during interview will give the researcher directed 
unmediated access to pre-reflective experience. In particular I have been very aware 
during the analysis of interview data of pervasiveness of mind/body dualism in our 
reflective thought and language. This means that both interviewer and interviewees 
have at times articulated ideas in terms of mind and body, although most often these 
terms are invoked as being inadequate LQ WKH VSHDNHU¶V VWUXJJOH to find a way of 
describing the interconnection between mind and body or the idea RIµDELWRIERWK¶
(which we do not necessarily have the words for in our language). 
 
Despite these limitations, I suggest that qualitative interviewing remains appropriate 
to the aim of exploring the experience of dance and being a dancer. The most 
persuasive argument I offer for this is the richness of the data that was produced in my 
interviews with the professional contemporary dancers. The dancers I interviewed 
varied in terms of nationality, ethnicity, gender, age, and the different institutions and 
groups where they had trained and performed. Although these factors (and others) all 
created personal variations in the accounts offered of the experience of dance, the 
interview data from the sixteen professional dancers when taken as a whole did, 
nevertheless, have common ground which suggests that there is something common to 
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be said about the experience of dance for all these different dancers, or at least for 
identifiable sub-sets of them. Indeed after sixteen interviews and in light of my 
extensive pilot interviewing I considered that I had reached saturation with the 
interview data in terms of the themes I was interested in exploring in relation to 
Merleau-Ponty. 
 
In addition to my choice of topics or questions for the interviews, the thematic content 
analysis of the data also contributed to the process of evoking and exploring the voice 
of dance as it is related to the voice of Merleau-Ponty¶VSKLORVRSK\ ,QWHUYLHZGDWD
was thus produced and analysed alongside my reading of Merleau-3RQW\¶V
philosophy, although it was not intended that Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWV VKRXOG WDNH
LQWHOOHFWXDOSULRULW\RYHU WKHGDQFHUV¶RZQFRQFHSWV DQGH[SHULHQFHV , read the two 
together as a way of exploring common ground between them where conversation 
could take place, rather than seeking to reduce one to the other. The aim is not, then, 
to produce a systematic comparative review of different aspects and forms of dance, 
but rather to allow the conversation between philosophy and practice to take place in a 
way that generates interesting new ideas, connections and understandings of 
embodiment.  
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Structure of the Thesis 
 
In exploring the embodied basis of being in this thesis, I follow Merleau-Ponty in 
taking pre-reflective, practical engagement as primary, allowing it to stand as my 
starting point for the exploration, conceptualisation and analysis of dance and being a 
dancer, rather than seeking to reduce dance to dualist components of thinking mind 
and mechanical body. Merleau-Ponty focuses our attention on the pre-objective 
relation we have to our bodies, meaning that while we can reflect on our bodies as 
objects, this should not be taken as the original or natural form of this relation. Rather 
there is a more fundamental sense of the embodied self which is prior to this 
conscious reflection on the body and requires our attention if we are to properly 
understand the nature of our embodiment and embodied being in the world. This does 
not mean that I cannot engage with reflective thought or with dualist renderings of the 
GDQFHUV¶ UHODWLRQVKLSV WR WKHLU ERGLHV EXW LW LV WKH SUH-reflective, pre-objective 
relationship to the body that I take to be primary. I therefore begin my analysis 
through consideration of the engaged, embodied practice of dance, focusing on how 
professional contemporary dancers learn and remember dance in terms of tacit, 
SUDFWLFDONQRZOHGJHRUµNQRZ-KRZ¶DQGWKHSUH-reflective sense of the dancing boG\¶V
active possibilities.  
 
From this starting point of pre-reflective, practical engagement, Merleau-Ponty 
theorises the active sentient body (rather than the mind) as the basis of sense of self, 
meaning, understanding and communication. The structure of this thesis follows this 
line of thought in building on a conceptualisation of contemporary dance and the 
dancing body in terms of habit and pre-reflective embodied practical knowledge to 
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explore contemporary dance as a mode of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and meaning, 
understanding and communication. From this foundation I am therefore able to 
consider the role of the practical and the pre-UHIOHFWLYH LQGDQFHUV¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWK
ZRUOGVHOIDQGRWKHUVHQJDJLQJZLWKGDQFHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIEHLQJWKLQNLng, feeling 
dancing bodies rather than starting from a conceptualisation that forces me to 
understand them as thinking minds that control their bodies like external objects. 
 
The conversation between Merleau-Ponty and dance opens with a chapter on 
µPractical Knowledge¶ and then proceeds through chapters on µSubjectivity¶ and 
µIntersubjectivity¶. It is through this route, then, that the conversation arrives at 
µRepresentation¶. Thus although dance is conceived throughout the thesis as a 
meaningful, expressive and communicative art-form as well as a physical practice, I 
have allowed language, art and meaning to arise as topics for discussion only after the 
conversation has already opened up new ways of conceptualising the embodied basis 
of practice, subjectivity and communication. The conversation is thus set up 
structurally as well as in terms of the choice of interlocutors to suggest that an 
embodied basis is fundamental, not just to dance as a physical practice, but also to 
dance as a meaningful way of being (self) and understanding (others). 
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PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE: 
 
+2:029(0(17,6µ,1¶7+('$1&(5¶6%2'< 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The above discussion of the possibilities for and context of this conversation between 
philosophy and practice establishes a link between the embodied practice of dance 
and Merleau-3RQW\¶V QRWLRQ RI SUH-reflective, habit-based tacit bodily knowledge 
theorised in terms of the corporeal schema. Work within the Sociology of the Body 
which uses Merleau-Ponty, and, indeed, Merleau-3RQW\¶V RZQ ZRUN typically uses 
dance as one of many examples, such as riding a bike, to illustrate the importance of 
tacit bodily knowledge and pre-reflective habitual action. In this opening chapter of 
the conversation I go beyond using dance as an anecdotal illustration to engage in an 
extended exploration of dance and the dancing body in terms of tacit bodily 
knowledge and habit, establishing the full potential for mutual illumination between 
dance and Merleau-Ponty. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V LGHD WKDW ZH PXVW WDNH HPERGLHG LQWentional, engaged action or 
practice to be primary in our understanding of our being in the world is the starting 
point for the idea of a conversation between philosophy and practice and it strongly 
XQGHUOLHV WKH ORJLF RI WKLV FKDSWHU RQ µ3UDFWLFDO .QRZOHGJH¶ DQG WKH IDFW WKDW WKLV
chapter opens the conversation. In addition to being a starting point, Merleau-3RQW\¶V
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conceptualisation of the corporeal schema is also a constant reference point 
throughout the chapter, which I aim to speak to or address through my writing and 
DQDO\VLVRIWKHGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIKRZPRYHPHQWLVµLQ¶WKHLUERGLHV 
 
The aim of this chapter is thus to explore the physical practice of dance, including 
learning, remembering and performing movements, in relation to the corporeal 
schema. I start here ± with practical knowledge and the corporeal schema ± not only 
because it makes logical sense if we are to root our understanding of embodiment in 
practice as Merleau-Ponty suggests, but also because the connections, common 
ground and capacity for mutual illumination between Merleau-3RQW\¶VSKLORVRSK\DQG
the practice of dance as it is experienced by professional dancers, are particularly 
clear here, thus making it a good starting point from which the conversation can begin 
to roam into notions of subjectivity, intersubjectivity and representation. 
 
It is in establishing the strong link between Merleau-Ponty and dance in the discussion 
of tacit practical knowledge, then, that I am able to justify going further with the 
conversation and exploring less obvious links in the later chapters. This opening 
chapter of the conversation works to show that there is sufficient common ground and 
potential for productive dialogue between the interlocutors to justify taking the 
conversation to other more sSHFXODWLYHUHDOPVVXFKDVWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIµ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶
DQG µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ ,W DOVR HVWDEOLVKHV D ILUP FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH 0HUOHDX-
Ponty and dance in terms of the corporeal schema which will then underpin further 
connections made later in the conversation. 
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I: Practical Knowledge and the Corporeal Schema in Brief 
 
A notable problem with the Cartesian view of the body is its failure to account for the 
SKHQRPHQRQ RI ERGLO\ NQRZOHGJH 7KLV LV WKH XVXDOO\ WDFLW IRUP RI µNQRZ-KRZ¶ RU
practical knowledge which is evident in such (well-practised) motor activities as tying 
VKRHODFHVRU ULGLQJDELNH LQFRQWUDVW WRSURSRVLWLRQDONQRZOHGJHRU µNQRZLQJ-WKDW¶
which is characterised as: 
 
« D kind of knowledge which is represented in a series of propositions or 
sentences in the mind of the thinking subject. (Edwards, 1998:51) 
 
Indeed it is argued that the body cannot in fact be an object, as the Cartesian thesis 
holds, given that it is the site of this form of knowledge (Edwards, 1998:51).  
 
Following Heidegger in the rejection of the idea of the (purely mental) Cartesian 
subject, Merleau-Ponty situates us as beings in the world, constituted by the links we 
have with that world. He uses the concept of the corporeal schema to explore this 
practical grasp that we have on our environment. Thus instead of the CartesLDQ µ,
WKLQN¶WKHUHLVµ,FDQ¶ 
 
«D practical cogito which structures not only our relationship to the world, but 
also the ways in which we think about it. (Burkitt, 1999:74) 
 
Shilling describes the concepWRIERG\VFKHPDDVRULJLQDOO\GHYHORSHGWRµDGGUHVVWKH
problem of how it is we are able to co-ordinate our bodies to perform actions without 
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KDYLQJ FRPSOHWH VLJKW RI WKHP RU FRQVFLRXVO\ PRQLWRULQJ RXU HYHU\ PRYHPHQW¶
(Shilling, 2003:200) with the effect that it: 
 
«Xnifies and co-ordinates postural, tactile, kinaesthetic, and visual sensations 
so that these are experienced as the sensations of a subject in a single space. 
(Grosz, 1994:83)  
 
The body schema develops as a result of the physical interaction that we have with the 
world as we learn to navigate around objects in our environment and is thus related to 
our proprioceptive capacities. It should, however, be noted that the body schema does 
not exactly map the topography of the physical body and can, for example, include 
aspects such as phantom limbs which are not physically present, and extensions of the 
SK\VLFDOERG\VXFKDVWKHEOLQGPDQ¶VVWLFNRULQGHHGWKHGULYHU¶VFDURUWKHW\SLVW¶V
keyboard. In addition to this the body schema is developed through social interaction 
DQGLV LQSDUWGHULYHGIURPWKHLPDJHZHKDYHRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VERGLHVDQGWKURXJK
their reactions to our body. 
 
For Merleau-Ponty the corporeal schema is integral to intentional movement, for 
example, I wave my arm to draw someone¶V DWWHQWLRQ UDWKHU WKDQ KDYLQJ WR GR
something in order to wave my arm, having first had the (purely mental) intention to 
do so. Thus my action and the intention to attract attention occur as a unified whole, 
in contrast to the process of locating an object ± say I want to attract attention with a 
coloured flag ± and then having to do something ± grasp it ± in order to move it. We 
do not, therefore, generally relate to our bodies as external objects, rather we are our 
bodies and have pre-reflective knowledge of them in the form of the corporeal 
schema.  
  67 
 
Further to this, the corporeal schema entails a pre-reflective sense or grasp of my 
environment, relative to my body, so that I can navigate it without having to 
consciously think about how to do so. This feature of the corporeal schema further 
extends to objects of habitual use such as the computer keyboard or the controls of a 
car so that I can have practical knowledge of the layout of the keyboard which allows 
me to type without consciously seeking out the correct keys.  
 
The concept of the corporeal schema thus allows Merleau-Ponty to explore human 
behaviour without subscribing to either the intellectualist picture of the body directed 
by a rational subject, or the mechanist (behaviourist) picture of habitual bodily action 
being purely a matter of conditioned stimulus-response reflex. Through his focus on 
tacit bodily knowledge and the corporeal schema, Merleau-3RQW\ LV DEOH WR µUHIOHFW¶
XSRQ WKH µXQUHIOHFWHG¶ EULQJLQJ µWKH SUH-objective, primordial relationship we have 
ZLWK RXU ERGLHV¶ WR WKH FHQWUH RI RXU DWWHQWLRQ DQG DZDUHQHVV :LOOLDPV DQG
Bendelow, 1998:52). 
 
, ZLOO QRZ H[DPLQH GDQFHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHV RI OHDUQLQJ DQG UHPHPEHULQJ D QHZ
choreography or new choreographic style to show what it is that dance can bring to 
this conversation about practical knowledge. My intention in analysing the data from 
P\ GDQFH LQWHUYLHZV LV WR GUDZ RXW DQG HODERUDWH FHUWDLQ DVSHFWV RI WKH GDQFHUV¶
accounts that I believe can fruitfully be read alongside Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRncepts of 
pre-reflective knowledge and the corporeal schema which I have briefly outlined here 
and in the previous chapter. 
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,QWKLVFKDSWHULWLVWKHGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVWKDWDUHIRUHJURXQGHGDQGUHFHLYHWKHPRVW
explicit attention, but Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFepts are always the position in relation to 
ZKLFK , GLVFXVV WKH GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV RI WKH H[SHULHQFH RI GDQFH 7KXV DOWKRXJK
Merleau-3RQW\¶VSKLORVRSK\GRHVQRWVSHDNDWOHQJWKLQWKLVFKDSWHULWLVWKHLGHDWKDW
the chapter speaks to Merleau-Ponty (rather than speaks of Merleau-Ponty) which 
shapes how I understand and analyse the accounts of the dancers, allowing those 
DFFRXQWVDQGWKHGDQFHU¶VFRQFHSWV WRJLYHPHDFFHVV WRDVSHFWVRI0HUOHDX-3RQW\¶V
conceptualisation of practical knowledge and the corporeal schema that I would not 
otherwise have had such a clear perspective on if I had only used my own everyday 
experience or worked through a process of rational argument to insist on the primacy 
of the pre-reflective. 
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,,/HDUQLQJ'DQFH³*HWWLQJLWLQWRWKH%RG\´ 
 
In this section I explore aspects of the dance as an embodied practice that I would like 
to suggest can clearly illuminate and be illuminated by Merleau-3RQW\¶VWKHRULVLQJRI
habit and the corporeal schema. I am particularly interested in the notions evoked by 
GDQFHUVRIµJHWWLQJ¶RUµKDYLQJ¶DPRYHPHQWµLQWKHERG\¶DQGLQH[SORULQJKRZWKLV
term is related to aspects of learning and remembering dance that are based on 
repetition and the establishment of a kind of bodily memory or awareness which is 
generally tacit  or pre-reflective. I will therefore use this section to explore how the 
GDQFHUV¶ QRWLRQ RI µJHWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ LV GLVFXVVHG LQ WHUPV RI UHSHWLWLRQ
memory, the possibility of correction, and in relation or contrast to the related notion 
RIµSLFNLQJXS¶ 
 
My interviewees employed two different phrases to talk about learning in dance: that 
RIµSLFNLQJXS¶DQGWKDWRIµJHWWLQJLWLQWRWKHERG\¶7KHVHZHUHXVHGE\GDQFHUVIURP
a range of backgrounds across both professional companies, but the uses of the 
different terms were not necessarily clear cut. This fluidity of the terms reflects the 
variety of ways in which learning occurs in dance. Dancers may, for example, in their 
daily work be learning discrete movements from a rehearsal director or 
choreographer; learning a new choreography or set of movements as they are created 
in the course of the rehearsal; learning a new style or way of moving which will 
enable them to improvise and create new movements or choreographies from a 
choreographer; learning a choreography that has already been created in some other 
context from a video; learning pre-choreographed movements from fellow dancers; 
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learning to dance with and perhaps in unison with other dancers; or learning to dance 
a solo. 
 
ThXVWKHUHLVQRµQRUPDO¶OHDUQLQJVLWXDWLRQIRU WKHSURIHVVLRQDOGDQFHUDVHDFKQHZ
VLWXDWLRQKDVGLIIHUHQWHOHPHQWV7KHGDQFHUVGRQRWLQIDFWXVHWKHWHUPµOHDUQLQJ¶WR
UHIHUWRWKHVHSURFHVVHVLQVWHDGPDNLQJXVHRIWKHWHUPVµSLFNLQJXS¶ZKLFKJHQHUDOly 
refers to taking a movement such as that performed by a choreographer and recreating 
LW WKHLURZQERG\DQGµJHWWLQJLW LQWRWKHERG\¶ZKLFKJHQHUDOO\UHIHUVWRSURFHVVHV
which achieve a kind of bodily memory of the movements such that the dancers do 
not have to think through the steps in their heads before they perform them. This state 
ZDVXVXDOO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHLGHDRIµPXVFOHPHPRU\¶LQWKHGDQFHUV¶GHVFULSWLRQV
µ*HWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ LV WKXV VRPHKRZ D GHHSHU SURFHVV WKDQ µSLFNLQJ XS¶ DV
dancers suggested that it takes more time to achieve and that the result is a more 
GXUDEOH PHPRU\ RI WKH PRYHPHQWV ,Q FRQWUDVW WKH QRWLRQ RI µSLFNLQJ XS¶ ZDV
generally used to refer to a more superficial process where dancers concentrated on 
watching a movement and copying it, but did not necessarily build up the same level 
RIH[SHUWLVHRUFRPIRUWZLWKWKHPRYHPHQWDVWKHSURFHVVRIµJHWWLQJWKHPRYHPHQWLQ
WKHERG\¶DIIRUGHG 
 
7KHUHZDVDOVRDVXJJHVWLRQLQWKHZD\WKDWGDQFHUVXVHGWKHWHUPVWKDWµSLFNLQJXS¶
could be understood as an initial stage which needs to occur before the process of 
µJHWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ FDQ EH XQGHUWDNHQ &OHDU GLYLVLRQV EHWZHHQ WKHVH WZR
processes were not, however, emphasised by the dancers as they did not generally set 
up the categories as definite sequential stages or in opposition to each other. The 
categories were thus closely related and sometimes overlapping in the accounts of 
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learning dance, although the dancers generally drew on the different notions to 
emphasise some distinction between the superficiality or depth of their knowledge of 
the movement.  
 
0\ RZQ XVH RI WKH WHUPV µSLFNLQJ XS¶ DQG µJHWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ GXULQJ WKH
interviews was very much guided by that of the dancers, and I waited for my 
interviewee to introduce the terms before using them myself. Thus I continued to use 
WKH WHUP µOHDUQ¶ WR UHIHU WR RQH RU PRUH RI WKH DFWLYLWLHV OLVWHG DERYH DQG ZDV
interested in asking dancers to reflect how they learned a new choreography. It should 
be noted that a number of dancers emphasised the fact that where possible a 
choreographer would take up residence at the contemporary dance company for a 
number of weeks or months and would in fact create the work in situ and based on the 
qualities of the individual dancers with dancers actively involved in generating the 
new movements that would eventually be set in the piece. Nevertheless, as my sample 
was drawn from repertory companies, all my interviewees had experience of learning 
choreographies which had been created in a different context and thus came to them 
DVµUHDG\-PDGH¶,WZDVWKHVHH[SHULHQFHVZKLFKZHUHWKHPDLQIRFXVRIPDQ\RIWKH
interview discussions around learning dance, but as I have suggested above many of 
the distinctions between learning, remembering and creating movements were quite 
fluid. 
  
In order to find different ways of making the question of learning meaningful to my 
interviewees I would sometimes approach the issue from the reverse perspective, 
DVNLQJZKDWLWHQWDLOHGIRUWKHPWRKDYHµOHDUQW¶RUWRµNQRZ¶DFHUWDLQSLHFHDQGKRZ
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it was that they got to this stage. Reflecting on what it meant to her to say that she had 
learnt a sequence of movement Carrie described how:  
 
Your body really knows it after a while and then to really know a choreography 
\RXGRQ¶WKDYHWRWKLQNDERXWLW>&DUULH@ 
 
Knowing a choreography is thus characterised by the movements being available to 
the dancer as he or she performs the sequence without need for reflective thought. The 
knowledge here is not propositional µknowledge-that¶ which requires mental 
reflection, rather it is tacit bodily knowledge or µknow-how¶. 
 
As a way of further clarifying that my interest was in the very basic processes of their 
everyday learning experiences, I would also sometimes supplHPHQWTXHVWLRQVRIµKRZ
GR\RXOHDUQVRPHWKLQJ"¶E\JHQHUDWLQJDOWHUQDWLYHVVXFKDVµLV LWDERXWVHHLQJLWRU
GRLQJLWRU«"¶5HSOLHVWR WKLVTXHVWLRQXVXDOO\HPSKDVLVHGWKDWDPRYHPHQWKDGWR
be done in order to establish this sort of memory:  
 
I think I ZRXOGKDYHWRGRLWDQGUHDOO\JHWLWLQWRWKHERG\«\RXFDQZDWFKLWDV
PDQ\ WLPHV DV \RX OLNH EXW LW¶V FRPSOHWHO\ GLIIHUHQW ZKHQ \RX¶UH GRLQJ LW LW¶V
such a physical thing and the only way you can really do it is to actually 
physically go and keep doiQJLWDQGNHHSGRLQJ LWDQG WKDW¶VEDVLFDOO\ WKHRQO\
ZD\LW¶VJRLQJWRJHWLWLQWRWKHERG\>$QWKRQ\@ 
 
New competencies in dDQFH WKXV JHW µLQWR WKH ERG\¶ through an active process of 
practice or repetition of a certain movement or set of movements. This phenomenon 
ZDVIUHTXHQWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHLGHDRIµPXVFOHPHPRU\¶ 
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The existence, and indeed the strength and durability, of muscle memory was not 
questioned by any of the dancers and it was often evoked when I asked the dancers to 
reflect on how exactly what it was to have learnt or to know a certain choreography or 
movement. Interestingly, however, the concept of muscle memory and the 
acknowledgement of its central role in learning dance, did not appear to remove the 
need for or to wholly encompass the concept of having or getting a pattern of 
PRYHPHQWµLQWKHERG\¶ 
 
In general terms, muscle memory was thus given as a narrower and more matter-of-
IDFW H[SODQDWLRQ RI KRZ WKH GDQFHU¶V ERG\ FRXOG JHW XVHG WR SHUIRUPLQJ FHUWDLQ
movements or sequences of movements so that they could be easily reproduced in the 
same form without need for conscious thought about how the different positions were 
achieved or what came next. Thus, for example, Carrie, quoted above describing how 
the steps became available without conscious reflection (µ\RX GRQ¶W KDYH WR WKLQN
DERXW LW¶ [Carrie]), gave an explanation of this phenomenon in terms of muscle 
memory and how such memory is formed or laid down through the repetition of 
certain movements:  
 
7KHUH¶VGLIIHUHQW W\SHVRIPHmory and one of them is muscle memory ± I think 
the repetition ± your body really knows it after a while. [Carrie] 
 
7KH GDQFHUV¶ FRQFHSW RI µJHWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ FRYHUHG WKLV DVSHFW RI OHDUQLQJ
dance, but also alluded to something less mechanical which allowed variation in learnt 
movement and gave the dancer, for example, a pre-reflective feeling or inclination 
  74 
about the appropriateness of a certain movement to a certain style (see below). 
µ*HWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ ZDV KRZHYHU OLNH PXVFOH PHPRU\ FRnsidered to occur 
through the repeated performance or practising of a certain pattern of movement. As 
Steven expressed:  
 
It takes repetition to get into the body ± to get the sensation clean, if that makes 
sense. [Steven] 
 
I suggest, then, that the dancerV¶ H[SHULHQFHV RI µJHWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ FDQ EH
fruitfully explored in relation to Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWRIKDELWDQGWKHSURFHVVRI
WKH µLQFRUSRUDWLRQ¶ RI D EHKDYLRXU DFWLRQ RU PRYHPHQW LQWR WKH FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD
,QGHHGWKHGDQFHUV¶FRQFHSWRIµLQ WKHERG\¶FDQEHVHHQWRSDUDOOHOWKRVHDVSHFWVRI
the concept of the corporeal schema highlighted in the above brief discussion of 
knowledge of a well practised motor skill as pre-reflective and based in the body.  
 
Merleau-Ponty considers all our actions to have a habitual aspect, meaning that they 
are a residue or sediment of previous action. This applies equally across the range of 
actions we perform in daily life from our basic bodily comportment, through the 
simple actions involved in, say, making a cup of coffee, and right through to the 
highly complex actions which characterise involvement in, for example, a game such 
as football or in contemporary dance. Merleau-3RQW\¶V LQWHUHVW ZDV LQ WKH
development and adoption of habits in the course of our daily activities where such 
habits are argued to be dialectically related to our ongoing activities so that they are 
shaped by action as much as they are shaping of it. As Crossley explains:  
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If our present actions are shaped by habits it is only because our previous actions 
have given rise to those habits; and insofar as our present actions mutate into 
new patterns they can give rise to new habits which will shape our future action. 
The improvised and innovative nature of action, in other words, is such that, on 
occasion, it gives rise to new and novel habits and dispositions. (Crossley, 
2001:120) 
 
'DQFHUV¶DELOLW\WRHVWDEOLVKDSUH-reflective knowledge of new movements or styles 
of movement when they learn dance can thus be considered habit formation in this 
sense. Previous ways of moving are here being shaped or changed in accordance with 
WKH GDQFHUV¶ H[SRVXUH WR QHZ W\SHV RI EHKDYLRXU DQG WKHLU UHSHWLWLRQ RI VXFK
EHKDYLRXUVXQWLOWKH\DUHµLQWKHERG\¶ 
 
The habitual and pre-reflective nature of learnt movements in dance is also 
highlighted by discussion of the processes involved when a dancer tries to change or 
correct a movement. As dancers described the strength of bodily or muscle-memory 
and the reinforcement of this learning through repetition, I frequently asked if it was, 
JLYHQWKHVHIDFWRUVGLIILFXOWWRµXQOHDUQ¶VRPHWKLQJ7KLVTXHVWLRQZDVRIWHQUHFHLYHG
ZLWK DQ H[FODPDWLRQ VXFK DV µSKHZ¶ RU µZRZ¶ DIILUPLQJ WKDW LW ZDV LQGHHG YHU\
GLIILFXOWWRµWDNHFRUUHFWLRQ¶RQDPRYHPHQWWKDWZDVDOUHDG\µLQWKHERG\¶ 
 
A number of dancers thus expressed the frustration experienced when a choreographer 
changed his or her mind about a movement after the dancers had spent time learning 
it. One dancer described a situation that she had experienced repeatedly:  
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WKHQFKRUHRJUDSKHUVFRPHKHUHDQGWKH\¶OOGRVRPHWKLQJDQG\RX¶UHOLNH³RN´
\RXZRUN,GRQ¶WNQRZKRZPDQ\GD\V ± a week or whatever ± and then they turn 
round and they change it ± wah! ± even that process itself, trying to change it 
into your, from your bRG\DJDLQWKDW¶VMXVWDQLJKWPDUHEHFDXVHOLNH,VDLG\RXU
ERG\¶VDXWRPDWLFDOO\JRLQJWRGRDFHUWDLQWKLQJ>0LFKDHOD@ 
 
7KHLGHDWKDWDFHUWDLQSDWWHUQRIPRYHPHQWEHFRPHVµVHW¶LQWKHERG\DVDUHSHDWLQJ
or habitual pattern of action is further illustUDWHGE\DQRWKHUGDQFHU¶VFRPPHQWDERXWD
FKRUHRJUDSKHU¶VXVHRIDFHUWDLQSKUDVHRIPRYHPHQW  
 
It was one of the initial phrases that he got us to change and then go back to the 
initial phrase again and there was lots of the same ± similar ± movement, but 
because we had changed it you kept wanting to go into the original. [Jamie]  
 
7KHLGHDRIµZDQWLQJ¶WRIROORZWKHOHDUQWRUKDELWXDOSDWWHUQRIPRYHPHQWZDVIXUWKHU
explained by Jamie in terms of bodily memory:  
 
7KHSUREOHP«LVPXVFOHPHPRU\± you know ZKDW\RX¶UHGRLQJDQGWKHQ\RX
WKLQNLW¶VJRLQJLQWRVRPHWKLQJHOVH>-DPLH@ 
 
It is interesting that this description is phrased in terms of wanting, knowing and 
thinking ± activities which would traditionally be considered to be based in the mind 
rather WKDQWKHERG\<HWWKHGDQFHU¶VHYRFDWLRQRIPXVFOHPHPRU\DVµWKHSUREOHP¶
and his clear frustration at the difficulties of changing a pattern of movement once it is 
µLQWKHERG\¶UHYHDOWKDWµZDQWLQJWRJRLQWRWKHRULJLQDO¶LVQRWDPHQWDOGHVLUH± quite 
the opposite, he is consciously trying to follow the new directions given by the 
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choreographer ± but a pre-reflective bodily phenomenon which guides his movement 
GHVSLWHKLVHIIRUWV WRFKDQJH LW7RµNQRZZKDW\RX¶UHGRLQJ¶ LQ WKLVFDVH LV WKXVDQ
example of pre-reflective know-how or practical bodily knowledge which has been 
shaped by the formation of muscle memory of the pattern of movement which 
originally followed the initial phrase.  
 
7KH SUREOHP RI WU\LQJ WR FKDQJH D SDWWHUQ RI PRYHPHQW RQFH LW LV µLQ WKH ERG\¶
suggest that these movements are incorporated into the corporeal schema as durable 
SDWWHUQV RU KDELWV RI PRYHPHQW ZKLFK FDQ UHPDLQ µLQ WKH ERG\¶ RU LQ WKH FRUSRUHDO
schema despite the fact that the dancer is consciously mentally aware that a different 
pattern of movement is required. This again suggests that knowledge and memory of 
movement for dancers cannot be thought of in traditional terms as a purely mental or 
intellectual capacity. 
 
Interested in the different, often incongruous or contradictory, forms of knowledge, 
awareness and intention that dancers described in relation to attempting to correct a 
learnt pattern of movement, I went on to ask a number of the dancers to help me to try 
to understand this in terms of mind and body. As I have outlined in my discussion of 
the interviews in the previous chapter, I had opened each interview by telling my 
interviewee that I was interested in the roles of and connections between mind and 
body in dance. This use of the traditional dualist terms was deemed necessary as I was 
advised that attempting to evoke my research interests in non-dualist terms such as 
embodiment was not appropriate to everyday conversation and interaction with non-
academics. Many of my interviewees therefore replied in terms of differential 
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functions of body and mind, trying to clarify for me what processes they felt were 
JRLQJRQZKHQWKH\µWRRNFRUUHFWLRQ¶ 
 
Again the power and durability of muscle (bodily) memory was emphasised in these 
accounts, but there was also a clear sense of conscious mental involvement in the 
correcting movements. In this account Louisa describes these different aspects as 
working almost in opposition to each other:  
 
«EHFDXVHPXVFOHPHPRU\LVUHDOO\SRZHUIXODQGDQGP\KHDGZLOO± LIZH¶UH
doing corrections and things ± ,VD\³GRQ¶WGRWKDWZLWK\RXUOHJ´DQG\RXUOHJ¶V
GRLQJ LW EHFDXVH LW¶V PXVFOH PHPRU\ DQG LW¶V YHU\ SRZHUIXO VR LW WDNHV D ZHH
ZKLOHIRUWKDWPXVFOHPHPRU\WRVHWWOHGRZQDQGTXLWHRIWHQZH¶OOJLYHQRWHVDQG
ZH¶OOVD\³\RX¶UHGRLQJLWDJDLQ´± ³RKMXVWOHDYHLWZLOO\RX´-  EHFDXVHWKHUH¶V
DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKDW LW¶VPXVFOH PHPRU\ DQG LW¶OO WDNH D ZHH ZKLOH WR WR OHW
your body learn it another way so that is interesting as well because we all just 
VD\³RK LW¶VPXVFOHPHPRU\± LW¶OOGR LWZKHQLWZDQWV´EHFDXVH\RXUEUDLQLV
JRLQJ³GRQ¶WGRWKDW´\RXNQRZ"± but you, your body just automatically does it 
EHFDXVH LW¶V ± the information you give your body before the movement ± it 
NQRZV VR LW GRHV WKH WKLQJ LW¶V XVHG WR VR \RX¶ve got to train it a little bit. 
[Louisa] 
 
This notion of the dancer (mind) having to train their body could be consistent with 
the way some sociologists of the body conceptualise thinking selves as working 
reflexively on their bodies as projects (Shilling, 2003:188-189). What is interesting 
DERXW /RXLVD¶V GHVFULSWLRQ KRZHYHU LV WKDW VKH DJDLQ XVHV WKH LGHD RI WKH ERG\
knowing the sequence of movement, suggesting that although she is trying to clarify 
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the difference between the mind and the body for me and seems to describe a situation 
where her head or brain is telling her body what to do, her account is essentially 
ambiguous with relation to the location of those traditionally mental faculties of 
knowledge, intention and subjectivity, as she uses the idea of knowing to refer to a 
FDSDFLW\ RI WKH ERG\ ZKLFK ZRUNV DJDLQVW DQG LV VWURQJHU WKDQ ZKDW KHU µKHDG¶ RU
µEUDLQ¶NQRZVRULVµWHOOLQJ¶KHUERG\ 
 
Other dancers also tried to explain correction for me in terms of body and mind. 
Steven, for example, described his experience of taking correction in terms of 
conscious mental intervention into pre-reflective movement memory or bodily 
knowledge:  
 
Sometimes you have to put like a little tag, like a little mental tag where you have 
to go ± ³2.LW¶V WKLVQRWZKDW\RXZHUH GRLQJEHIRUH´DQGWKDW¶VNLQGRIKRZ
rehearsals work like when you rehearse someone will give you a correction and 
,¶OODOPRVWSXWOLNHDOLWWOHIODJRUPHQWDOFKHFNSRLQWLQP\PLQGZKLFKLVDYHU\
intellectual thing rather than a sensory thing ± LW¶V OLNH ,¶P JRLQJ WR SXW WKH
sensation and before I have to recreate that sensation I have a checkpoint in my 
PLQGWRJR³2.LW¶VWKLVQRWWKDW´ZKLOH,¶PPRYLQJ>6WHYHQ@ 
 
This account again emphasises the difficulty of correcting a pattern movement once it 
has been incorporated into the corporeal schema of the dancer. Furthermore, 
correction here is seen to be a rather disjointed, uncomfortable or artificial process 
that interrupts the normal flow of the dance for the dancer. In contrast to the 
philosophical tradition of relating immanence to the body and transcendence to the 
mental realm, Merleau-Ponty argues that the body engaged in intentional action is a 
  80 
VLWHRIWUDQVFHQGHQFH:HLVV6WHYHQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHSURFHVV
of correction (which can be linked to immanence) interrupts or intrudes on what 
would normally be a transcendent state of bodily movement. I will further explore 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VQRWLRQVRI WUDQVFHQGHQFHDQGLPPDQHQFHLQ UHODWLRQWRWKHGDQFLQJ
ERG\LQP\GLVFXVVLRQRIµ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶LQWKHIROORZLQJFKDSWHU 
 
)URP6WHYHQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQ LWZRXOGVHHP WKDW WKHGDQFHU WDNLQJFRUUHFWLRQPXVWQRW
only have conscious awareness of the required changes to the pattern of movement, 
but also some form of conscious access to the pre-reflective bodily knowledge which 
is currently guiding them through the movement so that they can interrupt this flow of 
movement and implement the correction at the appropriate location in their 
performance of the choreography. Conscious thought is therefore an important aspect 
of learning dance, and indeed it should be remembered that even the basic picking up 
of movements through repetition involves a conscious, reflective desire to repeat and 
learn the pattern of movement ± dancers do not find themselves helplessly copying 
every action that occurs in their presence, although they might be better at doing so 
than most if they chose to.  
 
µ*HWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ RU LQWR WKH FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD LV WKXV LQ PRVW VLWXDWLRQV
consciously initiated for the dancers. There is, then, an interplay between reflective 
and pre-reflective knowledge of the movement in the context of correction as is 
IXUWKHULOOXVWUDWHGLQDQRWKHUGDQFHU¶VGHVFULSWLRQ 
 
Usually I take correction straight away, em, I take it quite straight away and 
then I try and I do it a couple of times the way they want it and try and get it into 
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my body. Some corrections are really, really hard to get, like so if you get 
VRPHWKLQJ UHDOO\ GLIILFXOW LW¶V PRUH DERXW P\ PLQG , WKLQN ± LW¶V P\ PLQG WKDW
takes the correction rather than ± LWJHWVLQWRP\ERG\,¶YHMXVWJRWWRNHHS± the 
EHVWZD\¶VUHSHWLWLRQWKDW¶V, ±  LW¶VJRWWRVWLFNLQWKHUHEHFDXVHRWKHUZLVHLW¶V
gone. That takes a while, it does take a while. [Michaela] 
 
Having emphasised a role for conscious thought in the process of getting a movement 
into the body or into the corporeal schema it is important to distinguish the 
descriptions above from an intellectualist account of learning dance. This is not to say 
that it is not possible to reflect on and share propositional knowledge about the 
nuances of various movements, but rather to assert that what is contained in this 
propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) about dance is not sufficient for someone 
to be able to physically do the dance. Sheets-Johnstone is thus able to compare two 
GLIIHUHQW ZD\V LQ ZKLFK D SHUVRQ FDQ WKLQN DFWLRQV LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI GDQFH µ«
thinking in movement and thoughts of movement are two quLWHGLIIHUHQWH[SHULHQFHV¶
(Sheets-Johnstone, 1981:400) The know-how of dance ± that which actually enables a 
practitioner to perform a certain movement or choreography, or, as Sheets-Johnstone 
emphasises, to improvise within a certain learnt style of movement ± is a form of tacit 
bodily knowledge passed on through (copied and repeated) action.  
 
7KH GDQFHUV¶ UHSHDWHG FRS\LQJ RI D PRYHPHQW DOVR KLJKOLJKWV WKRVH DVSHFWV RI RXU
practical sense or pre-reflective knowledge developed through social interaction. 
Indeed the corporeal schema is formed in part through the imitation or mimicking of 
the behaviour of others (Shilling, 2003:200-201) (further discussed in my chapter on 
µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶DQGLWLVHYLGHQWWKDWWKHSULPDU\PHDQVRIOHDUQLQJLQGDQFHLVIURP
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FRS\LQJVRPHRQHHOVH¶VPRYHPHQW2QHGDQFHUWKXVGHVFULEHGWKHOHDUQLQJSURFHVVDV
one where:  
 
,W¶V D NLQGRINLQDHVWKHWLF OHDUQLQJ ± you watch, you repeat, you repeat again, 
\RX SUDFWLFH DQG UHSHDW DJDLQ DQG WKHQ HYHQWXDOO\ ZKHQ LW¶V LQ \RXU
ERG\«>'DQLHO@ 
 
Again this quote highlights the need for active learning as, contra the intellectualist 
account, neither talk nor observation of a movement are sufficient for a dancer to pick 
it up ± LWLVDOZD\VQHFHVVDU\WRSK\VLFDOO\GRWKHPRYHPHQWLQRUGHUWRµJHWLWLQWRWKH
ERG\¶ 
 
In addition to this it is noted that this transfer of knowledgHWKHµSLFNLQJXS¶RIDQHZ
habit or dance occurs not as a series of separate images or propositions, but as a whole 
or Gestalt. This was evidenced by the way that learning a movement, or rather getting 
that movement right, was described by some of the daQFHUVDVKDYLQJDVXGGHQRUµDOO-
or-QRWKLQJ¶FKDUDFWHU 
 
Sometimes you just click, you think to yourself ± \RX¶OOEHGRLQJLWDQGDOORID
VXGGHQ\RX¶OOMXVWJR³RKULJKW± WKLVLVKRZWKH\GRLW´DQGWKHQ\RX¶YHJRWLW
[Michaela]  
 
This is also echoed iQ 5KLDQQD¶V GHVFULSWLRQ RI KHU ILUVW HQFRXQWHU ZLWK D
contemporary dance technique named after its originator Martha Graham:   
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,QP\ILUVW\HDUDW>'DQFH6FKRRO@WKDWZDVOLNHDZKROH\HDURI*UDKDPDQG,¶G
QHYHUGRQH*UDKDPEHIRUH,¶GKDUGO\GRQHDQ\Fontemporary and I was like, I 
felt like I literally could not do anything, for the first two terms I just felt like I 
FRXOGQ¶WGDQFHDQ\PRUH\RXNQRZ,FRXOGQ¶WPRYHMXVWXWWHUO\DQGWKHQLQWKH
third term things just started to click and my body just started to understand 
things without me having to mentally apply and it just started to, everything 
started to work. [Rhianna]  
 
In describing her frustration when choreographers changed their minds about a 
sequence of movements (quoted above), Michaela also described taking correction on 
DPRYHPHQWSDWWHUQWKDWVKHKDGZRUNHGKDUGWRµJHWLQWKHERG\¶DVµMXVWWKURZLQJLW
DOODZD\¶>0LFKDHOD@ Similarly another dancer remarked that after taking correction 
of this sort µ\RXIHHOOLNH\RX¶UHEDFNWRVTXDUHRQH¶>6X]L@Patterns of movement are 
QRWDVVXPHGLQWRWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDWKHQLQDµSLHFHE\SLHFH¶IDVKLRQEXWUDWKHU
as an overall impression. I will further explore the notion of Gestalt in dance in my 
GLVFXVVLRQRIµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ 
 
It was also apSDUHQWKRZHYHUIURPWKHGDQFHUV¶FRPPHQWVWKDWWKHUHLVVRPHOHHZD\
to adapt those movement patterns that are being learnt. Indeed dancers emphasise that 
getting a movement into the body is not characterised purely by a focus on the dance 
steps themselves. Merely copying the outer physical form or shape of the movement 
is not in fact considered to be sufficient in the context of learning and performing 
dance. In describing her experience of watching other dancers perform, one 
interviewee explained that there was more to dance than the steps alone:  
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$GDQFHVWHS WKDW¶VMXVWDGDQFHVWHSGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\VD\DQ\WKLQJRQVWDJH)RU
PHGDQFLQJDQGLI,ZDWFKDSHUIRUPDQFHLILW¶VMXVWGDQFHVWHSV± they can be 
really beautiful dance steps ± EXWLIWKHUH¶VQRreason behind them or feeling or 
passion or something else coming through from the dancers then it ± five minutes 
of dance steps is kind of enough. [Tara] 
 
7KLV LV UHODWHG WR WKH QHJDWLYH FRQFHSW RI µPDNLQJ VKDSHV¶ HYRNHG E\ D QXPEHU RI
dancers to describe a way of dancing that emphasised the lines and shape of the body 
at the expense of meaning or emotion in the performance. One dancer therefore 
commented:  
 
I think if you think too much about what things look like from the outside you 
start making shapes DQG,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDW¶V± I mean anyone can make shapes. 
[Rhianna]  
 
7KH GDQFHU¶V DELOLW\ WR OHDUQ GDQFH ZLWK DOO LW¶V QXDQFHV DQG FRPSOH[LW\ ZDV WKXV
FRQWUDVWHGDJDLQVWµPDNLQJVKDSHV¶ZKLFKLWLVVXJJHVWHGGRHVQRWWDNHDQ\SDUWLFXODU
talent or feel for dance. It was, however, understood that it does take a certain amount 
of training ± µDQ\RQH¶ ZDV KHUH FRQVLGHUHG WR UHIHU WR WKRVH SHRSOH ZKR KDYH EHHQ
trained in dance but are not actually dancers in a fuller sense of the word: they do not 
have what might be thought of as a natural vocation for dance. Indeed Rhianna, 
quoted above, went on to describe the inadequacy of training alone to make an artist:  
 
I think you could have a very, you could have an amazing trained dancer ± very 
technical, could do amazing things ± EXW,WKLQN\RX¶GVHHWKHWUDLQLQJ\RX¶GVHH
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± ZKLFK LV LW¶V ILQH LW¶V ILQH ± LQP\RZQSHUVRQDORSLQLRQ ,¶G UDWKHU MXVW VHH
someone dance. [Rhianna]  
 
In relation to her own dancing, Louisa explains:  
 
I get to a physical point ± the steps ± where they become secondary almost, so 
IRUPHGDQFH LVQRWUHDOO\VRPXFKSK\VLFDO LW¶VDERXW WKHVSDFH\RXFUHDWHLQ
DQGDURXQG\RXUERG\VRWKHQ,WKLQNLWFRPPXQLFDWHV«IRUPHLWOLHVLQJRLQJ
EH\RQGWKHVWHSV«,PHDQWKHPRVWDPD]LQJEDOOHWGDQFers do that ± you forget 
WKDW WKH\¶UH GRLQJ EHDXWLIXO DUDEHVTXHV EHFDXVH WKH\ FDQ JR EH\RQG WKDW
vocabulary. [Louisa]  
 
Similar notions of the communicative aspect of dance as something that comes from 
going beyond or transcending the steps or shapes of the choreography are apparent in 
this quote from Marco:  
 
Dance is not about steps ± you have the steps to make parts and then you give 
HYHU\WKLQJEXW LW¶VQRWDERXW WKHVWHSV\RXNQRZDVDGDQFHU«WKHVWHSV MXVW
link so I guess I talk through my body. [Marco]  
 
5KLDQQD DOVR GHVFULEHV DQ µHPSWLQHVV¶ RU PHDQLQJOHVVQHVV LQ GDQFH ZKHUH WKH
SHUIRUPHUVIRFXVVHHPVWREHRQµPDNLQJVKDSHV¶ 
 
Sometimes you go and you watch a piece and the dancers are amazing and you 
FRPHRXWDQG\RXWKLQN³ZRZ´\RXNQRZWKH\¶UHstunning but then you feel a bit 
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empty inside ± G¶\RXNQRZZKDW ,PHDQ"± DOPRVW LW¶V MXVW EHHQ OLNH VKHOOV RI
technicians that have been putting the piece across. [Rhianna] 
 
7KHQRWLRQRI µPDNLQJVKDSHV¶ZKHUH WKHIRFXV LVRQ WKHRXWHUVKHOORUVKDSHRI the 
dancer rather than meaning and intentionality behind the movement can therefore be 
linked, like the process of taking correction, to an interruption of the transcendent 
DFWLYLW\RIGDQFH,QWKHIROORZLQJFKDSWHURQµ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶,ZLOOIXUWKHUH[SORUe how 
dancers experience the interruption of transcendence when they focus on mirror 
images of their movement rather than their internal sense of their own moving bodies. 
The distinction between transcendence and immanence for the dancer, and that 
between focussing on the outer shape and the inner sense of the movement, is 
however ambiguous or fluid for the dancers as they rely heavily on mirrors and other 
images during their training and the processes of learning a choreography, and both 
must feed into each other, as I will discuss further in the next chapter. 
 
1HYHUWKHOHVVLWZDVFOHDUWKDWRQWKHZKROHµPDNLQJVKDSHV¶ZDVVHHQDVDQHJDWLYHRU
DWOHDVWLQVXIILFLHQWVWDWHIRUWKHGDQFHUZKLOHJHWWLQJDPRYHPHQWµLQWRWKHERG\¶ZDV
a clear goal for all the dancers interviewed. The process of actually getting a 
PRYHPHQW µLQWR WKH ERG\¶ ZDV KRZHYHU GLIIHUHQW IRU WKH GLIIHUHQW GDQFHUV DV LV
illustrated in this quote from Christina:  
 
,ILQGLWTXLWHHDV\WRORRNDWVRPHRQHGDQFHDQGLQWHUSUHWZKDWWKH\¶UH± I can 
ORRNDWZKDW WKH\¶UHGRLQJDQGGR LWTXLWHHDVLO\P\VHOIZKHUHDVVRPHGDQFHUV
find it a little bit more difficult to pick up ± you know ± H[DFWO\ ZKDW WKH\¶UH
GRLQJ %XW RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG LW¶V QRW DOZD\V D JRRG WKLQJ EHFDXVH WKH
FKRUHRJUDSKHU¶VZDQWLng you to do it in your own way whereas I find it easy to 
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copy a body, but not necessarily to copy a movement and put it into my own ± my 
own way of moving. I think that comes afterwards ± like I find it easy to watch 
VRPHRQHGDQFHDQGWKLQN³WKDWIRRWJRHVWKHUHWKHKDQGJRHVWKHUH´DQG,FDQ
TXLWHHDVLO\GRWKDWDQGWKHQDIWHU,¶YHGRQHLWDIHZWLPHVDQGJRWWKHPRYHPHQW
pattern then I can concentrate on making it my own. [Christina]  
 
Here Christina refers to picking up as an initial stage where there is more emphasis on 
copying the steps or shapes, after which she can begin to work on getting the 
movement into her body in the fuller sense through a process of incorporating this 
QHZSDWWHUQRIPRYHPHQWLQWRKHUµRZQZD\RIPRYLQJ¶RULQWRKHUFRUSRUHDl schema.  
 
In contrast to the process that Christina describes, most of the dancers considered their 
OHDUQLQJ SURFHVV WR EH PRUH µRUJDQLF¶ PHDQLQJ WKDW WKH\ ZHUH DEOH WR DGDSW WKH
movement to fit their bodies at the same time as adapting their bodies to perform the 
new movement. Christina herself signals that this is in fact the preferred way of 
working with respect to what the choreographer wants the dancer to do, and my 
interviewees emphasised that the more organic approach was generally thought of as 
tKHEHVWZD\IRUDGDQFHUWROHDUQDPRYHPHQWLQVXFKDZD\WKDWZRXOGµJHWLWLQWRWKH
ERG\¶UDWKHUWKDQWKHGDQFHUPHUHO\OHDUQLQJWRµPDNHVKDSHV¶ 
 
Most of my interviewees were, therefore, resistant to the idea that there were clearly 
defined stages in the learning process where steps were learnt first in isolation and 
WKHQWKHIHHOLQJRUPHDQLQJZDVVRPHKRZµSXWRQWRS¶7KLVUHVLVWDQFHPLJKWKDYHLQ
part, been due to a wish to distance themselves from characterisation as the type of 
dancer who just µPDGHVKDSHV¶DQGWKRVHGDQFHUVOLNH&KULVWLQDZKRGLGVXJJHVWWKDW
there was a stage in the learning that was just about copying rather than adapting the 
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movement were always keen to emphasise that this was only an initial stage in the 
learning process or that it was only appropriate for particular choreographies where 
the choreographer was felt to have more of an architectural approach to constructing 
shapes with the dancers¶ bodies than a focus on the meaning and intention behind the 
movements. Rhianna describes how in such pieces:  
 
,W¶VDORWDERXWIRUPVRLQWKDWVHQVH,GRWKLQN³+RZKLJK¶VP\OHJ"´³,VP\
OHJKLJKHQRXJK"´³:KDW¶VWKHOLQHWKDWSHRSOHDUHVHHLQJ"´³,VP\OHJRQWKDW
OLQH"´>5KLDQQD@ 
 
She makes it clear that this is not, however, normally her primary focus. 
 
After asking questions about learning movement that were primarily focussed on the 
physical and practical aspects of seeing and doing ± copying and repeating ± 
PRYHPHQW,ZDVLQWHUHVWHGLQJRLQJRQIURPWDONDERXWµSLFNLQJXS¶DQGµJHWWLQJWKH
PRYHPHQWLQWRWKHERG\¶WRDVNP\LQWHUYLHZHHVDERXWµKRZWKHPHDQLQJJRWLQWRWKH
PRYHPHQWV¶ ,Q UHDFWLRQ WR P\ DVNLQJ ZKHWKHU WKLV DVSHFW ZDV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW
occurred after the movement had been learnt, most of the dancers expressed a level of 
surprise and told me that the processes of coming to know and understand the 
movement physically and coming to understand the meaning of the movement were, 
if not simultaneous, very closely related and necessarily intertwined.  
 
The surprise that the dancers expressed in relation to the idea that one could learn a 
movement physically without thinking at all about its meaning suggests that the 
µRUJDQLF¶PRGHORIOHDUQLQJLVFORVHUWRWKHLUH[SHULHQFHVWKDQDPRGHOZKLFKFOHDUO\
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distinguishes between learning steps or shapes and afterwards adding some additional 
sense of what they mean or why you are doing them. As Marco says:  
 
<RX FDQ EH DVNHG ³WKURZ \RXUVHOI WR \RXU NQHHV QRZ´ ± you must give me a 
reason for throwing myself to my knees ± you know what I mean? ± \RXFDQ¶W
simply be asked ± you know ± ³VSLQRQ\RXUKHDGDQGWKHQEOLQN\RXr OHIWH\H´ ± 
why am I doing that? [Marco]  
 
Anna is representative of most of the dancers interviewed when she describes her 
experience of learning a new pattern of movement in terms of a gradual assimilation 
RIDOOWKHGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVµHYHU\WKLQJWRJHWKHU¶  
 
For me it happens kind of slowly ± everything together ± I mean obviously I 
GRQ¶W WKLQN D SLHFH FDQ PHDQ PXFK IURP WKH YHU\ ILUVW WLPH ZKHQ , ZKHQ
somebody shows me the steps but I still, I do still like to start ± OHW¶VVD\ZHKDYH
a first day ± I go home and when I think of the steps I kind of start, kind of ± you 
know ± MXVWWRVWDUWWKLVWKLQNLQJSURFHVV³ZHOOZKDW¶VWKHTXDOLW\"´± WKDW¶VD
good word ± ³ZKDW¶VWKHTXDOLW\KHUHIRUWKHIRUWKHVWHSV"´>$QQD@ 
 
Indeed even where the choreographer did not prioritise or perhaps was not explicit 
about the meaning of a particular sequence of movement, dancers emphasised that if 
they were to perform a movement it would have to have some meaning for them, even 
if it was not a meaning that the choreographer had intended. Michaela describes how 
ZLWKRQHZRUNZKHUHWKHFKRUHRJUDSKHU¶VLQWHQWLRQZDVQRWDYDLODEOHWRKHUVKH 
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«found some other way of finding out what it was about and just from like the 
movement and stuff, what was going on, I found like, with me and Steven we do a 
OLWWOHGXHWDQGZHGHFLGHGWKDWZH¶UHVWDJVEDWWOLQJHDFKRWKHUEHFDXVHWKHUH¶VD
OLQNLQJWKLQJDQGZHGHFLGHGZH¶UHVWDJVZH¶UHMXVWVWDJV and that was my story 
IRUWKHZKROHWKLQJ«DQGLWPDNHVVHQVHWRPHDQGLWEULQJVDQDWPRVSKHUHWR
the stage. [Michaela] 
 
When a dancer learns a pattern of movement, then, part of that process (although it 
may not be prioritised for all dancers in the very early stages of learning) is about the 
mutual adaptation of the movement to the body and the body to the movement which 
LV GHVFULEHG DV DQ RUJDQLF OHDUQLQJ SURFHVV :LWKRXW WKLV LW LV SRVVLEOH WR µSLFN XS¶
GDQFHVWHSVEXWQRWWRJHWWKHPRYHPHQWVµLQWRWKHERG\¶RULQWRWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD
which is the final goal in learning dance. I will discuss this process of mutual 
adaptation further in the following section, but for now would like to emphasise the 
fact that learning is not simply about the steps for the dancers. Rather the process of 
learning a pattern of movement requires adopting and adapting the movement in a 
way which goes beyond the mechanical copying of shapes to include a sense of the 
quality or feel of the movement and a sense of the meaning of movement. 
 
Furthermore, it was noted that once a pattern of movement has been incorporated into 
the corporeal schema it becomes possible for the dancer to adapt the movement or 
improvise in the same style without the need for conscious reflection on the nature of 
the style and the types of movements it encompasses. Thus one dancer described how 
being able to pick up movements quickly from a choreographer becomes easier over 
WLPHDVKHLQFRUSRUDWHGPRUHRIWKHWHDFKHU¶VSDWWHUQVRIPRYHPHQWLQWRKLVFRUSoreal 
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schema and thus developed a feel for the style that allowed him to understand how 
new movements might arise and how they would be connected to each other:  
 
The more you work with somebody, the easier that becomes because you 
understand their style, \RXFDQDOPRVWVHFRQGJXHVVZKDWLWLVWKH\¶UHJRLQJWREH
doing next. [Daniel]  
 
µ*HWWLQJ D PRYHPHQW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ RU FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD WKXV LQFOXGHG VRPHWKLQJ
more than the pattern of the steps so that the dancer has a practical sense of the 
movement which allows them to anticipate or µVHFRQG JXHVV¶ ZKDW ZLOO FRPH QH[W
while they are in the process of working with a choreographer. This practical sense is 
also experienced by dancers as an inclination about whether something is wrong or 
right ± whether the movement they have improvised or recalled is in the appropriate 
style or not, for example ± but this judgement does not necessarily correspond with a 
conscious awareness or reflective process, rather it is available at a pre-reflective level 
becoming available as a tacit sense of appropriateness as the movement is actually 
being performed. 
 
Learning dance, for these professionals, does not, therefore, fit with the mechanist 
picture of habit formation which postulates a stimulus-response reflex without 
allowing for notions of meaningfulness or intention. Dance is not understood by its 
practitioners as mechanical physical movements, but rather as phrases of meaning and 
any account of learning dance movements needs to allow for the intentionality and 
meaningfulness which is integral to the movements themselves as the dancers learn 
WKHPDQGLQFRUSRUDWHWKHPµLQWRWKHERG\¶RUFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD 
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'DQFHPRYHPHQWVRQFHµLQWKHERG\¶RUFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD, are inherently intentional 
and meaningful (aspects that would traditionally be associated with the mental rather 
than the physical, the mind rather than the body), then, but, contrary to the 
intellectualist picture of propositional learning and knowledge, the dancer¶s 
NQRZOHGJHRIWKHVHPRYHPHQWVLVFRQVLGHUHGWREHµLQWKHERG\¶DQGRIWHQDSSHDUVWR
be pre-reflective.  
 
Knowledge of dance is pre-reflective not only in the sense that the dancers do not 
need to or have time to think about the steps in a learnt choreography:   
 
« VRPH SDUWV RI LW DUH YHU\ IDVW DQG XQOHVV LW¶V LQ WKH ERG\ ± once you start 
having to think about the next step ± \RX¶UHJRLQJWREHEHKLQG. [Anthony] 
 
 But also in the sense that RIWHQWKH\DFWXDOO\GRQ¶WNQRZWKHPLQDUHIOHFWLYHVHQVH 
 
I just remember points as in I remember the leg going there and then that will 
OLQNZLWKZKDW¶VFRPLQJQH[WZKLFKZRXOGQ¶WGLUHFWO\PHDQWKHQH[WVWHSEXWMXVW
something in the next phrase. [Adam]  
 
Thus the dancer cannot actually say what the next step is, this knowledge is purely µin 
the body¶:  
 
It is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is 
made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort. (from Merleau-
Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, quoted in Crossley, 2001:127)  
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Dancers must therefore perform the dance in order to access their bodily knowledge 
of the sequence.  
 
Additionally it may be that other contextual elements such as music are required to 
prompt the bodily memory in ways that cannot be achieved by simply trying to reflect 
mentally on what comes next. With these contextual cues dancers described how it 
was often possible to perform patterns or phrases of movement which they had learnt 
a long time ago and where they no longer had any conscious memory of the sequence 
of steps. Anna describes this phenomenon in the following quote:  
 
, WKLQNWKHPXVFOHPHPRU\WDNHVRYHUOLNHHPOHW¶VVD\WKDWZH¶UHGRLQJVRPH
SLHFHV IURP ODVW \HDU DQG LW¶V UHDOO\ TXLWH KDUG WR GR ZLWKRXW ± if you put the 
music on you almost go into a different world and you start dancing it ± but 
ZLWKRXW WKHPXVLF LI VRPHERG\DVNV\RX³ZHOOZKDWKDSSHQVDIWHU WKLV"´ ± no 
idea ± you stop kind of ± VR,WKLQNLWLVLQ\RXUERG\LW¶VNLQGRIDVDZKROHDQG
the music is, well for me personally, is quite an important part of it ± the rhythm 
RILWDQG,PHDQWKHPXVLFJLYHVDFHUWDLQDWPRVSKHUHVRLW¶VLWVRPHKRZFOLFNV
into your kind of brain in a certain way ± em, yeah, I would say that it comes 
back to you as a whole ± there might be some blanks, but the parts that come to 
you, they kind of come whole. [Anna] 
 
Learning dance is thus about the formation of bodily know-how or a practical sense 
ZKLFKFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGWRJLYHWKHGDQFHUµDSHUVSHFWLYDOJUDVSRQWKHZRUOGIURP
WKHSRLQWRIYLHZRIWKHERG\¶&URVVOH\7KLVWDFLWNnowledge is therefore 
accessed not through conscious reflection but rather through bodily engagement with 
a situation or environment such as hearing a phrase of music or beginning a 
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previously learnt sequence of movement which signals in some way that the learnt 
pattern of movement is a suitable action for that situation.  
 
Bodily knowledge thus guides the dancer on to what comes next in the pattern of 
movement through immediate pre-reflective bodily engagement or interaction with 
the current environment or situation rather than relying on the dancer reflecting on the 
situation. This pre-reflective immediacy is captured by the notion used by a number of 
WKHGDQFHUVRIµEHLQJLQWKHPRPHQW¶'DQFHUVVHHPHGWRVWUXJJOHWRH[SODLQH[DFWO\
what they meant by thiV RU ZKDW LW ZDV OLNH WR µEH LQ WKH PRPHQW¶ SUHVXPDEO\
because it was not a state normally associated with reflective thought. Louisa 
describes it as:  
 
,QVWHDGRIWU\LQJWRWKLQNRIWKHZKROHSLHFHLI,OLYHLQWKDWPRPHQWDQGLW¶V± the 
first thing I have to do is step on stage and if I do that one hundred percent in the 
PRPHQWWKHQLWJLYHVLWIXOOYDOXH«DQGWKDW¶VQRWDOZD\VHDV\,PHDQ\RXPLJKW
KDYH SDUW RI WKH SLHFH WKDW \RX¶UH SDUWLFXODUO\ FRQFHUQHG DERXW EXW , WKLQN
ZKHQHYHU,¶YHGRQH± and iW¶VZRUNHG± MXVWWREHLQWKDWPRPHQWGRQ¶WRYHUGR
LWGRQ¶WWKLQNDERXWZKDW¶VFRPLQJQH[WMXVWGRWKHWKLQJ>/RXLVD@ 
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III: Stylistic Variation, or How Movement is Different in Different Bodies 
 
Practical know-how, then, is necessarily perspectival in that it is situated in and 
DFFHVVHG WKURXJK WKH LQGLYLGXDO GDQFHU¶V ERG\ DQG FDQQRW EH FRQFHSWXDOLVHG
abstracted from the position and interaction of that particular body in the world. Thus 
while it is possible to transfer certain aspects of bodily knowledge between bodies, the 
knowledge, or rather the practice or movement that that knowledge entails does not 
have a form other than its manifestation in bodily action. Movement is thus not 
something that takes form in a GDQFHU¶VERG\LW LVVRPHWKLQJWKDW takes form in this 
particular GDQFHU¶VERG\7KLVPRYHPHQWFDQWKHQEHFRSLHGE\DQRWKHUGDQFHUZKR
PXVWJR WKURXJKD OHDUQLQJSURFHVV LQRUGHU WRJHW WKHPRYHPHQW µLQWR WKHERG\¶RU
corporeal schema which involves adapting it to their body. Thus as Louisa explains in 
relation to learning a choreography that has been developed or made with other 
dancers:  
 
,I LW¶VPDGHRQVRPHERG\HOVHDQGWKH\KDYHDZKROHKLVWRU\RIZK\WKH\PDGH
WKRVHPRYHPHQWV\RXNLQGRIJHWLWVHFRQGKDQGDQG,WKLQNLWWDNHV«ORQJHU to 
sit on your body. [Louisa] 
 
It has been seen above that new actions or behaviours such as working with a different 
choreographer can shape the actions and habits of a dancer allowing them to pick up 
new choreographies or styles and incorporate them into the corporeal schema so that 
they become second nature to perform. It should not, however, be assumed that the 
transmission of these habits of movement between dancers involves the perpetual 
UHSURGXFWLRQ RI VRPH NLQG RI µRULJLQDO¶ IRUP RI WKH PRYHPHQW DFUoss the different 
dancers. The embodied nature of dance and the transfer of practical knowledge 
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discussed above mean that the learning of movements in dance is a process of 
learning a bodily way of being or bodily attitude towards the world from another 
dancer.  
 
In learning a movement the dancer is therefore required to deal with and perhaps take 
RQDVSHFWVRIDQRWKHUGDQFHU¶VHPERGLPHQW7KLVFDQDGGDQRWKHUOD\HURIGLIILFXOW\WR
the problem of picking up movement from another moving body, particularly where 
the differences between the two bodies are in some way extreme or insurmountable. 
This is illustrated in the following quote from a male dancer discussing the Graham 
technique, created by Martha Graham:  
 
«HVSHFLDOO\ IRUD ORWRIJX\VHVSHFLDOO\*UDham because it was created by a 
ZRPHQPD\EHDORWRIPDOHVGRQ¶WUHDOO\DSSUHFLDWHLWRUXQGHUVWDQGLWEHFDXVH
it is very, quite feminine, because obviously the feminine body is quite different 
WRWKHPDOHVRLW¶VJRLQJWREHRSHQWRFHUWDLQH[HUFLVHVDbit different. [Anthony]  
 
It was noted, then, that the dancers placed a great deal of importance on the actual 
process of how a movement had been made. Choreographers do not generally produce 
movements in the abstract ± this is particularly true in contemporary dance where the 
style and range of movements is far less defined than, for example, classical ballet and 
thus cannot be evoked in the classical vocabulary of pirouette, arabesque, pas de 
chat, etc± but create movements while they are working with particular dancers in 
particular companies. It was understood, then, that these movements would reflect 
VRPHWKLQJRIWKHGDQFHURUWKHERG\WKHPRYHPHQWKDGEHHQFUHDWHGµRQ¶ 
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The majority of my interviewees stated a strong preference for having the 
choreographer come in to the company and make the work on their bodies as they 
generally felt that trying to get movements created on other dancers into their bodies 
was a difficult and time-consuming and often boring exercise which rarely produced 
results of a quality comparable to works produced in situ. This is seen in the following 
quote from Suzi who describes one of the reasons she prefers to have the 
choreographer come to the company to create a piece:  
 
:KHQWKHFKRUHRJUDSKHUFRPHVLQDQGZH¶UHVWDUWLQJ from afresh then you can 
put your own ideas and then have the movement to your body rather than trying 
WRSLFN LWXS IURPVRPHRQHHOVH¶VPRYHPHQWEHFDXVHWKH\¶YHREYLRXVO\PDGH LW
XSSUHYLRXVO\VRLWVRPHWLPHVPD\EHDZNZDUGHVSHFLDOO\LI\RX¶UHZRUNLQJwith 
SDUWQHUVDQGWKH\¶UHGLIIHUHQWKHLJKWVDQGVWXIIOLNHWKDW>6X]L@ 
 
The only exceptions to this general trend of preferring to be present during the 
FUHDWLYHSURFHVVDQGKDYHWKHPRYHPHQWPDGHRQWKHGDQFHU¶VRZQERG\FDPHIURP
those dancers who found improvisation difficult and preferred to be told exactly what 
to do. This quote from Carrie suggests a link between this preference and her training 
in classical ballet which will be further explored below in my discussion of the lasting 
effects of trainLQJRQDGDQFHU¶FRUSRUHDOVFKHPD 
 
I find it very hard to improvise ± maybe because of the background ± ,¶YHPDLQO\
been told what to do. [Carrie] 
 
,WLVLPSRUWDQWWKHQQRWWRFRQVLGHUDGDQFHU¶VERG\DVDWDEXODUDVD)RUHDFKGDQFHU
some things are harder to learn than others, as one dancer expressed:  
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7KHUHZLOOEHVRPH WKLQJV WKDW\RX MXVWFDQ¶WJHW \RXNQRZPD\EHEHFDXVHRI
how your body is. [Adam]  
 
In contrast to theories of bodily inscription such as that of Foucault, the concept of the 
corporeal schema does allow for the materiality of the body citing our physical 
µEXPSLQJLQWR¶REMHFWVLQRXUHQYLURQPHQWDVIRUPDWLYH,QGHHGWKHQRWLRQWKDWWKHUH
were some things about the body that did not or could not be changed was pervasive, 
although not XQTXDOLILHGDPRQJWKHGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWV7KXVIRUH[DPSOHRQHGDQFHU
who had taken a complete break from dance for ten years had been able to re-join a 
professional company at an age beyond the usual retirement age for dancers and 
HIIHFWLYHO\ µSLFN XS ZKHUH KH OHIW RII¶ 7KLV ZDV ZLGHO\ UHJDUGHG DV TXLWH DPD]LQJ
ZLWKLQ WKH FRPSDQ\ DV LW LV YHU\ HDV\ WR µORVH \RXU IRUP¶ DV D SURIHVVLRQDO GDQFHU
when you are away from the company environment or not training on a daily basis. It 
was not unusual that this dancer explained the relative ease with which he had been 
DEOH WR UHWDNH KLV UROH LQ WKH FRPSDQ\ LQ WHUPV RI KLV ERG\¶V QDWXUDO IDFLOLWLHV IRU
dance:  
 
, ZDV TXLWH IOH[LEOH DV D NLG DQG ZKDW KDYH \RX VR LW¶V QRW VRPHWKLQJ WKDW ,
particularly will lose ± I thLQN,ZLOODOZD\VEHTXLWHIOH[LEOHZLWKP\ERG\«,¶P
TXLWH IRUWXQDWH WKDW ,¶YH JRW D ERG\ WKDW , FDQ HDVLO\ MXVW JR EDFN LQWR LW
[Anthony]  
 
Being aware from my pilot interviews of various sayings such as that being a dancer 
is ten percent talent and ninety percent hard work, I was therefore interested in the 
H[WHQW WR ZKLFK P\ LQWHUYLHZHHV FRQVLGHUHG WKDW WKH GDQFLQJ ERG\ ZDV µERUQ¶ RU
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µPDGH¶7KHTXHVWLRQVWKDW,DVNHGLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWhis were generally formulated 
around issues of whether some peopOHZHUHµPRUHQDWXUDOO\GDQFHUV¶WKDQRWKHUVDQG
of whether training was enough to make a good dancer or if there was something else 
necessary. Interestingly, because of the elite nature of the group I was interviewing 
there was a general scepticism about whether training could really make a good 
dancer in the fuller sense ± the dancers commonly cited examples of people they had 
trained with who had been technically excellent but lacked some kind of personal 
quality which gave the very best dancers their appeal. For example, Rhianna 
GHVFULEHGKRZVKHGLGQ¶WIHHOWHFKQLTXHDORQHZDVHQRXJK  
 
1R,WKLQNWKHUH¶VVRPHWKLQJH[WUD,WKLQN\RXVHHDORWRISHRSOHZLWKWKHERG\
IRUGDQFLQJDQG WKH WHFKQLTXHEXW WKDW¶V OLNHDOO WKHUHZDV WHFKQLTXHDQGWKH
body DQGWKDW¶VDOOWKHUHZDVMXVWWKLQNLQJDERXWRQHJLUOWKHUHZDVTXLWHDIHZ
girls, there was no like, to watch them was like watching an empty vessel, 
QRWKLQJ EHKLQG WKH H\HV WKHUH¶V QR VSDUN WKHUH¶V QR DQJHU WKHUH¶V QR ,
definitely think it takes something special. [Rhianna]  
 
There was also talk of performances that the dancers had seen as audience members 
ZKHUH WKH FDVW KDG GLVSOD\HG WKLV µHPSW\¶ WHFKQLFDO EULOOLDQFH DQG ZHUH WKXV QRW
considered natural dancers by my elite interviewees. 
 
The question of being a natural dancer was thus often answered in terms of the person 
± evidence of a particular connection with the audience, the music, and the meaning 
of the movement, for example ± rather than in physical terms alone. It was, however, 
widely acknowledged that bodies had natural facilities and limitations:  
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7KHUH¶VWKLQJVWKDWVRPHSHRSOHDUHDOZD\VVWXFNZLWK«,UHDOO\UHDOO\VWUXJJOH
with flexibility ± ,PHDQ,¶PDORWPRUHIOH[LEOHWKDQ,XVHGWREHEXWVWLOO,UHDOO\
struggle ± «,DOZD\VSXOl my hamstrings. [Rhianna]  
 
These different natural abilities were linked by Carrie to a notion of being better at 
certain movements in her description of a non-professional classical ballet class she 
had recently attended:  
 
The ones who really stood out at the adage ± the slow extensions of the leg ± the 
RQHVWKDWZHUHEHWWHUKDGWKHQDWXUDOIDFLOLW\LQWKHKLSVZKLFK\RX¶UHERUQZLWK
DQG WKHPRELOLW\RIWKHEDFN LVJHQHWLFHWFHWHUDVR WKDW¶VD ORW WRGRZLWK LWDV
well. [Carrie]   
 
Interestingly, howevHU PRVW RI WKH GDQFHUV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI WKH GLIIHUHQW QDWXUDO
facilities for movement of different bodies were not necessarily linked to notions of 
being better or worse at executing pre-defined movements, but rather to ideas about 
how movements were neFHVVDULO\ GLIIHUHQW RQ GLIIHUHQW SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV 7KXV RQH
dancer described how  
 
«GLIIHUHQWSHRSOH¶VERGLHV«ZLOOZDQWWRGRVRPHWKLQJVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWDJDLQ
because maybe that feels better or maybe they have a clearer pathway to a 
certain area of thH ERG\ ZKLFK WKH\¶OO DFFHQWXDWH RU WKH DFFHQW ZLOO EH LQ D
slightly different place depending on their own interpretation of the form. 
[Steven]  
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,WZDVQRWKRZHYHUFRQVLGHUHGWKDWDGDQFHU¶VLQGLYLGXDOVW\OHRIPRYHPHQWFRXOGEH
wholly explained by such (innate) physical aspects as body shape and flexibility. The 
concept of the corporeal schema allows not only that movements carry the histories of 
their (re)production with them, but that the history of the body is also manifest in the 
way that new movements are perceived, learned and carried out. 
 
In the course of my conversations with the dancers about how movements were 
different on different bodies or how different people had different natural facilities for 
movement, I questioned my interviewees about whether some movements or styles of 
PRYHPHQW 
IHOWEHWWHUWKDQRWKHUV¶DQGZLWKWKRVHZKRZHUHLQWHUHVWHGLQWDNLQJXS
this theme, why they thought this was. A number of the dancers answered these 
questions in terms of commenting on which types of movePHQWIHOWPRUHµQDWXUDO¶WR
them, for example, Carrie describes how  
 
« EHFDXVH ,¶P PDLQO\ FODVVLFDOO\ WUDLQHG ± VR ,¶YH GRQH D ORW RI EDOOHW ± the 
O\ULFDOJUDFHIXOVWXII LVPRUHVXLWHGWRPH WKDQVRPHVW\OHVRIFRQWHPSRUDU\«
,¶PPRUHQDWXUDOZLWKWKHIORwing stuff than with the staccato stuff. [Carrie]   
 
&DUULHWKXVHYRNHVDQRWLRQWKDWVRPHVW\OHVRIPRYHPHQWDUHPRUHµQDWXUDOO\VXLWHG¶
to her as a classically trained dancer than others. Her dancing body is experienced by 
KHUDVD µFODVVLFDOO\ WUDLQHG¶GDQFLQJERG\DQG WKXVDVDERG\ZLWKFHUWDLQ µQDWXUDO¶
tendencies (towards flowing graceful movement, for example). Her classical training 
has been incorporated into her corporeal schema and affects how she experiences 
dance ±in terms of whether something is suited to or natural for her or not ± and how 
she experiences her body.  
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7KRPDV FRPPHQWV WKDW µWKH LQGLYLGXDO VW\OHV DQG WHFKQLTXHV RI PRGHUQ GDQFH
choreographers [e.g. the Graham or Cunningham techniques] do not necessarily look 
right on ballet dancers ZKRVH ERGLHV DUH VR GHHSO\ PDUNHG E\ WKHLU WUDLQLQJ¶
(Thomas, 2003:112). This appears to resonate with a trend for those of my 
interviewees who were classically trained to experience their dancing bodies as 
classical trained bodies. Daniel, for example, describes his experience of an aspect of 
contemporary dance ± lowering his centre of gravity ± that he believes his classical 
training leads him to experience as problematic:  
 
«because I trained in ballet I find it quite hard to let go of my body ± ballHW¶V
quite a rigid technique, it has quite a lot of line in it, it has quite a lot of clarity in 
LWEXWVRPHWLPHVLW¶VKDUGWRGURSWKHZHLJKW>'DQLHO@ 
 
It should not be imagined, however, that the difficulties experienced by the classically 
trained dancer are unique. Indeed Thomas draws attention to the fact that while 
FRQWHPSRUDU\ GDQFHUV DUH µLQFUHDVLQJO\ UHTXLUHG WR KDYH ³IOH[LEOH´ ERGLHV WKDW FDQ
DGDSWWRWKHGHPDQGVRIGLIIHUHQWFKRUHRJUDSKLFVW\OHV¶ (Thomas, 2003:112), it is also 
true that:  
 
«Xntil recently modern dancers tended to be trained in a particular 
FKRUHRJUDSKHU¶VVW\OHRUWHFKQLTXH>DQGWKDW@«VSHFLILFPRGHUQWHFKQLTXHV>HJ
WKH*UDKDPRU&XQQLQJKDPWHFKQLTXHV@«FDQDOVRPDUNWKHERGLHVRIGDQFHUV
so thoroughly that they might not be able to adapt to another modern dance style. 
(Thomas, 2003:112)  
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Thus contemporary dance training can also lead a dancer to find particular styles or 
SDWWHUQVRIPRYHPHQWPRUHRUOHVVµQDWXUDO¶ 
 
I was therefore interested in the extent to which all my interviewees considered that 
personal style was the product of training background. I asked the dancers where they 
WKRXJKWSHUVRQDOVW\OHµFDPHIURP¶LQPRVWFDVHVTXDOLI\LQJWKHTXHVWLRQLQWHUPVRI
whether they thought it was to do with body shape or training, or perhaps something 
else. These suggestions ± training and body shape ± were either subsumed into a 
wider understanding: µ, WKLQNLW¶VHYHU\WKLQJ\RX¶YHKDGDORQJWKHZD\¶>'DQLHO@ or 
dismissed as not sufficient to account for variation in style:  
 
, WKLQN LW¶V SHUVRQDO WR WKH LQGLYLGXDO ±  like say if two people came from the 
same college who had the same training ± they could be completely different 
styles ± LW¶VQRW VRPHWKLQJ WKDW¶V WUDLQHGRUDQ\WKLQJ LW¶V MXVWVRPHWKLQJ WKDW¶V
comes from you, ZLWKRXW\RXWKLQNLQJDERXWLWLW¶OOFRPHWKURXJK>7DUD@  
 
Another dancer offered some suggestions of the factors that she considered had 
contributed to her own particular style or bodily way of being, explaining:  
 
I think mine comes from my actual persoQDOLW\DQGZKDW,¶YHGRQHLQWKHSDVW± 
not necessarily dance ± but I think with all the net-ball training and gymnastics 
and athletics and all that kind of thing plus other things that have gone on in my 
life as well ± WKDW¶VDOOEHFRPHSDUWRIPHDQGWKDW¶VFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHZD\WKDW,
have my own individual presence on stage. [Michaela]  
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In contrast to this, however, one dancer remarked, although perhaps rather flippantly 
as he goes on to describe his own individual patterns of movement based around a 
reliance on strength work later in the conversation: µ, WKLQN P\ QDWXUDO UK\WKP KDV
EHHQ EHDWHQ RXW RI PH ZLWK WHFKQLTXH¶ >-DPLH@ Thus there seem to be range of 
factors, including training, which interact to influence the styles of these dancers. 
 
In the following interview excerpt, I try to understand these how the influence of these 
different factors is experienced by the dancers during their everyday practice of dance 
by asking Rhianna  about what it feels like to do different techniques. She evokes a 
number of different factors that she considers determine which techniques or styles of 
movement are preferred by herself and others:  
 
$3'¶\RXWKLQNVRPHRIWKHWHFKQLTXHVMXVWVXLW\RXUERG\EHWWHU" 
 
Rhianna: Yeah, definitely, I mean I used to, oh God ± I used to be awful at 
Graham [contemporary dance technique@ ,¶P VWLOO QRWJRRGEXW , FDQPDQDJH
now, I can get through the exercises, I can sort of, I understand but oh God ± I 
used to be terrible, and on a Friday sometimes we used to do like a standing 
class ± ZHZRXOGQ¶WGRDQ\IORRUZRUN± and that was so much easier, so much, 
EXWWKDW¶VEHFDXVHRIWKHODFNRIIOH[LELOLW\%XW\HDK,WKLQNFHUWDLQSHRSOHVXLW
FHUWDLQEXWDOVR,WKLQNLW¶VKDELWWKDWPDNHVWKDWVRUWRIVHWVWKDWKDELWRIZKDW
you do. 7KHUH¶VDOVR,PHDQQDWXUDOO\VRPHSHRSOHPRYHIDVWHUDQGVRPHPRYH
slower and some prefer like, like I think Cunningham [technique] is quite sort of 
XQQDWXUDO,WKLQNLW¶VVRUWRITXLWHURERWLFDQGUHDOO\IXQQ\FR-ordination and I 
think you have to fight, for me I have to fight against naturally what I feel is ± 
you know ± movement, not movement but you have to, I have to really 
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concentrate on the co-ordination of those, whereas Graham I really understand 
the co-ordination in that, I really feel it in my body, I feel that easy ± the patterns 
DQG WKH ZD\ WKLQJV ILW WRJHWKHU , GRQ¶W , UHDOO\ VWUXJJOH ZLWK DQ H[HUFLVH
sometimes, especially the floor-ZRUN EXW WKHQ ,¶YH GRQH PRUH *UDKDP WKDQ
&XQQLQJKDP,GRQ¶WNQRZ\HDK,WKLQNFHUWDLQSHRSOHMXVW ± different types of 
action. 
 
AP: Yeah, and is that just to do with sort of body shape and flexibility? 
 
5KLDQQD,WKLQNLW¶VDELWRIERWK± like for me the co-RUGLQDWLRQWKLQJLVQ¶WUHDOO\
DERXWERG\VKDSHRUIOH[LELOLW\LW¶VMXVWDERXWOLNH± I find the actual probably 
executing the movements in Cunningham easier but I prefer Graham now, I 
never used to, but I do now because I feel like it works me more deeply than the 
&XQQLQJKDP , WKLQN , WKLQND ORWRISHRSOH OLNH , WKLQN LW¶VTXLWHPHQWDOZKDW
people OLNHDQGZKDWWKH\GRQ¶WOLNH,PHDQ,NQRZDORWRISHRSOHKDWHZKDWZH
do in class and I know sometimes I get really sick of it as well, you just want 
something loose, something softer, something more released and it depends on 
your state of mind as well. 
 
Thus there is a question here about whether some patterns of movement are more 
µQDWXUDOO\ VXLWHG¶ WR DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V GDQFLQJ ERG\ WKDQ RWKHUV 5KLDQQD UHVSRQGV WR
this by citing her own problems with the Graham technique in terms of a lack of 
flexibiliW\ VRPHWKLQJ VKH KDV HDUOLHU UHPDUNHG WKDW VKH LV µVWXFN ZLWK¶ DQG µZLOO
DOZD\V VWUXJJOH ZLWK¶ KRZHYHU VKH DOVR HPSKDVHV WKH UROH RI KDELW LQ D ZD\ WKDW
suggests she is unsure which of these two factors ± natural facility for and familiarity 
with a technique ± to prioritise in her explanation.  
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Interestingly, Rhianna also explains her relationship to Graham technique, having 
spent a considerable amount of time learning it, in terms of preference and 
understanding. She goes on, in a later part of the conversation, to relate her 
µXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ RI *UDKDP WHFKQLTXH EHWWHU WKDQ &XQQLQJKDP WHFKQLTXH WR WKH IDFW
WKDW WKH *UDKDP WHFKQLTXH ZDV FUHDWHG E\ D ZRPDQ RQ D ZRPDQ¶V ERG\ ZKLOH WKH
Cunningham technique was created by a man. This type of reasoning was echoed by a 
male dancer, Anthony, who described Graham technique as more difficult to 
µDSSUHFLDWH¶RUµXQGHUVWDQG¶IRUPDOHGDQFHUVEHFDXVHLWZDVFUHDWHGE\DZRPDQRQD
ZRPDQ¶VERG\+HWKHQJRHVRQWRGHVFULEHKLVRZQUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKLVWHFKQLTXH
based on aspects of his physical build:  
 
,¶PTXLWHIRUWXQDWHLQ WKDWZD\EHFDXVH,¶YHJRWTXLWHDVOLPERG\DQGLW¶V OLNH
,¶YHJRWPRUHRIDNLQGRIOLNHDIHPDOHVOLPERG\DQGTXLWHORRVHLQWKDWNLQGRI
way ± I can probably do certain movements probably a bit better than another 
PDOHZKR¶VTXLWH\RXNQRZa very male build, so to speak. [Anthony] 
 
In an effort to make a distinction between the physical capacity that she has for the 
different techniques and what she refers to as preference for or greater understanding 
of Graham technique, Rhianna suggests that in addition to the physical aspects of 
ERG\ IOH[LELOLW\ WKHUH DUH DOVR µPHQWDO¶ IDFWRUV DW SOD\ ,QWHUHVWLQJO\ KRZHYHU VKH
OLQNVWKHµPHQWDO¶IDFWRURISUHIHUHQFHWRWKHQRWLRQWKDWVKHXQGHUVWDQGVWKH Graham 
WHFKQLTXHEHWWHUEHFDXVHLWZDVFUHDWHGE\DQGRQDZRPDQ¶VERG\7KHWUDGLWLRQDOO\
mental notion of understanding is obviously very important here, then, but it seems in 
fact to be related corporeal capacity to naturally understand some movements better 
than others because of the similarity of two female bodies. The notion of 
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µXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶LQGDQFHDVOLQNHGWRDIRUPRISK\VLFDOHPSDWK\RUWUDQVIHUHQFHZLOO
EHIXUWKHUGLVFXVVHGLQWKHFKDSWHUVRQµ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶DQGµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ 
 
Rhianna thus finds Graham more difficult than Cunningham in terms of her physical 
OLPLWDWLRQVRQIOH[LELOLW\<HWLQRWKHUZD\VVKHILQGVLWHDVLHUWRJHW*UDKDPµLQWRKHU
ERG\¶± perhaps because it was created on a body more similar to her own in that it 
was fePDOHUDWKHUWKDQPDOHZKLFKDOORZVKHUWRKDYHDJUHDWHUµXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶RILW
In addition to this she cites the fact that she is more familiar with Graham and that this 
may influence the fact that she finds Graham less unnatural than Cunningham. Indeed 
she describes how habit ± of moving in a certain way or in the style of a certain 
technique ± has made the Graham technique feel slightly easier. 
 
Both Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu consider habitual action to be the basis of our 
bodily orientation towards the ZRUOGZLWK%RXUGLHXXVLQJWKHWHUPµhabitus¶LQSODFH
RIµKDELW¶%XUNLWWVLJQDOOLQJWKDWKLVFRQFHSWJRHVEH\RQGWKHEHKDYLRXULVW
notion of habit (as does Merleau-3RQW\¶V6WHYHQ:DLQZULJKWDQG%U\DQ7XUQHUKDYH
published a series of papers (2004a; 2004b; 2006; Turner and Wainwright, 2003; 
Wainwright et al., 2005; 2006; 2007) based on empirical data from interviews 
conducted with a number of members and retired members of a classical ballet 
company (The Royal Ballet, London). In a number of these papers the authors make 
XVHRI%RXUGLHX¶VFRQFHSWRIhabitus WRH[SORUHLGHDVDURXQGEDOOHWGDQFHUV¶GLIIHUHQW
styles and the effect of, for example, training on the way a dancer is disposed to move 
and understand their body.  
 
Crossley describes an inGLYLGXDO¶Vhabitus as: 
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An active residue or sediment of their past experiences which functions within 
their present, shaping their perception, thought and action and thereby shaping 
social practice in a regular way. It consists in dispositions, schemas, forms of 
know-how and competence, all of which function below the threshold of 
consciousness, shaping it in particular ways. (Crossley, 2001:93)  
 
Wainwright and Turner further explain their use of the term thus:  
 
%DOOHW LQ %RXUGLHX¶V VRFLRORJ\ FDQ EH GHVFribed as a specific social field of 
FXOWXUDO SUDFWLFH « 7KH ILHOG LV WKH FRQWH[W ZLWKLQ ZKLFK WKH habitus of 
LQGLYLGXDOVLVIRUPHG:HGHILQH³habitus´ORRVHO\DVWKHDWWLWXGHVGLVSRVLWLRQV
and taste that individuals share as members of a field. (Wainwright and Turner, 
2004b:100-102) 
 
,Q WKLQNLQJ DERXW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V VW\OH RI GDQFH :DLQZULJKW et al. (2006; 2007) 
emphasise that they are paying particular attention to µbodily habitus¶ in the sense of 
bodily comportment and movement. This focus on µbodily habitus¶ specifically in fact 
brings the conceptual framework that Wainwright et al. work with incredibly close to 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD,QGHHG&URVVOH\VXJJHVWV
that: 
 
Though the intellectual genealogy is unclear, it is commonly held that Bourdieu 
builds upon the work of Merleau-Ponty and presupposes it in much that he 
argues. (Crossley, 2001:91) 
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The notion of bodily habitus as composed of sedimented patterns of movement and 
competence is therefore very close to the notion of corporeal schema that I have used 
so far to illuminate the embodied practice of contemporary dance. What is different, 
however, about the aim of Wainwright et al. in using the concept of habitus to 
H[DPLQHGDQFHUV¶ERGLO\EHLQJDQGP\RZQUHDVRQVIor using Merleau-Ponty, is that 
the Bourdieusian framework is more suited to an examination of social institutions 
and how the practices associated with these different social institutions mark the 
individual bodies of those involved with them. Wainwright et al. XVH %RXUGLHX¶V
sociological framework which situates habitus not only within a network of social 
divisions such as those of a class system but, more importantly they suggest for this 
analysis, within a distinct field (or fields) of cultural practice, in this case professional 
classical ballet. This offers us an understanding of how the different practices 
associated with the institution of professional classical ballet in different countries are 
VRPHKRZµZULWWHQ¶RQRUHQJUDLQHGLQWKHLQGLYLGXDOGDQFHU¶VERG\LQIOXHQFLQJKRZ
they move. 
 
This focus makes sense for the discipline of classical ballet because of the relatively 
distinct different schools of ballet associated (primarily) with different countries. Thus 
although the discipline of ballet has been around for a long time and is internationally 
recognisable because of its core movements such as the pirouette or arabesque and its 
emphasis on the aesthetics of length, gracefulness and weightlessness, Thomas points 
to differences in this bodily habitus in relation to different ballet styles which have 
emerged and been institutionalised in different countries at different points over the 
course of the history of the discipline:  
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'DQFH IRUPV RI FRXUVH GR FKDQJH RYHU WLPH DQG GDQFHUV¶ ERGLHV LQ WKHir 
idealised and realised form, are also subject to change over time. For example, 
although ballet as a form may display certain core movement values, there are 
differences in positions of the arms (ports de bras) and the shoulder movements 
(epaulement) in the Russian, French and Italian Schools of ballet technique and 
training. (Thomas, 2003:111)  
 
In contrast to this approach, I do not intend in my work here with Merleau-Ponty to 
focus on how institutionalised social practices are imprinted on dancing bodies to 
create a specific (national) type of dancing subject, but rather to explore how dancers 
experience their own dancing bodies as the seat of the sense of self and how the 
FRQWLQXRXV IRUPDWLRQ DQG GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH GDQFHUV¶ FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD ± 
particularly in relation to interaction with mirrors and other dancers as I will discuss 
in the next chapter ± is related to and underpins the development of subjectivity, 
intersubjectivity and indeed the very capacity for representation in these individuals. 
 
This is not to say, however, that there are not major overlaps between the domain of 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V LGHDV DQG WKRVH RI %RXUGLHX DQG LQGHHG WKHUH PD\ EH YHU\
interesting things to say about dance and the dancing body from a Bourdieusian 
perspective. I therefore want to briefly examine Wainwright et al.¶V %RXUGLHXVLDQ
IUDPHZRUN LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH µILHOG¶ RI FODVVLFDO EDOOHW WR KLJKOLJKW VRPH LQWHUHVWLQJ
points around the theorisation of the imprinting of institutionalised social practices on 
the body, although I argue that this framework is less adequate for contemporary 
dance than it is for classical ballet. 
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I would also emphasise here that the shaping of my own project, including the choices 
I made to study contemporary dance rather than classical and to use Merleau-Ponty 
exclusively rather than a number of body theorists, while growing primarily out of my 
pilot interview work with ballet and contemporary dancers and my reading of 
Merleau-Ponty during this process, was also influenced by my engagement with and 
critique of Wainwright et al.¶V VWXG\ 7KDW LV WR VD\ WKDW :DLQZULJKW et al.¶V ZRUN
inspired me to look closer at dance and body theory, but it was also the inadequacies 
of their work and the Bourdieusian framework that inspired me to look beyond this to 
explore how Merleau-Ponty and contemporary dance had things to say to each other 
that opened up new ways of understanding embodied being that could not otherwise 
be accessed. 
 
Wainwright et al. propose analysing classical ballet dancers in terms of three distinct 
but interrelated habitus which interact to influence dance style. They use these three 
types of habitus to explore: 
 
« WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ « LQGLYLGXDO GDQFHUV WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ RI WKH EDOOHW
company, and the dominant forms of choreography within this institutional 
VHWWLQJ¶:DLQZULJKWet al., 2007: 309-310)  
 
7KXVWKH\SURSRVHDQRWLRQRIµLQVWLWXWLRQDOhabitus¶ZKLFKLVFRQVLGHUHGWREHURRWHG
in the company in which the dancer works and has been trained, and in addition to this 
D QRWLRQ µFKoreographic habitus¶ ZKLFK UHIHUV WR WKH LQIOXHQFH WKDW GDQFLQJ EDOOHWV
which have been choreographed in a certain style by a certain choreographer or select 
group of choreographers has on how a dancer moves. The third habitus is named 
µLQGLYLGXDOhabitus¶ DQGPD\UHIHU WRDVSHFWVVXFKDV WKH LQGLYLGXDOGDQFHU¶VKHLJKW
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ZHLJKW RU VSHHG 7KLV µWULSDUWLWH GLVWLQFWLRQ¶ LV H[HPSOLILHG LQ D GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH
British ballet dancer Wayne Sleep:  
 
[HLV@VWDWXUH>¶´@VSHHGDQGKLV UHPDUNDEOHDELOLW\ WR WXUQRU KLV µLQGLYLGXDO
habitus¶ ZDV DFFHQWXDWHG E\ KLV VFKRROLQJ 5R\DO %DOOHW 6FKRRO DQG WUDLQLQJ
5R\DO%DOOHWZKLFKWRJHWKHUIRUPHGKLVµLQVWLWXWLRQDOhabitus¶7KLVZDVIXUWKHU
UHLQIRUFHGLQWKHUROHVFUHDWHGIRUKLPDWWKH5R\DO%DOOHWYLDKLVµFKRUHRJUDShic 
habitus¶HJDV.R\RODLQ$VKWRQ¶Vµ0RQWKLQWKH&RXQWU\¶:DLQZULJKWet al., 
2007: 310)  
 
In the field of classical ballet it is well recognised that an elite dancer will have a 
certain style which is generally denoted either in terms of their country or company, 
or the choreographical style in which they have been trained. Thus it is possible to 
distinguish between the styles of, for example, a Russian dancer and an English 
dancer, or, for example, an Ashton dancer and a Balanchine dancer. Within the Royal 
Ballet, then, Wainwright et al. quote one interviewee as describing how someone who 
dances in the Russian style would not be considered suitable for the corps de ballet:  
 
³If anybody, I mean however fabulous a dancer they were, if they had come 
straight from the Kirov or the Bolshoi and they were excessively, you know, 
5XVVLDQ LQ WUDLQLQJ WKHQ LW¶V VRUW RI SRLQWOHVV « WKH\¶G VWLFN RXW OLNH D VRUH
thumb´. (Wainwright et al., 2007:311) 
 
Past action ± that is, training in and experience of certain styles ± is therefore 
sedimented in or written on the dancing body in such a way that those who have 
sufficient knowledge of dance forms and techniques can recognise. Thus if a Russian 
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ballerina goes to an audition for the Royal Ballet corps de ballet, those making the 
selection will recognise her as Russian in style and training despite the fact that she 
will be asked to perform the same movements as all the other dancers at the audition. 
Furthermore it is considered that such stylistic sediments are deeply ingrained ± the 
Russian ballerina will not be selected for the corps de ballet because her style is too 
different and cannot be moulded to what is required.  
 
,WLVDOVRQRWHGWKDWWKHµLQVWLWXWLRQDOhabitus¶DQGWKHµFKRUHRJUDSKLFDOhabitus¶FDQEH
very closely linked:  
 
0DQ\ RI WKH ZRUOG¶V JUHDW GDQFH FRPSDQLHV DUH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH VW\OH RI
dance of great choreographers, for example, New York City Ballet (NYCB) with 
Balanchine, the Royal Ballet with Ashton and MacMillan. The strong 
choreographic habitus within the individual dance company has been, perhaps 
WKH PDMRU IDFWRU LQ PROGLQJ D GDQFH FRPSDQ\¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO habitus. 
(Wainwright et al., 2007:313)  
 
The English dancer, from the point of view of these Royal Ballet interviewees, is 
therefore the Ashton or Macmillan dancer, and the American or the NYCB dancer is 
the Balanchine dancer. 
 
Wainwright et al. do not fully explain the physical manifestations of these differences 
in style, although some of the interviewees quoted allude to such as aspects as a 
difference in the stiffness or looseness of the upper body, or a different use of the 
arms. One interviewee also describes the problems he had coaching a Russian guest 
soloist to dance in a MacMillan piece, explaining:  
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³,W¶VTXLWHKDUGWRJHWULGRIDOOWKDW.LURYKHURLFLVP«KHNHSWWKURZLQJDOOWKHVH
kind of heroic poses´. (Wainwright et al., 2007:315) 
 
6XFKGLIIHUHQFHVDUHGHVFULEHG LQPRUHGHWDLO LQ7KRPDV¶VGLVFXVVLRQRI FKDQJHV LQ
the technique and aesthetic of ballet. Thomas details how:  
 
Developments in dance techniques and/or training can contribute to shifts in the 
aesthetics of given genres and alterations in the physical appearance of the 
dancing body, and vice versa. Consider, for example, the soft shoulder line and 
subtle flexibility of the upper body that marked the Ashton dancer of the 1950s 
and the early 1960s, or the speed, flexibility and hyper leg extensions which have 
become the marker of the female Balanchine dancer. (Thomas, 2003:111) 
 
Thomas further emphasises that the actual physicality of the dancing body ± its shape 
and capacities ± is intimately related to the aesthetics and the technique of the dance 
style in which the dancer has been trained (Thomas, 2003:111). She quotes Melissa 
Hayden, for example, a former principle danceULQ%DODQFKLQH¶VFRPSDQ\DVVD\LQJ 
 
³<RXPDNH\RXUVHOID%DODQFKLQHEDOOHULQDE\GDQFLQJKLVEDOOHWV«<RXUOHJV
change, your body changes, you become a filly´. (Thomas, 2003:111)  
 
Thomas also notes that what is experienced as a limitation ± stiffness, for example, ± 
in one style, will be seen as beneficial in another, and that this may determine not only 
whether a dancer is suited to a particular style or not, but also how their training 
proceeds and how their body is shaped by that training (Thomas, 2003:111). 
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The experience of dancing when the habitus is perfectly fitted to the field ± an Ashton 
(trained) dancer performing an Ashton work, for example ± ZLOOEHWKDWRIDµILVKLQ
ZDWHU¶  
 
When habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a 
µILVK LQ ZDWHU¶ « LW WDNHV WKH ZRUOG DERXW LW IRU JUDQWHG %RXUGLHX DQG
Wacquant, 1992:127).  
 
In contrast to this, the non-Ashton (trained) dancer will find the demands placed upon 
them by this particular choreographic field  ± the looseness of the upper body ± 
difficult and the movements will most likely be experienced as unnatural ± they are 
not in the habit of moving in this way.  
 
In beginning to explore the actual physical manifestations of these different styles we 
reveal the complH[LWLHVRIDQDO\VLQJDGDQFHU¶VPRYHPHQWVW\OHXVLQJ:DLQZULJKWet 
al.¶V WULSDUWLWH IUDPHZRUN 1RWH IRU H[DPSOH WKDW IOH[LELOLW\ DQG VSHHG DUH ERWK
characteristics of certain styles of ballet which dancers will have been trained to 
exhibit, but they have also been related by Wainwright et al. to certain individual 
characteristics such as height in the example of the dancer Wayne Sleep. The 
distinction between what is to be thought of as individual habitus and what is to be 
thought of as institutional and/or choreographic habitus is not, then, clear-cut even for 
classical ballet where the institutional and choreographic styles are well-defined. 
 
Wainwright et al. GHVFULEH WKHLU WULSDUWLWH VWUXFWXULQJ RI WKH GDQFHU¶V habitus DV µD
corrective¶ to one of the common criticisms of Bourdieu, namely that: 
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The concept of habitus KDVDORWRIZRUNWRGRLW%RXUGLHX¶VFRQFHSWXDOVFKHPH
It is something of an overburdened concept whose meaning tends to slip, slide 
and even disappear, as it is deployed in different contexts. (Wainwright et al., 
2007:310, quoting Shilling, 1993:149)  
 
I would suggest, however, that they are in danger of  making this mistake again with 
the concept of individual habitus as it becomes merely a catch-all category for those 
aspects of a balleWGDQFHU¶VVW\OHWKDWFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGLQWHUPVRILQVWLWXWLRQDORU
choreographical habitus. 
 
The identification of and distinctions between the three types of habitus are even 
further confused if we consider applying this frame work to contemporary dance. 
Contemporary dance companies rarely have their own schools (although Rambert 
Dance Company is a notable exception), which means that the notion of dancers 
having an institutional habitus derived from schooling and professional development 
of technique all within the same company cannot be applied to the majority of 
contemporary dancers. In contrast with the Royal Ballet dancers interviewed by 
Wainwright et al., my interviewees had a wide range of backgrounds, many having 
been to contemporary dance schools, but others having been schooled in classical 
ballet.  
 
The companies from which I drew my sample of dancers also negated any notion of a 
recognisable institutional stylistic habitus as, being repertory companies, they were 
characterised by their willingness to take on a variety of works in different styles. This 
is not to say that certain contemporary dance companies do not have recognisable 
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styles related to the influence of a particular artistic director or even rehearsal director, 
but in the companies that I interviewed, people did not tend to stay in these roles for 
more than a few years and it was also extremely common for dancers to move on to 
other companies after a few years, meaning that it was highly unlikely that any one 
dancer would find themselves working with the same artistic director for any length of 
time. Even more notably it is generally the case that dancing in a contemporary 
repertory company means that the style of the different works you perform will be 
dictated by a range of different choreographers who take up residence in the company 
only for a matter of months or sometimes even weeks. 
 
Wainwright et al.¶Vframework of three types of habitus is therefore unsuitable for the 
analysis of contemporary dance because it is too rigid, both in the sense that it relies 
on the assumption that a dancer will have been consistently exposed to the same 
stylistic elements throughout his or her training and career, and that it suggests that 
these patterns, once laid down will have a distinct influence on how that dancer 
dances in the future. This is exemplified in the example given above of a when 
Russian ballerina wished to be considered for the Royal Ballet corps de ballet and it 
was considered that the Russian style was too different from the English and too 
HQJUDLQHGVRWKDWWKHGDQFHUZRXOGµVWLFNRXWOLNHDVRUHWKXPE¶ 
 
The idea that each individual dancer can be thought of as having not just one habitus, 
but a collection of different stylistic patterns and dispositions which all interact with 
each other and allow us to read the background of the dancer from examining their 
bodily comportment and movement is, nevertheless, an important insight for the 
consideration of contemporary dance. It may also be that some of these patterns of 
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movement come to the fore more in certain situations ± for example when a dancer is 
asked to perform movements that require a style similar to one they learned for a 
different work produced by the same choreographer. Indeed in moving away from 
considering dance in terms of just one habitus ± and thus filing it away as one of a list 
RIH[DPSOHVVXFKDVGULYLQJDFDUULGLQJDELNHW\SLQJRQDNH\ERDUGRUW\LQJRQH¶V
shoelaces ± to seeing it as having a number of different components and stylistic 
variations, the example of dance becomes less one dimensional and we start to see the 
potential of thinking about dance as a way of opening up a range of possibilities for 
thinking about bodily habit and knowledge.  
 
For the contemporary dancers I interviewed, then, training and the experience of 
having performed works by certain choreographers do interact with more individual 
DVSHFWVRIDGDQFHU¶VVW\OHRIPRYHPHQWEXWLWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRLGHQWLI\DQGODEHORQH
type of institutional or choreographic habitus for any one dancer as they will all have 
experienced a diverse mixture of influences. The concept of institutional habitus is, 
KRZHYHU VXJJHVWLYH RI D QHHG WR DWWHQG WR WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO HOHPHQWV RI D GDQFHU¶V
training. Although all my interviewees had been through professional dance training, 
the different institutions that they had attended and the styles that they encountered 
there had impacted differentially on the way that they both perceived and embodied 
patterns of movement. Further to this, it was noted that the style of the artistic director 
of a contemporary dance company may instil certain stylistic elements in the dancers 
DV WKH\EHFRPHXVHG WRSHUIRUPLQJ WKHDUWLVWLFGLUHFWRU¶VZRUNV7KLV LVKRZHYHUD
far more complex picture than that of the institutional habitus for the classical dancer 
evoked by Wainwright et al., as there are a large number of competing or intertwining 
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elements, even if we confine ourselves to thinking about institutional backgrounds, 
which can influence the habitus of a contemporary repertory company dancer.  
 
The concept of choreographic habitus might also be adapted to the context of the 
contemporary repertory company to allow us to consider the ways in which the range 
of different choreographers encountered might impact (in a durable, transposable 
fashion) on the style of a dancer. One dancer therefore attributed personal style to  
 
AOO RI WKH WKLQJV\RX¶YHKDGDORQJ WKHZD\«HYHU\QHZZRUN WKDWZHGR\RX
pick up new skills and new ideas and when you move onto another 
choreographer yRXWDNHDOO WKDWVRUWRIEDJJDJHZLWK\RX«VRLW¶VHYHU\WKLQJ
[Daniel] 
 
7KLVTXRWHDQGRWKHUVGRKRZHYHUVXJJHVWWKDWWKHUHLVPRUHWRDGDQFHU¶VVW\OHWKDQ
can be accounted for by training and contact with different choreographies alone, 
bringing us to the discussion of the other factor in Wainwright et al¶V WKUHHIROG
GLYLVLRQRIWKHFODVVLFDOGDQFHU¶Vhabitus: the individual habitus. This notion of there 
being something individual about style resonates strongly with many of the comments 
made by my interviewees about how style is personal to the individual. One dancer, 
for example, is able to describe his experience of  
 
« an experiment once with a choreographer where she set us all a task, an 
individual task to dance like someone else in the group, in the style of that 
person, and that was really interesting because you did see it immediately ± who 
they were trying to be ± just because everybody has their habits and their own 
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sort of foibles and ways of moving so you get to know them when you dance 
together. [Daniel]  
 
All of my interviewees did, then, emphasise that movements were different in 
different bodies ± that is that each dancer has a form of bodily comportment and style 
RI PRYHPHQW WKDW LQIOXHQFHV KRZ WKH\ µSLFN XS¶ D QHZ SDWWHUQ RI PRYHPHQW The 
tripartite distinction between well-defined institutional, choreographic and individual 
habitus for the classical ballet dancer was not, however, transposable onto the field of 
contemporary dance repertory companies. Indeed it was notable that the only dancers 
who applied some kind of label to their own style were those who described 
themselves as classically trained.  
 
Classical ballet training in fact seemed to be one of the most obvious influences which 
dancers were aware of and able to use by way of explanation for why they moved the 
way they did or had trouble with particular movements. The experience of the 
classically trained dancer in the contemporary dance context can therefore be seen as 
WKDWRIµDILVKRXWRIZDWHU¶DVWKHZD\LQZKLFKKLVRU her body is trained to react and 
execute certain movements is at odds with the requirements of contemporary dance. It 
seems that for these individuals the nature of the institution in which they were trained 
has indeed had a distinct identifiable influence on the way they experience and pick 
up new movements.  
 
It is, however, important to note that classically trained dancers do not experience all 
DVSHFWV RI FRQWHPSRUDU\ GDQFH DV HTXDOO\ µXQQDWXUDO¶ )XUWKHUPRUH WKRVH ZKR KDG
trained at contemporary dance schools also reported finding certain patterns of 
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PRYHPHQW SDUWLFXODUO\ GLIILFXOW WR µJHW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ VKRZLQJ WKDW VHGLPHQWHG
patterns of movement are not only a product of classical training. The notion of fitting 
LQ ZLWK D FHUWDLQ FRPSDQ\¶V VW\OH Zas, in fact, an issue for both classically and 
contemporary trained dancers, although because of the emphasis on variety in a 
repertory company this became important only where an artistic director had a 
particularly strong aesthetic vision for the company. Some dancers did, however, 
make reference to these factors in discussion of auditioning for certain contemporary 
GDQFHFRPSDQLHVVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHUHZHUHFHUWDLQFRPSDQLHVWKDWWKH\MXVWZRXOGQ¶W
bother to go for because the style was too different from their own.  
 
Thus all the dancers were able to identify certain enduring aspects or patterns to their 
own movement but were less clear than the classical dancers in Wainwright et al.¶V
VWXG\DERXWZKHUHWKHVHSDWWHUQVRULJLQDWHGIURPPDQ\FLWLQJµHYHU\WKLQJ¶LQFOXGLQJ
training, personality, all the works ever performed, and for example sports or other 
dance forms they had done when they were younger. Having explored the possibilities 
offered by Wainwright et al.¶VQRWLRQVRIPXOWLSOHhabitus, I welcome their attempt to 
break down the complexities of style in terms of past action, but I would argue that 
the particular and rather rigid tripartite division they suggest with its emphasis on 
institutional habitus derived from a company with a recognised style and its 
associated school, and choreographical habitus GHULYHG IURP WKH FRPSDQ\¶V FORVH
relationship with a particular choreographer, is of little utility for the study of 
contemporary dance repertory companies in which my research consists. 
 
There are, however, other interesting insights which can be gleaned from engagement 
with Bourdieu. The Bourdieusian concept of habitus, for example, emphasises that 
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GDQFHUV¶ GLVSRVLWLRQV WRZDUGV FHUWDLQ VW\OHV RI PRYHPHQW DUH QRW RQO\ SK\VLFDO
tendencies to move in certain ways, but also function at the level of (aesthetic) 
preferences for certain styles of movement. Thus for the dancer aesthetic dispositions 
are incorporated into the habitus along with more physical dispositions as the dancer 
learns, with such aesthetic preferences or dispositions then functioning at a level 
µEHORZWKHWKUHVKROGRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶&URVVOH\7KLVZDVH[SHULHQFHGE\
my contemporary dance interviewees as a natural inclination for certain types of 
movement which they described as not quite accountable for in terms of bodily 
capability but also related to habit and something that they tried to express in notions 
of preference, appreciation and greater understanding for certain movements, although 
these concepts seemed to be difficult for them to pin-point and/or define. 
 
7KLVµQDWXUDO¶LQFOLQDWLRQ, or preference which cannot be fully articulated, for certain 
movements fits with an understanding of BourGLHX¶V concept of habitus as a pre-
reflectiYH µIHHO IRU WKH JDPH¶. In exploring this, I would, however, like to return to 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZRUN DV &URVVOH\ VXJJHVWV WKDW PXFK RI %RXUGLHX¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI
habitus DVDµIHHOIRUWKHJDPH¶DQGRIillusio DVDQµXQFRQVFLRXVEHOLHILQWKHJDPH¶
is arguably pre-figured in Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZRUk The Structure of Behaviour 
(Crossley, 2001:78).  
 
In The Structure of Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty gives an account of the perceptions and 
actions of a footballer involved in a game of football:  
 
)RUWKHSOD\HULQDFWLRQWKHIRRWEDOOILHOGLVQRWDQµREMHFW¶WKDWLVDQLGHDOWHUP
which can give rise to an indefinite multiplicity of perspectival views and remain 
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equivalent under its apparent transformations. It is pervaded with lines of force 
WKH µ\DUG OLQHV¶ WKRVH ZKLFK GHPDUFDWH WKH µSHQDOW\ DUHD¶ DQG articulated in 
VHFWRUVIRUH[DPSOHWKHµRSHQLQJV¶EHWZHHQDGYHUVDULHVZKLFKFDOOIRUDFHUWDLQ
mode of action and which initiate and guide the action as if the player were 
unaware of it. (Merleau-Ponty, 1965:168) 
 
,ZLVKWRGUDZKHUHRQ&URVVOH\¶V1) analysis of this passage of Merleau-3RQW\¶V
work which emphasises a number of points. The first of these consists in the 
SHUVSHFWLYDO DQG µinterested¶ QDWXUH RI WKH SOD\HU¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH IRRWEDOO SLWFK 
(Crossley, 2001:75). In order for the footballHUWRSHUFHLYHDQµRSHQLQJ¶KHRUVKHPXVW
both be positioned in a certain place on the pitch and have a certain level of skill with 
the football which will allows him or her to take advantage of the space between other 
players as an opening.  
 
Furthermore, &URVVOH\QRWHVWKDWWKHSOD\HU¶Vperceptions of the pitch and of openings 
for play call forth appropriate action without recourse to conscious deliberation. 
Merleau-Ponty adds that: 
 
Each manoeuvre undertaken by the player modifies the character of the field and 
establishes in it new lines of force in which the action in turn unfolds and is 
DFFRPSOLVKHGDJDLQDOWHULQJWKHSKHQRPHQDOILHOG¶0HUOHDX-Ponty, 1965:169).  
 
3HUFHSWLRQV WKXV LQIRUP DFWLRQV ZKLFK WKHPVHOYHV LQIRUP RU DOWHU WKH SOD\HU¶V
perceptual field. 
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The final point concerns the way in which the meaning and purpose of such 
perceptions and actions are related to the historical and cultural construct that is the 
football game. As Crossley muses:  
 
No one could doubt the agency of the player or the urgency which invests her 
every move. If she is good then she is spontaneous. She is tactical and strategic 
µLQKHUERQHV¶ZLWKRXWKDYLQJWRJLYHWKHPDWWHUDWKRXJKW$QG\HWWKHVHQVHRI
everything she sees and does derives from the game, a contingent historical 
construction which is one among hundreds and which means nothing to many. 
(Crossley, 2001:76)  
 
This sense of the player being completely invested in the game for Merleau-Ponty 
(despite its historical and cultural contingency) is further drawn out by Crossley: 
 
7KHSOD\HUGRHVQRWWKLQNDERXWWKHJDPHWKDWWKH\DUHµWXQHGLQ¶WRLWLQVXFKD
way that their every perception and action emERGLHVLWVVWUXFWXUHDQGORJLF«To 
EH D SOD\HU LV WR EH µDW RQH¶ ZLWK WKH ILHOG VHHLQJ WKLQNLQJ DQG DFWLQJ in 
accordance with its structure and form. (Crossley, 2001:78-111) 
 
Thus Merleau-Ponty is able to introduce notions akin to a pre-UHIOHFWLYHµIHHOIRUWKH
JDPH¶DQGµEHOLHILQWKHJDPH¶LQWRWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQKHUHZLWKRXWP\QHHGLQJWRWXUQ
to Bourdieu to speak to this aspect of dance. Moreover, why I prefer Merleau-Ponty to 
Bourdieu for this project is that while he perhaps offers less analysis of the social 
institutions which maintain and shape (and are shaped by) the practices of individual 
agents, Merleau-3RQW\DOORZVPHWRWKLQNPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\DERXWWKHDJHQW¶VUHODWLRQ
both to themselves as body-subject ± what is their sense of self and how is it formed? 
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± and to others primarily as body-subjects rather than as social actors. Thus my 
FKDSWHURQµ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶IRFXVHVRQWKHQRWLRQRIWKHSULPDU\VHQVHRIVHOIEHLQJRQH
ZKLFKLVGHULYHGIURPRUFRQVWLWXWHGE\DVHQVHRIWKHERG\¶VSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUDFWLRQ± 
µ, FDQ¶ UDWKHU WKDQ µ, WKLQN WKHUHIRUH , DP¶ ± DQG P\ FKDSWHU RQ µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶
focuses on the Merleau-Pontian concepts of intercorporeality and transference of the 
corporeal schema. The notions of intercorporeality and mutual inherence of 
interlocutors in the reversible flesh of the world also underpin my chapter on 
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ 
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Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
 
7KLVFKDSWHURQµ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH+RZ0RYHPHQWLVµLQ¶WKH'DQFHU¶V%RG\¶KDV
taken Merleau-3RQW\¶VHPSKDVLVRQWKHFRQFHSWVRIKDELWDQGWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDDV
a point of departure and a constant point of reference for the exploration of how dance 
is learned, remembered and performed. I have suggested, then, that there are certain 
DVSHFWVRIWKHGDQFHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVWKDWJLYHPHDQRSHQLQJWRGLVFXVVDQGDZD\RI
understanding aspects of corporeal schema theory, while, equally, there are certain 
aspects of Merleau-3RQW\¶V WKHRULVLQJ RI WKH FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD WKDW JLYH PH DQ
opening onto or understanding of certain aspects of the embodied practice of dance. 
This final section of the chapter acts to summarise these connections and thus display 
the groundwork that has been done in this opening chapter in terms of connecting an 
analysis of dance to an analysis of Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD
The following chapters will then build on this link to explore both Merleau-Ponty and 
dance more thoroughly and to seek out areas of common ground where they can be 
brought together in such a way that generates new understandings of embodied being. 
 
6HFWLRQ,,RIWKLVFKDSWHUGLVFXVVHVOHDUQLQJGDQFHLQWHUPVRIWKHGDQFHUV¶FRQcept of 
µJHWWLQJLWLQWRWKHERG\¶,VXJJHVWKHUHWKDWWKLVFRQFHSWFDQEHXVHIXOO\UHODWHGWRWKH
Merleau-Pontian idea of the incorporation of action or behaviour into the corporeal 
VFKHPDLQUHODWLRQWRDQXPEHURIDVSHFWVRI WKHGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWV ,HPphasise, for 
example, that these practitioners report learning a new pattern of movement primarily 
E\GRLQJLWUHSHDWHGO\QRWE\VHHLQJLWRUWKLQNLQJDERXWLWµ*HWWLQJLQWRWKHERG\¶
can take some time then as it requires repetition, but it is a durable form of memory. It 
is not, however, always available to conscious reflection, meaning that to get dance 
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µLQWRWKHERG\¶LPSOLHVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIVRPHSUH-reflective, practical knowledge, 
as is posited in the concept of the corporeal schema. 
 
The failure of the intellectualist account of learning, by contrast, to account for 
µJHWWLQJ LW LQWR WKH ERG\¶ ZDV KLJKOLJKWHG LQ WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH SUREOHPV
experienced by dancers when correction was needed to a movement that was already 
µLQ WKHERG\¶2QFH LW LV µLQ WKHERG\¶GDQFHUVSHUIRUP WKHPRYHPHQW DVSDUWRID
sequence) without thinking about it and in fact find it difficult to change or correct the 
VHTXHQFHRIPRYHPHQWVRQFHLWLVµLQWKHERG\¶+HUHGDQFHUVUHSRUWHGWKDWWKH\IRXQG
it very difficult to change a pattern of movement in the body despite the fact they 
knew in their minds what change was required. This helps us understand such patterns 
of movement as pre-reflective habits that are incorporated into the corporeal schema 
through processes RI UHSHWLWLRQ DQG VHGLPHQWDWLRQ DQG DUH WKXV KDUG WR µNLFN¶
Examining the embodied practice of dance therefore allows us to see how the pre-
reflective aspect of the corporeal schema actually plays out in practice.  
 
The issue of correction also suggested that such habits of movement were assimilated 
or incorporated as a whole or Gestalt, albeit in sections or phrases rather than an 
entire work at once. Thus dancers described correction to a phrase as resulting in 
KDYLQJWRµWKURZLWDOODZD\¶RUIHHOOLNHRQHLVµEDFNWRVTXDUHRQH¶2WKHUVGHVFULEHG
the process of correction as having to repeatedly enforce the change in the movement 
through conscious effort in order to get to a stage where the phrase was assimilated 
into the corporeal schema in its corrected form. 
 
  128 
It was also noted that although dancers made reference to the existence and 
LPSRUWDQFH RI PXVFOH PHPRU\ WKH\ FRQWLQXHG WR XVH WKH FRQFHSW RI µLQ WKH ERG\¶
which suggested that something additional was being evoked by this notion. Further 
to this, dancers also described how merely learning the physical form of the dance ± 
just the steps or shapes ± was insufficient, and it was noted that having a habit of 
PRYHPHQW µLQ WKH ERG\¶ DOORZHG WKH GDQFHUV D IUHHGRP WR LPSURYLVH RU DGDSW WKH
movement under the right conditions without need for conscious reflection on the 
style.  
 
Such practical knowledge was, in fact, generally unavailable to (immediate) conscious 
UHIOHFWLRQDVZDVHYLGHQFHGE\WKHGDQFHUV¶QHHGWRGRWKHGDQFHLQRUGHUWRµILQGRXW¶
what the series of steps was. This coincides with understandings of the corporeal 
schema that state that our practical knowledge is available to us during action and 
from the point of view of the body (Crossley, 2001:122) ± knowledge of the next step 
is available only when the dancer begins to dance the previous one, its position is 
µNQRZQ¶RQO\UHODWLYHWRZKHUHWKHERG\KDVMXVWEHHQ 
 
'DQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVDOVRKLJKOLJKW WKHLPSRUWDQFHRI WUDLQLQJDQGSUHYLRXVH[SHULHQFH
of different styles of dance in shaping how you perform movements. Again this 
illustrates and illuminates the role of sedimentation of patterns of action in the 
formation of the corporeal schema, while at the same time the notions of 
sedimentation and habit add a new dimension to our understanding of this aspect of 
dance.  
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Section III of the chapter is then based around the notion that the movements of 
contemporary dance are necessarily embodied rather than abstract forms: they are 
always different in different bodies. Dancers learn patterns of movements from the 
REVHUYDWLRQRIRWKHUGDQFLQJERGLHVDQGµJHWWLQJ LW LQWRWKHERG\¶LVXQGHUVWRRGDVD
SURFHVV RI WUDQVODWLRQ RI WKH PRYHPHQW ZKLFK LV LQ VRPHRQH HOVH¶V ERG\ LQWR \RXU
own body. My interviewees therefore described how patterns of movement brought 
with them their own histories ± ZKR WKH\ZHUH µPDGHRQ¶ DQGKRZ WKH\KDYHEHHQ
passed between dancing bodies ± which necessarily impacted on the process of 
learning for the dancers.  
 
This suggests that the laying down of new habits or patterns of movement in the 
corporeal schema is a complex process that involves modification of and interaction 
with established patterns. Dance movements transferred from one dancer to another in 
IDFWDOZD\VFDUU\DVSHFWVRI WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDEXWDOVR get changed 
when adopted by another dancer in accordance with his or her corporeal schema. Thus 
movements or habits of movement are embodied by specific embodied individuals. 
Patterns of movement do not exist in the abstract, they are necessarily recognised and 
understood as embodied by the dancers. The embodiment of the movement by a 
particular dancer would then also be passed on to those who learned the movement 
from them, further colouring the movement and adding to its history. Importantly for 
my interviewees, this meant that learning a movement from, or a movement which 
had been made on, a body very different from their own was experienced as 
particularly difficult. 
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The way a dancer performs a movement is therefore a function of his or her corporeal 
schema which is unique to the individual and constantly being refined and modified 
through the learning of new movements. Dancing bodies also necessarily bring 
histories which impact on the learning of new patterns of movement where the 
movement must be adapted to the new body just as the body must be adapted to the 
new movement. This meant that dancers learning new movements perceived and 
embodied the movements differently depending on, for example, their body shape, 
their training or their familiarity with this particular style of movement.  
 
It was also noted that this difficulty in getting certain types of movement into the body 
was described by a number of the dancers in terms of certain movements feeling more 
µQDWXUDO¶WKDQRWKHUVRURIFHUWDLQERGLHVfor example the female body) being more 
µQDWXUDOO\¶ VXLWHG WR FHUWDLQ PRYHPHQWV IRU H[DPSOH WKH *UDKDP WHFKQLTXH 7KH
notion of being naturally suited to certain types of movement was, however, also 
evoked by a number of interviewees in relation to their background and training, 
particularly for those who had been trained in classical ballet. These dancers, for 
example, reported that movements which were reminiscent of the grace of classical 
ballet felt more natural whereas those patterns of movement which were jerky or had 
a low centre of gravity were difficult to do and felt unnatural to them. Thus some 
PRYHPHQWVFDQIHHOPRUHµQDWXUDO¶WRDGDQFHUEHFDXVHRIWKHZD\WKDWWKHLUFRUSRUHDO
schema has been shaped through training. 
 
Wainwright et al. (2006; 2007) also recognise that dancers move differently from 
each other, in accordance with certain previously sedimented habits of movement that 
they carry with them when they learn or perform something new. These authors use 
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%RXUGLHX¶VFRQFHSWRIhabitus to explore the different aspects of how a ballet dancer 
PRYHV 7KH\ VXJJHVW WKHUH DUH WKUHH GLIIHUHQW HOHPHQWV WR D EDOOHW GDQFHU¶V VW\OH RI
movement ± institutional (from the company environment where they have been 
trained and perform); choreographic (determined by the choreographer of the works 
they perform); and individual (influenced by such things as height and personality of 
the dancer). Wainwright et al. suggest these aspects can be understood to constitute 
three separate habitus which interact to prodXFH WKH GDQFHU¶V RYHUDOO VW\OH RI
movement.  
 
The suggestion of three different habitus has, however, been shown to be difficult to 
maintain in relation to contemporary repertory company dancers like those I have 
interviewed. Unlike the ballet dancers that Wainwright et al. interview, my 
contemporary dance interviewees were not trained in a dance school attached to the 
company they are now part of. Also in contrast to Wainwright et al.¶V5R\DO%DOOHW
interviewees, contemporary dance repertory companies do not specialise in the 
performance of works in one specific style or by one (or a select few) specific 
choreographers. This means that while institutional and choreographic habitus can 
perhaps be clearly defined for the ballet dancers, these notions can certainly not be 
clearly defined and thus do not have the same utility for contemporary dance as 
aspects of institutional and choreographic style were far more fragmented and 
changeable for the contemporary repertory company dancers I interviewed.  
 
I have, however, identified different aspects which my interviewees refer to as key 
elements in shaping how they adopt and adapt patterns of movement. In particular 
those dancers whose main training had been in classical ballet rather than 
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contemporary dance frequently described this as affecting their approach to new 
PRYHPHQWV DQG KRZ PRYHPHQWV µVDW LQ WKHLU ERGLHV¶ 0RVW GDQFHUV DOVR VXJJHVWHG
that all the experiences they had of different dance styles had an effect on how they 
adopted new movements and some also mentioned the fact that their movement was 
influenced by sports they had done. In contrast to thinking about three relatively fixed 
habitus influencing how a dancer moves, then, I suggest that it is more appropriate for 
the analysis of contemporary dance to think about different elements coming together 
and interacting to form a more fluid corporeal schema which is constantly changing, 
evolving, developing, or being refined.  
 
The idea of sedimentation of habit is therefore clearly very important, and dancers put 
D ORWRIHPSKDVLVRQ WKH LGHDRIPRYHPHQWVEHLQJ µLQ WKHERG\¶EXW WKHUH LV DOVRD
strong sense from my contemporary dance interviewees that the corporeal schemas of 
these dancers are not rigidly set but continually evolving as they interact with the 
world and others and with each new patterns of movement they learn. In the next 
chapter I go on to explore aspects of how the corporeal schema is developed and 
refined as dancers interact with the mirrors that line the walls of every dance studio 
and with the other dancing body-subjects who they learn from and dance with. 
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SUBJECTIVITY: 
 
THE ROLE OF MIRRORS AND OTHERS IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPOREAL SCHEMA 
AS SENSE OF SELF 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
7KH SUHYLRXV FKDSWHU RQ µ3UDFWLFDO .QRZOHGJH¶ VXJJHVWV WKDW WKe mechanism for 
laying down elements of the corporeal schema is based on the sedimentation of habit, 
and I have focussed on the importance of repetition and familiarity for building up 
µERGLO\NQRZOHGJH¶RUµNQRZ-KRZ¶Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHFRUSRUeal schema 
allows us to conceive of knowledge, learning and understanding as practical and 
bodily rather than intellectual and ephemeral. 
 
This is familiar territory for the Sociology of the Body where a lot of the work which 
uses Merleau-Ponty focuses on notions of the habit-body, likening the notions of habit 
DQG WKH FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD WR %RXUGLHX¶V FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI habitus. Merleau-
3RQW\¶VPRGHORIWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDLVKRZHYHUPRUHXVHIXOWRP\H[SORUDWLRQRI
the evolving body-subject in dance thaQ%RXUGLHX¶VUDWKHUULJLGFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRI
habitus as I have begun to show in the previous chapter. Indeed Crossley argues that: 
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The phenomenologists generally have a more dynamic and fluid notion of the 
habitus as a lived-through structure-in-process, constantly evolving as an effect 
of the interactions of the agent or group with both others and the physical 
environment. (Crossley, 2004:39) 
 
 Thus while Wainwright et al., in a series of papers with which I engaged in the 
previous chapter, make interesting use of Bourdieu to think through certain fairly 
IL[HG DVSHFWV RI D GDQFHU¶V habitus and particularly the way in which moving 
company or VHYHUH LQMXU\ IRU H[DPSOH FDQ µVKDWWHU¶ WKLV habitus, I turn back to 
Merleau-Ponty to explore the more everyday aspects of developing and refining the 
corporeal schema as the dancer learns new patterns of movement and interacts with 
the mirrors and others in their physical and social environment. 
 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, a sophisticated account of habit and its role 
in the formation of the corporeal schema allows us to explore the notion of the 
thinking, knowing body-subject in dance. There is, however, a need to further explore 
the corporeal schema, moving on from this discussion of habit to think in terms of 
having some kind of sense of ourselves as having a certain embodied potential or 
certain possibilities for action,Qµ&RQWH[WXDOLVLQJWKH&RQYHUVDWLRQ¶,VXJJHVWHGWKDW
for Merleau-Ponty the original sense of self, or µ,¶, is that of µ, FDQ¶ UDWKHU WKDQ µ,
WKLQNWKHUHIRUH,DP¶+DYLQJDFRKHUHQWVHQVHRIwhat we can do or the possibilities 
we have for action is thus central to having a coherent sense of self, although this 
sense RIµ,FDQ¶PD\RIFRXUVHUHPDLQWDFLW 
 
In thinking about our sense of self and in terms of the corporeal schema and the tacit 
cogito or sense of µ, FDQ¶ 0HUOHDX-Ponty considered various developmental stages 
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that occur in early childhood. In the early months, Merleau-Ponty, following a number 
of influential accounts in the field of developmental psychology, considers that 
children do not differentiate between self and other, or indeed self and the world. The 
formation of subjectivity GXULQJ WKH FKLOG¶V GHYHORSPHQW can then be understood as 
the development of a sense of self as a coherent unified entity which is separate from 
others. The emergence of a differentiated sense of self is, therefore, for Merleau-
Ponty, very much tied to establishment of an individual, differentiated corporeal 
schema. 
 
The corporeal schema, although individual and differentiated from others, is not, 
however, developed in isolation. Its formation is, rather, interactional, and it is built 
up both through interaction with physical objects, and also through social interaction 
with other embodied beings. Physical interaction with our environment develops the 
corporeal schema as we encounter and learn to manipulate aspects of our physical 
surroundings and thus build up a proprioceptive picture of our bodies. The 
proprioceptive body image or schema is not, however, a replica of the topography of 
the human body (Shilling, 2003:200). This is revealed by phenomena such as 
phantom limbs, which are physically absent yet sensationally present in the body 
schema, and the way in which the corporeal schema can also incorporate physical 
REMHFWVVXFKDVWKHEOLQGPDQ¶VVWLFNWKHW\SLVW¶VNH\ERDUGRUWKHGULYHU¶VFDU 
 
The second source for the formation of the corporeal schema is social interaction, 
whereby the body schema is derived from both the experiences we have of other 
SHRSOH¶VERGLHVDQGDOVRWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKH\UHVSRQGWRDQGUHIOHFWEDFNDVSHFWVRI
  136 
thus built up from introceptive (or proprioceptive) experience but also relies on the 
child forming a sense of its body as (seen) from the outside, from the perspective of 
others. It is through social interaction and processes of reflection and mirroring that 
WKH FKLOG LV DEOH WR JDLQ WKLV µH[WHUQDO¶ SHUVSHFWLYH RQ LWV ERG\ ZKLFK it must then 
UHFRQFLOHZLWKWKHµLQQHU¶SLFWXUHIRUPHGWKURXJKLQWURFHSWLYHH[SHULHQFH LQRUGHUWR
develop an individual, differentiated corporeal schema.  
 
While these interactive processes of mirroring and reflection from reflective surfaces 
and others first occur in the formation of the corporeal schema in childhood, they 
continue to contribute to the development of the body schema throughout the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VOLIHWLPH,QWKHSUHYLRXVFKDSWHU,KDYHGLVFXVVHGKRZGDQFHUVLQWHJUDWH
new patterns of behaviour into their corporeal schemas as they learn and remember 
new patterns of movement. Throughout these processes of training and rehearsal, 
dancers continually develop and refine their proprioceptive functions as they 
constantly explore aspects of balance and how their body can be positioned in space, 
creating an ever more nuanced proprioceptive picture of the body. 
 
Dancers make a lot of use of mirrors and mirroring interaction with other dancers in 
the embodied practice of dance, meaning that dance is an interesting area to explore if 
we want to understand the development of the FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD LQ WHUPV RI WKH µ,
FDQ¶/RRNLQJDWGDQFHLQUHODWLRQWR0HUOHDX-3RQW\¶VWKHRULVLQJRIWKHIRUPDWLRQDQG
development of the corporeal schema through mirroring helps us to understand what it 
is that is going on in dance in a new way and also sheds light on how Merleau-3RQW\¶V
ideas can actually be seen to play out in practice. 
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7KLVFKDSWHUEXLOGVRQ WKHGLVFXVVLRQRI µ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶ WRFRQWLQXH WRVWUHVV
the importance of the corporeal schema and the pre-reflective. In seeking to explore a 
truly non-dualist understanding of the embodied basis of being, however, the 
conversation in this chapter must necessarily also engage with aspects of reflective 
thought and with images or representations of the body (which is to be understood as 
neither wholly subject nor wholly object, but something in-between). In the same way 
WKDW , KDYH HVWDEOLVKHG LQ WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI µ3UDFWLFDO .QRZOHGJH¶ WKDW QHLWKHU WKH
mechanistic nor the intellectualist picture of learning can account for what is going on 
in dance, the conversation here opens up a new space for the discussion of the 
embodied subjectivity in between traditional dualist terms: the body is neither purely 
object nor purely (Cartesian) subject; neither purely a source of immanence nor purely 
a source of transcendence.  
 
In this chapter the voice of Merleau-Ponty leads the conversation towards talking 
about the corporeal schema as the µ,FDQ¶ ± the most fundamental sense of µ,¶ ± and 
the voice of dance replies in Section II by engaging with what Merleau-Ponty has to 
say about infantile development and replying in terms of the everyday experience of 
the embodied practice of dance. Sections III and IV then go on to explore notions of 
immediacy and of vulnerability ± feeling exposed and defenceless ± in dance. These 
comments open up a space for discussion of issues around (or in-between) 
transcendence and immanence in relation to the body, and, in particular in relation to 
gendered embodiment.  
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I: Recognising Self in Relation to Others 
 
7KHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDRUVHQVHRIVHOIDVµ,FDQ¶ is continually developed and refined 
throughout life course, but the principle aspects of these processes of formation and 
modification of the corporeal schema can be usefully discussed in terms of 
developmental stages. In this section I would like to allow the voice of Merleau-Ponty 
to be heard and see what it can tell us about the formation of the corporeal schema in 
terms of developmental stages before we see what dance has to say in reply to this. 
Having drawn out some of the key aspects of Merleau-3RQW\¶V LGHDV LQ WHUPV of 
infantile development in this section, I will then move on in Section II to discuss them 
in relation to the experiences of the adult dancer. 
 
This is really the first time in the thesis when the voice of Merleau-Ponty¶V
philosophy is heard at length, and I have used a lot of quotation in this opening 
section to evoke this voice in a similar way to how I have evoked the voice of dance. 
Importantly for my evocation of the voice of dance, I was able not only to draw on the 
individual voices of sixteen different interviewees, but I was also present at the 
interviews and able to guide the discussion; make reference to other ideas that I had 
heard expressed; and ask for expansion and clarificaWLRQ RI WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V LGHDV
where necessary. It is thus a collaborative understanding of dance that I offer through 
the voice of dance in this thesis. In attempting to produce a similar range and depth of 
collaborative engagement with the voice Merleau-Ponty throughout the thesis, I have 
sought to work both with a range of his philosophical texts, and with a range of 
secondary literature on Merleau-Ponty¶V LGHDV ZKHUH UHFRJQLVHG VKDUHG
understandings have been established. The voice of Merleau-Ponty can therefore also 
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be understood as collaborative in that I work with an integrated picture of his 
philosophy which engages with how Merleau-Ponty¶V LGHDVKDYHEHHQ UHFHLYHGDQG
explored by others.  
 
,Qµ7KH&KLOG¶V5HODWLRQVZLWK2WKHUV¶c) Merleau-Ponty identifies a number of 
VWDJHV RU PRPHQWV LQ WKH FKLOG¶V GHYHORSPHQW RI LPSRUWDQFH WR the formation of a 
stable, unified corporeal schema. One such aspect is the phenomenon of imitation 
where the child copies the bodily gestures of, in the first instance, the primary 
caregiver. For Merleau-3RQW\WKLVSURFHVVRILPLWDWLRQZKLFKKHUHIHUVWRDVµSRVWXUDO
LPSUHJQDWLRQ¶ IROORZLQJ WKHSV\FKRORJLVW+HQUL :DOORQ FRQVLVWV LQ DSDLULQJRI WKH
child¶VERG\ZLWKWKHERGLHVRIRWKHUV7KXVWKHLQIDQWUHWXUQVWKHVPLOHRIWKHPRWKHU
by smiling back, and it can be observed that children will cry when others cry. 
Merleau-3RQW\ DOVR QRWHV WKDW FKLOGUHQ FDQ IUHTXHQWO\ EH REVHUYHG µDWWULEXWLQJ WR
others what EHORQJV WR WKH VXEMHFW WKHPVHOYHV¶ 0HUOHDX-Ponty, 1964c:148) and 
appropriating the actions of others to themselves.  
 
It is, however, important to distinguish this process of pairing from notions of analogy 
or simulation as such understandings assume an already constituted, fixed subjectivity 
which can employ such strategies (Gilbert and Lennon, 2005:144). By contrast, 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VIRUPXODWLRQRISRVWXUDOLPSUHJQDWLRQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHIRUPDWLRQRI
such subjectivity is only made possible by this process of pairing. Indeed David 
Michael Levin identifies the key concern in Merleau-3RQW\¶VGLVFXVVLRQDV 
 
«WKHDUJXPHQWWKDWKXPDQEHLQJVDUHQRWVHOI-contained, self-sufficient subjects 
contingently and externally related to one another, but beings who are formed 
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from the very beginning in and through their social interactions. (Levin, 
1991:62-63) 
 
As Levin describes: 
 
Close or intimate relations with others involve the child in a process of 
mirroring: the child sees herself reflected in and through the gaze, gestures, and 
postures of the other; the other, whom she sees, sees her and reflects back how 
she is being seen. Generally, if the mirroring is not for some reason distorted or 
disturbed (e.g. because one of the parents is schizophrenic or does not really love 
the child), the child will develop a firm sense of her body as a coherent whole 
DQGDQRULJLQDWLQJFHQWUHRIDFWLRQVKHZLOOGHYHORSDVWDEOHµFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD¶
(Levin, 1991:63)  
 
For Merleau-Ponty: 
 
7KHFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIRQH¶VRZQERG\LVWKXVIUDgmentary [lacunaire] at first and 
gradually becomes integrated; the corporeal schema becomes precise, 
restructured, and mature little by little. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:123) 
 
7KH FKLOG¶V FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD LV WKXV EXLOW XS JUDGXDOO\ WKURXJK D SURFHVV RI
µPLUURULQJ¶ ,QGHHG GUDZLQJ RQ /DFDQ¶V FRQFHSW RI µWKH PLUURU VWDJH¶ (2001), 
Merleau-3RQW\H[SORUHVWKHFKLOG¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRLWVVSHFXODULPDJHDVSUHVHQWHGLQ
the mirror. There is a paradox here in that while the visual image of the body 
presented in the mirURUFDQQRWEHHTXDWHGZLWKWKHFKLOG¶VH[SHULHQFHRILWVERG\ 
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«WKHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHVSHFXODULPDJHDVDdiscrete, unified LPDJHRIWKHFKLOG¶V
body is precisely what facilitates the necessary restructuring and maturation of 
WKH FKLOG¶V ERGLO\ DZDUHQHVs into a unified postural schema. (Weiss, 1999:12, 
emphasis in the original) 
 
)RU/DFDQWKHUHLVDQµLGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶EHWZHHQWKHLQIDQWDQGLWVUHIOHFWLRQ 
 
«LQ WKH IXOO VHQVH WKDWDQDO\VLVJLYHV WR WKH WHUPQDPHO\ WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image. It is this reflected 
LPDJHRILWVHOIZLWKZKLFKWKHLQIDQWLGHQWLILHVWKDW/DFDQXQGHUVWDQGVE\WKHµ,¶
(Levin, 1991:59-60)  
 
This process is, however, problematic as the reflection (prototypically for Lacan the 
image seen in a mirror) is an external form, and identification of such an external 
form as µ,¶ or ego PHDQVWKDWWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKHFKLOG¶VLGHQWLW\or sense of self is 
characterised by a separation, splitting RU µDOLHQDWLRQ¶ Levin describes how, for 
Lacan: 
 
These alienations and distortions are extremely significant, because their 
operation within the process through which the structure of the ego is constituted 
means that the ego will always be predisposed to experience and relate to others 
in a pathologically narcissistic way; that is, with a certain paranoia, exaggerated 
defensiveness, and unprovoked aggressivity ± with an attitude of closure, rather 
than an attitude of trust and openness. (Levin, 1991:61) 
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Merleau-Ponty also refers to alienation here, however, contra Lacan, he suggests that 
this alienation need not be understood as necessarily negative. Indeed it is the  
 
« QHFHVVDULO\ DOLHQDWLQJ DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH VSHFWDFXODU LPDJH DV DQ LPDJH RI
oneself, [that] somehow facilitates rather than disrupts the development of a 
FRKHUHQWERG\LPDJHRXWRI WZRVHHPLQJO\GLVSDUDWHH[SHULHQFHVVHHLQJRQH¶V
ERG\ µIURP WKHRXWVLGH¶ LQ WKHPLUURU DQGEHLQJ LQWURFHSWLYHO\ DZDUHRIRQH¶V
ERG\µIURPWKHLQVLGH¶ (Weiss, 1999:12) 
 
This paradox calls for the resolution of certain spatial problems whereby the child 
eventually recognises the specular image as being of oneself but not identical to 
oneself (Weiss, 1999:13). Merleau-Ponty explains:  
 
It is a problem first of understanding that the visual image of his body which he 
sees over there in the mirror is not himself; and second, he must understand that, 
not being located there, in the mirror, but rather where he feels himself 
introceptively, he can nonetheless be seen by an external witness at the very 
point at which he feels himself to be and with the same visual appearance that he 
has from the mirror. In short he must displace the mirror image, bringing it back 
from the apparent or virtual place it occupies in the depth of the mirror back to 
himself, whom he identifies at a distance with his introceptive body. (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964c:129) 
 
7KH VFKLVP EHWZHHQ WKH µRI RQHVHOI¶ DQG WKH µWR RQHVHOI¶ FDQQRW EH RYHUFRPH DQG
UHPDLQV D VRXUFH RI DOLHQDWLRQ WKURXJKRXW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V life. As Weiss notes, 
however:  
  143 
 
Both Lacan and Merleau-Ponty emphasise that it is this very schism that makes it 
possible for the child to project and extend her/his own bodily awareness beyond 
the immediacy of her/his introceptive experiences by incorporating the 
perspective of the other towarG RQH¶V RZQ ERG\ ± a perspective one actively 
participates in ± rather than having it thrust on one from the outside. (Weiss, 
1999:13) 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VXQLTXHFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIDOLHQDWLRQKHUHLVKRZHYHU
his emphasis on the positive aspects of such alienation as (potentially)  
 
«DZD\RIDZDNHQLQJDQGHOLFLWLQJWKHVRFLDOLQGHHGSURVRFLDOIRXQGDWLRQVRI
WKHFKLOG¶VLGHQWLW\/HYLQ 
 
,QGHHGZKLOH/DFDQDVVXPHVWKDW WKHSULPDU\PLUURULQJRI WKHFKLOG¶VHPERGLHGVHOI
involves a real mirror, Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, assumes that the primary mirroring 
will be interpersonal. Thus for Lacan mirroring is always objectifying and alienating, 
even when he situates it in an interpersonal relationship, because he conceptualises it 
as a variation on the prototypical moment of reflection in the mirror (an external 
object which reduces the body to an image or object) and thus frames the experience 
of the gaze in terms of objective third-person observation (Levin, 1991:61). Merleau-
Ponty, however, conceptualises the gaze differently, seeing it as based in a model of 
inter-KXPDQ UHODWLRQV WKDW LV µLQWHUVXEMHFWLYH FRPPXQLFDWLYH DQG HPERGLHG LQ
UHFLSURFLWLHV¶/HYLQ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The Lacanian alienation argument sees only the moment of negative sociality in 
the dialectics of narcissism and overlooks the radically transfigurative moment, 
the moment of redemption that Merleau-Ponty brings to light in his 
hermeneutical phenomenology of reciprocating gazes: visions gathered through 
their intertwinings, transpositions and reversibilities, into the communicativeness 
± the communion ± of the flesh. (Levin, 1991:61-62) 
 
While both Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, then, discern a process of alienation as 
socialisation occurs and the child is drawn out of itself, Merleau-Ponty suggests that 
the interpersonal basis of this alienation in social mirroring gives it the positive effect 
of making the child aware of the fundamentally social character of its being. 
Subjectivity, in this formulation, is thus always already intersubjectivity. This 
recognition of being always already a social being, in turn, encourages and enables 
IXUWKHU VWHSV WRZDUGV PDWXUH LQGLYLGXDWLRQ µLQWHJUDWLQJ DQG EDODQFLQJ VWURQJ QHHGV
IRUDXWRQRP\DQGHTXDOO\VWURQJQHHGVIRUVROLGDULW\¶/HYLQ91:66).  
 
For Merleau-Ponty then, individuation or µWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRI WKHµ,¶DVGLVWLQFW IURP
both the objects which surround it and IURPWKHµZH¶¶(Gilbert and Lennon, 2005:145) 
is a moment of self-constitution which necessarily involves other subjects. Prior to the 
age of about three years, others are not a problem for the child because, it is argued, 
the child does not distinguish between self and other. From about three years, 
however, the gaze of others can be experienced by the child as irritating or disturbing, 
DQG LW LV WKLV UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW WKH µ,¶ LV µVRPHWKLQJ RQ ZKLFK D YLHZ FDQ EH WDNHQ¶
which allows the differentiation of the self (Gilbert and Lennon, 2005:145).  
 
As Gilbert and Lennon describe: 
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The view which others have of us is not one we can have ourselves, yet it is a 
view that needs to be negotiated if we are to recognise ourselves both as an 
REMHFWDPRQJREMHFWVDQGRQHVXEMHFWDPRQJPDQ\«,QHQFRXQWHULQJWKHORRN
RIWKHRWKHUZHEHFRPHDZDUHRIRXUVHOYHVDVµVRPHWKLQJWREHORRNHGDW¶2XU
ERG\LVDQREMHFWLQDFRPPRQVSDFHZKLFKFDQEHREVHUYHG$VµVRPHWKLQJWR
EH ORRNHG DW¶ DQ LPDJH LV UHIOHFWHG EDFN WR XV GLVWLQFW IURP WKH SUH-reflective 
corporeal schema informing our engagement with the world. The availability of 
such an image and the possibility of our reflecting back to others such an image 
of themselves, yields a recognition of different points of view on the world. It 
enables a view of ours as one viewpoint among others, by means of the very 
process in which we are also given a recognition of ourselves as an inter-
VXEMHFWLYHREMHFW¶*LOEHUWDQG/HQQRQ-147).  
 
As Weiss suggests, for Merleau-Ponty: 
 
The specular image offers the child a new perspective not only on her/his body 
and being-for-others (what we might calO DQ µRXWVLGH-LQ¶ SHUVSHFWLYH EXW DOVR
simultaneously allows the child to project her/himself outside of her/his body 
into the specular image and, correspondingly, into the bodies of others (an 
µLQVLGH-RXW¶ SHUVSHFWLYH $OWKRXJK WKH IRUPHU PD\ LQGHHG EH a source of 
profound alienation, it is the latter, especially, that provides the ground for strong 
identification with others, identifications that expand the body to a social Gestalt. 
(Weiss, 1999:13) 
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Weiss stresses, however, that these idenitifications should not be understood to offer 
an alternative to alienation as they are in fact themselves made possible only on the 
basis of the self-alienation produced by the specular image (Weiss, 1999:13-14).  
 
Thus there remains an important process of separation or necessary alienation wherein 
the child comes to experience itself from without, as a specular body, as well as from 
within through intro- or proprioception. The corporeal schema is derived from both 
this introceptive experience and from the child coming to view itself from the outside 
as is revealed in the specular image and through mirroring interaction with others. It is 
important to note, however, that this process does not normally consist, for Merleau-
Ponty, in the separation or alienation of an introceptive subject from an objectified 
LPDJHUDWKHUWKHSURFHVVRIVHSDUDWLRQLVRQHRIµWKHERG\-subject turning back upon 
LWVHOIWRH[SHULHQFHLWVHOIDFDUQDOUHIOH[LYLW\¶&URVVOH\ 
 
Furthermore, objectification and alienation in the negative sense through the look or 
gaze of the other are not inevitable in Merleau-3RQW\¶V IUDPHZRUN ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYH
relations, for Merleau-Ponty, are rather communicative and reciprocal, involving 
mutual recognition, and thus do not, as a matter of course, involve the other 
REMHFWLI\LQJ RU µFDSWXULQJ¶ XV ZLWK WKH JD]H &URVVOH\  7KH negative ± 
objectifying or alienating ± effect of the gaze is, however, possible when this mutual 
recognition does not occur so that we feel our actions and expressions DUHµQRWWDNHQ
up and understood, but observed as if they were an insecW¶V¶ from Merleau-Ponty, 
The Phenomenology of Perception, quoted in Crossley, 1993:415). Thus Levin 
understands Merleau-Ponty to be suggesting that: 
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If the body (the embodied subject) is inherently interactional, oriented from the 
very beginning toward the engagement and development of its sociability, then 
WKH FKLOG¶V LQLWLDWLRQ LQWR VRFLDO UHODWLRQVKLSV FDQQRW EH DQ DOLHQDWLRQ QRU WKH
presence of others an encroachment or transgression. These words do not narrate 
the inherent nature of the situation. What they describe is possible as pathology: 
distortions in the structures of mutual recognition; disruptions and disturbances 
in the processes of communication within which children may find themselves 
ERXQG¶/HYLQ-66) 
 
In the following sections of this chapter I turn back to the voice of dance to see what it 
has to say to Merleau-Ponty¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO LGHDV DERXW WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ RI
subjectivity in relation to mirrors and others. In particular I am interested in exploring 
how dancers experience differences between internal and external pictures of 
themselves or their movements, or the difference between and relative importance to 
the dancer of what a movement feels like (from the inside) and what it looks like from 
the outside. I also bring dance to speak to Merleau-Ponty in order to open up a space 
for exploration of how Merleau-Ponty¶V LGHDV DERXW WKH SRVLWLYH HIIHFWV RI
intersubjective mirroring and the negative potential for objectification, alienation and 
disruption play out in practice for adult dancers. 
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,,7KH,PDJHWKH2WKHUDQGWKH'DQFHU¶V&RUSRUHDO6FKHPD 
 
The corporeal schema is continually developed and refined throughout the lifetime, 
with both sources ± the internal sensation and the external image ± remaining 
important. In µ&RQWH[WXDOLVLQJ WKH &RQYHUVDWLRQ¶ , KDYH QRWHG WKDW LQ moving away 
from a notion of the (abstract, generalised) body towards a notion of embodiment or 
embodied being, my intention is to move away from thinking about the body as text, 
image or symbol to focus instead on the lived-body. In the context of the following 
discussion, it is, however, important to note that the image can also be understood as 
part of lived experience ± without the image I do not have a thematic experience of 
myself and I do not even have a pre-reflective experience of a differentiated corporeal 
schema. Being able to do (dance), here, relies on the corporeal schema which is 
formed from different sources including the external image of the body.  
 
I therefore suggest that we must think not in terms of rejecting the ideas of the body as 
image, but of exploring what happens at the blurred boundaries between image and 
materiality in active embodied experience. Thus we cannot fully separate out lived 
experience from representation in dance, a theme that I will return to more fully in my 
FKDSWHURQµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶7KLVFKDSWHURQµ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶LPSRUWDQWO\HPSKDVLVHVD
blurring of traditional dualist boundaries. I do not wish to look at materiality and 
representation, or the internal and external senses of the body, and suggest that we 
should reject one half of the binary in favour of the other. Rather in attempting to 
produce a truly non-dualist account of human being, my interest lies in exploring the 
how these traditionally dichotomous categories actually overlap and interact in the 
lived-experience of the embodied practice of dance.  
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This difficulty in distinguishing between lived experience and representation also has 
a bearing on how we understand the notion of language in dance (or a language of 
dance) and the role of language in learning dance. Language is obviously important 
for learning dance as dancers do talk to each other and give direction on occasion 
verbally as well as physically, but it is DUJXDEO\ QRW SULPDU\ LQ GDQFHUV¶ learning 
processes as a lot of what goes on is tacit and pre-reflective and is not therefore fully 
contained in the symbolic realm. ,WKHUHIRUHUHDFKP\GLVFXVVLRQRIµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶
at the end of this conversation between philosophy and practice, having first discussed 
dance in these earlier chapters with a primary emphasis on the tacit and pre-reflective.  
 
,Q DSSURDFKLQJ µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ WKURXJK WKLV URXWH , FRQVLGHU WKDW , DP EHWWHU
equipped to explore the role of language in dance without necessarily falling into the 
dualist trap of assuming that language originates in the isolated mind of a Cartesian 
VXEMHFWDQGLV WREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKUHIOHFWLRQDQGWKHQHFHVVDULO\VROLSVLVWLFµ, WKink 
WKHUHIRUH,DP¶ Rather my understanding of representation in dance is built upon the 
insights gleaned from preceding discussion of the corporeal schema in terms of 
µ3UDFWLFDO .QRZOHGJH¶ µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ DQG µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ ZKLFK IRFXV RQ WKH
importance of the pre-reflective and posit a non-dualist understanding of embodied 
being. I therefore proceed here with a discussion of the role of mirrors and others in 
WKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHGDQFHU¶VFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDRUVHQVHRIVHOIZKLFK,EHOLHYHVHUYHV
as a necessary foundation for the later discussion of representation in non-dualist 
terms.  
 
  150 
The mirror is not the only source for development and refinement of the corporeal 
schema, but it may be an important one.  Crossley notes in particular that: 
 
In the modern context the existence of mirrors and other reflecting surfaces adds 
to this basic mirroring from others and potentially intensifies the relationship 
which an agent may enjoy to their self qua embodied being. The mirror is a 
FUXFLDOPHFKDQLVPIRUµVHOIZRUN¶LQWKHPRGHUQFRQWH[W± we use the mirror to 
style the self we want to be, to create the image that will make others see us as 
we want to be seen, thus allowing us to be that self for ourselves. (Crossley, 
2001:144)  
 
Furthermore the mirror is certainly very prominent in the dance studio, making it a 
good place to take up this discussion. I will therefore open this section with an 
exploration of how dancers both make use of and relate to their mirror images with 
reference to the development of their corporeal schemas as theorised by Merleau-
Ponty. 
 
The principle use which dancers make of the mirrors lining the walls of the rehearsal 
studios is related to how they form and hold certain positions of the body. Thus, for 
example, it may be important that the leg extended behind the dancer in an arabesque 
is at a right-angle to the vertical line of the body, and dancers will refer to the mirrors 
to check that they are correctly aligned when they assume this position. Carrie 
describes how she makes frequent use of the mirrors  
 
«MXVWWRFKHFNDSRVLWLRQ ± I look and then I remember it in my body ± how it 
looks ± so I can reproduce that without having to look in the mirror. [Carrie]  
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This use of the mirror image means that dancers are able to learn that certain 
proprioceptive experiences of, for example, an extension of the leg, correspond with 
certain external images such as the right-angle between leg and body. As the above 
quote suggests, the dancer will, after this process, then be able to be able to perform 
the arabesque at the correct angle without relying on the mirror.  
 
The sense of how the position looks from the outside is thus integrated into the 
GDQFHU¶VFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDVRWKDWZKHQWKHGDQFHUSHUIRUPVDQarabesque he or she 
knows that the fact that it feels a certain way (introceptively) means that it also looks 
a certain way from an external perspective. In response to my further questions about 
what exactly the mirror was used for and whether it was always a necessary part of 
performing a movement or perhaps became less important at different stages in the 
learning process, Carrie goes on to say: 
 
From that way I can see sort of how I look ± LI,ORRNEDG,GRQ¶WGRLWLI,ORRN
alright then I do it again. So yes if I do that a lot then obviously I can turn away 
from the mirror. [Carrie] 
 
The importance of learning through the process of repetition in dance was highlighted 
in the previous chapter, but it is important to note here that it is again through 
repetition that the dancers learn how their internal sensations of body position 
correspond with their external image. Repeatedly extending the leg into a right-angle 
seen in the mirror means that the arabesque LV LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWR WKH GDQFHU¶V
corporeal schema with the appropriate angle, so that it is then possible for the dancer 
to assume the position without looking in the mirror and to know, without the mirror, 
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what the position looks like from the external perspective. It is this sense of the 
arabesque as both an internal sensation and as a right-angle between the leg and my 
body (an external image) which characterises how such positions are incorporated into 
WKHGDQFHU¶VFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD 
 
A lot of the time for a dancer, then, the introceptive sensation of assuming a position 
is effectively the sensation of assuming a form which corresponds to an external 
image. The image of the right-angle is part of the sensation of the arabesque for the 
experienced dancer who has learned this position through repetition in front of the 
mirror. The dancer¶VFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDLVKRZHYHUFRQVWDQWO\HYROYLQJDQGDQXPEHU
of the interviewees commented on the occurrence of discrepancies between how the 
position looks from the outside and how the dancer feels it to look from this internal 
perspective. As one dancer describes: 
 
6RPHWLPHV ,JHW WKH LPDJH LQP\PLQGRIZKDW, WKLQN , ORRN OLNHDQG WKHQ LW¶V
completely different, like today we were doing some attitude [name of position] 
leg thing and I could have sworn my leg was like ± you know ± really turned out 
EXW«>6X]L@ 
 
,QVLWXDWLRQVOLNHWKHVHGDQFHUVGHVFULEHGKDYLQJWRµJREDFNWRWKHPLUURUV¶WRWU\WR
re-learn the position, again through repetition of assuming the position in the mirror 
until they have a sensation of the position that corresponds with the correct external 
LPDJH7KLVSURFHVVLVUHODWHGWRWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIµFRUUHFWLRQ¶LQWKHSUHYLRXVFKDSWHU
where dancers had learned one pattern of movement and were then asked to correct 
what they had learnt either because they were not performing the sequence as the 
choreographer wished or because some change had been made to the sequence. As 
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with this previous discussion, dancers noted the difficulty of adjusting the way they 
assumed positions such as the arabesque which they generally performed without 
conscious reflection.  
 
The mirrors that line the studio walls are therefore important to the continuing 
GHYHORSPHQWRIWKHGDQFHU¶VFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDDVWKH\DUHYLWDOWRWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI
the correspondence between how a position feels and how it looks. It is this 
LQWHJUDWLRQRIWKHLQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOµSLFWXUHV¶RIDSRVLWLRQWKDWFKDUDFWHULVHVKRZLW
LV LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWR WKHGDQFHU¶VFRUSRUHDO VFKHPDZKHQDGDQFHU LV OHDUQLQJDQHZ
position. Repetition in front of the mirror then allows the position to be established in 
the corporeal schema so that the dancer can assume the correct position without 
recourse to the mirror and without conscious reflection. The mirrors are not only 
important for learning new positions, however, they are also used by dancers to 
correct the way they assume positions where there is a discrepancy between how they 
feel they look and how they look from an external perspective as seen in the mirror. 
This involves the same process of repetition until the dancer has learned a new 
internal sensation that corresponds with the correct external image and can assume 
this without reflection or need of the mirror. 
 
This emphasis on the integral importance of the relationship with the mirrors was, 
however, limited to discussion of (static) positions such as the arabesque. The dancers 
did not prioritise the mirror image or the use of mirrors in discussion of sequences of 
PRYHPHQW 7KLV PHDQW WKDW ZKLOH PLUURUV PLJKW EH KHOSIXO GXULQJ µFODVV¶ZKHQ WKH
dancers were going through a series of exercises, they were in fact considered to be 
unhelpful in most cases where an actual choreography was being rehearsed as they did 
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QRW DOORZ DWWHQWLRQ WR µRWKHU WKLQJV VXFK DV TXDOLW\ RI PRYHPHQW DQG PRYLQJ¶
[Carrie] . At a simple level, as Louisa comments, µZKHQ,PRYH,FDQ¶WEHZDWFKLQJ
WKHPLUURUDOOWKHWLPH¶>/RXLVD@ 
 
In these situations the mirrors were seen by the dancers to focus too much attention on 
the positions so that, as Christina comments: 
 
,W VRUW RI WDNHV DZD\ WKH UHDOQHVV LI \RX¶UH ORRking at just like positions and 
shapes ± WKHQ ZKHQ \RX¶UH DFWXDOO\ GDQFLQJ LW FDQ DOVR MXVW ORRN OLNH \RX¶UH
doing a shape or position. [Christina]  
 
Focussing on the external image was also related in this way to the negative concept 
RIµPDNLQJVKDSHV¶GLscussed in the previous chapter:  
 
I think if you think too much about what things look like from the outside you 
start making shapes. [Rhianna]  
 
:HFDQXVH/RXLVD¶VFRPPHQWVRQWKHXVHRIPLUURUVWRH[SORUHKRZWKHPLUURUPLJKW
be understood to be unhelpIXODQGµWDNHDZD\WKHUHDOQHVV¶RI WKHPRYHPHQWIRU WKH
dancers:  
 
TKHPLUURUGRHVOLHLW¶VQRWDJRRGWKLQJWRORRNLQWKHPLUURUEHFDXVHZKHQ\RX
OHDUQDPRYHPHQWOLNHZKHQZH¶UHLQFODVVZHSUREDEO\IDFHWKHPLUURUEXWWKDW
can be problematic as weOOµFRVLI\RX¶UHZRUNLQJRQVRPHWKLQJDQG,¶PVWDQGLQJ
LQ IURQWRI WKHPLUURUDQG,¶PORRNLQJDWP\ IHHW WKHQP\QHFN¶VGRZQDQGP\
OLQHLVRXWRISODFHVR\RX¶YHJRWWREHFDUHIXOZLWKWKHPLUURUVDVZHOODQGQRW
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always be looking in the mirror ± you can see it every now and again to check 
EXW , WKLQN JHQHUDOO\ LW¶V EHWWHU IRU PH QRW WR KDYH D PLUURU EHFDXVH WKHQ ,¶P
IHHOLQJWKHPRYHPHQWDQGWKDW¶VDOZD\VPRUHFRUUHFWWKDQORRNLQJDWLWEHFDXVH
QRERG\VHHVWKHPRYHPHQWIURPKHUHVRLI,¶PWU\LQJWRFRUUHFt myself from here 
,¶PSUREDEO\QRWFRUUHFWLQJLW,¶PSUREDEO\PDNLQJLWZRUVHPD\EHDQG,VHHLW
a lot and I do it myself sometimes ± \RX¶UHFRPLQJDFURVVWKHIORRUGRLQJDMrWp
DQG \RX GR WKDW >ORRN URXQG@ WR FKHFN DQG DV VRRQ DV \RX GR WKDW \RX¶UH
disWRUWLQJLWXQOHVVLW¶VWKHFKRUHRJUDSK\DQGWKH\VD\³GRWKLVDQGDV\RXGRLW
MXVWORRNWKDWZD\DQGVSLUDO´EXW,WKLQNLW¶VLWFDQPDNHLWZRUVHVR\RX¶YHJot 
to be very careful. [Louisa] 
 
There is a very strong sense, then, in which the mirror is understood to give a false or 
distorted picture of the movement. The very act of looking in the mirror interrupts the 
PRYHPHQW DQGGLVWRUWV WKH OLQHRI WKHGDQFHU¶V ERG\PHDQLQJ WKDW WKH LPDJHRI WKH
movement that is reflected back to the dancer is not faithful to the character of the 
movement as it is normally performed when the dancer is not looking in the mirror.  
 
In the course of my interview with Louisa I questioned her further about whether it 
was possible and if so how she established a picture of what she looked like from the 
outside when she was moving. There are other images available to dancers such as 
photographs which do not require the dancer to change the pattern of movement or 
line of the body, but as Louisa explains: 
 
You can maybe look at a SKRWRJUDSKRI\RXGRLQJ LWEXW\RXFDQ¶W LW¶VDERXW
PRYHPHQW\RX¶UHQRWJRLQJWREHVWDQGLQJOLNHDSKRWRJUDSK,PHDQ\RXPLJKW
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GR EXW LW¶V SDUW RI D PRYHPHQW LW¶V SDUW RI D WKLQJ WKDW¶V JRLQJ RQ LW¶V OLYH
[Louisa] 
 
Thus the dancer does not seem to be able to use the mirror or photographic image to 
help develop the corporeal schema where the emphasis is on movement rather than 
(static) position. In the extended quote above, Louisa also evokes the notion of 
µIHHOLQJWKHPRYHPHQW¶EHLQJµPRUHFRUUHFW¶ than trying to look at the movement in 
the mirror. This distinction was echoed by all the dancers, particularly when it came 
to the issue of giving a certain stylistic quality to a movement, thus as the interviews 
progressed I was able to ask Anthony, for example: 
 
$3:KHQ\RX¶UHWU\LQJWRJHWDFHUWDLQTXDOLW\LQ\RXUPRYHPHQWLVWKDW± do 
you have a picture of what you look like from the outside, or is it more about how 
LWIHHOVRULVWKDWQRWHYHQDGLVWLQFWLRQ\RX¶GPDNH" 
 
Anthony: Maybe for me persoQDOO\LW¶VPRUHDERXWDSK\VLFDOLQVLGHIHHOLQJ 
 
Anthony went on to give an example of this, describing himself as having naturally 
light movements and explaining that the normal flow of his dance did not generate 
enough energy or force to lift another dancer. When required to do lifts, Anthony 
explained that if he focussed on his image in the mirror he would perhaps follow the 
right patterns of movement but would fail to generate the enough power to raise the 
other dancer in the air. Instead of this, then, he would have to focus on the internal 
sensations associated with the lift so that while still following the correct pattern of 
movement he was able to supply the extra force needed for the lift. 
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Marco also echoed this emphasis on the internal feeling of a movement:  
 
<RXIHHOLWEHFDXVHLW¶VYHU\GLIILFXOWWRVHH\RXUVHOIIURPWKHRXWVLGH± every time 
I see pictures I get depressed, I hate it ± so the image, you know, is not the dance 
± LW¶VGHILQLWHO\LQVLGH6RWKDWLVLQWHUHVWLQJWKDWPRYHPHQWFDQEe inside of my 
body ± you know? ± and of course you have all the pattern ± you know? ± my 
legs, how my legs go, but more interesting is the feel for me.  [Marco]  
 
Here Marco asserts that µthe image¶ LV HPSKDWLFDOO\ µQRW WKHGDQFH¶ WKDWGDQFLQJ LV
about some inner sensation for the dancer not about the pattern of the leg movements. 
It is, however, important that he qualifies this comment by acknowledging that it is 
possible to think about the movement in terms of an external image or pattern, but that 
the LGHD WKDW WKH GDQFHU¶V PRYHPHQW LV µLQVLGH¶ WKH ERG\ LV IRU KLP DV D GDQFH
practitioner, far more interesting. 
 
7KLV ZDV PDGH PRUH H[SOLFLW ZKHQ , TXHVWLRQHG 6X]L DQG 0LFKDHOD DERXW ZKDW ,¶G
heard from other dancers: 
 
$3$ORWRISHRSOH,¶YHVSRNHQWRKDve said that kind of the way you sort of think 
you look like something and its feeling ± WKH\ VDLG WKDW¶VPRUH LPSRUWDQW WKDQ
what it looks like from the outside. 
 
Suzi: For you personally, but not choreographically. Choreographically it can 
be way off the mark! 
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0LFKDHOD7KHIHHOLQJ¶VJUHDWOLNH\RX¶YHJRWWRWU\DQGILQGWKDWIHHOLQJEXWDOVR
\RX¶YHJRWWRWU\DQGJHWWKDW\RXKDYHWRWU\DQGJHWWKDWULJKWRWKHUZLVH\RX¶OO
EH GRLQJ \RXU RZQ WKLQJ DQG \RX¶UH IHHOLQJ VRPHWKLQJ DQG WKDW IHHOLQJ WKDW
\RX¶YHJRWLVQ¶WULJKW± LW¶VDGLIILFXOWRQHLWLVDGLIILFXOWRQH± WKDW¶VP\SRLQWRI
view personally ± LW¶V QLFH WR MXVW JR ZLWK WKH IORZ DQG ILQG \RXU RZQ ZD\
SHUVRQDOO\EXW«¶ 
 
Thus there is a definite tension for the dancers between the internal and external 
SLFWXUHVRIWKHPRYHPHQWDQGZKLFKLVPRUHµUHDO¶DQGµFRUUHFW¶,KDYHQRWHGDERYH
that dancers will make use of mirrors to check and correct positions and thus to adjust 
the internal feel of a particular movement so that when they feel they are assuming the 
arabesque position this corresponds with the appropriate external image. It is, 
however, clear that this use of the mirror to help the dancers correct their movements 
is not always possible or indeed appropriate in the context of a choreography. In 
addition to the logistical difficulties of trying to look in the mirror while in motion, 
the dancers were also resistant to the use of any medium such as the mirror or the 
SKRWRJUDSKLF LPDJH ZKLFK IRFXVVHG WKH DWWHQWLRQ RQ µPDNLQJ VKDSHV¶ DQG SRVLWLRns 
UDWKHUWKDQWKHIORZDQGHVVHQFHRIµWKHGDQFH¶ Nevertheless dancers were aware of 
the need, on occasion, to correct or refine sequences of movements by using mirrors 
or other images in order to create the required external effect for the audience as well 
as producing this effect by concentrating on the internal sensation ± happiness, for 
example, might be communicated to the audience most effectively when the dancer 
concentrates on internal sensations of happiness and lightness, but if the dancer feels 
that they are moving lightly when in fact the movement looks heavy to the audience 
and thus evokes feelings of sadness, then correction will be necessary. 
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One area where mirrors were regarded as sometimes necessary was where a number 
of dancers were required for a choreography to move in unison (or canon):  
 
6RPHWLPHVODWHURQLQWKHSURFHVVZHKDYHWRJREDFNWRWKHPLUURUVEXWWKDW¶V
RQO\ UHDOO\ IRU XQLVRQ ZRUN WR PDNH VXUH WKDW ZH¶UH DOO PRYLQJ DV RQH XQLW
[Steven] 
 
The emphasis here is on making sure that all the dancers are doing the same 
movement at the same time, that the positions they adopt during the sequence are 
uniform and co-ordinated.  
 
It is not, however, possible to clearly define when mirrors should be referred to and 
when the internal feeling of the movement should be definitive. Louisa, for example 
suggests that even unison work should be based on the internal feeling of where the 
movement comes from rather than a primary focus on the external shape of the 
movement, although the end result will be that it looks identical:  
 
If you have a group of people in contemporary dance doing the same movement, 
LI LW¶V FRPLQJ IURP WKH ULJKW SODFH ZKHWKHU LW¶V KHUH RU KHUH RU ZKHUHYHU
whatever point on the body, it will look exactly the same on each person 
DOWKRXJKWKDWWKRVHWZRERGLHVDUHFRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQWDQG,¶YHVHHQLWKDSSHQ
once. [Louisa] 
 
As Michaela suggests in the above quote, then, the exact emphasis placed on the 
internal and the external picture of the movement may finally come down to the 
individual dancer. It is also clear that the importance of the mirrors in the rehearsal 
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process will be, to some extent, dependent on the nature of the piece, for example, if 
there is a lot of emphasis on shape and unison work.  
 
There is also a need to make use of images where dancers have to learn new works 
from video. All the dancers reported dissatisfaction and problems with this process of 
OHDUQLQJIURPYLGHRDVH[HPSOLILHGE\0DUFR¶VFRPPHQWVFRPSDULQJOHDUQLQJIURPD
video with the process of a choreographer coming to the company to create the work:  
 
)RUPHLW¶VUHDOO\KDUG± LW¶VNLQGRIDGU\SURFHVV± you look at the tape, you 
know, and then you copy ± DQG³QRLW¶VQRW WKHUH´ ± and then you copy and it 
never, I tell you, it never is the same thing because maybe some details on the 
ERG\,FDQ¶WVHHRQWKHWDSH>0DUFR@ 
 
As Louisa further explains, when trying to copy from video: 
 
« \RX FDQ VHH IODW ZKDW WKH PRYHPHQW LV EXW \RX GRQ¶W NQRZ ZKHUH LW FRPHV
IURP\RXGRQ¶WNQRZZKHWKHUWKH\LQ order to lift their arm did they move their 
elbow first to do the movement. [Louisa]  
 
Thus although the video images are moving, unlike mirror or photographic images, 
there is still some sense in which the video image reduces the dance to a series of 
shapes without fully capturing the essence of how the movement is embodied and 
lived by the dancer. 
 
As identified in the previous chapter, copying and repetition are the key elements in 
the learning process whereby dancers incorporate new movements or patterns of 
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movement into the corporeal schema. Interacting with and copying other bodies is 
therefore cHQWUDO WR WKH GDQFHU¶V SUDFWLFH $OO WKH GDQFHUV however, make a clear 
distinction between the imitation process where they are in front of a real person and 
the imitation process when they are learning from video images of a dancing body. In 
this case the presence of an actual person is far preferable to the image. This was 
expressed by Michaela and Suzi in the course of our conversation about the process of 
learning a piece from video: 
 
0LFKDHOD LW¶V ZDWFKLQJ DQG SLFNLQJ XS SLFNLQJ XS PRYHV SLFNLQJ XS VWHSV
timing, arms, everything ± LW¶VPRUH OLNHDZDWFKDQG OHDUQDQG WKHQJRDZD\
DQG , GRQ¶W OLNH LW LW¶V UHDOO\ KDUG DFWXDOO\ , ILQG WKDW UHDOO\ KDUG ,¶G UDWKHU
have someone come in ± like the choreographer comes in and works with you 
whereas learning stuff of a video I find really hard. 
 
6X]L %HFDXVH ZKHQ D FKRUHRJUDSKHU FRPHV LQ DQG ZH¶UH VWDUWLQJ VRPHWKLQJ
from afresh then you can put in your own ideas and then have the movement to 
\RXU ERG\ UDWKHU WKDQ WU\LQJ WR SLFN XS VRPHRQH HOVH¶V PRYHPHQW EHFDXVH
WKH\¶YH REYLRXVO\ PDGH LW XS SUHYLRXVO\ VR LW VRPHWLPHV PD\ EH DZNZDUG
HVSHFLDOO\LI\RX¶UHZRUNLQJZLWKSDUWQHUVDQGWKH\¶UHGLIIHUHQWKHLJKWVDQGVtuff 
like that so you have to get choreographers to come in for stuff like that. 
 
Michaela: Especially to work with style ± like you say ± the style that they want 
DQG\RXFDQ¶WVHHLWSURSHUO\RQDYLGHR 
 
Suzi: And it gets diluted, it changes and they put their own thing. 
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0LFKDHOD7KDW¶VULJKW,PHDQZKHQWKH\VD\PDNHWKHSLHFH\RXURZQLW¶VWUXH
you do make the piece your own but sometimes you lose the what the quality was 
in the first place so when watching a video especially I find it difficult ± you 
FRXOG EH GRLQJ VRPHWKLQJ DQG WKH FKRUHRJUDSKHU FRPHV LQ DQG VD\V ³ZKDW¶V
WKDW"´ 
 
6X]L$QGDOVRVHHZKHQZH¶UHWU\LQJWRVHHHYHU\WKLQJ ± WKH\¶UHJRLQJWKLVZD\
DQGVR\RX¶UHIROORZLQJWKHPEXWDFWXDOO\LW¶VWKLVZD\± what a nightmare! 
 
These dancers again highlight that it is particularly difficult to make out the style or 
quality of movement when they are learning dance from an image rather than from 
real people.  
 
Thus although these contemporary repertory company dancers are proficient at 
µSLFNLQJXS¶IURPYLGHRLPDJHVDQGGROHDUQPDQ\RIWKHZRUNVWKH\SHUIRUPLQWKLV
way, they identified a number of problems with this process. One of the simplest 
issues was the direction of the movement. When learning from a person, dancers are 
used to mirroring the movement of that person, that is, facing them and moving in the 
same direction as them ± when the choreographer or rehearsal director moves to his or 
her left, the dancers who are facing him or her move to their right. This may be 
adapted so that the choreographer is in front of the dancers facing away from them 
and the dancers follow the choreographer from behind, perhaps also making use of the 
reflection of the choreographer in the mirror. With the video, however, the images of 
dancers on the screen move in the opposite direction to that in which the dancers must 
move if they are to copy the movement and produce the same pattern as the figures on 
WKHVFUHHQ(FKRLQJ6X]L¶VFRPPHQWDERYH/RXLVDH[SODLQV: 
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Everyone picks up differently off the video ± some people are really good at it 
and some people not so good ± I tend to get everything back to front. [Louisa] 
 
Similarly it was noted by a number of the dancers that the image on the screen was 
very small and 2-dimensional which meant that it was impossible to see some of the 
details of how the figure in the image was managing to achieve certain movements 
and positions. The most salient problem with the use of images was, however, as I 
have noted above, related to style and quality of movement. This could perhaps be 
explained in terms of the lack of detail in small images, the lack of movement in static 
images, and the fact that trying to learn a choreography from the performance tape of 
DQRWKHU GDQFHU PHDQV WKDW \RX JHW WKH PRYHPHQWV µVHFRQG-KDQG¶ RU LQ D µGLOXWHG¶
IRUPEHFDXVHWKHRWKHUGDQFHUKDVDGDSWHGWKHFKRUHRJUDSKHU¶VPRYHPHQWVLQFHUWDLQ
ways.  
 
There was, however, a very marked difference for dancers when they were interacting 
with real people rather images of others. All the dancers emphasised the importance 
of having the choreographer or a member of the original cast come to the company 
and the important role the rehearsal director has in correcting their movements. The 
fact that the images of the other cannot properly fulfil these roles suggests that when a 
dancer interacts with and copies another dancer they doing more than simply 
reproducing an image. No matter how good the image was, then, it would never be a 
substitute for having a real person in front of them. 
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Importantly when the dancers interact with a real person demonstrating a movement, 
not only does the dancer reflect that movement back to the other, but the other then 
UHIOHFWV WKH GDQFHU¶V PRYHPHQW EDFN WR WKH GDQFHU 7KLV FDQ HLWKHU EH SK\VLFDO
reflection where the other shows the dancer what it is that the dancer is doing, or 
verbal reflection where the other tells the dancer what it is that they are doing right 
and how they are failing to achieve the correct movement. Where the process of 
reflection is intersubjective, there is also the possibility of negotiation of the 
PRYHPHQWZKHUHIRUH[DPSOHWKHPRYHPHQWFDQEHDGDSWHGWRWKHGDQFHU¶VERG\ 
 
The dancers, therefore, report a very positive experience of this intersubjective and 
communicative process of reflection with a responsive other. The problems thus seem 
to arise where reflection does not have this communicative, intersubjective element. 
The introduction of an image form of the body can be understood to render the 
dancing body static and objectified rather than allowing it to be recognised as a 
communicative subjectivity.  
 
This is not to say that dancers do not make any use of image forms of the body. On 
WKHFRQWUDU\PLUURUDQGYLGHRLPDJHVSOD\DNH\UROHLQWKHGDQFHU¶VOHDUQLQJSURFHVV
and allow the dancers to have an internal sensation of certain positions and 
movements which incorporates a sense of how the position looks from an external 
perspective. It is through identifying with their own specular images that dancers are 
able to incorporate this external perspective into their corporeal schemas. The 
knowledge that certain internal sensations are related to certain external images of the 
body is also central WR WKHGDQFHU¶VDELOLW\WRXQGHUVWDQGDQGFRS\WKHYHU\FRPSOH[
movements seen on the body of the other.  
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Nevertheless dancers do report problems with image forms of the body which seem to 
WDNHDZD\ IURP WKH µUHDOQHVV¶RU LPPHGLDF\RI WKHGDQFH7KXVZKLOH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ
ZLWKWKHVSHFXODULPDJHLVYLWDOWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHGDQFHU¶VFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD
the specular image can also become problematic where it involves a separation or 
alienation from the lived experience of the dancing body. 
 
These ambiguities and paradoxes are theorised in Merleau-Ponty¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI
LQIDQWLOH GHYHORSPHQW LQ µ7KH &KLOG¶V 5HODWLRQ ZLWK 2WKHUV¶ c), but it is in 
examining the experience of the embodied practice of dance that we can really see 
how they play out in practice during adult life. The external image can produce the 
problems of objectification and alienation, but it is also, paradoxically, seen to be 
QHFHVVDU\ WR WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI WKH GDQFHU¶V FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD RU VHQVH RI ERG\-
subjectivity. Thus dancers spoke at length about the problems with using mirrors and 
how they did not like the relationships they had with their bodies mediated by mirror 
images, but they also all made use of the mirrors that line the walls of dance studios, 
recognising that the internal sense they had of the movements they were performing 
relied to some extent on interaction with these mirror images. 
 
Merleau-Ponty also opens up a new way of understanding intersubjective mirroring 
and the gaze which we have been able to explore in relation to dance. Here it was seen 
that intersubjective mirroring had the potential to contribute to the refinement of the 
GDQFHU¶VFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDLQWKHVDPHZD\WKDWPLUURULPDJHVFDQEXWEHFDXVHRIWKH
potential for mutual subjective recognition and communication, the objectifying 
effects were potentially removed and dancers tended to report these experiences in 
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positive terms without reference to separation or alienation. This was not, however, 
always the case, and dancers noted that paying too much attention to the technique of 
a dance performer rather than trying to engage with what that performer is trying to 
communicate could easily have the negative effect of focussing attention on the body 
as object and closing yourself off to the meaning of the dance. I will discuss this point 
IXUWKHULQP\FKDSWHURQµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ 
 
Thus the gaze and intersubjective mirroring interaction have positive and negative 
aspects for the dancer, just as the mirror image does. The point here is not, then, to 
arrive at an understanding of mirroring or the gaze as either negative or positive, 
objectifying or necessary, but rather to explore how dance and Merleau-Ponty open up 
a space for discussion that lies in-between these divisions. In the next section I will 
continue to explore this in-between space through a discussion of the dancing body 
which emphasises the importance of thinking about both transcendence and 
immanence in relation to the body rather than trying to arrive at an understanding 
which places the body on one side of this traditional dichotomy. 
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III: Immediacy and Transcendence  
 
The idea that the dancer should have an immediate, pre-reflective, relationship with 
his or her movement and with his or her body was taken up by a number of my 
intervieweesDV,KDYHEULHIO\GLVFXVVHGLQP\FKDSWHURQµ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶. In 
this section I wish to further explore notions of immanence and transcendence in 
relation to the dancing body, discussing how the emphasis on immediacy and body-
awareness in dance fits or fails to fit with understandings of (the interruption of) 
transcendence.  
 
As I will explain in more detail below, Merleau-Ponty, contra both Sartre and de 
Beauvoir, suggests that the body for the task focussed body-subject is a source of 
transcendence, although the body can become a source of immanence when it 
becomes the explicit focus of attention: as soon as we focus on and become 
reflectively aware of our own body we objectify it and this means interruption of 
transcendence. This makes a lot of sense in terms of dance when we consider the 
GDQFHU¶VH[SHULHQFHRIGDQFHDQGKRZWKHREMHFWLILFDWLRQRIWKHERG\IRUHxample in 
WKHPLUURULPDJHLQWHUUXSWVWKHLPPHGLDF\DQGIORZRIWKHGDQFHU¶VPRYHPHQW 
 
In this section, however, I wish to focus more closely on two concepts evoked by the 
GDQFHUV WKDW RI µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG WKDW RI µEHLQJ LQ WKH PRPHQW¶  7KHVH
concepts help us to see how Merleau-3RQW\¶V QRWLRQ RI WKH ERG\ DV D VRXUFH RI
transcendence plays out in practice, but they also emphasise the problems associated 
with any attempt to make a dualist dichotomy between transcendence and immanence, 
even in the way that Merleau-Ponty does with the distinction between task-focussed 
  168 
and body-focussed action. Indeed I suggest later not only that the distinction between 
task-focus and body-focus is often impossible to make in dance, but also that this 
distinction doeVQRWILWZLWKGDQFHUV¶RZQHYRFDWLRQVRIWUDQVFHQGHQFHIn Section IV I 
then move on to discuss the differences between male and female descriptions of 
transcendence, immediacy, openness and vulnerability. 
 
In the course of the interview I conducted with Louisa, this dancer was able to speak 
at some length about WZRQRWLRQVRIZKDWVKHFDOOHGµEHLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶DQGµEHLQJ
LQWKHPRPHQW¶ As a dancer, Louisa explains: 
 
<RX KDYH WR JHW WR D SRLQW ZKHUH \RX \RX¶UH LQ \RXU RZQ ERG\ DQG \RX¶UH
\RX¶UHQRWGRLQJVKDSHV\RX¶UHILQGLQJRXWZKHUHLWFRPHVIURP>/RXLVD@ 
 
µ%HLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶LVWKXVQRWDERXWµPDNLQJVKDSHV¶RULPDJHVEXWDERXWORFDWLQJ
WKHDSSURSULDWHLQQHUVHQVDWLRQIRUWKHPRYHPHQWµILQGLQJRXWZKHUHLWFRPHVIURP¶
This is noted to be particularly difficult where dancers are required to learn from an 
image of the dance rather than from a real person:   
 
,I\RX¶UHOHDUQLQJLWRIIWKHYLGHRWKHQLW¶VJRLQJWRWDNHORQJHUWRILQGRXWZKHUH
the movement comes from in a true way. [Louisa]  
 
Louisa was more consistently articulate about these aspects of her experience of dance 
than many of my other interviewees so there is an emphasis on quotes from this 
interview in the material below. I have, however, also tried to show that her ideas 
were supported by what other dancers said (although maybe not so articulately) and I 
have made a point of engaging with the interview data to explore where other dancers 
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diverge from what Louisa says. This is, in fact, particularly relevant for the discussion 
of gender in the following VHFWLRQDVZKLOH/RXLVD¶VFRPPHQWVDERXWEHLQJµin your 
body¶ and µin the moment¶ are representative of both female and male dancers¶ 
understandings of these aspects of dance, she does not work through how this 
emphasis on immediacy and openness in the performance of dance can be quite 
exposing for the dancer, leading to feelings of vulnerability which were experienced 
particularly by female dancers. I will therefore move away from Louisa in order to 
discuss these elements in more detail in Section IV. 
 
Louisa describes µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ LQ WHUPV RI IHHOLQJ FRPIRUWDEO\ VLWXDWHG or 
grounded in her body:  
 
µ6RWKDW¶VNLQGRI WREH LQ\RXUERG\ ± how it sits ± WKDW,¶PFRPIRUWDEO\ WKHUH
DQGWKDW,¶PFRUUHFWZLWKLQP\SUHVHQFHWKHUH>/RXisa]  
 
7KLVQRWLRQRIFRPIRUWRUKDUPRQ\LVIXUWKHUHFKRHGLQ0DUFR¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIKRZLW
IHHOVWREHµLQKDUPRQ\ZLWK\RXUERG\¶ 
 
,W¶VSHDFHIXODQGHPLW¶VSHDFHIXOLW¶VFRPIRUWDEOH\RXNQRZLW¶VSOHDVXUDEOHVR
LW¶V OLNHDPPP LW¶V UHDOO\YHU\GLIILFXOW WRH[SODLQ LW¶V MXVW WKHUH LW¶V LQ\RXU
ERG\ DQG \RX NQRZ LW¶V JRRG DQG HYHU\WKLQJ¶V ZRUNLQJ \RX NQRZ"« HP LW¶V
quite hard to explain. [Marco]  
 
This VHQVHRIµEHLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶ILWVZLWK the emphasis I have noted above on the 
feeling of the movement rather than focussing on the external image of how the 
PRYHPHQWORRNVDQGWKHLGHDWKDWWKHLQWHUQDOIHHOLQJLVPRUHFRUUHFWRUµWUXH¶ 
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Louisa does, however, identify two situations in which a dancer will not be in his or 
her body. Firstly she acknowledges that: 
 
7KHUHPLJKWEHDSRLQWZKHQ\RXILUVWOHDUQDSLHFHZKHQ\RX¶UHQRWLQ\RXUERG\
because it takes time because it takes to let the movement settle in your body. 
[Louisa]  
 
The second situation which she identifies as calling for the dancer to be out of his or 
her body is when something goes wrong or correction to a movement is required. As 
Louisa describes, this may mean that the dancer needs to temporarily be out of his or 
her body in order to correct something before returning to a sWDWHRI µEHLQJ LQ \RXU
ERG\¶7KXV Louisa describes a situation  
 
« ZKHQ \RX¶UH WU\LQJ WR EH LQ \RXU ERG\ EXW \RXU EUDLQ¶V JRLQJ ³ZKDW DP ,
JRLQJWRGR":KDWDP,JRLQJWRGR"+RZDP,JRLQJWRIL[WKLV"´- so I mean 
WKDW¶VGLIIHUHQW ± WKDW¶V2.WREHRXWRI\RXUERG\DWWKDWSRLQWEHFDXVH\RX¶UH
trying to deal with stuff. [Louisa] 
 
7KH KDUPRQ\ RI µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ LV WKXV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW LV SRVVLEOH RQFH WKH
dancer has incorporated the movement into the corporeal schema and can rely on 
feeling the movement rather than focussing on the external image. In contrast to this 
WKHGDQFHUPD\KDYHWREHµRXWRIWKHERG\¶GXULQJFRUUHFWLRQDQGWKHLQLWLDOSURFHVV
of learning a position or pattern of movement. The focus at this stage is more on the 
image as the dancer may be using mirrors to make sure that the internal sensations 
correspond with the correct external image. At these times it is therefore appropriate 
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DQG LQGHHG GHVLUDEOH WR EH µRXW RI WKH ERG\¶ DV LW LV WKURXJK WDNLQJ WKH distancing 
external perspective on the body that dancers can further develop and refine the 
corporeal schema. This is, however, only a temporary situation as all the dancers 
LQVLVWHGWKDWLWLVQHFHVVDU\WREHIXOO\µLQ\RXUERG\¶LQRUGHUWRSHUIRUPGDQFHLQD
proper and meaningful way. 
 
/RXLVDDOVRJRHVRQWRHYRNHDQRWLRQRIµEHLQJLQWKHPRPHQW¶WKDWFDSWXUHVDVHQVH
of a need for the dancer to focus on the here and now when performing:  
 
«MXVWWREHLQWKDWPRPHQW ± GRQ¶WRYHU-GRLWGRQ¶WWKLQNDERXWZKDW¶VFRPLQJ
next, just do WKHWKLQJ«LQVWHDGRIWU\LQJWRWKLQNRIWKHZKROHSLHFHLI,OLYHLQ
WKHPRPHQWDQGLW¶VWKHILUVWWKLQJ,KDYHWRGRLVVWHSRQVWDJHDQGLI,GRWKDW
one hundred percent in that moment then it gives it full value, but if I step on 
VWDJHDQG,¶PKDOIZD\WKURXJKWKHSLHFHLQP\KHDGDOUHDG\WKHQ,¶PQRWUHDOO\
LQLW,¶PVRPHZKHUHHOVH>/RXLVD@ 
 
This idea of not letting the mind focus on something ahead of the here and now of 
ERGLO\ PRYHPHQW LV DOVR HFKRHG E\ 0DUFR¶V GHVFULSWLRQ of how being in harmony 
with your body requires that you do not think about other things but simply have an 
internal awareness of the body µyour brain is inside [in your body] and you know 
HYHU\WKLQJWKDW¶VJRLQJRQ¶>0DUFR@ 
 
Other dancers similarly expressed the importance of not over-doing a performance to 
the extent that it somehow removes the dancer from the immediate context of the 
ZRUNWKDWWKH\DUHSHUIRUPLQJDQGWKXVVRPHKRZGLVWUDFWVRUGHWUDFWVIURPWKHµWUXH¶
movement. Ben thus commented: 
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I think if a work is made very, very well you can see the essence and then the 
performer becomes immersed in the work and then it works, then you get dancers 
who comment on the work while ± the work is made but not necessarily to a very 
high standard and they try and fix it or tKH\FRPPHQWRQLWZKLOHWKH\¶UHGRLQJLW
DQG WKH\ DGG WKHLU OLWWOH WRXFK ZKLFK VRPHWLPHV LV 2. EXW VRPHWLPHV GRHVQ¶W
necessarily give the work its chance to communicate. [Ben]  
 
Another dancer further describes his reaction to watching performers who do not stay 
true to this immediate context of the work:  
 
,I WKH\¶UH QRW FRPPLWWHG LQ WKH GHWDLO WKHQ LW¶V OLNH \RX ZDWFK VRPHERG\ HOVH
EHFDXVHLW¶V LW¶VGLVWUDFWLQJEXWRIWHQWKDW¶VDERXWWKHPWU\LQJWRVKRZRIIDQG
trying to put themselves forward rather than be sincere to what the movement 
was. [Daniel] 
 
7KLV QRWLRQ RI LPPHGLDF\ RU µEHLQJ LQ WKH PRPHQW¶ ZDV WKXV UHODWHG WR LGHDV RI
sincerity and also to a sense of openness and honesty in both physical and 
mental/emotional terms. At the physical level, then, Louisa describes how µbeing in 
the moment¶ allows the dancer to  
 
«RSHQXSD YRLGZKHUH \RX¶UHDELWPRUH IUHH WR UHVSRQGYHU\TXLFNO\ZKHQ
WKLQJVGRQ¶WJRWKHZD\LW¶VVXSSRVHGWR«LI,¶PLQWKHPRPHQWDQG,¶PWUXHWR
that moment then it is what it is so if I went on and I lifted my leg and I did a 
little judder then I go with it, rather than fight it. [Louisa]  
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This physical openness or responsiveness of the dancer who is in his or her body and 
µin the moment¶ is thus quick and pre-reflective and related to the sense of being in 
harmony with the body and focussed on the internal feeling of the movement 
incorporated in the corporeal schema.  
 
In contrast to this, QRW EHLQJ µLQ WKH PRPHQW¶ DQG µLQ \RXU ERG\¶ ZRXOG HQWDLO WKH
dancer failing to attend to the immediacy of the dance and the internal experience but 
UDWKHUORRNLQJRXWVLGHRIWKLVLPPHGLDWHVLWXDWLRQ7KLVHFKRHV&KULVWLQD¶VFRPPHQW
ZKLFK , KDYH TXRWHG DERYH WKDW IRFXVVLQJ RQ WKH PLUURU LPDJH µWDNHV DZD\ WKH
UHDOQHVV¶ ± the mirror in this case WDNHV DZD\ WKH LPPHGLDF\ RI WKH GDQFHU¶V SUH-
reflective) relationship to the dance and the body so that the body is seen as an object 
rather than internally sensed in that moment as an integral aspect of the dancing body-
subject. 
 
I now wish to return to WKHYRLFHRISKLORVRSK\WRGLVFXVVGDQFHUV¶FRPPHQWVDERXW
µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH PRPHQW µLQ UHODWLRQV WR WKH QRWLRQV RI
transcendence and immanence. The philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de 
Beauvoir examines existence in terms of different modes of being, some more 
associated with the body and some more with the mind. In the case of de Beauvoir it 
is also notable that some modes of being are more associated in our society with men 
and some with women, and I will return to this issue of gender difference in Section 
,9LQUHODWLRQWRIHPDOHGDQFHUV¶FRPPHQWVDERXWYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGWKHJD]H 
 
Two such modes of existence in Sartrian/Beauvoirian thought are those of 
transcendence and immanence where we can understand transcendence as µa sense of 
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openness to future projects as an existence for-itself¶ and immanence as µa sense of 
URRWHGQHVV WR WKH SDVW VWHPPLQJ IURP RQH¶V REMHFWLILFDWLRQ DV D EHLQJ-for-RWKHUV¶ 
(Weiss, 1999:45). Both Sartre and de Beauvoir understand the mind to be our primary 
source of transcendence and the body to be our primary source of immanence. Under 
this framework the body is in the negative position of holding us back and 
imprisoning us in materiality and objecthood, while the mind has the privileged 
position of affording us transcendence from this material prison and a form of 
freedom and self-determination. Importantly for de Beauvoir it is woman in our 
society who is mainly associated with the body and thus with immanence meaning 
that she is denied the transcendence afforded to men. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, however, suggests that the body can be a source of transcendence 
rather than immanence.  For Merleau-Ponty, the body has intentionality and can thus 
be understood as having qualities that might be more traditionally associated with the 
Cartesian mind or subject and thus with freedom as a being-for-itself. This notion of 
experiencing a kind of freedom and self-determination through the body, rather than it 
only being something attainable through the mind and in spite of the body (which is 
experienced as a limitation on this freedom in the Sartrian/Beauvoirian framework) 
VHHPV WR ILW ZLWK GDQFHUV¶ SRVLWLYH H[SHULHQFHV RI GDQFH 7KXV ZKHQ WKH\ DUH QRW
focussing too much on the mirror image, but are rather µin¶ their own bodies, dancers 
do not experience the body as a material prison but as a source of expression and 
freedom. Similarly, when they do not think too far ahead in the piece but concentrate 
on the here and now of the dance movement, they do not experience the dance and 
their dancing bodies as things, rather they live through the dance as it happens, 
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experiencing their dancing bodies not as a limitation on their freedom, but as the very 
means of their existence and self-expression. 
 
Merleau-Ponty does, however, concede that the body may in fact be a source of 
immanence under certain circumstances. For Merleau-Ponty the important distinction 
LV LQ UHODWLRQ WR ZKHWKHU WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V IRFXV LV RQ WKH WDVN WKDW WKH\ DUH
performing ±on the intention of the action, such as to drive a nail into the wall ± or on 
the body itself ± the hand wielding the hammer. The body can be a source of 
transcendence when the focus is on the task, but this transcendence is interrupted by 
immanence when we focus on our bodies as this focus renders the body an object to 
us. 
 
The assumption that focussing on the body automatically objectifies and interrupts 
transcendence can, however, be questioned (Weiss, 1999:46). This is worth looking at 
more carefully as for dancers those experiences which might be described as 
transcendent are very closely related to focusing on the immediacy of the dance and 
the dancing body ± µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH PRPHQW¶ $Q LPSRUWDQW
distinction for Merleau-Ponty concerns whether the relationship with the body here is 
pre-reflective or reflective, as he suggests that pre-reflective awareness of the body 
while the main focus is on the task allows transcendence, while conscious reflective 
focus on the body interrupts transcendence. At many levels this seems to fit with 
GDQFHUV¶GHVFULSWLRQVRIQRWLRQVRIµEHLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶DQGµEHLQJLQWKHPRPHQW¶DV
something you should not think about too much, which would suggest that these are 
primarily pre-reflective phenomena and that like Merleau-PontyGDQFHUV¶ experiences 
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VHHPWRVXJJHVWWKDWLWLVZKHQWKLVDZDUHQHVVRIWKHERG\DQGµWKHPRPHQW¶UHPDLQ
tacit and pre-reflective that they are most conducive to facilitating transcendence. 
 
1HYHUWKHOHVV , ZRXOG OLNH WR VXJJHVW WKDW WKH QRWLRQV RI µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG
µEHLQJLQWKHPRPHQW¶GRQRWQHFHVVDULO\ILWZLWKMerleau-Ponty¶VHPSKDVLVRQEHLQJ
task-focussed rather than body-focussed. Indeed dancers specifically say that the best 
dance is achieved when you do not think about what is coming next but focus entirely 
on your body and the movement in the here and now. To link this back to the example 
above, contra Merleau-Ponty, it would seem that transcendence for the dancer might 
well be better achieved through focussing on the hand wielding the hammer than 
through focussing on the over-all task of getting the nail into the wall. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ VXJJHVWV WKDW WKLV DZDUHQHVV GRHV QRW LQWHUUXSW
transcendence when it is tacit and pre-reflective and the conscious focus is on the task 
rather than the corporeal schema. This distinction does not, however, necessarily 
make sense for dance where the conscious focus on the task may in fact be a 
FRQVFLRXVIRFXVRQWKHGDQFHU¶VRZQERG\DQGWKRVHRIRWKHUV ,QGHHGWKHGDQFHUV,
interviewed suggested that thinking ahead in a choreography or not taking each 
movement as it comes and as it is in your body at that particular moment actually 
interferes with the dance. 
 
, ZRXOG WKHUHIRUH DUJXH WKDW :HLVV¶ VXJJHVWLRQ contra Merleau-Ponty, that paying 
close attentLRQ WR RQH¶V ERG\ EHIRUH RU GXULQJ DFWLRQ QHHG QRW WDNH DZD\ IURP WKH
WUDQVFHQGHQFH RI RQH¶V LQWHQWLRQDO DFWLYLW\ :HLVV  ILWV ZLWK WKH GDQFHUV
SRVLWLYH FRQFHSWV RI µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH PRPHQW¶ :KLOH WKH
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GDQFHUV¶ XVH RI WKHVH SKrases might be considered suggestive of immanence and 
interruption under Merleau-Ponty¶V IUDPHZRUN WKH SKHQRPHQD DUH LQ IDFW
experienced as facilitating transcendence. 
 
Merleau-Ponty radically challenged understandings of transcendence/immanence and 
bodily being by suggesting that the body was not always associated with immanence, 
although it could still be sometimes, as we will see in the case of the female dancers 
discussed below. In exploring dance, however, we can go further than Merleau-Ponty 
to say that even direct focus on the body need not necessarily interrupt transcendence 
for the dancers, as awareness of the immediate physicality of the dance and the 
dancing body does not always mean objectification for the dancer. The clear 
distinction between the body as site of transcendence or immanence in relation to 
whether body-awareness is tacit and secondary or the primary conscious focus does 
not therefore work for dancers and I would suggest that we need to leave behind this 
remnant of dualism if we are to truly understand embodied being. 
 
,QSODFHRIWKLVZHPLJKWIRFXVLQVWHDGRQKRZWKHGDQFHUV¶FRQFHSWVRIµEHLQJLQ\RXU
ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH PRPHQW¶ RSHQ XS D VSDFH LQ-between traditional divisions 
between subject and object and transcendence and iPPDQHQFHµ%HLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶
IRU H[DPSOH HPSKDVLVHV ERWK D QRWLRQ RI µEHLQJ¶ ZKLFK FDQ EH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK
VXEMHFWLYLW\DQG µLQ WKHERG\¶ZKLFKZHFDQDVVRFLDWHZLWKPDWHULDOLW\ DQGSHUKDSV
immanence. This state was however valued by all the dancers as facilitating the kind 
of freedom and self-expression that we would associate with transcendence. Thus the 
dancers have particular notions of groundedness and immediacy which perhaps imply 
immanence or the interruption or inhibition of transcendence under the traditional 
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framework, yet in the practice of dance are actually understood as the opposite to 
interruption or inhibition of dance suggesting that they in fact facilitate transcendence.  
 
I therefore argue that it is impossible to understand dance within the traditional 
framework which separates out transcendence and immanence into binary categories. 
Rather than understanding groundedness and immediacy as contributing to an 
interrupted or inhibited transcendence, then, I wish to suggest that they can be 
understood as contributing to an in-between category which I will refer to as 
µinhabited¶ transcendence. 
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IV: Gendered Embodiment 
 
,Q WKLV ILQDO VHFWLRQ RI WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ , ZLVK WR XVH GDQFHUV¶
experiences of immediacy, openness and vulnerability to further explore aspects 
around the gaze and the interruption of transcendence, drawing particular attention to 
gender differences between my interviewees.  
 
The notion of immediacy that accompanies the states of µbeing in your body¶ and 
µbeing in the moment¶ FDQDOVREHVHHQLQ/RXLVD¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIDQRSHQQHVVand pre-
reflective responsiveness to fellow performers:  
 
:KHQ\RX¶UH LI\RX¶UHLQWKHPRPHQWDQG\RX¶UHRQVWDJHDQG\RX¶UHDZDUH ± 
\RX¶UHLQWKHPRPHQWDQG\RX¶UHLQ\RXUERG\\RX¶Ue in that part of the piece, 
but you also have to be super-DZDUH LQ WKH ZD\ WKDW \RX¶UH UHDG\ WR DFFHSW
DQ\WKLQJ DQG WKDW¶V OLNH WKDW FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WKDW KDSSHQV ZKLFK LV QRW \RX
GRQ¶WWDON\RXMXVWNQRZ\RX\RXHYHQIHHOLWLQ\RXIHHOLQVLGHRI\RXUhead and 
you just react ± WKDW¶VWKHVWUDQJHWKLQJDQGWKDW¶VUHDOO\H[FLWLQJZKHQ\RXMXVW
KDYHWKDWZKHQLW¶VLQV\QFOLNHWKDW>/RXLVD@ 
 
Being open and responsive is thus a physical thing but also consists of some kind of 
mental or emotional openness or honesty which allows intersubjective 
communication. This phenomenon will be further discussed in the following chapters 
RQµ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶DQGµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶,QWKLVVHFWLRQKRZHYHU,ZLVKWRORRNDW
this notion of openness in relation to how dancers experience themselves as exposed 
to the gaze of the other when they dance, discussing the marked differences between 
male and female dancers in the interview accounts of this aspect of dance. 
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In response to a question about the level of trust required between dancers doing 
partner-work, Steven expressed the idea that  
 
«WR WUXVWVRPHRQH\RXKDYH WR OHW\RXUJXDUGGRZQ\RXKDYH WRDQG, WKLQN
WKDW¶VZKDWPDNHVDJUHDWSHUIRUPDQFHDQGDJUHDWSHUIRUPHULVZKHQDOOWKDWLV
just dropped, you know, it¶VMXVWGURSSHGDQGWKHKRQHVW\WRJR³WKLVLVPHQRZ
QRZKHUH´>6WHYHQ@ 
 
He also described his understanding of the essence dance in terms of the importance 
of: 
 
«KDYLQJDJRDQGKDYLQJWKHFRXUDJHWRJR³,¶PDFWXDOO\EHLQJLQWKHQRZDQG
being in tKHPRPHQWDQGEHLQJYXOQHUDEOHWRZKDWKDSSHQV´>6WHYHQ@ 
 
Again the openness evoked here is characterised by its immediacy. The dancer has to 
be constantly ready for this kind of open and honest encounter and, as Louisa 
HPSKDVLVHVWRµWDNHLWIRUZKDWLWLV¶UDWKHUWKDQVWDQGEDFNDQGUHIOHFWRQLWRUMXGJH
it. 
 
Honesty and openness in fact appeared in the accounts of all of the dancers, and 
particularly, although not exclusively, in the accounts of my female interviewees these 
ideas were evoked in terms of or alongside notions of vulnerability, exposure and 
µKDYLQJWREDUHDOO¶4XHVWLRQLQJWKHGDQFHUVDERXWZKHWKHUDQGWKHQKRZPXFKWKH\
felt they had to be personally invested in a piece to dance it, I found that all of my 
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interviewees made reference to KDYLQJWRµGLJGHHS¶DQGFDOOXSRQSHUVRQDOHPRWLRQDO
resources in their dancing.  
 
The dancers in fact expressed the view that the need to invest something of 
themselves in a piece was necessary not only to a good performance but also to the 
creation and rehearsal of dance works and movements, although many gave examples 
of bad practice where this was sometimes lacking. In response to this I often asked 
dancers how it felt to open themselves up and pour themselves into a work in this 
way, suggesting, where I had found in their comments unequivocal advocacy of this 
type of personal investment, that it might be quite demanding. The following excerpt 
shows the continuation of one such conversation with a female dancer: 
 
7DUDLW¶VYHU\H[SRVLQJDQGVRPHRIWKHWDVNVWKDWZH¶UHDVNHGWRGROLNHZKHQD
new choreographer comes in are very exposing because they want to get, they 
ZDQWWRWKH\GRQ¶WZDQWWRMXVWVHHWKHVDPHWKLQJDVWKH\ZDQWWRJHWVRPHWKLQJ
else out of you so you really just have to bare everything. 
 
AP: Also presumably they have to get it quite quickly? ± WKH\FDQ¶WJHWWRNQRZ
you? 
 
7DUD<HDKWKH\¶YHJRWOLNHIRXURUILYHZHHNVWRPDNHDSLHFHZLWKWKDW ± they 
just have to like rip you apart, get to what they want. 
 
AP: I suppose you must learn a lot about yourself, as well as about your body? 
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7DUD<HV LW¶VYHU\FKDOOHQJLQJ IURP WKDWSRLQWRIYLHZ ± you cry lots of tears 
DQGWDQWUXPVDQG³ZK\GR,SXWP\VHOIWKURXJKWKLV"´ 
 
This sense of vulnerability was echoed in the accounts of the majority of the female 
dancers that I interviewed, although it should be noted that throughout these accounts 
this kind of openness was asserted to be absolutely necessary to the creative, rehearsal 
and performance processes. None of the female dancers questioned that they had to be 
open in this way then, but they acknowledged that this could ± although it did not 
have to ± give rise to feelings of personal or emotional vulnerability.  
 
In contrast to this, while a number of the male dancers did make use of or identify 
ZLWKWKHQRWLRQRIYXOQHUDELOLW\6WHYHQ¶VDERYHGHVFULSWLRQRIµbeing in the now and 
being in the moment and being vulnerable to what happens¶LVDQH[DPSOHRIDPDOH
dancer using the term), none of the male dancers described experiences of personal or 
emotional vulnerability in the way that female dancers did, tending instead to focus on 
other ideas such as having the courage to be open and in relation to the trust needed 
because of physical vulnerability in dance. This would suggest that they are using the 
notion of vulnerability in a different way to describe something less personal and 
emotionally difficult than that which is experienced by the female dancers. Moreover 
a number of the male dancers that I interviewed did not identify with the notion of 
vulnerability in these accounts. This lack of identification was commonly expressed in 
terms of vulnerability not being an appropriate consideration because being open in 
this way was the nature of dance and thus unproblematic:  
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0DUFR« RQH KXQGUed percent you put yourself, you know, and if you even if 
\RX¶UHOHDUQLQJDFKRUHRJUDSK\DOUHDG\PDGHWKHQ\RXPXVWILQG\RXUVHOIWKHUH
and then you, yeah, yeah, put yourself. 
 
AP: Is that, does it feel good to do that all the time, or is it sometimes a bit? 
 
0DUFR,WKLQNLW¶VQDWXUDOLW¶VQRWLILWIHHOVJRRGLW¶VQDWXUDOEHFDXVH\RXPXVW
do it. 
 
AP: Mmm, what else would you do? 
 
0DUFR<HDK\RXPXVWGRLWVR« 
 
It should be noted that this individual came from a country which he described as 
having a culture more based on openness and expressiveness than he had found 
British or European culture to be, which might account for his unquestioning 
acceptance of the need to be open in dance. There were, however, other examples of 
male dancers rejecting the notion of vulnerability, for example:  
 
,ZRXOGQ¶WVD\,KDYHWRJLYHP\VHOIDQG,GRQ¶WVHHLWLQWKDWVHQVHRIµSXWP\VHOI
RQWKHOLQH¶± LW¶VH[FLWLQJLW¶VGDQJHURXVWKDW¶VZKDWLWLVWKDW¶VWKHRQO\UHDVRQ
I do it. [Ben]  
 
Here Ben responds to my questions about personal investment in a dance work or 
SHUIRUPDQFHE\HPSKDVLVLQJQRWLRQVRIGDQJHUDQGEUDYHU\HFKRLQJ6WHYHQ¶VXVHRI
WKHZRUGµFRXUDJH¶%HQJRHVRQWRVD\ 
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,ZRXOGQ¶WVD\,SXWP\VHOIRQWKHOLQH,WKLQNDVDGDQFHURUDQ\SHUIRUPHU\ou 
KDYHWREUDYHDOOWKHWLPH\RXKDYHWREHEUDYHDQGKRQHVWDQG,WKLQN,GRQ¶W
WKLQNLW¶VSXWWLQJ\RXUVHOIRQWKHOLQH, WKLQNWKDW¶VMXVWZKDW\RXKDYHWREHWR
access those places as a performer ± you have to be that open ± the difficulty 
comes in KRZ\RXUHQYLURQPHQWPD\EHPDQLSXODWHV\RXDQG,WKLQNWKDW¶VZKHUH
the, the understanding of the companies and the understanding of the 
FKRUHRJUDSKHUVLVYHU\LPSRUWDQWDQGLW¶VYLWDOWKDWWKHVXSSRUWPHFKDQLVPVDUH
there for you to lay yourself on the lLQHDQGWKHQZKHQ\RX¶YHODLG\RXUVHOIRQWKH
OLQHWKDWWKH\¶UHWKHUHWRSLFNXSWKHSLHFHV>%HQ@ 
 
Thus while the accounts of the female dancers tended to focus on the vulnerability of 
laying themselves open to the (potentially negative) judgement of others, male 
dancers tended to emphasise the courageous nature of the act of baring themselves in 
this way. 
 
Although it is possible to attribute differences in the accounts of vulnerability given 
by male and female dancers to the readiness with which the males and females were 
prepared to go into detail about experiences of personal or emotional vulnerability 
with a (young, female) interviewer, I do not believe that the distinct difference 
between male and female accounts could be solely attributed to comfort with the 
interview situation, especially given the range of experience, age, race, nationalities 
and sexualities of my male and female interviewees. I therefore wish to use this last 
section of the chapter to explore ideas around gendered embodiment in relation to the 
concepts of transcendence and immanence. In doing this I explore how Merleau-
Ponty¶VDFFRXQWRIERG\-subjectivity has been made use of by feminist thinkers Iris 
Young and Gail Weiss.  
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,ULV <RXQJ¶V SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO VWXG\ µ7KURZLQJ /LNH D *LUO¶  explores 
differences between bodily comportment and movement, as exemplified by throwing 
styles, of males and females. In this account Young suggests, following Merleau-
Ponty: 
 
«WKDW LW LV WKHRUGLQDU\SXUSRVLYHRULHQWDWLRQRI WKHERG\DVDZKROe towards 
things and its environment that initially defines the relation of the subject to its 
worOG¶<RXQJ:261).  
 
In examining what is specific about female bodily orientation or comportment, Young 
therefore seeks to illuminate something of feminine subjectivity.  
 
<RXQJEHJLQVKHUDQDO\VLVE\QRWLQJGH%HDXYRLU¶VFRPPHQWVDERXWKRZ:  
 
:RPHQH[SHULHQFHWKHERG\DVDEXUGHQ«>ZKLFK@ZHLJK>V@GRZQWKHZRPHQ¶V
existence by tying her to nature, immanence and the requirements of the species 
at the expense of her own individuality. (Young, 1990:260) 
 
In bringing in the insights of Merleau-Ponty, however, Young is able to move away 
IURP GH %HDXYRLU¶V IRFXV RQ WKH ZRPDQ¶V SK\VLRORJ\ LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH KRUPRQH
changes associated with pregnancy and the menstrual cycle, to think about feminine 
comportment and orientation towards the world as defining of feminine existence. 
 
7KH LPSRUWDQFH RI GH %HDXYRLU IRU <RXQJ¶V DFFRXQW LV KRZHYHU WKH LQVLJKW WKDW
while human beings are both transcendent and immanent ±   
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We are simultaneously beings-for-ourselves and beings-for-others, and are 
comprised of both minds (our primary source of transcendence) and bodies (our 
primary source of immanence). (Weiss, 1999:45)  
 
± transcendence is associated in our society with males and immanence with females.  
 
Young follows de Beauvoir in noting that the young girl is associated more with 
immanence than transcendence in a way that is not true for the young boy. In 
particular, the young boy is often encouraged to engage in physically active play 
where the young girl is more likely to be warned of the threat of physical injury, the 
GDQJHU RI DSSHDULQJ µXQIHPLQLQH¶ RU UHPLQGHG QRW WR JHW KHU FORWKHV HVSHFLDOOy 
dress) dirty (Weiss, 1999:45): 
  
Young girls are socialised to focus so heavily on their bodies, to treat their 
ERGLHVDVREMHFWV WREH µSUXQHG¶ µVKDSHG¶ µPRXOGHG¶DQG µGHFRUDWHG¶ :HLVV
1999:45) 
 
Young suggests, then that: 
 
The three contradictory modalities of feminine existence ± ambiguous 
transcendence, inhibited intentionality, and discontinuous unity ± have their root 
«LQWKHIDFWWKDWIRUIHPLQLQHH[LVWHQFHWKHERG\IUHTXHQWO\LVERWKVXEMHFWDQG
object for itself at the same time and in reference to the same act. Feminine 
bodily existence is frequently not a pure presence to the world because it is 
referred onto itself as well as onto possibilities in the world. (Young, 1990:266) 
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The physical ± for example, throwing ± action of the girl can therefore be understood 
to be inhibited by a focus on, or reference to, the body before and/or during engaging 
in physical activity. This would be  
 
« D PRYH DZD\ IURP µSXUH¶ WUDQVFHQGHQFH « EHFDXVH RQH¶V LQWHQWLRQDO
PRYHPHQW WRZDUGV RQH¶V JRDO ZRXOG EH LQWHUUXSWHG DQG « EHLQJ-for-others 
would threaten to supersede being-for-oneself. (Weiss, 1999:46) 
 
In drawing together the insights of de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, Young is able to 
counter Merleau-3RQW\¶V µJHQGHU-EOLQG¶ DFFRXQW RIERGLO\ DFWLRQZKLOH DW WKH VDPH
time using Merleau-3RQW\¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH ERG\ DV WUDQVFHQGHQW to counter de 
%HDXYRLU¶VPRUHQHJDWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHERG\DVLPPDQHQW<RXQJ¶VDFFRXQW
of self-referral is, however, argued by Weiss to be unsatisfactory on a number of 
levels, not least because it suggests that masculine existence is the model against 
which feminine existence is to be compared and found deficient.  
 
Weiss also questions the assertion that H[SOLFLW UHIHUHQFH WRRQH¶VERG\ZKLOHRQH LV
HQJDJHG LQ DQ DFWLRQ µQHFHVVDULO\ WDNH>V@ DZD\ IURP WKH µWUDQVFHQGHQFH¶ RI RQH¶V
intentional activity¶ :HLVV  This is a particularly important point for the 
discussion of dance where bodily awareness is often foregrounded, arguably without 
interrupting transcendence, as I have noted above in my suggestion of a concept of 
µLQKDELWHG¶ WUDQVFHQGence. Indeed Weiss argues that there are in fact many tasks 
ZKLFK UHTXLUHSD\LQJ FORVH DWWHQWLRQ WRRQH¶VERG\SULRU WR DQGHYHQGXULQJDFWLQJ. 
She therefore suggests that: 
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7KHFRQWUDGLFWRU\PRGDOLWLHVRIµIHPLQLQH¶ERGLO\H[LVWHQFHLGHQWLILHGE\<RXQJ
occur not because women focus on their bodies before, during, or even after their 
action, transforming their bodies into objects in the process, but because many 
women mediate their relationship with their bodies by seeing their bodies as they 
are seen by others and by worrying about what they and these (largely invisible) 
others are seeing as they are acting. (Weiss, 1999:47) 
 
Thus Weiss VHHV<RXQJ¶VHPSKDVLVRQVHOI-reference by the individual woman rather 
WKDQ µWKH VRFLDOO\-referred character of bodily exiVWHQFH¶ DV SUREOHPDWLF :HLVV
:KLOH:HLVVDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWWKHDFWLRQVRIERWKPHQDQGZRPHQµKDYHD
socially-UHIHUUHG FKDUDFWHU LQVRIDU DV WKH\ DULVH LQ UHVSRQVH WR D VRFLDO VLWXDWLRQ¶
:HLVV VKHVXJJHVWV WKDW<RXQJ¶VDQDO\VLVGRHV not sufficiently attend to 
those societal attitudes towards women which Young herself identifies as the source 
RIWKHZRPDQ¶VREMHFWLILHGUHODWLRQVKLSWRKHUERdy. As Weiss continues to argue: 
 
:KDWPDNHVVRFLDO UHIHUHQFHRIµIHPLQLQH¶H[LVWHQFHVRSUREOHPatic, is that the 
imaginary perspective of these often imaginary others can come to dominate and 
HYHQVXSHUVHGHDZRPDQ¶VRZQH[SHULHQFHRIKHUERGLO\FDSDELOLWLHVVRWKDWWKH
ODWWHUEHFRPHVFRQIODWHGZLWK WKH IRUPHU«WRFDOO WKLV VHOI-reference does not 
acknowledge or do justice to the very real effects of this imaginary other on my 
action. (Weiss, 1999:47) 
 
There is, of course, abundant evidence from watching contemporary dance that female 
GDQFHUVGRQRWLQIDFWµWKURZOLNHDJLUO¶EXWDUHUDWKHUH[WUHPely physically capable 
and appear to be without any self-consciousness about exploring their physical 
potential. )XUWKHUPRUH , KDYH VXJJHVWHG DERYH WKURXJK WKH FRQFHSW RI µLQKDELWHG¶
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transcendence that close attention to the body does not necessarily, as Weiss also 
DUJXHVLQKLELWRULQWHUUXSWPRYHPHQWIRUWKHGDQFHULQWKHZD\WKDW<RXQJ¶VDQDO\VLV
suggests. Nevertheless there is a tension evident in the interview accounts for the 
majority of the female dancers between the positive desire for openness and 
immediacy in dance and a worry about how others are seeing and judging their 
movement which can be experienced as negative and limiting. It is this potential 
interruption of transcendence for the female in dance that I wish to explore in the rest 
of this section.  
 
Anna, like Tara quoted above, gives the following account of the stage when a new 
choreographer first comes to a company in which she evokes a notion of vulnerability 
related to personal or emotional exposure: 
 
Sometimes you are asked to do things whatever ± they might ask you to just, on 
WKHVSRW\RXGRQ¶WNQRZWKHPDQGWKH\PLJKt ask you to just give your all,  make 
an impression of sad women or ± yeah ± give us a little story, and ± you know? ±  
you just have to go for it and  ± yeah ±  I find that sort of ± , GRQ¶W ILQG WKH
physical side so vulnerable ± ,GRQ¶WPLQGNLQGRIGDQFLQJRUGRLQJPRYHPHQW ± 
but when you involve emotions it becomes quite vulnerable. [Anna] 
 
$QQD HPSKDVLVHV KHUH WKDW LW QRW µWKH SK\VLFDO VLGH¶ RI GDQFH ± being asked to 
perform a difficult jump or movement in front of everyone ± that makes her feel 
exposed and vulnerable or uncomfortable. Rather it is the way that a new 
FKRUHRJUDSKHU PLJKW DVN KHU WR SHUIRUP VRPHWKLQJ PRUH µSHUVRQDO¶ DQG ZKLFK
requires her to make visible aspects of her own experience and her own emotions that 
she feels exposes her in an uncomfortable way in front of an unknown audience in the 
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dance studio. The potential to feel uncomfortable, exposed, and thus awkwardly self-
conscious and inhibited (as Young describes) therefore seems to affect female dancers 
despite the fact that they report feeling no awkwardness or self-consciousness about 
their physical abilities.  
 
While there was evidence of female dancers, most notably Louisa, who did not take 
up the theme of vulnerability in this way, there did appear to be broad differences 
between the male and female accounts. Indeed it was only female dancers who 
reported a tendency to experience the dropping of (emotional) defences in dance as 
making them vulnerable to judgement. By contrast, males tended to experience this 
state of openness and honesty as liberating and exciting, although they also evoked 
QRWLRQVRIµGDQJHU¶DQGWKHQHHGIRUJUHDWµFRXUDJH¶ 
 
These differences might be characterised as a difference of emphasis between the talk 
of the male dancers emphasising heroic action and that of the females emphasising 
passive vulnerability. It should be noted, however, that the male dancers distanced 
themselves from notions of egoism and showing off in dance. Thus Steven describes:  
 
)RUPHLW¶VQRWDERXWKRZJRRG,ORRNRUKRZJUHDW,DPLW¶VDERXWWKHZRUNDQG
about putting myself in that honest, courageous place where something special 
can happen because in putting myself out there, you know, something can 
happen between myself and the other performers and the audience. [Steven]  
 
The concept of openness expressed by the majority of the male dancers was, 
therefore, while courageous and active, ideally characterised by a sense of humility 
rather than by the kind of showing-off that distances the dancer from the immediacy 
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of the dance. I therefore suggest that the differences between male and female 
accounts do not stem straightforwardly from the male dancers wishing to emphasise 
their position as the centre of the action ± as they did not in fact endorse this as an 
appropriate approach to dance ± and thus that there may be differences between the 
male and female experience of dance that are not reducible to talk.  
 
Characteristically, then, while the powerfulness of the male dancer is tempered by 
humility, he is, by virtue of this, afforded an immediate and uninhibited relationship 
with the movements he performs, meaning that the transcendence of his action is not 
interrupted. The female dancer, by contrast, in worrying about how others may see or 
judge her movement, interrupts the pre-reflective movement and may therefore 
experience inhibition. Thus aOWKRXJKWKHW\SLFDOQRWLRQRIµWKURZLQJOLNHDJLUO¶GRHV
not apply to the female dancer, I would suggesW WKDW :HLVV¶V FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI
socially-mediated self-referral is useful for understanding how transcendence can be 
interrupted for the female dancer. Importantly, LWLVQRWWKHGDQFHU¶Vown focus on her 
ERG\ RU FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD DV HQWDLOHG E\ µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH
PRPHQW¶ that inhibits her movement, rather it is the effect of the (imaginary) other 
watching and (potentially) judging her. 
 
Both male and female dancers were, however, equally committed to a notion of being 
open, even where it was acknowledged that the creative process has the potential to be 
difficult, as one female dancer explains:  
 
,W¶VQLFHWRFRPHWKURXJKWKHHQG ± ³,ZHQWWKURXJKWKDWDQGLWZDVKRUULEOHEXW
ORRNZKDWZH¶YHJRWDWWKHHQGRILW´LW¶VWKDWNLQGRI ± if you never go through, 
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LI\RXQHYHURSHQ\RXUVHOIXSDQGJRWRWKRVHSODFHVWKHQ\RX¶UHQHYHUJRLQJWR
get anything out of it. [Tara]  
 
Despite differences in the way they experienced and conceptualised it, then, both male 
and female dancers considered opening themselves up in this way to be an integral 
part of their art. Male and female dancers also both evoked the notion of using the 
FUHDWLYH SURFHVV RI RSHQQHVV WR µJHW WR SODFHV¶ WKH\ ZRXOGQ¶W RWKHUZLVH EH DEOH WR
DFFHVV 7KXV 7DUD¶V GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKLV DUWLVWLF SURFHVV DV RSHQLQJ XS DQG µJRLQJ WR
WKRVH SODFHV¶ HFKRHV 6WHYHQ¶V QRWLRQ DERYH RI µSXWWLQJ P\VHOI LQ WKDW KRQHVW
FRXUDJHRXVSODFHZKHUHVRPHWKLQJVSHFLDOFDQKDSSHQ¶6LPLODUO\$QQDGHVFULEHV: 
 
I know ± ZKHQ,¶POLNHGDQFLQJ ± I can feel itLW¶VDIHHOLQJWKLQJZKHQLWGRHV
happen ± DQGZKHQ LW GRHVQ¶WKDSSHQ ± it kind of it gets you to another place 
ZKLFK,JXHVVWKDW¶VWKHNLQGRIDUWLVWLFSODFH>$QQD@  
 
It is this openness, then, that allows the dancer (male or female) to DFFHVVµDQRWKHU¶
µDUWLVWLF¶SODFHwhich I would suggest that we should understand as transcendence of a 
type that occurs through the dancing body rather than in spite of the body, as I have 
discussed in Section III. Nevertheless it was also that same openness that left female 
dancers aware of feeling vulnerable and exposed to negative judgements by others, 
thus potentially introducing feelings of awkwardness and self-awareness that 
interrupted their relationships with their bodies and movement and thus interrupted 
transcendence. Once again then, we are left with a paradox where openness, like 
looking at yourself in the mirror, is both necessary (to transcendence) and a major 
source of alienation (or interruption of that transcendence).  
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It could be argued from reading this section that male dancers have an easier and less 
often interrupted route to achieving transcendence in dance than females and that 
prevailing social attitudes to women have a negative and limiting effect on female 
GDQFHUV¶FDSDFLW\IRUDQGHQMR\PHQWof dance.  I would, however, like to emphasise 
WKDW , GR QRW DJUHH ZLWK GH %HDXYRLU¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ZRPDQ LQ RXU VRFLHW\ DV
fundamentally denied access to transcendence. Nor do I follow Young in 
understanding the female mode of bodily comportment and thus dancing to be 
somehow inferior to the male mode because it includes limitations that male dancers 
do not experience.  
 
Rather what I wish to suggest through this conversation between philosophy and 
dance is that the types of positive state achieved in dDQFHVXFKDVµEHLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶
DQGµEHLQJLQWKHPRPHQW¶FDQQRWEHXQGHUVWRRGLQWHUPVRIWKHWUDGLWLRQDOGLYLVLRQV
between transcendence and immanence along lines of either mind and body, male and 
female, or task-focused and body-focused action. The importance of immediacy, 
openness and transcendence was emphasised just as much by my female interviewees 
as by my male interviewees and none of the female dancers I spoke to suggested that 
they felt they could not achieve these goals. These aspects of dance, were, however, 
perhaps more of an issue for my female interviewees and they tended to spend a lot 
more time in conversation talking about the difficulties they had to overcome on 
occasion to achieve these states. The difficulties that female dancers had to overcome 
were, however, understood by them as valuable part of the process of coming to know 
more about themselves as dancing body-subjects, thus enhancing the potential for 
immediacy, openness and transcendence in their performance.  
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Thus although there was a difficult element of vulnerability mentioned by female 
dancers that male dancers did not report experiencing, I would argue that this does not 
make the female mode of dance and of achieving transcendence through the dancing 
body inferior to the male mode, indeed it is arguably in some ways more fulfilling. 
Such differences and ambiguities between male and female experience again blur 
boundaries between positive and negative aspects of the experience of dance, helping 
us to think about that space in-between transcendence and immanence in a more 
nuanced way.  
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Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter explores the notion of subjectivity, not in terms of the Cartesian dualist 
IRUPXODWLRQµ,WKLQNWKHUHIRUH,DP¶EXWLQWHUPVRIWKH0HUOHDX-Pontian body-subject 
and the tacit cogito µ,FDQ¶0RYLQJRQIURPWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIµ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶
LQWKHSUHYLRXVFKDSWHUWKLVGLVFXVVLRQRIµ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶UHYROYHVDURXQGWKHLGHDWKDW
mirroring or reflection from mirrors and others are central to the formation, 
development and refinement of our WKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDDVVHQVHRIVHOIWKHµ,FDQ¶ 
This is what begins to happen at the mirror stage of infantile development, but it is 
also played out in the dance studio as the corporeal schema is constantly being 
modified throughout life and in mirroring interaction with the environment and others. 
 
In seeking to understand how the individual corporeal schema is constituted, Merleau-
Ponty, like many other theorists of self and identity, turns to childhood to explore 
FHUWDLQ NH\ PRPHQWV LQ WKH FKLOG¶V GHYHORSPHQW ZKLFK KDYH a bearing on the 
formation of self and the individualised corporeal schema. These processes are not, 
however, limited to childhood and our sense of our corporeal schema is continually 
refined and modified through adult life. It is at this stage that I introduce dance back 
into the conversation to see what the experiences of dancers in relation to reflection 
from mirrors and others have to say to Merleau-Ponty¶V WKHRULVLQJ RI LQIDQWLOH
development. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\VXJJHVWV WKDW LW LVRQO\E\DWWHQGLQJ WRERWK WKH µVSHFXODU¶ H[WHUQDO
DQG WKH µLQWURFHSWLYH¶ LQWHUQDO SLFWXUH RU sense of our bodies that we are able to 
develop a distinct unified corporeal schema or sense of self. This can be explored in 
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dance where dancers report processes of trying to reconcile discrepancies between 
their internal feel for the movement they are performing and the look of the 
movement in the mirror or when other dancers show them what they are doing 
(wrong). For example a leg that the dancer thinks is at a right-angle to the body may 
in fact be at a different angle as shown by the mirror image.  
 
In interacting with the mirror RUDQRWKHUGDQFHUVKRZLQJWKHP³\RX¶Ue actually doing 
WKLVQRW WKLV´ the corporeal schema is modified through processes of repetition and 
habit-IRUPDWLRQDVGLVFXVVHGLQµ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶so that the dancer develops a 
different sense of what it feels like (internally) to have the leg at a right-angle. Thus 
we can begin to understand what is going on when a dancer uses a mirror to correct a 
movement, and we can begin to understand the role of the internal and the external 
images in theorising the corporeal schema, and to appreciate how they are separate 
from each other but always interacting which each other in practice. 
 
Furthermore there is a paradox whereby Merleau-Ponty suggests that we actually need 
the alienating experience of seeing the specular (external) image of self ± separation ± 
in order to develop unified corporeal schema ± unity. This is why a coherent, unified 
sense of self as distinct from others develops at the mirror stage of infantile 
development and not before. This separation or alienation is also played out in the 
dance studio where dancers attending to mirror images of themselves describe 
feelings of being somehow distanced from the immediacy of the movement.  
 
Thus while dancers do make use of mirrors for refining their corporeal schemas, they 
also emphasise the importance of the introceptive image or sense of the movement 
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and described not wanting to get too focussed on the mirror image as it has the effect 
of drawing them out of themselves and out of the immediacy of their movement. 
Dancers in fact often described the specular image in the mirror as false or distorted 
and reported that too much focus on the mirror image in dance appeared to interrupt 
WKHGDQFHU¶VVHQVHRIVHOIDVDGDQFLQJERG\-subject by rendering the body thing-like 
or objectified. The concepts of objectification, alienation and splitting, related to the 
mirror stage of development, can be seen to both shed light on and be illuminated by 
WKLVGLVFXVVLRQRIGDQFHUV¶UHODWLRQVKLSVWRPLUURULPDJHV 
 
Intersubjective mirroring or reflective interaction with others is also seen in dance and 
dancers did not generally describe the negative feelings of objectification and 
alienation in connection with mirroring interaction with other dancers. For Merleau-
Ponty (contra Sartre) the gaze of the other can be less objectifying than the mirror 
because of the communicative aspect of looking at someone ± you see them as a 
subject expressing something rather than as an object. Thus there is potential for 
mutual recognition, communication and negotiation in interpersonal mirroring 
interaction. Again this can be seen and explored in the context of the embodied 
practice of dance. It is also, obviously, very important to be seen or watched for a 
dancer if they wish to communicate something. As Merleau-Ponty emphasises the 
gaze need not necessarily be objectifying and alienating. 
 
There is, however, potential for objectification in Merleau-3RQW\¶V WKHRULVLQJRI WKH
gaze, which, when it occurs, precludes intersubjective communication. This 
phenomenon was recognised by both male and female dancers who described how 
examining GDQFHUV¶WHFKQLTXHVWRRPXFKVHHLQJWKHPDVSK\VLFDOVKDSHVUDWKHUWKDQ
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as people) when watching a performance meant that you were not able to be open to 
what they were communicating. This notion of objectification, related to mirror 
images and less frequently to the gaze of another dancer, can be related to Merleau-
3RQW\¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI KRZ WKH ERG\ can be understood as a site of transcendence 
rather than immanence, but that this transcendence can be interrupted when the body 
becomes the explicit focus of reflective conscious awareness.  
 
The move towards seeing the body as a source of transcendence rather than 
immanence, while still acknowledging that this transcendence may be interrupted, is 
LPSRUWDQWIRUWKLQNLQJDERXWGDQFHUV¶H[SHULHQFHV7KHUHDUHKowever, problems for 
the analysis of dance with Merleau-Ponty¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW DQ\ IRFXVRQ WKHERG\ DV
opposed to a task-related focus ± thinking about the hand wielding the hammer rather 
than driving the nail into the wall, for example ± necessarily interrupts transcendence. 
This point needs to be reassessed in relation to dance where bodily-awareness is 
FHQWUDOWRSHUIRUPLQJWKHµWDVN¶RIGDQFHZHOODQGWKHLQIDFWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ
conscious body-awareness and conscious task-awareness becomes blurred beyond the 
point where it is conceptually useful. 
 
In place of this formulation, then, it can be argued WKDWDWWHQGLQJWRRQH¶VERG\UDWKHU
WKDQ WKH DFWLRQ \RX¶UH SHUIRUPLQJ GRHV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ LPSO\ REMHFWLILFDWLRQ
alienation and interruption. Indeed for dancers, I suggest that awareness of the moving 
body is often foregrounded as part of their body-subjectivity. This is evidenced by the 
way dancers evoke the notions of uninterrupted transcendence or immediacy with the 
FRQFHSWVRIµEHLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶DQGµEHLQJLQWKHPRPHQW¶ZKLFKimply a focus on 
the dancing body itself and the movement currently being performed. Rather than 
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understanding µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH PRPHQW¶ as inhibiting 
transcendence for dancers, then, I propose a neZFRQFHSWRIµinhabited¶ transcendence 
which blurs the boundaries between elements previously associated with both 
transcendence and immanence. 
 
Some dancers did, however, describe feelings of being exposed, vulnerable or overly 
self-conscious when they were observed by others, making it hard for them to dance 
freely. This was common among the female dancers ± whereas males tended to 
emphasise the courageousness of putting themselves on display or exposing 
themselves (physically and emotionally), females emphasised feelings of vulnerability 
and focussed on the potential for negative judgements being made about them by 
others rather than on their own active part in the process. This vulnerability was often 
experienced as increased self-awareness and thus awkwardness in front of unknown 
observers when something particularly exposing (usually emotionally rather than 
physically) was called for.  
 
This experience of awkwardness and self-awareness (awareness of yourself from the 
perspective of someone who is watching you) is reminiscent of the description Iris 
<RXQJ RIIHUV RI µWKURZLQJ OLNH D JLUO¶ Indeed although female dancers are very 
SK\VLFDOO\ FRPSHWHQW DQG GR QRW µWKURZ OLNH JLUOV¶, there is still a sense in which 
<RXQJ¶VDQDO\VLVPLJKWLOOXPLQDWHVRPHWKLQJRIWKHIHPDOHGDQFHUV¶H[SHULHQFH 
 
:HLVVEXLOGLQJRQ<RXQJ¶VDQDO\VLV suggests that societal attitudes towards women 
WHQGWRREMHFWLI\WKHPDQGWKDWZRPHQ¶Vown experiences of their bodies or selves in 
action are mediated through these objectifying attitudes, meaning that transcendence 
  200 
is interrupted. There was a definite sense of this potential for interruption or alienation 
LQWKHIHPDOHGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIH[SRVXUHDQGYXOQHUDELOLW\WKDWZDVQRW apparent in 
the accounts of the male dancers who emphasised exposing themselves as part of their 
heroic action.  
 
This did not mean, however, that female dancers tried to avoid opening themselves up 
or exposing aspects of themselves, nor that they felt limited in their ability to dance 
because of these feelings of vulnerability. Indeed they all emphasised the importance 
of being vulnerable and exposed in this way as part of the creative, expressive, 
communicative process. The negative aspects of these feelings were, however, a 
constant underlying issue for the female dancers which they described as the most 
difficult, although also the most rewarding, aspect of dancing. This vulnerability thus 
ERWK OLPLWV DQG IDFLOLWDWHV WKH IHPDOH GDQFHU¶V SRWHQWLDO IRU DFKLHYLQJ (inhabited) 
transcendence in/through her dancing body. 
 
In this chapter I have begun to develop a more sophisticated notion of a non-dualist 
concept of body-subjectivity through the conversation between Merleau-Ponty¶V
philosophy and the practice of contemporary dance. This cannot be simply about 
rejecting the notion of the body as material object in favour of thinking about it as 
occupying the symbolic realm; nor about rejecting all the ideas and concepts that have 
come out of the Cartesian focus on subjectivity and reflective thought. Rather I would 
suggest it must be about exploring an in-between space where all these distinctions 
become hazy. It is about a blurring of traditional dualist boundaries which need not 
necessarily entail an out-right rejection of some or all of the components of the 
traditional Western thought on subjectivity and the body, although it does require that 
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all of them should be de-centred or re-assessed, particularly in terms of the relations 
between terms.  
 
What I have tried to do through this chapter of the conversation between Merleau-
Ponty and dance, then, is not to reject concepts such as those of internal and external, 
subject and object, and transcendence and immanence, out-right, but to show the 
difficulty of understanding these as binary terms. I suggest that it is not possible to 
dichotomise or separate these terms out from each other. Rather they are overlapping 
and mutually reliant. For example, the internal and the external senses or pictures of 
the body must interact in order to produce a unified corporeal schema. My argument 
is not, therefore, that we should reject the external image because it is related to the 
objectification of the body, but that we must attempt to understand, through Merleau-
Ponty and the experience of the embodied practice of dance, how the body as object is 
incorporated into and an integral part of embodied being.  
 
Similarly I do not seek to reject the notion of the body as a potential source of 
immanence, but to show how this cannot be fully separated out from the body as a 
source of transcendence. Focus on the body for the dancer does not limit potential for 
transcendent action in dance. Rather it seems to facilitate a certain kind of 
transcendence ± ZKLFK,KDYHWHUPHGµLQKDELWHG¶WUDQVFHQGHQFH± that is related to the 
FRQFHSWVRIµEHLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶DQGµEHLQJLQWKHPRPHQW¶DQGLVKLJKO\YDOXHGE\
the dancers.  
 
Merleau-Ponty¶V UH-theorisation of the body as a potential source of transcendence 
while still being a potential source of immanence is a very important one, particularly, 
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it would seem, for female dancers when vulnerability makes them feel awkward and 
self-aware. I would, however, suggest that thinking in terms of a new dichotomy 
between task-focused and body-focused is not helpful for understanding 
transcendence in the embodied practice of dance as it is in danger of producing a new 
rigid dualism in our use of terms which does not play out in practice.  
 
Thus while the concepts of internal and external, and transcendence and immanence, 
are not considered completely redundant, the rigid dualist formulation by which they 
have been traditionally framed is rejected in favour of an approach that explores what 
happens at the boundaries where the different terms flow into each other. Again I am 
UHPLQGHGRI(OL]DEHWK*URV]¶VXVHRIWKHMöbius strip as metaphor for understanding 
body and mind as in flux. It is this fluidity of the dancing body-subject ± neither fully 
Cartesian subject nor fully object ± that helps me to explore spaces that open up at the 
boundaries between internal and external, subject and object, communication and 
objectification, and transcendence and immanence. 
 
In the next chapter I will build on the understanding established here of the corporeal 
schema as (the basis of) body-subjectivity or embodied being, conceptualised in non-
dualist terms, to explore the bodily basis of intersubjective recognition and 
communication between dancers. 
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INTERSUBJECTIVITY: 
 
INTERCORPOREALITY AS THE BASIS FOR 
INTERSUBJECTIVE SYNCHRONY AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The preceding two chapters have focussed on the corporeal schema and the use of this 
FRQFHSW IRU H[SORULQJ GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV RI themselves, their bodies and dance. 
µ3UDFWLFDO .QRZOHGJH¶ GLVFXVVHG GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV RI OHDUQLQJ NQRZLQJ DQG
performing patterns of movement in teUPVRI WDFLW SUDFWLFDO µNQRZ-KRZ¶KDELW DQG
the corporeal schema. The chapter on µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶WKHQZHQWRQWRGLVFXVVWKHUROH
of mirroring and reflection in the formation and continued development of the 
corporeal schema.  
 
µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ VXJJHVWHG that the formation of corporeal schema does not occur in 
isolation. Indeed our sense of self ± as separate from others ± relies on interaction 
with others (originally the primary caregiver but this includes a wider range of people 
throughout our lives). The GLVFXVVLRQ RI µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ WKHUHIRUH pointed to the 
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importance of intersubjective mirroring interaction in the formation of the corporeal 
schema, suggesting that it is through seeing ourselves reflected back by others that we 
come to have a coherent sense of ourselves. 
 
The formation of a sense of self is therefore always already a sense of self in relation 
to others, it is intersubjective. This chapter continues my exploration of the embodied 
basis of being by turning attention to the embodied basis of intersubjectivity as 
conceptualised in Merleau-Ponty¶V SKLORVRSK\ DQG H[SHULHQFHG LQ WKH SUDFWLFH RI
dance. In Section I of this chapter I will explore Merleau-Ponty¶V WKHRULVDWLRQ RI
intersubjectivity as intercorporeality, before moving on in Section II to listen to the 
voice of dance and explore the different ideas and concepts that dancers evoke in their 
discussion of experiences of dancing with others.  
 
The philosophical discussion of intercorporeality in Section I draws on ideas from 
Merleau-Ponty¶VODst unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible (1969).As with the 
rest of this conversation, rather than offering my own novel reading of these dense 
unfinished parts of Merleau-Ponty¶V ZRUN , KDYH VRXJKW WR HQJDJH ZLWK VKDUHG or 
collaborative understandings from the scholarly community that works on Merleau-
Ponty, and to use these ideas as starting points for bringing Merleau-Ponty into 
conversation with dance.  
 
,Q WKLV GLVFXVVLRQ RI µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶, I will explore how it is intercorporeality ± 
theorised by Merleau-Ponty LQ WHUPVRI µWUDQVIHURIFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD¶ ± that allows 
me to recognise the other as another subject like me, rather than as an object in the 
world; and how this form of physical empathy between subjects, which is the basis of 
  205 
intersubjectivity, can allow for moments of understanding, synchrony or communion 
between two individuals. What is important here is that this does occur between two 
differentiated (adult) individuals; the subjects do not merge into one, failing to 
distinguish between self and other as the infant does. Rather they are able to recognise 
the other as other while still attaining some kind of connection, empathy or 
communion with him or her through transfer of corporeal schema. It is this particular 
facet of intersubjective relations that I wish to explore in depth in relation to the 
HPERGLHG SUDFWLFH RI GDQFH ZKHUH , VXJJHVW WKDW WKH GDQFHUV¶ HQKDQFHG DELOLWLHV WR
read the corporeal schema of the other allows them access to this intercorporeal 
communion or synchrony through dance more readily than we may generally 
experience it in everyday life. 
 
Merleau-Ponty¶V SKLORVRSK\ VXJJHVWV D QHZ ZD\ RI WKLQNLQJ DERXW LQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\
with his conceptualisation of intercorporeality or carnal intersubjectivity. I am 
interested here not only in exploring how this works conceptually then, but more 
LPSRUWDQWO\ LQEULQJLQJ WKHVH LGHDV WRJHWKHUZLWKGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIGDQFLQJZLWK
others to see how intercorporeality plays out in practice for the dancers. 
 
In-keeping with the notion of a conversation between philosophy and dance in this 
thesis, I do not intend that Merleau-Ponty¶V IUDPHZRUN VKRXOG EH XVHG WR ULJLGO\
FDSWXUHWKHGDQFHUV¶FRQFHSWVDQGH[SHULHQFHVQRUWKDWWKHGDQFHUV¶ZD\VRIHYRNLQJ
their experiences of intersubjective synchrony and understanding should be used to 
evidence or refute Merleau-Ponty¶V WKHRUHWLFDO FODLPV LQD UHGXFWLYHVHQVH5DWKHU ,
offer these two voices to the reader, suggesting that by engaging with both them 
alongside each other, we are able to open up new areas where their ideas overlap, and 
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thus that I am able to explore new aspects of intercorporeality as it is played out in 
practice, learning new things about both Merleau-Ponty¶VSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHSUDFWLFH
of dance in the process. 
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I: Intersubjectivity as Intercorporeality 
 
Western Cartesian philosophy has traditionally struggled with the problem of 
LQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\DOVRNQRZQDVWKHSUREOHPRIµRWKHUPLQGV¶'HVFDUWHV¶cogito sets 
up both what it is to be a conscious subject and what it is to know a conscious subject 
so that the only way to know a conscious subject is to be that conscious subject 
reflecting on itself: µI think therefore I am¶. Thus where human being is defined, as 
per Descartes, as res cogitans, I can only have access to myself and can never be sure 
of the existence of other human beings. This situation of solipsism ± the isolation of 
the subject from others ± is arguably intrinsic to and insoluble within Cartesian 
thought. 
 
Merleau-Ponty can, however, give us an answer to this question of how we can know 
about others, in shifting the focus from the private, invisible experience of thought to 
the lived body and a redefinition of human being in terms of embodiment and 
behaviour, which are visible and publicly available. If self or subjectivity is not non-
material consciousness but is rather manifest in my animate embodiment then we do 
not have transparent access to self through introspection as Descartes suggests, but 
rather achieve self-knowledge through action. The Cartesian problem of solipsism is 
thus dissolved in Merleau-Ponty¶VIUDPHZRUNDV µP\H[LVWHQFHDVDVHOILVRQH[DFWO\
WKHVDPHIRRWLQJDVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIRWKHUVHOYHV¶0DWWKHZV,GRQRWKDYH
complete, transparent access to myself, but neither is my knowledge and surety 
confined to an inner realm of consciousness: if to be human is to be a human body and 
H[KLELW KXPDQ EHKDYLRXU WKHQ µ, FDQ VHH \RXU KXPDQLW\ DQG \RX FDQ VHH PLQH¶
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(Dillon, 1997:113). Intersubjectivity, for Merleau-Ponty, therefore relies on a 
reciprocity of perception. 
 
This reciprocity is encapsulated in the concept of reversibility that Merleau-Ponty 
elaborates in The Visible and the Invisible (1969). Reversibility is primarily 
conceptualised through the basic model of one hand touching another where the hand 
that touches can also be touched by the hand that was originally touched but is now 
touching. Indeed being able to touch anything requires that the toucher is also 
touchable, as to touch a thing is to feel the thing touching me:  
 
It is the contact of two bodies (one or both of which may be sentient) and not the 
(inconceivable) encounter of immaterial, non-extended consciousness with a 
material extended thing. (Dillon, 1997:163)  
 
This dissolves any clear distinction between touching and touched, sentient and 
sensible, and thus between the body as subject and the body as object, and Merleau-
Ponty further extends the notion of reversibility to encompass vision, perception in 
general, intersubjectivity and language.  
 
In extending the model beyond the reversible touching of my own hands, it is 
revealed, however, that reversibility is not completely symmetrical. Thus when I 
touch an object in the world, such as a table, there is reversibility but, while I can 
touch the table and feel myself touched by the table, I cannot feel the table touching 
me in the same way that I can internally sense my left hand as it touches my right. The 
table is not part of my body, nor is it sentient in the way that my body is. This 
asymmetry is further evident when we turn to the modality of vision.  
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In Eye and Mind (1964a) Merleau-3RQW\TXRWHVDSDLQWHU¶VFRPPHQWWKDW 
 
In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the forest. 
Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a:167) 
 
 This discussion then turns to the role of the mirror in reversibility between the seeing 
and the seen. The trees, like the mirror, situate the painter as an object among objects 
in the world, make him visible. In being separate from him, the trees, like the mirror, 
define a perspective on the painter that allows him to be seen from the outside. In this 
sense, both the trees and the mirror function as the other then, although trees do not 
have reflective surfaces and mirrors do not see in the way the painter sees (Dillon, 
1997:162).  
 
Reversibility of this seeing-seen kind is important at the level of perception because it 
suggests how we can have access to the world. Just as immaterial, non-extended res 
cogitans cannot touch material res extensia, neither can we explain how 
transcendental consciousness can see an object in the world, without reducing that 
perception to pure thought. It is my tangibility and visibility ± my embodiment ± that 
allows me to touch and see things in the world. Here Merleau-Ponty introduces the 
FRQFHSWRIµIOHVK¶ZKLFKLVWREHXQGHUVWRRGDVQHLWKHUPLQGQRUPDWWHUEXWUDWKHUto 
be constitutive of both subject and object (Gilbert and Lennon, 2005:32). The 
reversibility of the seer and the seen can therefore be understood in terms of their 
mutual constitution in the flesh of the world with perception to be understood as the 
flesh of the world folding back upon itself. The flesh of my body is thus essentially 
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part of the flesh of the world, although the flesh of my body is a particular variant of 
flesh in that it is sentient as well as sensible. 
 
Merleau-Ponty conceives of perception not as an inner representation or thought of an 
outer wRUOGWKHQEXWDVDQµRSHQQHVV¶ and, as a similarly embodied being, the other 
is open to the world as I am. Thus perceptual subjects are open to, or perceive, a 
shared world ± although having different perspectives they do not perceive exactly the 
same thing ± wherein they are both objects among objects and subjects among 
subjects. For Merleau-Ponty: 
 
Against the notion of multiple subjective realities then, we have a notion of an 
µLQWHUPXQGDQH VSDFH¶ LQ UHODWLRQ WR ZKLFK DOO SHUFHSWXal subjectivities are 
decentred. (Crossley, 1995:57)  
 
As embodied, sentient and sensible, beings open to a shared world, we experience 
each other in what Merleau-Ponty terms carnal intersubjectivity or intercorporeality:  
 
My body is the ground of my identity for myself, hence it can function as the 
ground of my identity for others, and your body plays the same role for you, me, 
and the others who dwell in our world. Furthermore, the isomorphism of our 
bodies provides a basis for mutual understanding: I understand the behaviour of 
your hands as I see them from the outside because my hands are similar to yours 
and I know them from the inside. (Dillon, 1997:113-114) 
 
Thus there is a reversibility to intersubjective (or intercorporeal) relations which again 
relies on my own sensibility as well as my sentience. From infancy, the child 
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experiences its body as neither wholly Cartesian subject ± in which case it would be 
invisible ± nor as wholly object ± in which case it would not be able to serve the 
FKLOG¶VLQWHQWLRQV,QGHHGREMHFWPDQLSXODWLRQUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHFKLOGERWKVHHVLWVKDQG
in relation to the object it wishes to grasp, and that this wish or intention to grasp is 
lived through the hand. Thus the child both sees its hand as object and lives through it 
as subject in what Merleau-Ponty calls corporeal reflexivity (Dillon, 1997:122).  
 
This corporeal reflexivity also allows that there is overlap, not only between my body 
as subject and my body as object, but also between my experience of my (visible) 
body and my experience of other bodies. The corporeal schema is not a private, inner 
realm, but rather is visibly manifest in my embodied behaviour, and it is possible to 
see the other doing what I am doing and vice versa. It is this further dimension of 
intercorporeality that explains the phenomenon of imitation or mirroring discussed in 
the previous chapter. The visibility of the corporeal schema and the overlap or 
isomorphism between my experience of my own body and my experience of the body 
of the other explains the possibility of imitating the behaviour of the other despite the 
fact that the outer look of the behaviour is not the same as the inner feel of the 
behaviour.  
 
This intercorporeal connection with the other is referred to as transfer of corporeal 
schema, and it is through this process that we recognise other human beings as like 
ourselves, making it the grounds of intersubjectivity. The reversibility (between self 
and other) inherent in intercorporeality and the transfer of corporeal schema is not, 
however, symmetrical. Indeed the asymmetry of reversibility is fundamental to the 
concept and, even in the case of reversibility between my right hand touching my left 
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and my left touching my right, Merleau-Ponty stresses that the events of touching and 
being touched do not coincide. The right hand is always either touching or being 
touched, never both at the same time, and the touching hand does not coincide with 
the hand touched but rather there is a separation between the two that allows 
perception to occur. Perceiving something is not the same as coinciding with or being 
that thing and requires some form of non-coincidence or difference which Merleau-
Ponty refers to as dehiscence, fission, or écart (Dillon, 1997:159): 
 
There is an identity of the touching and the touched (the touching is the being 
touched) but there is also the difference Merleau-Ponty calls 
dehiscence/divergence/écart (the touched thing is separate from, independent of, 
more than the touching that reveals its presence). (Dillon, 1997:163)  
 
Furthermore shaking hands with the other is not like the touching of my own hands in 
that the experience the other has of my right hand as object is inaccessible to me 
where the experience of my left hand touching my right was accessible. There is, 
therefore, an asymmetry to intercorporeal relations, a dehiscence or fission, so that 
while the transfer of corporeal schema means that there can be identification with the 
RWKHULWGRHVQRWPHDQWKDW,DPLGHQWLFDOWRWKHRWKHU,FDQQRWOLYHWKHRWKHU¶VERG\
while at the same time being my own. Transfer of corporeal schema is therefore just 
that, a transfer, not an identity.  
 
As was seen in µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶, however, Merleau-Ponty traces the development of the 
FKLOG¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHUVIURPHDUO\LQIDQF\ZKHUHWKHUHLVQRGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ
self and others. This early stage is characterised by what Merleau-Ponty refers to as 
syncretism or syncretic sociability, where babies can be seen to, for example, start to 
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cry when others cry. Merleau-Ponty suggests that at this stage of development there is 
no distinction between the different perspectives of self and other. Contrary to more 
traditional accounts of early ego-centrism, Merleau-Ponty does not, however, see the 
child as locked in a solipsistic private realm from which it has to somehow recognise 
others as other consciousnesses, but rather as having to learn to distinguish the 
experience of self from the (originally undifferentiated) experience of others (Dillon, 
1997:121).  
 
The possibility of this primordial undifferentiated, syncretic state does not, however, 
imply that the distinction between self and other is false or ungrounded. Rather,  
 
The fact is that the world transcends us and cognitive development is required to 
accommodate phenomenal realities, such as the reality that human bodies are 
separate and distinct from one another. The infant must learn to distinguish 
himself from others; he must develop a sense of his own identity as distinct from 
those around him; he must suffer through the experience of alienation that will 
lead him into the adult world where it is true both that we identify with others 
and that each of us is alone. (Dillon, 1997:123) 
 
 For Merleau-Ponty, this distinction between self and other is achieved through the 
mirror stage discussed in the previous chapter where the child develops a sense of self 
based around a stable, unified corporeal schema or body image.  
 
Thus as the cognitive development associated with the mirror stage progresses,  
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TKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKH2WKHUZLOOUHVLGHLQDFRQWLQXXPRIµOLNH-me-but-not-PH¶
which will develop to include the full range of experience from interpersonal 
VROLGDULW\WRDOLHQDWLRQ¶'LOORQ 
 
The child, then,  
 
« KDV OHIW WKH UHDOP RI V\QFUHWLF VRFLDELOLW\ +H FDQ ZLWQHVV DQRWKHU LQIDQW¶V
crying without being drawn into it. Subsequent experiences of syncretism 
(orgiastic unification, team spirit, class consciousness, etc.) will be qualitatively 
different and episodic rather than abiding. However, the sense of fundamental 
human community, based on the enduring phenomenon of transfer of corporeal 
schema, will remain as a permanent experiential possibility (unless it is 
interrupted or distorted by some intervening pathology). (Dillon, 1997:124) 
 
Outwith the realm of infantile syncretic sociability then, transfer of corporeal schema 
takes on its true sense as a transfer across some kind of separation or fission between 
self and other. In adulthood, transfer of corporeal schema operates at an immediate, 
pre-reflective level allowing me to recognise the other as a human being like me and 
open to the same shared world, but crucially, even at this immediate, pre-reflective 
level I recognise the other as having a different perspective to my own. Thus the 
otherness of the other, the difference of the other from me is part of the immediate, 
pre-reflective meaning that the other has for me within this process of identification 
(Dillon, 1997:168). There is then, as noted above, an asymmetry in the reversibility of 
self-other relations: I perceive the other and the other perceives me, but we do not 
merge into one another ± WKHRWKHU¶VSHUception of me remains inaccessible to me and 
vice versa.  
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Intersubjective or intercorporeal relations are, while relying on the overlap or 
reversibility between my embodiment and that of the other, therefore rooted in this 
fundamental separation or difference between self and other for Merleau-Ponty. I can 
recognise you as the same kind of being as I am, but I do not experience your body 
exactly as you experience it:  
 
I may suffer your pain by witnessing it in your behaviour, but it is your pain, the 
pain of another body separate from mine, and there are both qualitative and 
physiological differences between your pathos and my response to it. Here is the 
basic truth obscured by the polemics of solipsism: I live my body as you live 
yours, but they are separate bodies; if one dies the other may still live for a while 
longer; one may eat while the other goes hungry. The transfer of corporeal 
schema which is the ground for our communion remains a transfer, an exchange 
across the space that separates us. We may be close in physical or in psychic 
space, or we may be removed or estranged from each other ± harmonious 
attunement is a human possibility, and, at the other end of the spectrum, so is 
brutalization and dehumanization ± but, although we must dwell in the same 
world, we cannot occupy the same space at the same time. (Dillon, 1997:129)  
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V DFFRXQW RI LQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\ LV WKHUHIRUH DEOH WR DFFRXQW IRU ERWK
privacy of experience and communion between human beings. Furthermore both these 
elements are required for an adequate account of communication between selves:  
 
The very possibility of communication clearly implies a link between one self 
and another; it expresses a sense of connectedness with others that I have even 
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before I begin to speak, and without which the whole project of communication 
or dialogue would be meaningless. But for that very reason the communication 
occurs in the space between us; communication implies the existence of two 
distinct selves between whom it takes place ± I cannoW µFRPPXQLFDWH ZLWK¶
myself. (Matthews, 2002:98) 
 
In order to communicate then, we must be both separate from each other and able to 
overcome that separation in intermundane space where our perceptual fields and 
perceptibility intertwine with those of others. Communication therefore rests on a 
notion of openness to a shared interworld where:  
 
Our thoughts, feelings, intentions, understanding, etc., assume an embodied and 
therefore visible form: i.e. in speech and other cultured actions. This allows for a 
genuine human interworld by defining subjectivity as publicly available. 
Thoughts, feelings and intentions, even when hidden in practice, do not belong to 
an inner realm which is only accessible to a solitary subject. They manifest in 
conduct in intermundane space and are therefore perceptible to all. (Crossley, 
1995:57-58)  
 
Intercorporeality therefore denotes an intersubjectivity based on carnal bonds between 
beings and the world, all part of the same reversible flesh. Access to the world and to 
others is to be understood as flesh folding back on itself so that our perceptual fields 
and perceptibility intertwine with each other in intermundane space where each of us 
is decentred as a perceptual subject but still remains a separate being. This 
understanding of how we can know and communicate with each other is therefore 
based on ideas about reciprocity, reversibility and openness.  
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,ZLOOQRZPRYHRQWRH[SORUHKRZGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIGDQFLQJZLWKRWKHUVUHYROYH
around similar notions of openness, awareness, sharing and responsiveness, thus re-
introducing the voice of dance to the conversation to see how it can speak to Merleau-
Ponty¶VFRQFHSWVRILQWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\DQGWUDQVIHURIFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD 
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II: Synchrony and Understanding in Dance 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V account of intersubjectivity includes the possibility of alienation, 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKURXJKWKHREMHFWLI\LQJJD]HDVZDVH[SORUHGLQµ6XEMHFWLYW\¶EXWLWDOVR
allows for human beings to come together in moments of syncretism and communion 
through the mechanism of transfer of corporeal schema. It is this pre-reflective 
connection between dancers to which I now turn. 
 
Communication between dancers when they are moving together is interesting for the 
discussion of intercorporeality because it is often achieved without words and through 
the medium of (pre-reflective) bodily contact. As Louisa suggests, openness to such 
bodily communication is often part of an overall awareness that dancer has of their 
embodiment and situation within the immediate context of the dance:  
 
II\RX¶UH LQ WKHPRPHQWDQG\RX¶UHRQVWDJHDQG\RX¶UHDZDUH ± \RX¶UH LQ WKH
PRPHQWDQG\RX¶UH LQ\RXUERG\\RX¶UH LQ WKDWSDUWRI WKHSLHFHEXW\RXDOVR
have to be super-DZDUH LQ WKH ZD\ WKDW \RX¶UH UHDG\ WR DFFHSW DQ\WKLQJ DQG
WKDW¶VOLNHWKDW FRPPXQLFDWLRQWKDWKDSSHQVZKLFKLVQRW\RXGRQ¶WWDON\RXMXVW
know, you, you even feel it in, you feel inside and you just react ± WKDW¶V WKH
VWUDQJHWKLQJDQGWKDW¶VUHDOO\H[FLWLQJZKHQ\RXMXVWKDYHWKDWZKHQLW¶VLQV\QF
OLNHWKDWDQG\RXGRQ¶WHven have to see the person to feel what they want to do, 
you can feel if you have to go a bit quicker, you can feel if you have to slow 
down. [Louisa] 
 
 In this case then, the dancers are not consciously formulating thoughts or reflecting 
on the situation but are reacting to each other ± WR HDFK RWKHU¶V ERGies ± at a pre-
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reflective level. Louisa also emphasises that much of dance occurs at too fast a pace to 
allow for reflection, meaning that there is not sufficient time to think about what steps 
come next ± hence the importance of habit and the corporeal schema as discussed in 
µ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶± or to tell another dancer what you or they should be doing.  
 
Putting things into words is thus not always possible during dance because it simply 
takes too long to formulate what you wish to say and to say it. Furthermore many (if 
not all) aspects of dance such as, for example, force, balance, and weight-bearing, 
require dancers to physically engage with each other and feel and adjust their 
embodied interaction. Many dancers in fact used the idea of a conversation as an 
analogy for this process of negotiation and understanding between dancing bodies, but 
emphasised that it was not possible to conduct the process in words:  
 
TKHUH¶VWKLVOLNHGLIIHUHQWNLQGRIDZareness that you have to have, just because 
you have to be able to move together, in a small space, and big space, so em, you 
definitely have to have that self-awareness and knowing kind of, kind of not just 
being taking care of yourself but I think what is the nicest part as well when you 
GRJHWWRGDQFHDFWXDOO\ZLWKVRPHRQHLW¶VQRWMXVWGHILQLWHO\WKHQ\RXFDQ¶WMXVW
GR VWHSV DQG LW¶V OLNHPHHWLQJ VRPHRQHDQHZSHUVRQEXW\RX MXVW FDQ¶W WDON
you have to talk with your bodies so you have to kind of listen to each other ± 
\RXFDQ¶WDOZD\VGRLW\RXU way, you have to find the way. [Anna] 
 
The awareness of and connection with other dancers achieved in this way is not, 
therefore, limited to understanding the materiality of their bodies in terms of weight 
and position in space, but also includes an understanding of them as intentional beings 
who want to do things in certain ways that may be different to what you want. Thus 
  220 
there was a sense that it is possible to get to know a dancer through dancing with 
them, not just in terms of their size and shape but as an animate embodied human 
being. The dancers are able to recognise each other through their bodily interaction 
not only as other physical objects in the world but also as other body-subjects. Tara, 
again here makes reference to the notion of talking and listening through the body 
when working with a new partner:  
 
You can tell a lot without, even just working closely with them, just from the look 
or the way they, their body works with yours, and how they, you can kind of 
listen to each other through your bodies. You can become quite close to people ± 
you have to be prepared to work very closely with people physically, but because 
\RX¶UH VRFORVHSK\VLFDOO\\RX LWRSHQVXSVRPHWKLQJPHQWDOO\DVZHOO WKHUH¶V
some connection there. [Tara] 
 
7DUD¶V FRPPHQWV DERXW WKH OLQN EHWZHHQ SK\VLFDO FORVHQHVV DQG PHQWDO FORVHQHVV
resonates with the notion of transfer of corporeal schema where we can come to know 
SHRSOH¶VWKRXJKWVIHHOLQJVDQGLQWHQWLRQVWKURXJKLGHQWLfying with them at the level of 
the corporeal schema. It is through this pre-reflective intercorporeal identification that 
I can immediately sense, for example, sadness or anger in the other, but this facility is 
perhaps heightened in the case of dancers working closely with each other.  
 
In µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ I have discussed how dancers make a lot of use of mirroring or 
pairing interaction when they learn dance. I would suggest here that µpLFNLQJXS¶RU
taking correction on a movement having seen it demonstrated can be understood as 
involving intercorporeal overlap between how the dancer experiences his or her own 
body and how the dancer experiences the body of the person demonstrating the 
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PRYHPHQW 7DUD¶V FRPPHQWV WKHUHIRUH VXJJHVW WKDW WKH LQWHUFRUSRUHDO LGHntification 
involved in learning dance also makes the dancer more open to those dimensions of 
WKH RWKHU¶V H[LVWHQFH WKDW VKH GHVFULEHV DV PHQWDO ,QWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\ DQG WUDQVIHU RI
corporeal schema are crucial to the practice of learning dance as I have described it in 
WKHSUHFHGLQJFKDSWHUVDQGGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIWKLVSURFHVVVXJJHVWWKDWQRWRQO\GR
they come to understand other dancers physically in terms of how they move, but also 
that there can be a sense of closeness, connection or communion at a human, mental 
or emotional level when dancing with someone.  
 
In the following extended quote Steven struggles to find the appropriate words and 
analogies to explore this connection between dancers:  
 
I think that you get to know people incredibly well through dancing ± incredibly, 
incredibly well in a way which is really quite beautiful actually, really quite 
beautiful because it, because, because it, because of the context of it, it allows 
space for you to ± ,GRQ¶WZDQWWRVRXQGUHDOO\cheesy here ± but almost for like 
\RXUZKHQLWIRU\RXUVRXOVWRLQWHUFRQQHFWLQPDQ\VHQVHVEHFDXVHWKHUHLVQ¶W
WKHHPVH[XDOLW\RUHJRRUDOOWKHVHRWKHUNLQGRIWKLQJVSODFHGRQWRSRILWLW¶V
just simply about being with someone in the space and connecting with someone 
DQGWKDWLVVXFKDEHDXWLIXOVHQVDWLRQ,PHDQ,¶YHFKDWWHGWRP\IULHQGVZKRDUH
not dancers about this and I think the only way that I often explain to them about 
how wonderful it is to dance and so on is like imagine, making love to someone 
EXW\RX¶Ue not  ± G¶\RXNQRZZKDW,PHDQ" ± WKDWWRWDOO\GRHVQ¶WPDNHQRVHQVH ± 
<RX¶UH DV LQWLPDWH ZLWK \RX¶UH DV FRQQHFWHG ZLWK WKDW SHUVRQ \RX NQRZ DQG
REYLRXVO\LWGRHVQ¶WDOZD\VJHWWRWKDWOHYHOEXWZKHQLWGRHVWKDW¶VZKHQQRWRQO\
do you feel it but the audience feels it as well ± LWJHWVWRDSODFHZKHUH\RX¶UH
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FRPPXQLFDWLQJ\RX¶UHRSHUDWLQJRQDOHYHORIVHQVDWLRQDQGFRQQHFWLRQDQGLW¶V
DOPRVW OLNH \RX¶UH \RX¶UH KDYLQJ D FRQYHUVDWLRQ RI VHQVDWLRQ EXW WKHUH¶V QR
attachments or connotations of anything else really ± LW¶VUHDOO\TXLWHEHDXWLIXO
really something quite special and then yeah you do get to know somebody then 
because you get to see em, ± LW¶V UHDOO\ GLIILFXOW WR H[SODLQ EXW \RX JHW WR VHH
them for who they are, you know because people have a lot of barriers and a lot 
RIPDVNVXSRQWKHPVHOYHVDORWRIWKHWLPHDQGLI\RX¶UHUHDOO\LQYHVWHGLQWRWKH
moment and invested in this connection then you have to let those masks and 
those barriers fall down so that you can feel one another, be with one another 
and experience this thing with one another and I mean, when it gets to that point 
\RX NQRZ WKDW SHUVRQ  ZKHWKHU WKH\¶UH IHHOLQJ VDG RU ZKHWKHU WKH\¶UH IHHOLQJ
KDSS\DQG WKH\GRQ¶WHYHQKDYHWRHYHQVD\DQ\WKLQJVR\RXNQRZ\RXKDYHD
sense of how they are that day and you take that into account - WKHUH¶V QRW D
MXGJHPHQWRQWKDWLW¶VMXVWWKLVLVKRZWKHSHUVRQLVWRGD\WKLVLVKRZ,DPWRGD\
and this what it is today DQGWKDW¶VZK\LW¶VEHDXWLIXO [Steven] 
 
This is not to say that dancers do not communicate with each other verbally. There 
was, however, a clear suggestion from all my interviewees that being physically close, 
µLQ WXQH¶ RU V\QFKURQLVHG with another dancer allowed some access to the thoughts 
and feelings of the other without anything being reflected on or said. In the above 
quote Steven therefore emphasises that knowing whether another dancer is happy or 
VDG LV QRW VRPHWKLQJ WKDW \RX ZRUN RXW E\ UHIOHFWLQJ RQ RU MXGJLQJ WKH SHUVRQ¶V
movement as good or bad, but rather something that is intuited or sensed and 
somehow absorbed into the character of the movement on any particular day.  
 
Steven describes this, somewhat hesitantly, then, as an interconnection or communion 
RI WKH WZRGDQFHUV¶ VRXOVDVZHOODV WKHLUERGLHVZKLFKKH OLNHQV WR intimacy of the 
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experience of making love. The comparison he makes with sexual intimacy is 
interesting, not only because shared sexual or orgasmic experience has been suggested 
above as one of the most recognisable examples in adult life of a sense of connection 
or communion through transfer of corporeal schema, but also because Steven further 
qualifies his use of this example. Steven in fact suggests that dance is an even better 
example of this kind of interconnection than sex because he associates sex with 
notions of egoism and sexuality which I take to mean that there are more issues 
around one person having and showing off their power over the other in sex, whereas 
dance, for Steven, ideally seems to allow for something without these power relations 
and thus more akin to communion of the souls. This is unlikely to be true of all sexual 
encounters and all dancing encounters, and the experience of completely entering into 
a state of communion with someone where all egoism is dissolved may be not really 
be possible, especially in an encounter between two dancers who are both professional 
performers. Nevertheless, I consider that it is interesting that Steven voices these ideas 
about the dissolution of egoism and power relations when dancing with someone as 
this sense of interconnection in dance fits with and illuminates the synchrony and 
communion that Merleau-Ponty¶VSKLORVRSK\VXJJHVWVVKRXOGEHDYDLODEOHDOWKRXJK
only episodically, in adult life through transfer of corporeal schema. 
 
It was not the case, however, that a connection or intimacy of this kind was always 
established between dancers working together. Anna, for example, mentioned that 
there were certain dancers she had been in companies with that she had felt 
uncomfortable working with, while Carrie, again using conversation as an analogy for 
dancing with someone commented of forming a connection with another dancer that:  
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You just naturally gel with another person like you would, you know, having 
coffee, sometimHV\RXGRVRPHWLPHV\RXGRQ¶W [Carrie] 
 
Furthermore it appeared that this type of intimacy or syncretism between dancers was 
more usually established in a company where the dancers worked together closely 
over long periods of time. Thus Adam who, in contrast to the majority of my 
interviewees, had spent his career moving between companies in quick succession did 
not refer to this intimate connection between dancers. Adam makes a distinction 
between getting to know someone as a dancer ± how they move ± and getting to know 
someone as a person. For Adam, dancing with someone allowed you to get to know 
him or her as a dancer but was not sufficient to get to know the other dancer as a 
person:  
 
YRX¶UH ZRUNLQJ ZLWK WKUHH GLIIHUHQW JLUOV ZLWK WKUHH GLIIHUHQW ERGLHV DQG
personalities and everything VR\RXJHWWRPD\EHDOLWWOHELWEXW,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDW
dancing can actually make you know each other ± you know ± I think as dancers 
and understanding their bodies maybe yeah. [Adam]  
 
This was also echoed by Jamie, who was new to the company and to professional 
dance as a whole, who considered that although he knew people from, for example, 
his dance school very well in terms of how they danced he did not necessarily know 
much about their lives outside dance and thus would not say that he knew them as 
people, only as dancers. 
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The rest of my interviewees did, however, suggest that dance allowed for a particular 
type of intimate personal connection. In a continuation of the passage quoted above 
Steven further explains:  
 
You do get to know a lot about peopOHZKHQ\RXGDQFHZLWKWKHPEHFDXVH\RX¶UH
working with them all the time and you sweat ± you sweat with one another for 
goodness sake ± you know when you sweat with someone you get to know 
HYHU\WKLQJDERXWWKHP«LWNLQGRILVVRVXFKDFORVH-knit thing and you have to 
be so co-GHSHQGHQW\RXNQRZ LW¶VVR\RXNQRZLW¶V LPSRVVLEOH IRU\RXQRW WR
get to know someone really well. [Steven] 
 
Thus in many of these accounts there is in fact an overlap between the notions of 
dancing with someone and the social ERQGV WKDW ZHUH IRUPHG ZLWKLQ µFORVH-NQLW¶
companies where dancers worked with each other for long periods of time, spent a lot 
of time together when touring and socialised with each other outside of work. Thus 
Toby suggests it might be easier to work closely and develop a connection with 
someone you have a social bond with:  
 
If you know them outside that probably helps becausH \RX¶YH DOUHDG\ JRW WKH
trust. [Toby]   
 
Outwith the realm of infantile syncretic sociability then, transfer of corporeal schema 
is not an automatic guarantee of connection or communion with others. Indeed it is 
very rare for adults to achieve these feelings of communion or synchrony for any 
extended period of time, although Merleau-Ponty does argue that it is the very 
  226 
possibility of this connection that allows for our recognition and understanding of the 
other as a human body-subject like me, rather than as a object in the world. 
 
This does not mean, however, that adults will only be aware of understanding each 
other through some form of immediate, pre-reflective physical empathy. Indeed while 
there may be immediate recognition of humanity and certain basic expressions of 
anger or fear for example; learning to understand someone as an adult does, generally, 
take time and involves sharing and openness of a kind that is achieved through verbal 
social interaction and not just through dance.  
 
My intention in bringing dance to speak to the notion of transfer of corporeal schema, 
then, is not to rule out other notions of social interaction, but to explore the 
importance of this form of physical empathy and show that the kind of synchronised 
connection between individuals which Merleau-Ponty talks about does actually play 
out in dance; this being an arena where  individuals are particularly adept at focussing 
RQDQG UHDGLQJHDFKRWKHUV¶ERGLHVRU FRUSRUHDO VFKHPDVDQGRIWHQGRQRWKDYH WKH
same reliance on talk that most people have in daily social interaction. Having 
established this I will then go on the next chapter to explore linguistic communication 
more fully, although still in relation to the primacy of embodiment and practice rather 
than assuming that language is primary to human existence and understandings of self 
and other. I therefore return here to my discussion of how dancers moving 
(physically) closely with each other establish bonds of trust, connection and intimacy 
to fully explore this intercorporeal relationship before letting the conversation 
between philosophy and practice turn to questions of language. 
 
  227 
Dancers in fact often work with others that they do not have prior social bonds with, 
meaning that we can explore how trust can be established between dancers without 
this prior connection. Indeed Tara suggests that trusting other dancers is so central to 
being able to dance with them that she feels it comes naturally to dancers as a result of 
their training:  
 
TKHUH¶VD ORWRI WUXVW LQYROYHGGHILQLWHO\EXW WKHNLQGRI , WKLQN WKDW¶V WKURXJK
WUDLQLQJ \RX MXVW NQRZ WR WUXVW SHRSOH OLNH LW¶V RIWHQ LI \RX¶UH GDQFLQJ ZLWK D
new SHUVRQ,WKLQNWKHWUXVWZRXOGLQVWDQWO\EHWKHUHEXWLW¶VMXVWWKDW\RXGRQ¶W
NQRZHDFKRWKHU¶VERGLHVVRWKDW¶VZKHUHWKHGLIILFXOW\DULVHVLW¶VMXVW\RXGRQ¶W
know how they might respond to this or how they might respond to that but you 
always trust tKHP,WKLQN,WKLQNWKDW¶VVRPHWKLQJLQRXUFRQWHPSRUDU\WUDining 
that is kind of inherent. [Tara] 
 
Adam similarly emphasises the importance of quickly establishing trust or feeling safe 
with a partner in suggesting that failure to do this can result in movements not being 
performed properly and perhaps in injury:  
 
IIWKHJLUOGRHVQ¶WIHHOVDIHIRURQHWKHQ\RXNQRZVKH¶VQRWJRLQJWRWDNHWKDWULVN
«EHFDXVHEDVLFDOO\WKDW¶VZKDWVKHQHHGVWRNQRZLIVKH¶VJRLQJWREHMXPSLQJ
and like landing on my shoulder she needs to just do it and take that risk that, 
\RXNQRZVKH¶VJRLQJWRJHWWKHUHDQGLIVKHNLQGRIKDOIGRHVLWWKHQWKDW¶VZKHQ
KRZSHRSOHFDQJHWKXUWDVZHOOEHFDXVH\RXNQRZ\RX¶UHQRWUHDOO\FRPPLWWHG
to the movement and then something happens. [Adam] 
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7KXVIRUDGDQFHULI\RXDUHDVNHGWRMXPSLQWRDQRWKHUGDQFHU¶VDUPVLWLVQHFHVVDU\
to trust that that person will catch you. When working with a new partner then, it is 
possible to feel this level of trust and safety because you know that this person is a 
dancer and therefore that they are trained to interact with others in a way that you 
understand as safe. This sense that they are a dancer may be gleaned instantly from 
the social situation (in the dance studio) or, perhaps, from the physical impression you 
have of them and how they position themselves physically towards you (you have the 
impression they know what they are doing).  
 
There is, however, a (non-LQVWDQWDQHRXVSURFHVVRIJHWWLQJWRNQRZWKHRWKHUGDQFHU¶V
body that Tara alludes to above when she comments that although trust may be 
established instantaneously there may still be difficulty working with someone ± a 
lack of syncretism ± where you do not know the body-subject of the other dancer and 
therefore cannot intuit how they may respond to different situations. Rhianna 
GHVFULEHV WKLV SURFHVV DV WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI DQ µXQVSRNHQ UHODWLRQVKLS¶ EHWZHHQ
dancers where:  
 
After you work with someone for a while you get to like, you feel their body, you 
IHHOOLNHZKHUHWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRWDNH\RXU\RXMXVW\RXNQRZLI\RX¶UHZRUNLQJ
on a duet together you just develop that understanding of how much a risk you 
can take within that and each other. [Rhianna] 
 
 She further describes this relationship as something that is negotiated through 
working physically closely together:  
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As you start to like get comfortable with it and start to explore the connection, 
you develop your own story I think without speaking to each other ± you know, 
\RXGRQ¶WVD\³RKZKHQ,¶PGDQFLQJZLWK\RX,IHHOOLNH\RX¶UHWKLVDQGWKLVWKDW
DQG WKH RWKHU´ ± \RX MXVW VRUW RI \RX GRQ¶W HYHQ NQRZ \RXUVHOI H[DFWO\ ZKDW
necessarily what the relationship is between you but you do definitely develop 
VRPHWKLQJWKDW¶VOLNHERWKRI\RXXQGHUVWDQGSK\VLFDOO\EXWGRQ¶WQHFHVVDULOy put 
into words ± ,WKLQNLW¶VTXLWHVSHFLDO>5KLDQQD@ 
 
7KHSURFHVVRIJHWWLQJWRNQRZDGDQFHU¶VERG\IRUP\LQWHUYLHZHHVZDVWKHUHIRUHD
matter of establishing some kind of unspoken relationship with the other dancer and 
of establishing an understanding of how that person moves and how it is possible for 
you to move with them safely and meaningfully. Thus there is a bond established 
EHWZHHQ GDQFHUV WKURXJK WKLV SURFHVV RI JHWWLQJ WR NQRZ WKH RWKHU GDQFHU¶V ERG\
which lets dancers feel comfortable and confident working together and allows them 
to sense the mood and responses of a partner. Building this unspoken relationship 
when dancers work physically closely with each other is therefore a process of 
reciprocal recognition of the other dancer as another subject or human being who is 
similarly embodied: it is intersubjectivity as intercorporeality.   
 
The concept of the corporeal schema, as discussed in µ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶suggests 
that the movement of any particular dancer is coloured by many aspects of his or her 
history as a dancer and as a person including gender, race, social class, sports played, 
relationship history, experiences of childbirth or parenthood, or experiences of loss or 
grief, for example.  
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Thus dancers come to a new pattern of movement with a new partner already 
individuated and with certain qualities and aspects to their movement that reveal 
many things about their history including, for example, their training, their 
performance history and apprehensions they may have about injury. As Louisa 
describes, working physically closely with someone means that it is possible to sense 
nervousness or injuries from the way the other dancer moves:  
 
YRXMXVWNH\LQWRZKDWLWLVZKHWKHU\RX\RXFDQDOZD\VWHOOZKHQ\RX¶YHJRWD
SDUWQHUZKR¶VQHUYRXVVR\RXDV,VDLGEHIRUHLI\RX¶UHLQWKHPRPHQW\RXXVH
ZKDWHYHU¶VWKHUH\RXZRQ¶WILJKWLWWKHUH¶VQRSRLQWLQILJKWLQJWKDWVR\RXMXVW
GRZHOO,GRMXVWGRZKDW\RXKDYHWRGRRULI\RX¶YHJRWDGDQFHUPD\EHZKR¶V
JRWDZKR¶VFDUU\LQJDVlight niggle or injury then you have to be careful with 
that sRWKHUH¶VWKDWDOORZDQFHWKHUH>/RXLVD@ 
 
Here Louisa emphasises that she does not attempt to fight against the other dancer 
where she senses that they are tense with nerves or injury, but that she makes an 
DOORZDQFH RU DGDSWV WR WKLV DVSHFW RI WKH RWKHU GDQFHU¶V PRYHPHQW 7KLV HFKRHV
6WHYHQ¶VFRPPHQWVDERYHWKDWKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDQRWKHUGDQFHU¶VPRRGGRHVQRW
entail making a judgement, rather it is something that is sensed and adapted to.  
 
This notion of accepting the interaction for what it is and not trying to force 
something or pretend something is linked to what dancers described as the importance 
of being open or honest in dance, of allowing yourself to be exposed or possibly 
vulnerable VHH µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ 6HFWLRQ ,9 ,W ZDV FRQVLGHUHG E\ PDQ\ RI P\
interviewees that dance as an art-form and as a physical practice called for you to drop 
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DQ\µEDUULHUV¶RUµPDVNV¶DQGWKDWWKLVDVSHFWPDGHLWSDUWLFXODUO\VSHFLDO LQWHUPVRI
the way that you got to know the people you dance with.  
 
Thus there was something about the physical encounter, the intercorporeality, in 
GDQFH WKDW ZDV XQGHUVWRRG DV SDUWLFXODUO\ µKRQHVW¶ DQG µRSHQ¶. Dancers, as I have 
GLVFXVVHG LQ µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ IHOW WKDW WKH\ KDG to make themselves completely 
physically available and open for the choreographer and that they were also called 
upon to be mentally and emotionally open and pliable during the creative process so 
that they could draw on their personal experiences in ordeUWRµVRXUFHWKHPRYHPHQW
IURPWKHLQVLGH¶7KLVSK\VLFDODQGPHQWDORUHPRWLRQDORSHQQHVVRUKRQHVW\ZDVWKXV
also considered to characterise the interaction between dancers when they moved 
together, meaning that, because neither party was holding anything back or pretending 
anything, it was possible to have an (unspoken) relationship characterised by mutual 
recognition, acceptance and understanding.  
 
Dancers therefore recognise and adapt to aspects of the corporeal schema of another 
dancer which are related to past experiences in life and dance. Through moving with 
each other and experiencing each other in this way, they can therefore come to 
understand and experience a kind of physical and emotional or mental synchrony or 
empathy with the dancer with whom they are moving. In exploring the experience of 
dance in these terms we are therefore able to make productive use of and also shed 
new light on Merleau-Ponty¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\DVLQWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\ 
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Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
 
The corporeal schema is not developed in isolation, rather, our sense of self is derived 
at least in part from (mirroring) interaction with others as I have explored in the 
previous chapter. The corporeal schema is thus a social phenomenon rather than a 
private one ± differentiation of self requires recognition of the other as other; 
subjectivity is always already intersubjective ± and we continue to develop our 
corporeal schemas through social interaction throughout our lives.  
 
This chapter has discussed how transfer of corporeal schema as conceptualised by 
Merleau-Ponty is the basic mechanism by which we are all able to recognise others ± 
immediately and pre-reflectively ± as human beings like ourselves characterised by 
human embodiment and human behaviour. We identify with the embodiment and 
behaviour of the other and thus recognise the humanity of the other. 
 
7KHSUREOHPRIµRWKHUPLQGV¶highlighted at the beginning of the chapter is thus seen 
to a misnomer. It is other active embodied beings that I perceive, recognise and 
understand, and Merleau-Ponty offers us understanding of intersubjectivity based on 
mutual perception and mutual constitution in shared world. The problem of 
intersubjectivity is therefore resolved by Merleau-Ponty through a redefinition of 
human being in terms of embodiment and behaviour, which are visible and publicly 
available.  
 
The human body thus has characteristics of both subjectivity and objectivity for 
Merleau-Ponty. It is both sentient and sensible ± it sees and can be seen, touches and 
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can be touched. Merleau-Ponty uses the idea of reversibility to show that these two 
aspects of existence, while not the same thing as each other, are always overlapping in 
actual embodied experience. 
 
Reversibility is illustrated by the example of one of my hands touching the other, 
where the hand that touches (subject) can become the hand that is touched (object). 
Merleau-Ponty also draws attention to the fact that the touching hand has to be part of 
the same realm as the touched in order to make contact with it ± it has to itself be 
touchable. The touching and touched hands are not, however, identical with each 
other, and Merleau-Ponty emphasises that a distinction between touching and touched 
remains ± a hand cannot fill both roles simultaneously. But the distinction between the 
touching and the touched is contingent and arises in the process of touching rather 
than being pre-defined.  
 
This example of the reversibility of the touching hands can also be extended to 
account for interaction with others. Thus there is a reversibility to intersubjective 
relations which relies on my own sensibility as well as my sentience. There is overlap, 
not only between my body as subject and my body as object, but also between my 
experience of my body and my experience of other bodies. The corporeal schema is 
not a private, inner realm, but rather is visibly manifest in my embodied behaviour, 
and it is possible to see the other doing what I am doing and vice versa. This 
intercorporeal connection with the other is referred to as a pairing or transfer of 
corporeal schema, and it is through this process that we recognise other human beings 
as like ourselves, making it the grounds of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is thus to 
be understood as intercorporeality.  
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It is the isomorphism of our bodies, then, that provides basis for mutual 
understanding. Transfer of the corporeal schema operates at a pre-reflective level 
where I make an immediate identification of the other as a human like myself and as 
open to same shared world. This mutual recognition of our inherence in a shared 
world can be experienced ± although only episodically in adulthood ± as syncretism or 
communion between individuals such as in team spirit or orgasmic unification.  
 
Furthermore this theorisation of intersubjective relations also accounts for the 
recognition in adulthood that the other is not me ± transfer of corporeal schema is a 
transfer across space between two separate individuals. Thus it is also the grounds for 
the experience of privacy that we have in adulthood, as the reversibility inherent in the 
transfer of corporeal schema is not symmetrical and we do not coincide with the other 
but rather remain separate although both decentred in relation to intermundane space 
of the shared world. 
 
Transfer of corporeal schema is thus important for all of us, not just for dancers. It is 
how we sense when someone is angry or when they want to get passed us on a busy 
street, and equally how we are able to understand that the anger we sense belongs to 
the other person and not to us. I suggest, however, that dancers allow us to study the 
bodily basis of intersubjectivity in a far more in-depth and sustained way than we can 
from the glimpses we get from our own everyday experiences. Dancers have, through 
their training, developed a heightened awareness and are particularly adept at 
µUHDGLQJ¶WKHERG\SDUWLFXODUO\WKDWRIDQRWKHUGDQFHU 
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Dancers in fact recognise each other not only as fellow human beings but also as 
fellow dancers through this identification with the embodiment and behaviour of the 
other. Dance is, in fact, learnt primarily through imitation, meaning that dancers are 
SDUWLFXODUO\ VNLOOHG DW REVHUYLQJ PRYHPHQW LQ RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV DQG WUDQVODWLQJ
that movement into their own bodies. I would argue that this makes dancers 
particularly open to the transfer of corporeal schema mechanism as they have a 
KHLJKWHQHGDZDUHQHVVRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VHPERGLHGEHKDYLRXUVDQGERGLO\DWWLWXGHVDQG
are highly trained in the process of translating or transferring the movement of the 
body of the other into their own body.  
 
This does not mean that they necessarily perform the same movements or behaviours 
as the other, nor that they have similar bodies ± they may be different of heights, 
gender, or ages, for example. The mechanism of transfer of corporeal schema does, 
however, imply that dancers are able to identify at a pre-reflective level with the 
embodied situation or orientation towards the world and the behaviour of another 
dancer. They are able to pre-reflectively sense and understand the embodiment of the 
other because as they perceive it in the other they understand it through their own 
bodies and tacitly recognise it as that of a dancer. I have suggested above that this 
immediate recognition of someone as a fellow dancer allows dancers to work 
successfully with and trust a new partner. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V FRQFHSW RI WUDQVIHU RI FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD VXJJHVWV WKDW WKLV
mechanism not only allows instant identification of the other as human, but can also 
function as the basis for experiences of communion or syncretism between adult 
human beings. Experiences of this kind were, in fact, reported by the majority of my 
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interviewees and were described by the dancers as a special kind of connection or 
unspoken relationship that was established as dancers moved together and got to 
NQRZHDFKRWKHU¶VERGLHV7KXV LWZDVEDVHG LQPRYLQJZLWK VRPHRQHDQG OHDUQLQJ
about the particular embodiment of the other dancer but, like the notion of transfer of 
corporeal schema, the experience went beyond this physical understanding leading 
RQHGDQFHUWRGHVFULEHLWDVWKHLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQRIGDQFHUV¶VRXOV 
 
The syncretism or communion achieved by dancers moving together and coming to 
NQRZHDFKRWKHU¶VERGLHVLVQRWWKHRQO\PRGHORIWKLV kind of connectedness between 
humans, with other examples including team spirit or experiences of unification 
during the sex act. It is, however, an interesting example for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, in comparison to a number of other human activities where the primary 
medium for communication and understanding appears to be language, dancers are 
very aware of and emphasise the fact that the connection they have with each other 
has a strong tacit element which they suggest is understood and communicated 
between dancers physically as they move together but cannot be put into words. This 
is very suggestive of the notion of a pre-reflective transfer or communication of 
something between embodied beings which is central to the concept of transfer of 
corporeal schema. Mutual understanding is not an intellectual thing here, it is an 
unspoken bodily phenomenon of reversibility. 
 
Communion in dance is also interesting because it was reported by my interviewees as 
occurring in particular where dancers learn to move with each other, rather than, for 
example, performing unconnected solo choreographies within a work. Physical 
syncretism, then, went hand in hand with this fuller notion of connection between the 
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dancers. Communion between dancers was achieved when dancers developed a tacit 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJHDFKRWKHU¶VERGLHVDQGKRZWKH\PRYHGDQGFRXOGWKXVLQWXLWKRZWKH\
would respond to different situations. Alongside this came an understanding of the 
RWKHU GDQFHU¶V PRYHPHQW LQ WHUPV RI WKH GDQFHU¶V KLVWRU\ DQG FXUUHQW mood and 
concerns. At this stage then, dancers reported that it was possible to sense small 
FKDQJHVLQDWWHQWLRQRUPRRGRIDSDUWQHUEHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHVRµLQV\QF¶RUµLQWXQH¶
with that person physically but also ± as a consequence of that physical closeness ± at 
a level that they described as mental. This gives us a very clear illustration of the 
transfer of corporeal schema ± a bodily or intercorporeal phenomenon ± as the basis 
for intersubjective communication or communion.  
 
My interviewees also emphasised that dance is characterised by openness in the sense 
of both awareness and honesty. It is such openness to others and to a shared world that 
characterises Merleau-3RQW\¶V FRQFHSW RI LQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\ RU LQWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\ DQG
allows us to commune with the other. The unspoken relationship between dancers is 
described as being characterised by openness to each other and tacit mutual 
understanding in a way that resonates with and illuminates the pre-reflective 
reciprocity of intersubjective/intercorporeal relations described by Merleau-Ponty.  
 
It should also be noted that communion in dance is more usually something that has 
been developed over time as the result of working together and getting to know the 
RWKHUSHUVRQ¶VERG\ DQGPRYHPHQW7KXV DOWKRXJK the moment of syncretism itself 
will be a distinct occurrence, most usually during a certain part of a performance on a 
particular occasion, and not something that is continuously felt between two dancers, 
GDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVVXJJHVW WKDW the possibility of this kind of connection is enhanced 
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by attending to the corporeal schema of the other over an extended period of time and 
learning (and perhaps imitating or mirroringPDQ\RIWKHGHWDLOVRIWKHRWKHUGDQFHU¶V
movement. I would therefore suggest that while transfer of corporeal schema can 
work instantaneously and pre-reflectively, it can also be enhanced by some of the 
reflective elements of conscious copying, repetition and correction that characterise 
learning dance. Just as it can take time to get a movePHQWµLQWKHERG\¶ZKHQOHDUQLQJ
dance, then, intercorporeality and transfer of corporeal schema at very detailed level 
can also involve time and practice. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWRILQWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\DQGWUDQVIHURIFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDDOORZV
us the possibility that we can recognise the other as like ourselves and have access to 
the thoughts, feelings and intentions of the other. In exploring how dancers come to 
develop connections with each other through moving together and working closely 
with each other physically, I have shown how this mechanism can be seen to play out 
in practice in this context.  
 
In focusing on those aspects of this communion that dancers describe as unspoken or 
something that cannot be put into words I do not, however, intend to deny the 
important role of language but rather to show that it can be fitted into a broader model 
of mutual recognition and communication: a model of intersubjectivity as 
intercorporeality.  ,Q WKHQH[WFKDSWHURQ µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ ,ZLOOEXLOGRQQRWLRQVRI
the primacy of embodiment and the corporeal schema to explore how we can 
understand language, art and meaning through the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and 
the practice of contemporary dance. 
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REPRESENTATION: 
 
LANGUAGE, ART AND MEANING 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The conversation between philosophy and dance thus far has primarily focussed on 
the notion of the corporeal schema. Habitual actions such as in dance require neither 
explicit instruction (they often come from copying others) nor deliberation before they 
are performed. Neither, however, are such actions mechanistic as they occur and can 
be modified in response to various different situations thus requiring recognition of a 
common significance of such situations. It is through the corporeal schema, then, as a 
mode of awareness of body and world that we grasp the significance of situations we 
encounter and the potential for actions in such situations. 
 
It has therefore been argued that linguistic models of propositional knowledge and 
learning are unsatisfactory for the study of dance and that by rejecting those models 
we can explore a far richer picture of what is going on in terms of a sophisticated 
notion of habit and the concept of the corporeal schema. The corporeal schema can be 
understood as our pre-reflective awareness of unified body and world, informing our 
interaction with our environment. Thus it does not require explicit conceptualisation 
or linguistic expression: 
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It is not an inner representation but a mode of awareness of our corporeal entity. 
This schema is not simply a reflection of present position but is open to future 
possibilities. Our body image, or corporeal schema, is framed in terms of 
potentialities for engagement, and thereby is independently a mode of awareness 
of our world. (Gilbert and Lennon, 2005:120) 
 
It has also been shown in the previous chapter that mutual understanding between 
dancers need not be understood in terms of a linguistic phenomenon and that by 
focussing on the tacit aspects of mutual understanding we can again open up an area 
for the exploration of the mechanism of (transfer of) corporeal schema which 
underlies our capacity for intersubjective or intercorporeal awareness and 
communication. Having opened up and explored these areas it is now possible for the 
conversation between philosophy and practice to come to the discussion of language 
while retaining the underlying notions of the importance of the pre-reflective, tacit 
elements of our embodied subjectivity. 
 
Sociology of the body using Merleau-Ponty to talk about language has tended to draw 
on his early work ± principally The Phenomenology of Perception ± and thus to treat 
language as habitus WRXVH%RXUGLHX¶VWHUPRUDQacquired use of the body. This is 
important but does not do full justice to Merleau-3RQW\¶VZRUNRQODnguage or to the 
complexities of language that can be explored through the focus on dance. 
 
In thinking of language as a shared habitus we can see that language and therefore 
meaning is embodied, public and shared (rather than private, inner and ethereal). We 
can explore this further through consideration of communication through dance and 
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the dancing body and can use these ideas to further theorise how dance is (not) like a 
language. 
 
Interrogating the notion evoked by the dancers that dance is (like) language also takes 
us beyond the picture of language as habitus and opens up an area for exploration of 
the connections between language, perception, philosophy and art in Merleau-3RQW\¶V
writing in connection with ideas about the meaningfulness of dance. 
 
Indeed in his later works Merleau-Ponty begins to treat language as a subject in its 
own right rather than just an aspect of his analysis of the lived body. Thus he begins 
to explore reversibilities within language such as that between the realm of ideas and 
the realm of things. Merleau-Ponty argues that the impulse to express something, the 
significative intention, arises from the things of the silent perceptual world, already 
tacitly meaningful, demanding expression. 
 
Language does not all work in this way ± giving voice to the silent perceptual world ± 
as much of it is formulaic and institutionalised and does not express anything new. 
What is interesting about language is, however, its creative capacity to give voice to 
the silent perceptual world, a facility that it shares with other non-verbal art-forms 
such as painting (and dance). Indeed Merleau-Ponty conceptualised painting and 
language as analogous to each other in the way they express the silent meaning of the 
perceptual world. 
 
This chapter brings together these ideas about language and art from Merleau-Ponty 
ZLWKDQH[SORUDWLRQRIGDQFHUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIGDQFHDVOLNHDODQJXDJH,QGRLQJ
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so I am able to make sense of how dance both is and is not (like) a language in a way 
that both illuminates the communicative dimension of dance with this theoretical 
framework and gives us a particularly rich experiential field for examining how 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWVPLJKWSOD\RXWLQSUDFWLFH 
 
As in previous chapters I do not set out here to locate Merleau-Ponty within an 
intellectual tradition, but rather to hear what his philosophy has to say to dance. 
Reference made to thinkers such as Saussure and Derrida in this chapter are therefore 
included to help clarify Merleau-Ponty¶V LGHDV EXW WKH LQWHQWLRQ LV not to explicitly 
locate Merleau-Ponty within the framework(s) of structuralist or post-structuralist 
thought. There are also moments where, as in previous chapters, my contemporary 
dance interviewees make reference to classical ballet. Again my intention in using 
these comparisons is to help illuminate contemporary dance, rather than to position 
contemporary dance in relation to other dance forms. 
 
In Section I of this chapter I wish to explore elements of Merleau-Ponty¶V
philosophical conceptualisation of language, attending to both his early and his later 
work. Although I occasionally turn to my dance interview data to give examples of 
KRZ GDQFHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHV ILW ZLWK DQG LOOXVWUDWH Merleau-Ponty¶V LGHDV 6HFWLRQ , LV
about listening to what Merleau-Ponty has to say (or what scholars working on his 
texts have taken him to be saying) about language and meaningful expression. 
 
The parallel that Merleau-Ponty suggests between art and language (and the 
importance he places on art as performing a similar function to phenomenological 
philosophy) then opens up Section II of the chapter where the voice of dance is re-
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introduced to see how it can speak to and illuminate Merleau-Ponty¶VWKHRULVDWLRQRI
this parallel. Section I also notes a further parallel that Merleau-Ponty presents 
between the function of art and the function of non-Cartesian philosophy which I will 
UHWXUQWRPRUHIXOO\LQWKHWKHVLVµ&RQFOXVLRQ¶ 
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I: Speech, Dialogue and Meaning 
 
Merleau-Ponty had a continued and indeed growing interest in language throughout 
his philosophical career. In his early work language appears as an important aspect of 
his theorisation of the lived body in works such as The Phenomenology of Perception, 
while in his later works such as Signs and The Prose of the World (later abandoned), 
language becomes the central focus of interest in its own right. In his final 
(unfinished) work, The Visible and the Invisible, language is then again subsumed into 
the wider reaching ontology of reversible flesh which I have begun to explore in 
relation to intersubjective relations in the previous chapter. 
 
In this section I do not intend to focus exclusively on any of these stages, and indeed 
do not aim to cast them as wholly distinct from each other. My engagement with 
Merleau-Ponty¶VSKLOosophy of language thus takes a chronological approach which is 
sensitive to the changes in his position, but seeks to understand these shifts as 
evolution of a theory of language rather than complete breaks with or rejection of 
previous ideas. As with previous chapters, I therefore seek to give a picture which fits 
with the overall spirit of Merleau-Ponty¶VZRUNDVXQGHUVWRRGIURPP\RZQUHDGLQJ
of a range of his texts and from shared and established understandings of Merleau-
Ponty¶VDSSURDFK WR ODQJXDJHZhich I access through engagement with the work of 
other scholars working on his philosophy. 
 
To help take the reader through this engagement with Merleau-Ponty¶VZRUN ,KDYH
broken this section down into five different sub-sections that explore particular 
aspects of Merleau-Ponty¶V SKLORVRSK\ RI ODQJXDJH , FRQVLGHU WKHVH WKHPDWLF
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divisions to be more helpful than dividing his work up into different time periods 
because they show how the different elements fit together and can be seen to build on 
earlier woUN WKXV HVWDEOLVKLQJ D FRKHUHQW µYRLFH¶ RI Merleau-Ponty¶V SKLORVRSK\ RI
language, rather than seeking to chart contrasting directions in the different published 
accounts of language. 
 
This does not mean that I consider an appreciation of the differences between 
Merleau-Ponty¶V HDUO\ DQG ODWHU ZRUNV WR EH XQLPSRUWDQW DQG LQGHHG , FULWLFLVH WKH
Sociology of the Body for often failing to acknowledge and engage with Merleau-
Ponty¶VPRUHGLIILFXOWODWHUZRUNDQGWKXVRSHUDWLQJDVLIDOOWKDWMerleau-Ponty had 
to say about language can be gleaned from The Phenomenology of Perception. I have, 
however, chosen to focus on developments in Merleau-Ponty¶VLGHDVDERXWODQJXDJH
LQ WHUPV RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DQ RYHUDOO YRLFH RU µVSLULW¶ WR KLV ZRUN 7KLV HPSKDVLV LV
guided not only by my reading of Merleau-Ponty and his commentators, but also by 
the aim of bringing Merleau-Ponty into conversation with dance. I find that both 
Merleau-Ponty¶VHDUO\DQGODWHUZRUNKDYHLQWHUHVWLQJWKLQJVWRVD\WRGDQFHDOORZLQJ
me to build up a coherent picture of dance and language. It is, however, notable that 
while my engagement with Merleau-Ponty¶V HDUO\ ZRUN RQ ODQJXDJH DV habitus) 
helps me to fit an understanding of the role of verbal communication in dance into the 
picture that has already been produced of dance in terms of the corporeal schema, it is 
his later work that really allows me to explore the notion of dance itself functioning as 
language, and its relation to non-Cartesian philosophy. 
 
 
Language as engagement not representation 
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It is the corporeal schema that orients us within and gives us a pre-reflective grasp on 
the world and in dance. The focus on the pre-reflective does not, however, mean that 
language does not have an important role within the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and 
within the context of dance. Indeed, for Merleau-3RQW\µODQJXDJHLVDSULPDU\YHKLFOH
E\ZKLFKZHDUHLQLWLDWHGLQWRKDYLQJDZRUOG¶*LOEHUWDQG/HQQRQ 
 
The primary function of language as conceptualised in Merleau-Ponty¶VHDUO\ZRUN is 
not, however, representation. The world is not to be understood as the subject matter 
of shared representations (as might be expressed by a set of assertions), but rather as a 
place in which we live. Words are therefore uttered as part of our interaction with the 
world and others. Rather than belonging to an internal realm of intellectual thought 
and contemplation they have a basis in gestural communication between humans 
living in social groups and engaged in common action (Burkitt, 1999:81). Language 
therefore primarily serves to extend the possibility of engaged agency in everyday 
communal life. 
 
Words should not, then, EH WKRXJKWRIDV µFRQFHSWVZKRVHPHDQLQJ LVH[SODLQHGE\
further concepts ad infinitum¶ WKHQ EXW DV µWRROV ZKRVH PHDQLQJ FRQVLVWV LQ the 
HIIHFWV WKH\ DFKLHYH DQG XVH WR ZKLFK WKH\ DUH SXW LQ FRQFUHWH LQWHUDFWLRQ FRQWH[W¶
(Crossley, 2001:80). In dance, for example, we can see verbal articulation can 
sometimes be a necessary part of the physical understanding and synchrony that 
dancers rely on to dance together. As Louisa comments, µVRPHWLPHV\RXKDYHWRWDON
\RX MXVW VD\ ³OHW¶V JR RYHU WKHUH QRZ´ DQG \RX NLQG RI JR¶ >/RXLVD@ This can be 
understood as similar to utterances such as µSDVVWKHKDPPHU¶RUµSDVVPHWKHEDOO¶LQ
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the context of playing football, for example, where language can be seen as another 
manner in which we extend the possibilities for our intentional bodily interaction with 
the world: 
 
Linguistic articulation makes visible new possibilities, shapes the world in 
different ways and consequently suggests new possibilities of response. (Gilbert 
and Lennon, 2005:121-122) 
 
It helps us drive the nail into the wall or score the goal. 
 
Louisa further draws attention to the value of language in addition to physical 
communication between dancers in describing how in addition to being able to adapt 
her movement to an overly powerful partner she could also say something to the other 
dancer which would allow a different range of possibilities for the performance of the 
movement in the future:  
 
YRXFDQ IHHO LI VRPHERG\¶VJLYLQJ\RXDPRYHPHQW WRRKDUGVR \RX MXVWDGDSW
VOLJKWO\ ZLWK WKDW RU \RX¶OO JR ZLWK LW DQG WKHQ VD\ ZKHQ \RX FRPH RII VWDJH
[Louisa]  
 
6KHDOVRJRHVRQWRJLYHDQH[DPSOHRIKRZLWLVSRVVLEOHWRµPLVUHDG¶WKHPRYHPent 
of another dancer, describing working with a partner who repeatedly shifted his 
weight and pushed against her during the performance of a choreography when they 
were standing back to back with her facing the audience. The physical communication 
here was confusing as she did not understand if he wanted her to move in a certain 
ZD\RULIKHZDVMXVWµSXPSHGXS¶ZLWKKLJKOHYHOVRIDGUHQDOLQH,WZDVQ¶WXQWLOWKH\
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came off the stage and were able to speak about what had happened that she 
discovered that he had dislocated two toes during the preceding sequence and had 
been trying to rectify this. 
 
 
Action and reflection 
 
In addition to immediate uses of language to enhance or alter characteristics of current 
interaction with the world and others, then, there also may be a need for us to 
explicitly conceptualise or articulate aspects of a situation where our pre-reflective 
grasp on the world is interrupted or meets with obstacles (Gilbert and Lennon, 
2005:122). This need to articulate something in words or reflective thought was also 
VHHQLQWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVRIFRUUHFWLRQRIPRYHPHQWV LQ µ3UDFWLFDO
.QRZOHGJH¶+HUHDGDQFHUKDV DFHUWDLQPRYHPHQW µLQ WKHERG\¶ WKDW LVSHUIRUPHG
without call for reflection, but encounters problems with this in that the choreographer 
changes his or her mind or the movement of the dancer does not appear to fit with that 
of other dancers. It is at this point, when the dancer needs to correct the movement to 
bring it in line with what the choreographer or the other dancers require, that it 
becomes necessary to reflect on the movement in thought and probably speech. 
Language is therefore central to this process although it is used by the dancers in 
FRQMXQFWLRQ ZLWK RWKHU PRGHV RI µUHIOHFWLRQ¶ RU LQWHUDFWLRQ VXFK DV Whe physical 
negotiation of movement described in the previous chapter. 
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It is important to note, then, that practical (pre-reflective) activities and meanings 
cannot be separated entirely from conceptualised, articulated or theoretical (reflective) 
activities and meanings: 
 
Theoretical [conceptualised] activity requires and only makes sense in the 
context of practical know-how, informed by situated experiences and 
EDFNJURXQG>DQG@«SUH-reflective meanings informing our bodily engagements 
often derive from the more explicit theoretical beliefs of current or past 
communities. (Gilbert and Lennon, 2005:122) 
 
Thus while it is in language that reflective thought is achieved, Merleau-Ponty does 
not understand this as an entirely separate realm from our practical engagement with 
the world. Language does not re-present or copy the world in a separate domain but is 
rather in and of the world while at the same time reflecting the world back to itself 
just as a physically present mirror reflects the physical world of which it is itself part 
(Dillon, 1997:171). 
 
Furthermore, reflective thought is only possible through speech, which is itself a 
bodily phenomenon and, in the final instance, pre-reflective. As Crossley describes, 
for Merleau-Ponty, speech brings individuals into a relationship with themselves: 
 
They think and equally hear their own thoughts, such that they may inspect those 
thoughts. Their reflectiveness is a relation to and dialogue with their self made 
possible by way of speech. But speech itself cannot, in the final instance, be the 
result of a reflective act. I may plan what to say but I can only do so in words and 
those words themselves cannot be planned. I cannot think or plan an act of 
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speech without speaking and thus speech must be regarded, like perception, as an 
originary, pre-reflective act which brings the subject and object of speech, the 
speaking subject, into being. Furthermore, speech is an embodied activity and 
language, like perception, is a body technique. To acquire language is to acquire 
a QHZZD\RIXVLQJRQH¶VERG\&URVVOH\-80) 
 
As has been suggested in the previous chapter, then, thoughts, feelings and intentions 
are not located in an inner realm which we have transparent access to through 
introspection DV 'HVFDUWHV¶ cogito suggests. Rather they are part of our embodied 
orientation towards the world and available in the social realm of a shared interworld. 
Merleau-Ponty thus emphasises µWKHDFWLYHERG\DV WKHH[SUHVVLYHEDVLVRIPHDQLQJ
DQGLGHDV¶:LOOLDPVDQG%HQGHORZ 1998:53): 
 
Meaning for Merleau-Ponty is not the product of some inner mental state. 
Rather, it resides in the actual concrete behaviour of the sentient body-subject: 
HPERGLHG JHVWXUHV ZKLFK DUH VR WR VSHDN µSXEOLFO\ DYDLODEOH¶ WKURXJK RXU
participation in a common visible world of intermundane space and shared 
understandings. (Williams and Bendelow, 1998:53) 
 
 
Language as public, collaborative and intersubjective 
 
Language is not, therefore, confined to an inner realm of consciousness or res 
cogitans, for Merleau-Ponty, but is a shared interworld that we are open to by virtue 
of our embodiment as hearing, speaking, reading and writing beings constituted both 
in and of the (flesh of the) world. Indeed, as Crossley argues: 
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It is sometimes supposed that listening to or reading the words of another 
LQYROYHVXVWKLQNLQJDERXWWKHLUZRUGV«EXWWKLVIDOVH:HPD\RIFRXUVHWKLQN
about their words but, as in perception, this presupposes a prior phase of 
grasping the significance of those words. In the first instance ZH PXVW µWKLQN
DORQJZLWKWKHP¶DVLWZHUHDOORZLQJWKHLUZRUGVWRIRUPRXUWKRXJKWVIRUXV,W
is in this way that they can make us think things we have not thought before, as, 
for example, we enter the magical world of a novel or find ourselves for the first 
time thinking in the fashion of a new philosophical or scientific school. We are 
not forced to agree with what they make us think, of course. In Merleau-3RQW\¶V
dialogical conception of speech and language, utterances provoke responses, 
both for speaker and for listener, and neither need agree with what is said. But 
they cannot disagree if they have not first followed the thought and allowed their 
self to be possessed by it. When such sharing of thoughts takes place, an 
interworld or common ground is formed between the interlocutors. They are 
µZRYHQ LQWRDVLQJOHIDEULF¶DQGWKHDFWLRQVRIHDFKFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGRQO\E\
ZD\ RI WKLV FRPPRQ ZKROH « (DFK WKLQNV WKURXJK WKH RWKer and makes the 
other think. (Crossley, 2001:83) 
 
In communication I am not, therefore, launching forth words which the other as 
isolated solipsistic subject must somehow independently take up and make 
meaningful. Rather: 
 
As I speak, write, or gesture, I do not choose my words in isolation of the other 
for we are of the same flesh. The other leads me towards an utterance and 
partially determines its propriety. My words are always already interaction; my 
expression is never mine alone. (Davis, 1991:35) 
  252 
 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, language is a shared interworld of linguistic codes and 
resources through which speaking subjects come in to relation with themselves and 
with others (Crossley, 1993:412). 
 
There is also a relationship of reversibility that characterises communication for 
Merleau-Ponty. In the visual realm reversibility consists in my being both seeing and 
visible: to see an object does not necessarily entail that that object sees me, but it 
requires that I am visible from the perspective of the object or other and that I could 
take up the perspective of the object/other. Thus I must be mobile, sentient and of 
worldly flesh. Similarly in communication reversibility consists in my being able to 
take up the (figurative) perspective of the other. Again we are both in and of a single 
unitary worldly flesh, not isolated Cartesian subjects. As with vision, however, I do 
not coincide with my interlocutor, rather that we remain separate beings although we 
must, at the same time, be able to overcome that separation in intermundane space. 
 
Thus even where I do not voice my thoughts out loud or in the presence of another it 
is the possibility of my taking up the position or perspective of the other, our 
separation and reversibility, which makes my own thoughts more visible to me: 
 
In reflection I become other to myself: this is the familiar specular relation where 
the terms are asymmetrically reversible. The reflecting role is exchangeable with 
the reflected (when I speak silently to myself I can take up either of the dehiscent 
roles: the erstwhile spoken-to can currently speak) but some role, some persona, 
is always momentarily alienated, perceived from the outside. (Dillon, 1997: 172) 
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Thought and expression are therefore always dialogical or social in character 
(Crossley, 1993:412). Furthermore Merleau-Ponty notes that our spoken words can 
surprise us and teach us our thoughts just as our behaviour can teach us our emotional 
state. 
 
Thus I come to know my own thoughts in the social context of communication: 
 
I discover my truths by seeing them mirrored in others. A thought, a way of 
seeing things, a truth ± as Saussure says ± is nebulous until it is formulated in 
language; now it is clearer why this so: when my groping words awaken a 
recognition in others, when words come to fill my significative intention and 
communicate it to another, something is established which has a life of its own 
and becomes more visible to me. A cultural object is born which mirrors my 
existence in the eyes of another and allows that inchoate existence to realise itself 
for itself. (Dillon, 1997:207) 
 
 
Language as founded on the perceptual world 
 
Language does not, therefore, simply clothe or encode a thought already formulated. 
Often it may take the form of repeating something that has been said already either by 
the speaker or by the other, but Merleau-Ponty does not see this notion of endlessly 
repeating what has been already said as capturing the full potential of language and 
communication. He is rather interested in the capacity for what he understands as 
genuine communication, where, rather than repeating something that has already been 
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formulated in words or thought, speech is to be understood as an act of formulation or 
a process of discovering what it is that I think: 
 
I am drawn toward signification by something that needs to be said and which 
imposes on me the task of finding words for it in order to learn, myself what it is 
that I want to say. (Dillon, 1997:199) 
 
There is, therefore, for Merleau-Ponty an impulse or intention to signify that exists 
prior to my speech. There is something that needs or demands to be said, a silent gap 
that needs to be filled with words and thus given voice. It is this notion of something 
prior to language that demands to be said and suggests or calls forth the words to me 
that distinguishes Merleau-Ponty from those of his (and our) contemporaries who 
suggest, based on a certain reading of Saussure, that language is a system that only 
refers to itself. For Merleau-Ponty, although language does exhibit infra-referentiality 
where signs are meaningful by virtue of their place in the system of language and their 
relation to each other within that system, speech is in fact called forth by the silence of 
the perceptual world. 
 
Merleau-Ponty was in fact very much influenced by the emergence of Saussurian 
semiotics, and became increasingly interested in language as a topic in its own right, 
rather than as a part of his theory of the lived body, towards the end of his career. He 
began work on a book entitled The Prose of the World, later abandoning this project 
as he turned his attention instead to The Visible and the Invisible. Although this book 
± The Visible and the Invisible ± also remained unfinished at the time of his death, it 
was the ontology of reversible flesh which he began to explicate in this work that 
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Merleau-Ponty appears to have hoped would act as a basis not only for his concepts of 
humanity and the world, but also for his theory of language. 
 
He does not, therefore, in this later work, seek to produce an account of language 
based on the notion of intersubjectivity, but rather bases both his theory of language 
and his theory of intersubjectivity on the concept of an anonymous or pre-personal 
reversible flesh. Language, for Merleau-Ponty, therefore becomes the (pre-personal or 
pre-objective) voice of the world, the folding of the flesh of the world back on itself to 
illuminate itself in, once again, a relationship of reversibility. Reversibility for 
Merleau-Ponty, however, involves a divergence or fission and here it is seen that 
linguistically articulated meanings have a detachability from the world into the realm 
of ideas. The innate, pre-reflective meanings of the perceptual world are thus the same 
as but also different to or separated from the meanings articulated in language in a 
way that is characteristic of Merleau-3RQW\¶V conceptualisation of asymmetrical 
reversibility (Dillon, 1997:215). Again there is identification but not identity between 
the two ± they are reversible but they do not coincide. 
 
As with vision, it is also important to note that not all flesh is sentient, capable of 
seeing or capable of speaking. Language is the world articulating itself through us, the 
flesh that speaks. The concept of the pre-personal or anonymous flesh does, however, 
mean that it is possible to move away from the notion of consciousness as a starting 
point for a theory of language (Dillon, 1997:207), just as in the case of vision the 
concept of flesh allows that seeing need not be conceived of as the impossible contact 
of res cogitans with res extensia VHHµ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶). 
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Merleau-Ponty was not, of course the only thinker to turn away from a focus on 
consciousness and human subjectivity as the basis of philosophical understanding to 
focus on language. Indeed contemporaries such as Foucault and Derrida, influenced 
by a Saussurian understanding of meaning as determined not by the relation of signs 
to the world, but by the difference between one sign and another within the system of 
signs, were also notably anti-humanist in their post-structuralist theories. As Dillon 
argues, however, Merleau-Ponty differs from these philosophers µLQKLVH[HFXWLRQRI
µWKHOLQJXLVWLFWXUQ¶¶'LOORQ 
 
Indeed Dillon suggests that in taking language rather than consciousness as the origin 
of all meaning, philosophers such as Derrida are, in fact, merely displacing the 
problem which haunts philosophies based on consciousness. Neither approach is able 
to account for the origin of their own originary term, be it language or consciousness 
(Dillon, 1997:175). For these philosophers then, it is not possible to address the 
question of the origin of language, and thus they cannot account for the evolution of 
language from a pre- or non-linguistic phase in human history. All cognition is 
mediated in language in this account, so that we cannot know of anything beyond or 
outside language and cannot conceive of a pre- or non-linguistic form of life ever 
learning to use signs (Dillon, 1997:186). 
 
Merleau-Ponty differs from this stance in that he conceives of language as having a 
foundation or origin in the perceptual world. Language serves to liberate the meaning 
of the world, for Merleau-Ponty, by giving voice to the silent meaning of the 
SHUFHSWXDO ZRUOG DQG µVSUHDGLQJ D IXUWKHU OD\HU RI VLJQLILFDQFH RYHU LW¶ &URVVOH\
2001:79). Language is, however, essentially in and of the world and ideas do not, in 
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fact, inhabit a separate realm from the things of the world. Ideas themselves are, 
UDWKHUZRUOGO\ERWKLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\DUHGHULYHGIURPWKHZRUOGµIRUWKHUHLVQR
other source and ideas do not spring up ex nihilo¶'LOORQDQGLQWKHVHQVH
that we can only have them by virtue of our worldly embodiment and perceptual 
experience: 
 
Language comes into existence in the phenomenal world and could not exist 
without it or the human bodies interacting within it. (Dillon, 1997:186) 
 
 
Reference and (genuine, creative) expression 
 
Merleau-Ponty was particularly interested in the idea ± derived from Saussure ± that 
meaning in language arises from the difference between signs within the linguistic 
system, rather than from any direct rule-governed relation between words and things. 
This position can be extended, as, for example, in the work of Derrida, to suggest that 
words are in fact related only to other words and that we never get any closer to a 
meaning, only to a relationship of difference between the words within the system. 
'HUULGD¶VQHRORJLVPµdifférance¶FDSWXUHVWKHdual ideas that meaning is based on the 
difference between words and also that it is constantly deferred as we can only refer 
from one word to another within the system of language, never reaching any endpoint 
as the system of language is itself incomplete. 
 
The problem with this Derridian position is, however, that the ultimate conclusion is 
that we can never get outside of language and that words can never refer to anything 
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except other words. Thus while Merleau-Ponty was interested in the notion of 
difference and the way in which language refers back to itself in a way that he 
suggests may be analogous to the way the sentient body in perceiving the world refers 
back to its own sensibility, he differs from others who have followed a path into 
language derived from Saussure in that he continues to posit something prior to 
language ± the gap of the significative intention against which we can measure words 
to see if they fit. If there was nothing beyond language then we could say anything, 
any set signs would do, but Merleau-Ponty argues that this is not the case. Rather, 
there is something, some meaning, that demands expression and which therefore 
delimits the range of words I can use to express it (Dillon, 1997:201). 
 
This meaning which exists beyond the words I use to fill the significative intention 
and which demands expression emanates from the perceptual world. For Merleau-
Ponty, words do not therefore exhaust, capture or embody the significative intention, 
indeed it is possible to formulate it in different ways, rather in giving voice to silent 
meaning they suggest something beyond themselves. In genuine expression of this 
kind then, words do not simply fill the gap of the significative intention but are also 
altered themselves in the process of insertion (Dillon, 1997: 199). Thus for Merleau-
Ponty: 
 
It is an essential part of our human being that we can go beyond signs toward 
their meaning: that is, can use existing signs in new ways, to express new 
thoughts. To express a meaning is not, after all, to copy something that already 
exists, but to make use of the relations between signs to create something new. 
([SUHVVLRQ LV D µWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ¶ UDWKHU WKDQ D µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ (Matthews, 
2002:157) 
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Language does not, therefore, imprison us or determine our thought. Rather we are 
able to make use of language, utilising the multiple potential interconnections 
between signs to µchange the whole natXUHRIWKHV\VWHPDQGFUHDWHDQHZPHDQLQJ¶
(Matthews, 2002:157). Giving voice to the perceptual world is not therefore a process 
of copying or reproducing what is already in the world, rather 
 
«Peaning emerges from the contact between the subject and a world, which, 
after all, the subject themselves is a part. (Matthews, 2002:157-158, emphasis in 
the original) 
 
Genuine expression is the creation or evocation of a new meaning, but it is one that is 
derived from our interaction with the world and others. 
 
Thus for Merleau-Ponty there is a creative capacity in language which allows us to 
come up with new ideas and to communicate with each other in the true sense of 
introducing someone to something that they did not already know (Matthews, 
2002:153). This feature of communication ± the possibility of learning something new 
± is also important for how we understand the way that language carries meaning. 
 
Those theories, derived from Saussurian semiotics, which suggest that meaning is 
purely arbitrarily and conventionally attached to words fail to explain how it is that 
we can understand meaning in a chain of signifiers (words) that we have not already 
been introduced to and accepted as meaningful. Within such theories it is therefore 
impossible to think thoughts that we have not already learnt through convention and 
accepted as meaningful. The other cannot tell us anything we do not already know 
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because we would not be able to understand it if we have not already accepted that 
those words can have that conventional meaning. 
 
Contrary to this, Merleau-Ponty suggests that our understanding and expressive 
capacities are not limited by the conventional meanings of words in language and that 
it is in fact possible to use words in new ways to express new thoughts. Thus, 
although Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that much of the meaning expressed in 
language depends on the conventional or institutionalised attribution of certain 
meanings to certain words, there is a continuum from very conventional or 
institutional uses of language such as the language of science or mathematics through 
to creative uses of language such as poetry or slang where the new meaning is evoked 
by the new use of words. 
 
In the first form or mode of language the meaning of the words has been 
institutionalised or sedimented and we tend to pass right through the words or 
sentences we read to their meaning, hardly aware µWKDWWKHVHDUHZRUGVDQGVHQWHQFHV
WKDW ZH DUH UHDGLQJ¶ 0DWWKHZV  ,Q FRQWUDVW WR WKLV the creative, or 
DXWKHQWLF LQ +HLGHJJHU¶V terminology, form of language or expression involves 
authors finding ways to express new thoughts or add new meaning to words or 
sentences. In creative language such as poetry, meaning is not determined solely by 
convention but is somehow carried by the words themselves so that a new expression 
or signification might be produced. Thus we have language 
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«which creates itself in expressive acts, which sweeps me on from the signs 
towards the meaning. (from Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, quoted in 
Matthews, 2002:154) 
 
It is this creative capacity in language, the fact that we can use words to evoke 
meanings that they do not already have ± which can then be sedimented into 
conventional language usage ± that explains how it might have been possible for pre- 
or non-linguistic forms of life to acquire language and how it is possible to express 
and communicate something new. For Merleau-Ponty, convention plays a major role 
in determining the meaning of most of the words we use, but there is also a possibility 
for our use of words to suggest new meanings that are not currently conventional. 
Words then, can imply meanings beyond that given by their place in conventional 
language by carrying some suggestion of a new meaning in their sound or placement 
within a sentence. 
 
Thus Merleau-3RQW\¶VDFFRXQWRI ODQJXDJHDOORZV IRU WKHJHQHVLVRI ODQJXDJH DV D
form of gestural communication about the world) and for reference to something 
beyond language. Language, for Merleau-Ponty, does not therefore occupy or create a 
separate realm, but is ultimately derived from our interaction with others and the 
world, giving an extra layer of significance to or breaking the silence of the already 
(pre-reflectively) meaningful perceptual world. 
 
 
Painting, language and philosophy 
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For Merleau-Ponty, art-forms such as painting are also, like language, derived from 
and ways of expressing the silent meaning of the perceptual world. Merleau-Ponty in 
fact took a particular interest in painting and, in particular, the artist Cézanne, writing 
at length on the analogy between art and phenomenological philosophy. 
 
Phenomenology enquires into our immediate pre-objective engagement with the 
world and how as embodied beings we perceive the world in which we are positioned. 
For Merleau-Ponty: 
 
Perception is not a matter of intellectual contemplation, but of active 
involvement with things. Because of this, vision is charged with meanings that 
we find in the objects of perception because of our active involvement with 
them. Philosophy, in the form of phenomenology, attempts to describe in words 
WKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHVHµOLYHG¶PHDQLQJVHPHUJHDVWKHEDVLVIRUPHDQLQJVWKDW
we may attribute to the world in more abstract accounts, such as that given in the 
sciences. But art can do more than simply describe that pre-objective world of 
perception: it can directly present it. (Matthews, 2002:133-134, emphasis in the 
original) 
 
Painting is not merely about re-presenting the world then, but, like authentic language, 
about expressing it in a novel formulation that can teach us something new, give voice 
to something previously mute. Art, in fact, teaches us to look at the world in a 
different way, just as phenomenology does, and can draw our attention to, for 
example, the way that different sensory faculties are integrated with each other. This 
is exemplified in cinema where the presence or absence of sound in the form of 
dialogue, sound effects or music can dramatically alter our experience of the visual 
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elements of the film. Art thus draws our attention to our way of being in the world as 
situated, embodied subjects in pre-reflective engagement with the perceptual world. 
 
For Merleau-Ponty perception is itself meaningful in that it is always of something 
significant, a Gestalt. Perception is not a matter of building up our awareness of the 
world from isolated sensations through the work of judgement or intellect as it is 
conceived in classical psychology (and classical philosophy). Rather in Gestalt 
psychology there a rejection of the distinction between sensation and judgement and 
perception is understood to be a combination of the two. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, 
perception is already a primordial patterning or stylisation of the world, and painting, 
like authentic language and other art-forms, spreads a further layer of significance 
over the already meaningful perceptual world, allowing new meanings to emerge 
from our contact with the silent things of the world. 
 
The relation to the perceptual world suggested in Gestalt psychology is also 
exemplified, for Merleau-Ponty, in film. A film as a perceptual object is not a 
collection of images but a structured whole, a Gestalt, where the meaning of each 
individual part or image has to be understood in terms of its relation to the whole. A 
film is, in fact, a temporal Gestalt in that we cannot grasp its meaning from a single 
momentary perception but have follow it as it develops over time, relating each image 
to what has come before and what comes after. The full meaning of the film, and thus 
of the individual images of which it consists, is therefore only available after we have 
seen the whole and can understand the relation of the parts to that whole. 
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The meaning of a work of art for Merleau-Ponty is thus very much tied to the work as 
a complete perceptual object. There is an apparent separability of a film from its story 
or meaning ± we can read the script, for example, or be told that this is an anti-war 
film ± but, in fact, the meaning of the film with all its images and sounds is far richer 
than we can understand from the script and far more than a simply embodying the 
ZRUGV µZDU LV ZURQJ¶ 0DWWKHZV -142). We are presented, then, with a 
difference between art and conventional language in that it is not possible to express 
or translate the meaning of art into any formulation other than that of the work itself. 
This does not mean, however, that it is not possible to have works of art composed in 
words such as novels and poetry. These literary artworks display the same 
characteristics as visual art in the way that they constitute a meaningful whole which 
is not simply the sum of the words they contain and which cannot be fully expressed 
in terms other than those used in the artwork. 
 
In the parallel between painting and language drawn in the part of the otherwise 
abandoned manuscript of The Prose of the World that was published in essay form as 
µ,QGLUHFW /DQJXDJH DQG WKH 9RLFHV RI 6LOHQFH¶ (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b), Merleau-
Ponty therefore draws attention to the creative faculty of language rather than its 
institutionalised conventional functioning. He points to the fact that language, like art, 
is derived from our contact with the silent perceptual world and that language, like art, 
can somehow carry its meaning in its physical form. Art does not simply re-present an 
event in the world, rather it gives us a new, non-conventional understanding of the 
event, it brings a new meaning into being and changes the way we experience the 
world. This, then, is an important insight into how language works in genuine 
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authentic expression and how it is that it relates or refers to things in the world in a 
non-straightforward way. 
 
Language, as I have suggested above, does not simply clothe or encode a clearly 
formulated thought, rather it is the very means and structure of that formulation, the 
way to discover what it is that needs to be said. Similarly art does not involve the 
artist formulating an idea or meaning which he or she then translates into or embodies 
in the medium of painting, sculpture or dance, rather the idea exists in its expression 
just as we come to know our thoughts by speaking them out loud or silently to 
ourselves. The parallel between (visual) art and language offered by Merleau-Ponty is 
therefore also suggestive of how we might understand the notion of art-forms such as 
dance as (like) language. 
 
Art, like phenomenology, does not aim to rationally explain the world as classical 
philosophy does, but rather to make us more aware of and highlight different aspects 
of our situation in the world as embodied perceiving subjects. Painting, for Merleau-
Ponty, is thus a paradigm case of how we can understand what it is to be in the world 
in a way that is different from classical philosophy because it is a situated embodied 
activity rather than a matter of a disembodied Cartesian mind contemplating the world 
from a remove. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V LQWHUHVW LQ YLVXDO SHUFHSWLRQ DQG KLV FXOWXUDO FRQWH[W LQ WZHQWLHWK
century France drew him particularly towards painting and film as art-forms. Dance 
was not, therefore an art-form that he engaged with in any detail. Bringing his ideas 
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into conversation here with dance as an art-form and physical practice however allows 
us to explore many of the themes that he took up his discussion of visual art and film. 
 
Indeed I would argue that dance as an art-form that it is performed by, through and on 
the human body, with the dancer always present to and aware of the audience offers 
us more opportunity than painting or film to explore the themes of embodiment and 
intersubjective communication. Furthermore dance emphasises our active engagement 
with the world in its use of movement and touch in addition to the visual aspects of 
the art-form. 
 
I re-introduce the voice of the practice of dance at this stage then with the intention of 
seeing how it can speak to notions of parallel between art and language by exploring 
GDQFHU¶V DFFRXQWV RI H[SUHVVLRQ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DQG KRZ WKH\ XQGHUVWDQG WKH
meaning of dance. 
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II: Contemporary Dance as Language and Communication 
 
 
It is particularly interesting, given the close relationship between language and art in 
the work of Merleau-Ponty, that my interviewees made reference to the idea of talking 
through their bodies, and to understanding dance as a mode of communication, as a 
language. In this second section I will draw on Merleau-3RQW\¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH
parallel between art and language bringing it into conversation with the notion of 
dance as (a) language expressed by my interviewees. 
 
Many of the dancers, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, used the idea of 
having a conversation as an analogy for the interaction they felt characterised dancing 
with someone. The conversation here, however, moves on to explore notions of 
communication and language in dance in the context of interacting or communicating 
with an audience. 
 
For the dancers, dancing for someone was in some way equivalent to speaking to 
someone. Indeed many suggested that what had attracted them to dance as a both a 
SUDFWLFHDQGDFDUHHUZDVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIEHLQJDEOHWRµVD\¶WKLQJVWKDWWKH\IRund 
KDUG WR H[SUHVV LQ ZRUGV 7KLV ZDV GHVFULEHG ERWK LQ WHUPV RI WKH GDQFHUV¶ RZQ
individual difficulties expressing themselves in words and in terms of the inadequacy 
of verbal language:  
 
  268 
, IHHO VRPHWLPHV WKDW VRPH WKLQJV FDQ¶WEH H[SUHVVHG LQZRUGVDQG that by the 
sheer act of moving, I sometimes express the things that you cannot in words or 
PD\EH,¶PQRWDUWLFXODWHHQRXJKWRH[SUHVVWKRVHWKLQJVLQZRUGV [Steven] 
 
Furthermore it was a way of having your voice heard by a wider public than you 
would normally have the opportunity to address in conversation. 
 
It is not a new idea to think about artistic production as a means of expression, and it 
is QRWRQO\GDQFHDUWLVWVZKRIHHOWKDWWKH\DUHDEOHWRµVSHDN¶WRSHRSOHWKURXJKWKHLU
art. What I wish to draw attention to here, then, is not simply the idea that artists can 
express something meaningful through their art. Rather I am interested in the ways in 
which the moving, responsive body is of primary importance for the ways dancers 
communicate, both with each other as I emphasised in the previous chapter, and with 
an audience.  
 
As I will explore through listening to the voice of dance in this section of the chapter, 
HPERGLHG PRYHPHQW LV FHQWUDO WR GDQFHUV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI dance as an art-form 
which they understand as allowing them to create and share meanings with others. It 
is this emphasis on and experiential understanding of the importance of the body for 
expression and communication in dance that I explore here and bring into 
conversation with Merleau-Ponty¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOLGHDV 
 
As with Section I of this chapter, Section II is divided into a number of sub-sections 
ZKLFKH[SORUHGLIIHUHQW DVSHFWVRIGDQFHUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIGDQFHDV ODQJXDJHDQG
communication, and which bring the voice of dance into conversation with themes 
from Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKLORVRSK\ 7KHVH GLYLGHV DUH LQWHQGHG WR VWUXFWXUH WKH
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conversation in a way that is helpful to the reader, but it is intended that the 
conversation should be understood as flowing from one aspect to another in a way 
that builds up an overall picture of how Merleau-3RQW\¶VSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHYRLFHRI
dance can be brought together, rather than as addressing individual themes in isolation 
from or in contrast to each other. 
 
Dance as a mode of communication and shared interworld 
 
Notions of mutual recognition and sharing were very important to dancers in their 
accounts of dancing with others. Indeed for Steven µEHLQJ DEOH WR PRYH DQG KDYH
FRQWDFWZLWKSHRSOHDQGVKDUHWKLQJVZLWKSHRSOH¶>6WHYHQ@were all tied up together in 
KLVLGHDRIZKDWLWZDVWRGDQFH6XFKQRWLRQVDOVRDSSHDUHGLQGDQFHUV¶GLVFXVVLRQVRI
how it is that dance as art and physical practice communicates something to an 
audience. 
 
As I have noted in previous chapters, dancers reject notions of dance as just being a 
series of steps or shapes:  
 
FRUPHDVDGDQFHULW¶VQRWDERXWVWHSVWKHVWHSVMXVWOLQNVR,JXHVVWDONWKURXJK
P\ERG\VRLW¶VPRUHDERXWWKDW [Marco]  
 
The µphysical conversation¶ or µtalking through the body¶ analogy that characterised a 
QXPEHURI WKHGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVDERXWKRZWKH\FRPPXQLFDWHGZLWKHDFKRWKHUFDQ
also be extended to describe what dance was about for the dancers as performers:  
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Dance, I suppose, was a kind of physical system of communication for me, an 
expression as it were, so becoming a street dancer was a kind of avenue or 
release for me to express myself creatively. [Ben] 
 
Indeed it was the communicative faculty of dance and the dancer that was considered 
to be of primary importance, beyond even the physical expertise displayed:  
 
I love to push myself physically but I think over and above that the artistry and 
KRZ \RX FRPPXQLFDWH WKDW WR DQ DXGLHQFH LV ZKDW ,¶P PRUH LQWHUHVWHG LQ
[Louisa] 
 
The importance of communication with the audience was also emphasised by dancers 
commenting on their own experiences of going to see dance performances. Tara, for 
H[DPSOHSOD\VGRZQWKHLPSRUWDQFHRISK\VLFDOµWULFNV¶ 
 
I think the layman would be impressed with fancy moves and like tricks and big 
jumps and stuff whereaV,NQRZWKDWWKDW¶VSRVVLEOHDQG,¶PPRUHLPSUHVVHGE\
the relationship or the connection with someone on stage or the connection with 
the audience. [Tara] 
 
 Daniel similarly describes an experience of watching a performance by a company 
which also had a group of young apprentices and older retired dancers who performed 
short pieces. Of all three of these groups ± the young apprentices, the main company 
and the older dancers ± Daniel felt that the older dancers were the best despite their 
loss of physical abilities:  
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These older people who were just, for me, they stole the show ± they were just 
absolutely amazing ± ZKDW WKH\¶G ORVW LQ WKHLU SK\VLFDO DELOLW\ WKH\ PRUH WKDQ
made up for in presence and contact with the audience, communicating with the 
audience. [Daniel] 
 
Rather than being about performing the physical movements, then, dance was 
understood as being  
 
«DERXWVKDULQJLWLVDERXWH[SUHVVLRQLWLVDERXWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ«GDQFHLVD
social thing, so for you to just dance on your own in a room is great and I think 
WKDW¶VDIDQWDVWLFexercise, EXW,GRQ¶WWKLQNLWZLOOUHZDUG\RXDVPXFKDVLI\RX
dance with other people or sharing the dance with other people. [Steven] 
 
Many of the dancers in fact emphasised that while it was possible WRGDQFHRQRQH¶V 
own, it somehow did not make sense to do so (unless, as Steven says, you were doing 
it as some kind of exercise). 
 
Dance as a mode of communication is about sharing the dance with other people then, 
and the reciprocal way in which that impacts not only on them but also on how the 
dance is meaningful or rewarding for the dancer. Dance can thus be thought of as, as 
Merleau-Ponty conceptualises language, an intermundane space which dancer and 
audience are open to and share. Anna echoes this intersubjective, reciprocal notion of 
communication in dance:  
 
,¶YH VHHQ GDQFH WKDW GRHVQ¶W KDYH WKDW FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DQG , WKLQN LW GRHVQ¶W
ZRUN,PHDQOLNHDOODUWLW¶VNLQGRIH[SUHVVLYH ± you express feelings or issues 
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or whatever and you try to get through to someone WKURXJK \RXU DUW , GRQ¶W
NQRZZKHWKHULW¶VPRUHWKHVHGD\VEXW\RXJHWTXLWHDORWRISHUIRUPDQFHDUWLVWV
ZKR LQYROYH WKH DXGLHQFH DV ZHOO D ORW VR WKHUH¶V GHILQLWHO\ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ
even, not just me communicating with the audience but they communicate back 
to me, I mean you get that anyway when you do, I mean you can feel the 
DXGLHQFHZKHQ\RX¶UHGRLQJ\RXUDUWDQGNLQGRIWU\WRUHSO\ ± ,WKLQNWKDW¶VWKDW
makes a good artist anyway ± \RXFDQ¶WMXVWEORFN\RXUVHOIIURPWKHVLWXDWLRQVR
the better you can kind of communicate, the better the artist. [Anna] 
 
Being a dance artist for Anna was thus about expression conceived of as reciprocal 
communication with the audience. The expressive quality of dance, like language, is 
not, then, something that resides within the isolated Cartesian subject. Rather it is 
essentially collaborative and shared. It is something that happens between people, as 
Davis suggests of language under Merleau-Ponty¶VWKHRULVDWLRQ 
 
Language is not mine alone, as something that is somehow magically hurled 
towards the other. Language is not a projectile, but a collaborative project of 
reversible subjectivity. (Davis, 1991:37) 
 
Daniel also described how, as a performer, he was always interested and excited by 
the meanings that audience members found in works he performed:  
 
The audience will come back to you afterwards and read all these stories into it 
DQGWKH\¶OOWHOO\RXDOOWKHVHWKLQJVZKLFK\RXQHYHUWKRXJKW\RXQHYHUVDZWKDW
in the piece. [Daniel]  
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Thus although dancers understood communication in dance as trying to express 
something or get something across to someone, there was also a sense in which this 
meaning which was being put across through the dance arose out of some kind of 
collaboration between the dancer and the audience. Meaning was, importantly, not 
VLWXDWHG LQVLGH WKH GDQFHU RU DXGLHQFH PHPEHU¶V KHDG, but rather emerged in the 
communicative space that they share. Dancers also emphasised that works were 
different in every performance as they were like evolving conversations both between 
the dancers and between the dancers and the audience. 
 
7KHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUNWKXVGHSHQGVRQWKHDXGLHQFH¶VSHUVRQDOLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKWKH
piece: 
 
It should speak to the audience in different ways ± LWZRQ¶WEHWKHVDPHIRUHYHU\
memberXQOHVVWKHFKRUHRJUDSKHU¶VFU\VWDOFOHDU± when, you know, somebody 
slaps you in the face as they walk by ± WKDW¶VYHU\FOHDUWRHYHU\ERG\ZKDWWKDW
LV EXW LW¶V OHWWLQJ WKH DXGLHQFH GHFLGH IRU WKHPVHOYHV DV ZHOO ± what the 
relationship is between two people, rather than me trying to tell them what it 
LV«2QHPRYHPHQWFDQVD\PDQ\GLIIHUHQWWKLQJVWRGLIIHUHQWSHRSOH -  it depends 
on how you feel as well and how you want to like, how you want to accept that 
WKLQJ WKDW¶V LQ IURQWRI\RX ±  LI \RX¶YHJRWHP, two of you come on stage and 
WKHUH¶VREYLRXVO\ WKHUH¶VGHILQLWHO\D UHODWLRQVKLS WKHUHZKDWHYHU LW LV \RX MXVW
WKDW¶V ± WKHUH¶V QR JHWWLQJ DZD\ IURP WKDW ±  and everybody in the audience 
might feel it differently ± if they just walk slowly towards each other for two 
people sitting there it might be a confrontation, for another person sitting there 
ZKR¶VMXVWKDGDGDWHZLWKVRPHERG\WKH\¶YHEHHQG\LQJWRJRRXWZLWKLWPLJKW
be more of a romantic thing, it might just be depending on how the audience 
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feels and how I feel and how I want to accept it, although sometimes, as I say, it 
can be very clear what it is, it depends on your approach as well, that they know 
ZKHQ WKH\ ZDON WRZDUGV HDFK RWKHU WKDW WKHUH¶V JRLQJ WR EH D EDWWOH EXW
sometimes it can be more subtle and you can leave it open for the audience. 
[Louisa] 
 
The meaning of the work is not completely open ± there is a definite sense that there 
is a relationship between the two dancers on stage ± but neither is it completely 
determined by the dancers on the stage. Rather it emerges as the audience (and 
dancers) engage with and react to the scene as it unfolds. 
 
 
The structure of the language of dance 
 
As well as discussing ideas of sharing and reciprocal communication, which echo 
Merleau-Ponty¶V FRQFeptualisation of language, dancers also explicitly referred to 
dance as (a) language during the interview conversations. Dancers also used the 
closely related term µvocabulary¶ LQ WKHLUGHVFULSWLRQVRI OHDUQLQJDFKRUHRJUDSKHU¶V
movement style. Louisa gave me an example of this:  
 
The Wayne McGregor [choreographer] vocabulary ± \RX¶GKDYH WRGRD ORWRI
classes with him to get into that, to get in sync with that, but em, somehow it does 
EHFRPH FRPIRUWDEOH DIWHU D ZKLOH µFRV LW FDQ EH UHDOO\ GLIILFXOW LQLWLally than 
after about five or six classes you start to knoZZKDW WKH\¶UHJRLQJWRGRQH[W
[Louisa] 
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In learning dance of a specific style or technique, dancers become accustomed to the 
range of movements that the choreographer employs in building choreographies and 
also get some sense of how the choreographer might wish to fit these individual units 
of movement together. This could be seen as analogous to learning a set of words (the 
vocabulary) in a language and having some sense of how they might fit into a 
sentence within that language. 
 
Dancers also emphasised that familiarity with the language ± the style or technique ± 
of dance is essential to being able to communicate through dance. Thus, as Carrie 
explains:  
 
Technique is very important because it gives you the freedom to express what 
\RXIHHOLQVLGHEHFDXVHZLWKRXWDQ\WHFKQLTXH\RX¶UHVRUWRIVWUXJJOLQJDJDLQVW
your body to, whereas when you can do the step then you can think about how 
you do the step. [Carrie] 
 
 Here, then, knowledge of a certain technique can be understood as equivalent to 
knowledge of a language in that it is necessary to have a certain command of the 
language in order to say what you wish to say. 
 
The parallel with language is less obvious, however, when it comes to the conveyance 
of meaning in contemporary dance, as there is no direct correlation between 
(individual) movements and meaning. As Carrie suggests in the above quote, in 
contemporary dance a lot rests on how you do the movement rather than what 
movement you do. Thus again dancers emphasised that dancing was more than doing 
the movement or µmaking shapes¶, while acknowledging that going beyond µmaking 
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shapes¶ did involve competence at the level of the movement as those who struggled 
with the basic movements would not be as free to engage with the expressive or 
communicative aspect of dance:  
 
If you feel more comfortable doing something then it frees you up to use the 
movement as a means of expressing. [Rhianna] 
 
Familiarity with the language of dance, (arguably) unlike with a verbal language such 
DV (QJOLVK RU )UHQFK GRHV QRW WKHUHIRUH PHDQ WKDW \RX FDQ QHFHVVDULO\ µUHDG¶ WKH
meaning of a piece. In my discussion with Michaela and Suzi about the language(s) of 
dance they described ballet as a particular dance language that they were both familiar 
ZLWKDQGZKLFKFRXOGEHUHFRJQLVHGLQWHUPVRIµthe way they use their ERGLHV¶>6X]L@ 
where: 
 
 TKHUH¶VMXVWGLIIHUHQWZD\VRIPRYLQJEXWEDOOHWLVDFHUWDLQOLNHLWLVD certain 
way. [Michaela]  
 
The familiarity with and understanding that these dancers had of the language of 
ballet in terms of the possible ranges of movement and how these phrases of 
movements could be linked together did not, however, mean that they could 
necessarily understand the meaning of the work: 
 
AP: So if you got someone creating a ballet, doing a ballet ± do you know what it 
means because you understand the language, or? 
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Michaela: Mmm, sometimes, sometimes not. Sometimes I sit and watch a ballet 
LQDSHUIRUPDQFHDQGWKLQN³ZKDWWKHKHOOLVJRLQJRQKHUH"´ 
 
6X]L<RX¶UHOLNHWKDWZLWKFRQWHPSRUDU\ 
 
Michaela,W¶VWUXH 
 
Suzi: Especially contemporary. 
 
Michaela: You know the language to a certain extent ± step-wise you know the 
language and everything but it could mean anything because my boyfriend is a 
bDOOHWGDQFHUDQGVRPHWLPHV,JRDQGZDWFKKLPDQG,¶POLNH³+PPPP´ 
 
Suzi: Yeah. Technically ± yes ± EXW ZKDW WKH\¶UH DFWXDOO\ WU\LQJ WR WHOO \RX ± 
sometimes. 
 
0LFKDHOD<HDKLW¶VTXLWHGLIILFXOW ± you get your pas de bourré and stretch and 
stretch but that¶VLWDQGVRPHWLPHVLW¶VUHDOO\KDUGWRILQGZKDW¶VJRLQJRQDQG
especially with contemporary dance ± some of the more abstract dance you just 
WKLQN³ZKDWWKHKHOODUH\RXGRLQJ"´\RXNQRZLWFRXOGJRVRPDQ\ZD\V ± ,¶YH
seen people with toilet rolls rubbing under their arms, you know? 
 
Suzi: Yeah, and you think to yourself ± HYHQLI\RX¶UHDGDQFHU ± they could be, 
\RXWKLQN³ZKDWLVLW\RX¶UHDFWXDOO\WU\LQJWRWHOOXVKHUH"´ ± you know? ± and 
\RXFRXOGWKLQNWR\RXUVHOI³VRPD\EHLW¶VOLNHWKLVPD\EHLW¶VOLNHWKDW´DQGWKHQ
it could be something completely different ± you can make up a story in your own 
PLQGRIZKDW\RX¶UHZKDWWKH\¶UHGRLQJ 
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0LFKDHOD7KDW¶VLWSUHFLVHO\ ± \RXFDQXQGHUVWDQGDODQJXDJHDQGWKHQWKHUH¶V
other ways of mis-communication, mis-LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ VR \RX¶YH DEVROXWHO\ JRW
QRLGHDZKDW¶VJRLQJRQ ± but to a certain extent you do, you do understand it. 
 
Dancers thus report that understanding the language of a dance does at some level 
give them a privileged understanding of the movement being performed. 
 
Familiarity with dance might allow a dancer to be more open to the way dance works 
to convey meaning:  
 
,GRQ¶WNQRZZKDWLW¶VOLNHIRUWKHQRQ-dancer, but I would have thought so 
[that dancers have a different appreciation] becaXVH LI \RX¶UH XVHG WR
ZDWFKLQJGDQFHDQG\RX¶UHXVHGWREHLQJDELWPRUHRSHQWRLWZKHUHDV,
WKLQN LI \RX GRQ¶W ZDWFK DV PXFK GDQFH PD\EH \RX¶UH , GRQ¶W NQRZ
\RX¶UHQRWTXLWHVRPXFK>5KLDQQD@ 
 
It was also considered by many of my interviewees that their familiarity with dance 
made them more open or sensitive to the meaningful nuances of dance performance, 
where an ordinary member of the public might be more focussed on the purely 
physical or athletic aspects such as impressive big jumps. Steven suggests here that as 
a dancer he is better able to see how a dancer may have imbued a movement with a 
certain quality, although he emphasises that this does not allow him straightforward 
access to the meaning of the work: 
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$3 '¶\RX WKLQN ZKHQ \RX¶UH ZDWFKLQJ Gance because you know what it feels 
OLNHWRSHUIRUPDFHUWDLQPRYHPHQWWKDWWKDWPHDQVLW¶VHDVLHUIRU\RXIHHOZKDW
WKHGDQFHU¶VWU\LQJWRHYRNH" 
 
6WHYHQ,WKLQNVR\HDKRIFRXUVHZLWKRXWDGRXEW%XWWKHQDJDLQLW¶VVXFKDQ
LQGLYLGXDOWKLQJLVQ¶WLW"Because the, the way I may have a sensation of it or the 
way I approach that movement is going to be the way I approach that movement 
± HYHQWKRXJKZH¶UHGRLQJWKHVDPHWKLQJKHRUVKHPLJKWEHLQJGRLQJWKDWEXW
what I recognise, or the way they approach iW PD\ EH GLIIHUHQW VR WKDW¶V
something that I find that really interesting and I can see the differences in their 
approach and I get to see them, you know, and the choreography. So I think yeah 
LWGRHVDQGWKDW¶VEHFDXVH,¶PPRUHIDPLOLDU± like if I lookeGDWDFDUHQJLQH,¶G
EHOLNH³SKHZ´EXWLIDPHFKDQLFORRNHGDWLWKH¶GEHOLNH³\HDK-  boom boom ± 
WKHUHKH¶VGRQHWKDWMREWKHUHKH¶VGRQHWKLVEDEDED,UHFRJQLVHWKLVDQGRK
KH¶VGRQHWKLV,ZRXOGKDYHGRQHWKDWPD\EHEXWWKDW¶VJRRGHQRXJK´DQG you 
can see the differences in between how people approach the work and I suppose 
EHFDXVH ,¶P LQYROYHG LQ WKH DUW IRUP WKHQ , WKLQN PD\EH LW LV HDVLHU IRU PH WR
understand, possibly understand clearer the message of the choreographer but 
usually with most ZRUNLW¶VQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHDOO\DERXWWKDWLW¶VDERXWZKDW,JHW
from it so you know yeah and no ± ,NQRZ,VHHPOLNH,¶PFRQWUDGLFWLQJP\VHOI 
 
Thus although dancers may be more open to seeing meaning in contemporary dance, 
it was not suggested that it was possible for them to access the meaning of a piece in a 
straightforward way. 
 
Dancers also spoke of a kind of physical empathy with other dancers when they watch 
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do the movement. My interviewees were, however, very aware that despite being 
dancers they did not always understand the dance that they saw performed. When I 
asked them to speculate about whether their experience of watching a performance 
was different from that of a non-dancer, answers were therefore often ambiguous as 
while the dancers felt that in some sense they did understand the (language of the) 
dance better because they were dancers themselves, they were unable to describe quite 
what this meant as it did not correlate exactly with being able to understand the 
meaning. As Christina describes:  
 
Obviously when we watch a piece we will know that that movement they did felt 
DPD]LQJEXW,GRQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\WKLQNZHKDYHDGLIIHUHQW>IURPDQQRQ-dancer] 
interpreWDWLRQ RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI WKH SLHFH EHFDXVH WKH PRYHPHQW GRHVQ¶W
necessarily explain the meaning ± LW¶V WKH IHHOLQJ WKDW \RX¶UH SXWWLQJ DFURVV
rather than the movement itself ± G¶\RXNQRZZKDW,PHDQ"± VR,GRQ¶WUHDOO\
think that a dancer would interpret the meaning differently, they would just look 
at the, the movement differently. [Christina] 
 
The individual movements within a dance language, such as the pas de bourré or the 
arabesque, do not, then, have a discrete, identifiable, conventional meaning, in the 
way that words do within a sentence or language. Understanding how, for example, 
the work of a certain choreographer or style is made up of certain movements put 
together in certain ways does not therefore help dancers to decipher the meaning of a 
particular sequence. 
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Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty in fact revised the straightforward parallel drawn 
between language and painting in his later abandoned work The Prose of the World in 
which he states that 
 
« HYHU\WKLQJ « WKDW LV WUXH RI SDLQWLQJ LV DOVR WUXH RI ODQJXDJH«ODQJXDJH LV
painting as painting is language. (from Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of The World, 
quoted in Dillon, 1997:204) 
 
The problem that he comes to recognise with this parallel is that: 
 
There is little in painting that corresponds to the sedimentation of language. 
6HGLPHQWDWLRQ « JLYHV ODQJXDJH D KLVWRULFDO FKDUDFWHU GLIIHUHQW WR WKDW RI
painting, but, more to the point, it grants ductility to the word that is nowhere 
equalled in painting. It is the sedimented language of acquired usage that recedes 
before the thing, bows to its meaning, renders itself unobtrusive, creates the 
illusion of a transparent signification: in short, sedimentation allows a 
transcendence of the signifier toward the signified. To be sure painting has 
tradition, many traditions, and those traditions confer an accessibility to past 
acquisitions (perspective, chiaroscuro, the techniques of rendering light, texture, 
etc.), but one does not see through the painting to its meaning as one does in 
language. (Dillon, 1997:204) 
 
Similarly with dance, understanding the tradition or technique within which the work 
is made ± what dancers refer to as the language of the dance ± is not always sufficient 
to give transparent access to the meaning. Thus while all of the dancers that I 
interviewed used the idea of dance as a language, when I questioned them about this 
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further they struggled to articulate just how that analogy worked or failed to work in 
WHUPVRIEHLQJDEOHWRµUHDG¶WKHPHDQLQJRIDGDQFH 
 
Daniel: The different languages are basically ± \RX¶YHJRW\RXUYHU\EDVLF\RXU
ballet, your Cunningham, maybe contemporary dance -Graham ± VR\RX¶YHJRW
three very particular styles and within that you can take it off ± they derived their 
own techniques, so they all had a different language ± em, the guy 
[choreographer]  that we have at the moment is very into fragmented, isolating 
through the body ± we did a duet with him a couple of years back so I, I got to 
know his movement style so when we got to this work it seemed I had it already ± 
I could switch it on.  The previous choreographer was very much about, em, very 
specific counts, very specific isolations of the body, quite sort of rigid stuff  that 
was ± for me I found it harder to ± WKDW¶V QRW VRPHWKLQJ WKDW , ZRXOG PD\EH
dance so naturally ± but I had to understand that language, that was his 
language. 
 
AP: And by understanding it, does that mean that you can sort of read it and 
XQGHUVWDQGZKDWKH¶VWU\LQJWRVD\" 
 
'DQLHO (P VRPHWLPHV QRW DOZD\V QR « ZH WU\ WR ZH WU\ WR WDNH Rn all the 
LQIRUPDWLRQWKDWWKH\JLYHWRXVEXWWKHUH¶VJRLQJWREH ± trying to understand it 
or appreciate it ± \RXWU\WRXQGHUVWDQGZKHUHWKH\¶UHFRPLQJIURP 
 
7KH GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV GR QRW WKHUHIRUH VXJJHVW WKDW GDQFH FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV D
language in the sense of thinking of individual movements as words with 
conventional meanings which can be built up into chains or sentences. Indeed the 
dancers asserted that individual dance steps did not carry set meanings and that it was 
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possible to express many different things with the same movement depending on how 
it was done and in what context. 
 
 
Dance as Gestalt 
 
Interestingly, over-attention to the individual movements, breaking down the overall 
structure of the dance into component parts, was, in fact, considered by many of the 
dancers to be unhelpful when trying to find the meaning of a work:  
 
II,¶YHKDGDUHDOO\SHGDQWLFGD\ZKHUH,KDGWRJRDQGUHDOO\EUHDNDQGDQDO\VH
the movement right down and I go and watch a show that evening I find myself 
doing that to them ± OLNH,¶GEHUHDOO\UHDOO\EUHDNLQJGRZQZKDWWKH\¶UHGRLQJ
DQG WKHQ WKDW¶VQRW IDLURQQRWRQO\ WKHPEXW LWGRHVQ¶WPDNHPHRSHQ Wo work 
which is a bit annoying. [Steven] 
 
Understanding meaning in dance consists for Steven in being open to communication. 
Knowledge of the language ± the tradition or technique ± in which the work is 
composed does not, however, seem to be sufficient or indeed necessary for this 
openness to the meaning of a work. This can be compared to appreciation of visual art 
where over-attention to technical aspects such as brush technique may in fact make it 
more difficult for the viewer to encounter the work as a meaningful whole or Gestalt. 
Indeed Anna comments about watching dance:  
 
,ZLVKVRPHWLPHV,ZRXOGQ¶WORRNDWWKe language that I know ± you know?- that 
³RKWKHLUOHJVVKRXOGQ¶WEHWKHUH´RU³VKRXOGEHWKHUH´DQGMXVWORRNLQJDWWKH
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movement, at the technique ± and I wish I could not have it and just look ± ³LVKH
acWXDOO\VD\LQJVRPHWKLQJWRPH"´>$QQD@  
 
For Anna then, attending to the language of a dance in the sense of the technique can 
sometimes interrupt her engagement with the communicative faculty of dance as art: 
focussing on the language actually prevents her from engaging with what the work is 
µVD\LQJ¶ 
 
The comparison with viewing visual art is again useful here: a certain familiarity with 
FXELVPKHOSVXVVHHWKHIDFHVDQGSHRSOHLQ3LFDVVR¶VZRUNDVIDFHVDQGSHRSOHUDWKHU
than blocks of colour Yet focussing too much on the technique and how the blocks of 
colour are constructed and fit together will in fact render the painting meaningless 
(apart from as an example of cubist technique) again as the Gestalt is lost. Similarly 
this paradox exists in dance where knowing the language helps the dancer understand 
WKHZRUNDV0LFKDHODVD\V µWRDFHUWDLQH[WHQW¶EXWFDQDOVRKLQGHUDSSUHFLDWLRQRI
the work as a meaningful whole. 
 
Meaning in dance was thus not considered to be based on the series of individual 
movements but to be a function of the whole or Gestalt where each movement can 
only be properly understood in terms of its relation to the piece as a whole. Thus it 
was considered crucial to the execution of the movement that the dancers should have 
some kind of idea of why they are doing the movement ± in particular, how it fits into 
the wider context of the work as a meaningful whole:  
 
YRX FDQ EH DVNHG ³WKURZ \RXUVHOI WR \RXU NQHHV QRZ´ ± you must give me a 
reason to throw myself on my knees ± \RXNQRZZKDW,PHDQ"<RXFDQ¶WMXVWEH
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DVNHG\RXNQRZ³VSLQRQ \RXUKHDGDQGWKHQEOLQN\RXUOHIWH\H´ ± why am I 
doing that? ± you know? ± VR LW¶V UHDOO\ LPSRUWDQW DV D GDQFHU DQG WKH
FKRUHRJUDSKHU PXVW NQRZ ZK\ KH¶V GRLQJ ± what his intention is ± really the 
whole way through. [Marco] 
 
Anthony also emphasises the important communicative role of the choreographer in 
helping dancers develop this kind of understanding:  
 
,WKLQNLW¶VUHDOO\LPSRUWDQWIRUWKHFKRUHRJUDSKHUWRFRPHDQGH[SODLQWRWKHP
what the movement is about, definitely ± what the piece is about and really ± µFRV
that really helps the dancers to get a feel of what the movement is supposed to be 
instead of just doing a movement. [Anthony]  
 
Indeed, as Anna describes:  
 
,GRQ¶WWKLQN\RXFDQUHDOO\JHWDQ\WKLQJWKURXJK ± the communication part ± if 
you GRQ¶WNQRZ\RXUVHOIZKDW\RX¶UHGRLQJ\RX¶UH MXVWFRS\LQJ WKDWSHUVRQ LQ
the video and then just trying to do the movements ± EXW\HDK LW¶V WKHKDUGHVW
SDUWEXWWKDW¶VZKDWPDNHVLWNLQGRIDUW LI\RXFDQILQGWKDW³RK\HDKQRZLW
makes sense, now it PDNHVVHQVH´>$QQD@ 
 
This understanding of why a movement is to be performed takes the dancer beyond 
just doing steps ± individual movements ± RUµPDNLQJVKDSHV¶DOORZLQJWKHGDQFHUWR
conceptualise the work as a meaningful whole that expresses or communicates 
something. Thus although the dance steps are not inherently meaningful, the way in 
which they are put together in a choreography infuses them with meaning. 
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This process was effected in different ways depending on the choreographer. Tara 
gives examples of this where:  
 
One choreographer would give us steps and talk about an emotional thing and 
the way they would talk about it felt quite separate so it was kind of my job, our 
job to put the two together. But then there was another choreographer who said 
³FDQ\RXVKRZPHVRPHWKLQJ´ ± VKHZRXOGWDONDERXWWKHHPRWLRQVKHZRXOGQ¶W
JLYHXVDPRYHPHQWVKHZRXOG WDONDERXW WKHHPRWLRQVKHZDVOLNH³FDQ\RX
JLYHPHVRPHWKLQJFRPHXSZLWKVRPHWKLQJWKDWH[SUHVVHVWKDW"´DQGZH¶GEH
like ± you have to really go to that place and see what movement bursts out of 
WKDW 6R ,¶G VD\ WKDW PRVW ± ,¶G VD\ RQ WKH ZKROH ± they go hand in hand ± 
GHILQLWHO\ EHFDXVH D GDQFH VWHS WKDW¶V MXVW D GDQFH VWHS GRHVQ¶t really say 
anything on stage. [Tara] 
 
Despite different approaches to creating a meaningful piece of choreography, then, all 
WKHGDQFHUVHPSKDVLVHG WKH LPSRUWDQFHRIJRLQJEH\RQG µPDNLQJVKDSHV¶ WRDSRLQW
where, as Louisa describes:  
 
« \RX¶UH FRPIRUWDEOH ZLWK WKH PRYHPHQWV DQG WKHQ \RX FDQ VWDUW WR JR
somewherHDQGFRPPXQLFDWH VR WKHDXGLHQFHPLJKWJR³:KDWZDV WKDW"2h ± 
LW¶VDIHHOLQJ´>/RXLVD@ 
 
Dancers also emphasised that meaning in dance was often something that was sensed 
from the overall feel of the work as a whole, rather than clearly formulated in such a 
way that it would be possible to put it into words or break down how it was that it 
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PDQDJHGWRHYRNHFHUWDLQIHHOLQJVRULGHDV7KHGDQFHUV¶DFFRXQWVGLGQRWWKHUHIRUH
suggest that it was ever really possible to have a straightforward process where a 
choreographer could give a comprehensive account of the meaning that is appropriate 
for all the dancers involved, or indeed that fully satisfies any of the dancers. As Anna 
H[SODLQV µLW¶V QRW NLQG RI VR VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG WKDW \RX FRXOG JR ³ZKDW¶V WKH SLHFH 
DERXW"´¶>$QQD@ Thus, for example, Toby describes contemporary dance as similar 
to classical music in that it expresses something that cannot necessarily be put into 
words but is rather felt by the audience. 
 
Steven similarly describes identifying meaning in a contemporary dance performance 
as like identifying meaning in a dream:  
 
I like to feel something from the work and then through that feeling I then ± it 
NLQGRILQVSLUHVPHWRWKLQNDERXWWKHIHHOLQJVDQGVHQVDWLRQVWKDW,¶YHKDGIURP
the work ± thDW¶VIRUPHZKHQ,ZDWFKUHDOO\JUHDWZRUN,MXVWIHHOVRPHWKLQJ ± 
,FDQ¶WTXLWHXQGHUVWDQGLWLQWKHVDPHVHQVHWKDW\RXORRNDWDGUHDPDQG\RX
FDQ¶WUHDOO\XQGHUVWDQGDGUHDPEXW\RXKDYHWKLVIHHOLQJEHKLQGLWDQGLWNLQGRI
makes sense, but it doesQ¶WUHDOO\but you do understand it anyway. [Steven] 
 
Louisa also compares dance to poetry. In response to my further questioning about 
what it meant to say that dance was a language, she replied:  
 
IWLVIRUPHOLNHSRHWU\,WKLQNLW¶VFORVHUWRWKDW± poetry ± than it is a language. 
[Louisa]  
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The distinction that Louisa is making here is between a system of signs where every 
word/movement has a set meaning, which I have been asking her about and which she 
refers to here as a language, and the poetic form where meaning is derived in a less 
direct way. 
 
In poetry then, as with a dream or music, the meaning is derived from an overall 
impression of the whole and does not rely on each word, movement or musical note 
having a particular conventional meaning. Poetry evokes new meaning in words 
through their use in the context of the poetic work as a whole or Gestalt in the same 
way that in dance or visual art each movement, brush stroke or block of colour can 
only be attributed meaning in the context of the whole. 
 
In poetry I can use the creative capacity in language to bring extra meaning to, for 
H[DPSOHWKHZRUGµORYH¶ZKLFKLWGLGQRWSUHYLRXVO\KDYH This is the sense, then, in 
which the language of dance resembles poetry ± it is permanently in the creative 
phase of suggesting or evoking new meaning without ever reaching a phase of 
referring to this meaning in a straightforward or seemingly transparent way. 
 
There are, however, differences for Merleau-Ponty between the linguistic and non-
linguistic forms of creative expression. While the words in poetry already bear 
meaning which is added to or changed, for example, the movements in dance do not 
come with these conventional meanings. In the language of dance individual 
movements do not have a conventional meaning outside the context of the work as a 
whole. 
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Furthermore there is the possibility with poetry that the new meaning evoked in an 
individual word will become sedimented so that future uses of that word will bear the 
new meaning outwith the context of the poetic work. In language this new meaning 
can then go through a process of sedimentation (through further usage of this new 
VHQVH RI WKH ZRUG µORYH¶ E\ ZKLFK LW EHFRPHV LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWR FRQYHQWLRQDO
language. At this point the extra or new meaning is incorporated into the conventional 
PHDQLQJVRWKDWWKHZRUGµORYH¶QRZUHIHUVWRWKLVQHZDVSHFWLQDVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDQG
conventional way. 
 
It is this process of sedimentation that Merleau-Ponty suggests separates the operation 
of language from other forms of artistic production of meaning. For Merleau-Ponty, 
while the literary artist is adding to what gone before ± the sum of our culturally 
DFFXPXODWHGPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGµORYH¶± those artists who work outside of language 
in, for example, visual art or dance are continually forging meaning anew without the 
possibility of sedimentation (Dillon, 1997:205; Matthews, 2002:158). Thus while 
some levels of meaning in poetry such as certain metaphors can become familiar to us 
and conventional so that we understand them as straightforwardly having a certain 
meaning (dead metaphors), this process of sedimentation does not seem to happen in 
contemporary dance. 
 
The parallel with poetry is therefore an interesting, although not straightforward, one. 
Understanding dance as analogous to poetry helps to explain how dancers can work 
with an established language to express something that is genuinely new. 
Furthermore, in exploring how a parallel between poetry and dance plays out in 
practice through consideration of how danFHUVFDQDQGFDQQRWµUHDG¶WKHODQJXDJHRI
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dance, we can begin to see the importance of his distinction between linguistic and 
non-linguistic art-forms. This level of analysis helps us understand in more depth why 
it may be that dancers speak of gaining familiarity with the different aspects of the 
language of a choreographer, but they do not suggest that this necessarily helps you to 
understand what is meant by a particular movement. 
 
Who is expressing whose meaning? 
 
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance, 
How can we know the dancer from the dance? 
    ± William Butler Yeats 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, art does not merely consist in the artist expressing his or herself in 
the sense of evoking some aspect of personality or experience. Rather the artist 
 
« starts from where he or she is, from his or her individual personality, and 
creates a work that expresses a meaning that he or she is probably not fully 
aware of. (Matthews, 2002:140) 
 
The meaning of the work of art is so closely bound up with the physical form of 
H[SUHVVLRQWKDWDOWKRXJKLWRULJLQDWHVLQ WKHDUWLVW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQRUUHODWLRQWR WKH
ZRUOGWKHDUWLVWFDQQRWNQRZWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUNEHIRUHFUHDWLQJLWµDQGPD\QRW
HYHUEHLQDSRVLWLRQWRNQRZLWVPHDQLQJLQIXOO¶0DWWKHZV7he meaning 
arises in the creation of the work of art and is inseparable from its expression in that 
particular form. 
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The idea of the meaning of a choreography being entirely bound up in its physical 
form, the manner of its expression, is interesting for this discussion of dance because 
it implies that meaning is inseparable from the movements of the choreography as 
created by the choreographer, and also that the meaning is inseparable from the 
execution of those movements as performed by a particular dancer at a particular 
point in time. Thus my interviewees refer to dance both as their own communication 
with the audience and as a way of trying to convey something from the choreographer 
to the audience, allowing the audience to come into contact with the chRUHRJUDSKHU¶V
intention or meaning. In response to my questioning about where the meaning comes 
from in dance ± whether it is somehow in the movements or if perhaps it is important 
WRNQRZWKHFKRUHRJUDSKHU¶VLQWHQWLRQLQWHUPVRIPHDQLQJ&KULVWLQDVXJJHVts that: 
 
iI\RXDUHDFWXDOO\GDQFLQJDFKRUHRJUDSK\LW¶VLPSRUWDQWWKDWZHNQRZZKDWWKH
choreographer meant, obviously, then we can put across what she ± you know? ± 
what she meant. [Christina]  
 
Christina illustrates this notion of putting across what the choreographer meant with 
UHIHUHQFH WR D SLHFH VKH KDG SHUIRUPHG ZKLFK ZDV LQVSLUHG E\ WKH FKRUHRJUDSKHU¶V
visit to an aquarium and reflections on her pregnancy. In this case, then, Christina 
suggests that it is important to try to bring the audience into contact with the themes 
RIµZDWHULQHVV¶DQGµQXUWXULQJ¶WKDWVKHEHOLHYHVDUHFHQWUDOWRWKHZRUN 
 
This ambiguity about (or double sense of) who it is that communicates or expresses 
something to the audience ± the dancer or the choreographer ± was also noticeable in 
GDQFHUV¶ GHVFULSWLRQV RI WKHLU RZQ H[SHULHQFHV RI ZDWFKLQJ GDQFH 7KXV P\
interviewees, when describing themselves as audience members faced with a dancer 
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performing a choreography in front of them, often introduced the question of what it 
was that the choreographer trying to say seemingly almost interchangeably with the 
question of what it was that the dancer was trying to say. 
 
They did, however, sometimes introduce the notion of a difference between the 
meaning as expressed or intended by the choreographer and the meaning as expressed 
or intended by the dancer. Indeed while it was considered important by the dancers 
that the choreographer gave them some idea of the meaning of the work, there was a 
sense in which, as I have noted above, the full meaning of the piece could never really 
be explained. Thus there are always gaps which dancers need to fill in, in terms of the 
meaning of the piece as a whole and how the different parts relate to that whole:  
 
there is freedom to interpret other peoSOH¶V ZRUN DQG WKDW¶V ZKHUH WKH NLQGRI
artistry comes into play ± my interpretation. [Steven] 
 
The extent to which the dancer needs to become involved with the work in this way 
was considered to vary depending on how prescriptive the choreographer was. Thus, 
for example, Tara describes:  
 
One [choreographer] we worked with gave away very little of what, how he 
wanted us to move through the piece emotionally, and so you, I kind of just took 
LWXSRQP\VHOIWRMXVWZRUNRXWDZD\EHFDXVHLILW¶VZURQJKH¶OOWHOOPH³WKDW¶V
DZIXOZKDW \RX¶UHGRLQJ´ VR MXVW IRUP\RZQNLQGRI sanity, well not that, my 
own peace of mind ± so, how this piece works for me ± but then some 
choreographers will give you a whole heap of information about what it is, what 
it should be feeling like and how your emotional state should be. [Tara] 
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7KXVWKHUHZDVDEDODQFHWREHVWUXFN2QRQHKDQGGDQFHUVDWWHPSWHGWRµVWD\WUXH
WR¶ WKHPHDQLQJRI WKHZRUNDV LQWHQGHGE\ WKHFKRUHRJUDSKHUQRW OHWWLQJ WKHLURZQ
egos get in the way as Ben describes:  
 
As a performer and as an individual, em, I should allow a work to communicate 
its worth before anything else and I think if a work is made very, very well you 
can see the essence and then the performer becomes immersed in the work and 
then it works. [Ben] 
 
 While on the other hand it was considered essential that the dancer should engage 
with the work at a personal level and genuinely express something of themselves to 
the audience in their performance of the work. 
 
The relationship between choreographer (and the choreography) and dancer was not, 
then, entirely one-sided where the choreographer held the meaning and the dancers 
tried to reproduce this meaning, but took the form of more of a negotiation of 
meaning. The meaning emerges as the choreographer and dancer come together and is 
FRQVWLWXWHGLQWKHGDQFHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRIZRUNUDWKHUWKDQLQWKHDEVWUDFWLGHDRIWKH
ZRUNLQWKHFKRUHRJUDSKHU¶VKHDG 
 
I have argued above that dance can be understood as communication between 
audience and dancer where the meaning emerges and is negotiated in the process of 
this communication. Steven echoes this idea but also alludes to a previous 
communication between choreographer and dancer:  
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TKHUH¶V«DFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQ\RX WKHGDQFHUDQG\RX WKH FKRUHRJUDpher 
and once they leave there is so much other things to find in the work that in many 
VHQVHV LW¶V DOPRVW OLNH WKH FKRUHRJUDSKHU JLYHV \RX WKH VNHOHWRQ DQG WKHQ \RX
have to put the flesh on top of it and breathe life into it so that the work can 
express something to the audience and share something with the audience and 
WKDW¶VIRUPHDUHDOO\JRRGWKLQJ ±  LW¶VQRWDERXWPHGDQFLQJRQVWDJHLW¶VDERXW
me sharing this thing between ± kind of an interesting relationship and sharing 
going on. [Steven] 
 
It is WKHGDQFHUVWKHQZKRJLYHµOLIH¶WRWKHZRUN± µLW¶VQRWVKDSHV ± LW¶VPRYHPHQW
DQG LW¶V D OLYLQJ EUHDWKLQJ WKLQJ¶ >/RXLVD@ ± by giving it embodied form and by 
investing something of themselves in its performance. It is only when a work comes 
to life in this way then that it can be understood to be genuinely communicative and 
PHDQLQJIXO UDWKHU WKDQ MXVW µPDNLQJ VKDSHV¶ DQG IRU GDQFHUV WKLV ZDV DERXW VRPH
kind of meaningful personal sharing or communication with both the choreographer 
and the audience:  
 
YRXVWDUW WRXQGHUVWDQGVRPH WKLQJV WKDW WKHFKRUHRJUDSKHU¶V WHOOLQJ\RX IURP
WKH LQVLGH , WKLQN WKDW¶VPDWXULQJDVDGDQFHU , WKLQN WKDW¶VZKDW LW¶VDERXW ,
PHDQ,ZDWFKPDWXUHGDQFHUVWKDW¶VZKDW,VHH ± WKLVSHUVRQDODWWULEXWHWKH\¶UH
able to bring that across to the audience member. [Daniel] 
 
Becoming better or less immature as a dancer was thus about an openness to sharing 
meaning in such a way that dance can be genuinely communicative. Compared to a 
dancer who has just left dance college, Tara thus describes:  
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SRPHRQHZKR¶VEHHQD\HDURXWRIFROOHJH± ,WKLQN\RXFDQWHOOWKH\¶YHMXVWWKDW
WKH\¶UH PRUH RSHQ PRUH SUHVHQFH RQ VWDJH RU HYHQ LQ WKH VWXGLR WKH\¶UH MXVW
more ready to receive and give. [Tara] 
 
Meaning is not something that resides in the head of one isolated Cartesian subject 
then, be that the choreographer, the dancer or the audience. Rather dance comes to be 
meaningful in a process of sharing and negotiation between these different 
subjectivities, and each subject is decentred with respect to the intermundane space 
where the meaning takes shape. 
 
Furthermore the meaning of a dance or choreography is wholly tied up with its 
physical expression through the body of the dancer. This is not a meaning that can be 
fully grasped or articulated by the dancer or choreographer through introspection, 
UDWKHU LW LV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW KDV WR EH XQGHUVWRRG WKURXJK HDFK VXEMHFW¶V RSHQQHVV WR
that intermundane space where meaning is produced. In art as in language, we 
understand meaning through its (embodied) expression not prior to it in some internal 
realm of res cogitans. 
  296 
Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have argued that dance, like language, can be profitably understood 
as an interworld, or intermundane space. Verbal language and dance do not re-present 
the world in the sense of producing a copy of the world in a domain apart, but rather 
allow us to communicate with others by virtue of our embodiment and our practical 
orientation to the world. 
 
As I have noted in µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶, there is a great deal in dance that is 
communicated between the dancers without words. Dancers describe this non-verbal 
communication as important in a number of ways including where there is not enough 
time to explain, for example, a positioning to someone or where it is necessary to 
negotiate something such as the balance of weight between bodies leaning on each 
other that cannot necessarily be put into words. 
 
This does not mean, however, that dancers do not employ verbal language in their 
interactions. Indeed the linguistic articulation and thematisation of aspects of dance 
during the learning process can vastly increase the possibilities for creating and 
interacting in dance. This concluding section briefly revisits the importance of 
linguistic articulation in learning and performing the practical skill of dance, before 
returning to the notion of how dance and language function in parallel ways as 
interworlds of intersubjective communication which we are open to by virtue of our 
mutual constitution in the flesh of the world. 
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,Q WKH FRQWH[W RI OHDUQLQJ DQG SHUIRUPLQJ GDQFH ODQJXDJH DGGV WR WKH GDQFHU¶V
practical pre-reflective engagement with the immediate environment, including other 
dancers, extending the range of possibilities for action. The primary function of 
language here is not to represent the world but to diversify and extend our potential to 
interact with it. In dance this can take the form of simple commands or expressions of 
LQWHQWLRQVXFKDV µOHW¶VJRRYHU WKHUH¶RU µZDLW IRUPH WR ILQLVK this before you start 
WKDW¶2IWHQLQGDQFHWKLVW\SHRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLOOEHXVHGZKHUHWKHGDQFHU¶VSUH-
reflective practical grasp on the environment meets some kind of obstacle such as the 
failure of a partner to be positioned where you expected them to be. Here it can 
become useful to explicitly conceptualise the problem and discuss how it can be 
resolved, although, for dancers, this may well happen alongside a physical exploration 
of how the interaction should feel. 
 
The reflective capacity allowed by language is, furthermore, crucial to the process of 
correction in the learning of dance. Such explicit conceptualisations of features of 
movement and dance are also FHQWUDO WR GDQFHUV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI WHFKQLTXHV DQG
ideas which underpin (and are, at the same time, underpinned by) their pre-reflective 
practical performance of dance. Importantly then, there is a mutual dependency 
between our practical pre-reflective engagement with the world and our reflective or 
conceptual engagement, where each one is informed by the other. 
 
It therefore becomes impossible to understand language as belonging to an inner 
realm of consciousness or res cogitans which is entirely separate from the world of 
things. Indeed speech is part of our immediate pre-reflective engagement with the 
world, functioning to expand the possibilities for our engaged agency in phrases such 
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DVµSDVVPHWKHEDOO¶7KHUHLVDOVRQRVHQVHLQZKLFKZHFDQWKLQNDERXWZKDWZHDUH
going to say without (silent) speech, meaning that speech, like perception, must 
originally be pre-reflective. 
 
Furthermore, speech, and thus thought, are, like dance, embodied practices: ways of 
using the body and interacting with the world around us. Indeed although language 
allows us to abstract aspects of the world into ideas, Merleau-Ponty emphasises the 
worldly basis of ideas both in that we are able to have them (speak them) by virtue of 
our worldly bodies and that they are ultimately derived from our interaction with the 
already meaningful perceptual world. Language does not represent or copy the world 
in a separate domain but is part of the world, reflecting the world back to itself like a 
(physically present) mirror. 
 
Speech does, however, allow us to come into a new relation to and dialogue with 
ourselves where we can think and hear our own thoughts and thus inspect or reflect on 
them. Thus, as I have argued in µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶, we have access to our own 
thoughts and feelings not through a transparent process of introspection as Descartes 
suggests, but rather through the (potentially) publicly available expression of these 
thoughts and feelings. We hear our own thoughts as we hear the thoughts of the other, 
then, just as we perceive our own behaviour as we perceive the behaviour of others, 
and it is this possibility of seeing or listening to the self from the perspective of the 
other ± reversibility ± that is the basis of reflection. 
 
The location of the subject in language thus requires, for Merleau-Ponty, that the 
subject is open to and decentred in relation to the intermundane space of language. 
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We can explore how this actually plays out in practice by taking dance as functioning 
in a way that is parallel to language. This parallel was suggested by both my dance 
interviewees in their reference to the language of dance and by Merleau-Ponty in his 
reference to the parallel between language and art, and I have sought to demonstrate 
in this chapter that the parallel between dance and language is a useful one for 
illuminating both dance and language and exploring what opened up when philosophy 
comes into conversation with practice. 
 
The meaning that dancers are able to express through the language of dance is tied up 
in the embodied practice of dancing and the whole effect that the performance has on 
the performers and audience, rather than being something that resides in the head of 
the choreographer or dancer. This can be usefully explored in relation to an 
understanding of how language, thought and meaning (in dance and in general) should 
not be understood as confined to an inner realm of consciousness. Rather Merleau-
Ponty and the practice of dance both suggest that meaning originates in our bodily 
interaction with the world and is fundamentally social (dialogical) in character. Indeed 
an isolated individual would never, in Merleau-Ponty¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQGHYHORSD
language: 
 
The meanings that words and expressions acquire come from the communication 
between one individual and another. In using language, we are therefore 
necessarily brought up against the fact that we are in the presence of other selves, 
and it is our shared history that makes communication between us possible. 
(Matthews, 2002:155) 
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Dancers also emphasise that dancing on your own ± without other dancers or an 
audience ± does not make any sense as meaning-making through dance is essentially 
communicative and collaborative. Meaning happens between people in the shared 
intermundane space of language or dance which we are mutually open to by virtue of 
our mutual constitution in the reversible flesh of the world, not inside an isolated 
individual. 
 
Thus the voice of Merleau-Ponty¶VSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHYRLFHRIWKHSUDFWLFHRIGDQFH
both suggest parallels between how art functions to express meaning and how 
language functions. Dancers speak of dance as a language or of there being different 
languages of dance such as that of classical ballet and those of some of the major 
contemporary traditions.  Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, discusses a parallel between 
painting and language, suggesting that language functions to convey meaning in the 
same way as art, although he later revises his position on this, referring to the 
difference that there is nothing in art that is analogous to the process of sedimentation 
or institutionalisation in language. This means that, according to Merleau-Ponty, art 
never acquires the apparent transparency of language, where we can pass through the 
words to their meanings with little awareness that we are actually reading words and 
sentences. 
 
This lack of transparency of meaning in art can bHXQGHUVWRRGLQUHODWLRQWRGDQFHUV¶
accounts of understanding meaning in contemporary dance. DHVSLWHGDQFHUV¶IUHTXHQW
references to the languages or vocabularies of dance, contemporary dance does not in 
fact function to convey meaning in the same (transparent) way as conventional 
ODQJXDJH'DQFHUVZHUHQRWDEOHWRµUHDG¶WKHPHDQLQJRIGDQFHVLQDVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG
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way where they went from movements to meanings as we would do reading words on 
a page. Instead it was considered that movements were only meaningful as parts in the 
context of the whole, the Gestalt, of the dance work. 
 
Understanding meaning in contemporary dance was thus not analogous to 
understanding meaning in conventional language, but my interviewees suggested that 
there were parallels between understanding meaning in dance and understanding 
meaning classical music, dreams, or poetry. Here again the meaning was a function of 
the work (or dream) as a whole or Gestalt, rather than a sum total of the different 
musical notes, images, words or movements. It is also notable that unlike 
conventional language where the meanings seem to be arbitrarily attached to the 
words and institutionalised as part of the system of language, here it seemed that some 
token of the meaning (arising from the silent perceptual world) was somehow carried 
in the expression itself such as a feeling of sadness that might arise from a dream or 
piece of music. 
 
Familiarity with the vocabulary of a certain style of dance cannot then be 
conceptualised as analogous to familiarity with the vocabulary of a verbal language 
such as English, French or German where this knowledge could allow us to pass 
directly from the words to the meaning of a piece of speech or prose. There are, 
however, parallels with certain forms of spoken or written language ± we might think 
of, for example, the difficulties of translating poetry or slang into a foreign language ± 
where the meaning of words is bound up in their physical (sound-image) form and 
their position within, in the case of poetry, the work as a meaningful whole. 
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In dance then, rather than the individual movements bearing set meanings, meaning 
arises from the overall feeling of the piece, and dancers considered that the way in 
which movements were performed, the quality with which their performance was 
imbued, was more important for the evocation of meaning than the actual technical 
details of the movement itself. Understanding the meaning of a choreography was 
thus mainly about being able to sense the qualities with which the dancers imbued the 
PRYHPHQWV,WZDVWKLVDVSHFWRIµUHDGLQJ¶GDQFHIRUZKLFKGDQFHUVGLGQRWIHHOWKDW
familiarity with the dance language was either necessary or sufficient. There was a 
sense then in which any member of the public should be able to see something 
meaningful such as sadness or longing in the way that a dancer performed certain 
movements as this evocation does not rely on technical conventions which have to be 
learnt. 
 
Furthermore it was in fact suggested by my interviewees that too much focussed 
attention on individual movements and technique would often lead to a dancer being 
less able to appreciate the meaning of a piece than someone who was less familiar 
with dance techniques as, in going too far into the details, they lose sight of the work 
as a meaningful whole. This emphasis on the overall meaning or Gestalt rather than 
the individual movements was part of general resistance amongst my interviewees to 
WKHLGHDRIWKLQNLQJRIGDQFHDVµPDNLQJVKDSHV¶, which has also been noted in earlier 
chapters. 
 
When dancers go beyond making shapes, then, they are opening themselves up to an 
interworld of genuine communication and shared, negotiated meanings. Dancers 
emphasise not only the importance of expressing something through dance but also 
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the notions of mutual communication and sharing of meanings where the audience 
made their own connections with the work and brought their own experiences and 
understandings to bear. This illuminates the true sense of intersubjective 
communication, as suggested by Merleau-Ponty, in that meanings in dance are 
collaborative, occurring in a shared interworld. 
 
Understanding meaning in dance, which is the basis for understanding dance as a 
mode of expression and communication, relies on openness to a shared interworld. 
Here both parties are RSHQWRWKHµODQJXDJH¶RIGDQFH where meaning can be produced 
through a shared process of mutual recognition and understanding. Dancers can be 
more open to the shared interworld of the language of dance (than non-dancers) by 
virtue of their familiarity with dance as an expressive art form (knowledge of tradition 
and technique) and as a bodily practice (facilitating processes of physical empathy or 
transfer of corporeal schema), but this does not mean that they have transparent access 
to the meaning of a dance work. Rather it is the nature of dance as an art-form that it 
is not transparently meaningful ± it only suggests meaning which is then picked up on 
by the audience who further add to the meaning by interpreting it in certain ways. 
 
Openness to or participation in this interworld does not necessarily mean that dancers 
FDQµUHDG¶WKHPHDQLQJRIGDQFHLQDVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGZD\then, but it does allow the 
possibility of communicative self-expression through dance, and also makes them 
sensitive to meaningfulness in dance, allowing them to forge their own meanings and 
interpretation in communication with others. Thus the fact that even dancers do not 
have transparent access to meaning does not mean that we cannot see dance as a form 
of intersubjective communication. Rather it is this shared or collaborative aspect of 
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meaning in dance that makes dance a particularly good model of genuine 
communication. 
 
Dance allows us to explore how meaning is shared (i.e. intersubjective), embodied 
and in the world rather than in the head of isolated Cartesian subject. Furthermore it 
opens up ways of understanding that we are not trapped in language only ever able to 
rehearse ideas that we have already encountered, but rather able to create and 
communicate new meanings through our interaction with the world and others. 
 
It is this capacity for genuine communication where subjects can create new meaning 
with and for the other that Merleau-Ponty particularly values in art. In contrast to this 
he suggests that much of the language that we use and that conventional philosophy is 
written in is institutionalised and that we understand its meaning in relation to 
conventions of use that we have previously learnt. Philosophy constructed in this way 
can say nothing new about the world for Merleau-Ponty, and he suggests that it is 
only through the phenomenological approach to philosophy which he parallels with 
the writing of poetry or the practice of other art-forms, that we can truly say 
something new about the world and genuinely communicate new ideas to others. 
 
I believe that this parallel between Merleau-3RQW\¶VDPELWLRQVIRUSKLORVRSK\DQGKLV
understanding of the function of art is of great importance for understanding the 
conversation between philosophy and dance in this thesis. I have, however, left off 
discussing this important connection up to this point because of the need to 
characterise dance as primarily an embodied physical practice rather than 
understanding it in a reductive way as merely a symbolic form or text. The thesis has 
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thus far, therefore, worked through an understanding of dance that is based on the 
SULPDF\RI  HPERGLHGSUDFWLFH UHDFKLQJDSRLQW LQ WKLV FKDSWHURQ µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶
where it has become possible to talk about dance as having a representational capacity 
outwith the dualist distinction between materiality and representation. 
 
,W LV WKHUHIRUH QRZ SRVVLEOH LQ WKH µ&RQFOXVLRQ¶ WR WKLV FRQYHUVDWLRQ EHWZHHQ
philosophy and practice to pick up this theme in Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZULWLQJ ZKLFK
equates the function of art with the true goal of philosophy in a way that fully 
recognises the non-dualist implications of this understanding. 
  306 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
$V , KDYH QRWHG LQ WKH µ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶ Merleau-Ponty suggests that a non-dualistic 
understanding of embodied being must start from a theory of embodied practice. This 
allows us to think in terms of a body-subject, rather than seeing the body as object, 
and thus to consider embodiment as the basis of such aspects of being as subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity. Further to this suggestion, this thesis has been based on my 
contention that if we are to truly move away from dualism in our understanding of 
human being, then we need not only to conceptualise embodiment adequately in 
philosophical terms, but also to engage with lived embodied practice. The philosophy 
of Merleau-Ponty and the practice of dance have therefore been brought together in 
ZKDW,KDYHHYRNHGDVDµFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQSKLORVRSK\DQGSUDFWLFH¶ 
 
It is this PHWKRGRORJLFDO DSSURDFK RI µFRQYHUVDWLRQ¶ ZKLFK I have argued allows 
Merleau-Ponty¶s philosophy and the embodied practice of dance to µVSHDN WR HDFK
RWKHU¶ in such a way that makes it possible to explore the resonances between them 
without either reducing one to the other or enforcing/reinforcing strict dualist 
boundaries between philosophy and practice, mind and body; subject and object, or 
representation and materiality. This conclusion reviews and reflects on how this 
conversation has worked to open up a new space which lies in between these 
traditional dualist divides and has thus allowed me to develop and explore new ideas, 
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connections, perspectives and understandings of the embodied basis of being that a 
different methodological approach would not have facilitated to the same extent. 
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Embodiment, Philosophy and Practice 
 
The thesis starts (LQµ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶) from thinking about embodied practice as 
a fundamental aspect of our lives, and then moves on (LQ µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶ DQG
µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶) to explore the workings of the corporeal schema in more detail. 
These chapters think through how human being or human subjectivity is inherently 
embodied and how our interaction with others (our recognition of, communication 
with, and sense of ourselves in relation to other human beings) is embodied. The last 
chapter then explores issues of µ5epresentation¶ ORRNLQJ DW RXU FDSDFLW\ IRU
symbolisation and the communication and understanding of meaning. Meaning, 
representation and language are not conceptualised here in terms of the ethereal res 
cogitans of the Cartesian subject or mind, but as capacities of embodied beings 
situated in the (reversible flesh of) the world. 
 
The importance of the corporeal schema in our orientation towards the world and our 
understanding of self and others is particularly apparent in early (pre-linguistic) 
developmental stages. Such stages of infant development are used in Merleau-Ponty¶V
philosophical works, for example to illustrate and explore subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity as primarily functions of a pre-reflective corporeal orientation to the 
world and others, rather than being reliant on reflective (linguistic) thought as the 
Cartesian tradition suggests. 
 
What is important to this philosophy of embodiment is, however, not just that early 
stages of infant development can be understood in terms of the importance and 
primacy of the corporeal schema, but that human existence as a whole can be 
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understood in these terms. The corporeal schema is thus to be understood as the basis 
for interaction and sense of self in adult life as well as for the infant, and it is with this 
in mind that this thesis has focussed on professional contemporary dance, taking 
advantage of the fact that dancers, unlike infants, are able to reflect on and talk about 
their experiences of their embodied practice during research interviews. Dance has 
also been taken to be particularly well-equipped to speak to Merleau-Ponty¶V
philosophical conceptualisation of embodiment because of the expertise that dancers 
develop through their training in attending to their own and other (dancing) bodies. 
 
The conversation between philosophy and practice covers four main areas where the 
GDQFHUV¶ UHIOHFWLRQV RQ WKHLU HPERGLHG FDSDFLWLHV IRU µ3ractical knowledge¶, 
µ6ubjectivity¶, µ,ntersubjectivity¶, and µ5epresentation¶ are explored in relation to 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDLQWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\DQGWKH
reversible flesh of the world. We could talk about embodied knowledge, embodied 
subjectivity, embodied intersubjectivity, and bodily representation and 
communication, but these terms are problematic as they allow us to continue within 
the framework of body-mind dualism by suggesting, implicitly if not explicitly, that 
these aspects might have non-embodied (purely mental or ethereal) counterparts. 
 
The importance of Merleau-3RQW\¶VZRUNDQGRIWKHEXUJHRQLQJILHOGRIHPERGLPHQW
studies is, by contrast, the move towards dissolution of body-mind dualism. Starting 
from the embodied does not limit us to thinking only about the body then, rather it is a 
starting point for rethinking what it is to be human in non-dualist terms. This is 
SHUKDSV PRVW HOHJDQWO\ FDSWXUHG E\ (OL]DEHWK *URV]¶V (1994) notion of the Möbius 
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strip where body and mind are on a 3-dimensional, overlapping, twisting circular 
continuum with each other (see fig.2) 
 
 
Figure 2: Möbius Strip 
 
 
The metaphor of the Möbius strip serves not only to characterise the way that I am 
conceptualising embodiment in this thesis ± as a fluid, looping continuum between the 
never entirely separable body and mind ± but also the way I understand how 
philosophy and practice are able to speak to each other in the conversation between 
Merleau-Ponty and dance. The thesis has not brought philosophy and practice 
together to test or oppose each other with regard to how we can understand (dancing) 
existence. Rather the voices of Merleau-Ponty and dance are understood to be located 
on a fluid continuum where that they flow and blur into numerous different positions. 
As Grosz suggests for the body-mind continuum, these two voices can never fully 
merge into one, but the continuum and twisting of the strip means that they are not 
entirely separate from each other and wherever we start with one we can trace it round 
until it blurs into the other or we find ourselves looking at the same point from the 
other side of the strip. 
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Conversation, Craftsmanship and Art  
 
I also wish to note that the production of this thesis has, for me, blurred boundaries 
not only between research as philosophical reflection and research as empirical 
practice, but also between these aspects of research and the notion of research as art. 
& :ULJKW 0LOOV  VXJJHVWV WKDW µLQWHOOHFWXDO FUDIWVPDQVKLS¶ LV FHQWUDO WR WKH
VXFFHVV RI VRFLRORJLFDO UHVHDUFK DQG , ILQG WKH QRWLRQ RI µFUDIWLQJ¶ VRPHWKLQJ feels 
particularly important and relevant to the process of producing or evoking this 
conversation between Merleau-Ponty and dance. In particular, I would suggest that 
due to the lack of well-established models for writing up research in this way, the 
sense of creative artistry or the feeling of carefully crafting something has been 
central to my experience of constructing this conversation. Thus in (formulating and) 
using the experimental approach entailed in the notion of conversation I am aware of 
the blurring of boundaries between research and art: between the thesis as a report of 
(empirical and theoretical) research and the thesis as purposely and creatively crafted. 
 
Further to this, I wish to recognise that the engagement with and production of dance-
art by my interviewees has had a great impact on the character of the research on the 
HPERGLHGEDVLVRIEHLQJ WKDW WKLV WKHVLVFRQWDLQV ,QGHHG LW LV FRQWHPSRUDU\GDQFH¶V
ability to force us to think beyond a dualism between materiality and representation 
that makes it particularly suitable to be brought into conversation with Merleau-
3RQW\¶VQRQ-dualist philosophy.  
 
In an attempt to move away from understandings of the meaning of dance-art as 
somehow lying in the realm of representation and thus divorced from materiality and 
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bodily experience, I have not emphasised that it is dance as artistic representation that 
speaks to philosophy, but rather that it is dance as an embodied practice that can be 
brought into conversation with philosophy to move beyond traditional dualist divides. 
This lack of emphasis has not, however, meant that the notion of dance as art has not 
been understood as belonging to the same flowing continuum on which I have located 
philosophy DQGSUDFWLFHDV,KDYHEHJXQWRH[SORUHLQµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ 
 
As we come to the close of this conversation I therefore suggest that we might begin 
to think about how following the Möbius strip round another twist might reveal a 
different (although always there and never fully separate) perspective on the 
embodied basis of being, and thus new potential for conversation through further 
opening up an exploration of the importance of dance as an art-form. Indeed as 
Williams and Bendelow suggest, praxical modes of embodied expression such as 
dance (they also H[WHQGWKLVWRDOODUWSURYLGHDSRZHUIXOH[SUHVVLRQRIµIXQGDPHQWDO
IHDWXUHV RI WKH KXPDQ FRQGLWLRQ¶ PHDQLQJ WKDW WKH ERXQGDULHV EHWZHHQ DUW DQG
philosophical or social WKHRU\ FDQEH µWHPSRUDULO\ GHVWDELOLVHG LI QRW SHUPDQHQWO\
HIIDFHG¶:LOOLDPVDQG Bendelow, 1998:8). 
 
7KHUHVWRIWKHµ&RQFOXVLRQ¶VHUYHVWRUHYLHZDQGUHIOHFWRQWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQ
philosophy and practice that has been central to this thesis. I will, however, return to 
the metaphor of the Möbius strip towards the end of my below discussion of 
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ LQYLWLQJ WKH UHDGHU WR VHH WKH EOXUUHG ERXQGDU\ EHWZHHQ DUW DQG
philosophy at the end of the conversation contained in this thesis, not only as a fitting 
finishing point, but also as a starting point, similar to my original starting point of the 
connection between philosophy and practice, but seen from the other side of the strip. 
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From this point, I suggest, it is possible to imagine starting with the conversation all 
over again, tracing new meaning and finding new positions from which to understand 
embodiment as we loop back along the other side of the strip. 
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The Conversational Approach and the Opening up of a New Space for 
Understanding the Embodied Basis of Being 
 
In what follows I wish to conclude the thesis by reflecting on both the process of 
µRSHQLQJXSDVSDFH¶WKURXJKWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQSKLORVRSK\DQGSUDFWLFHDQG
some of the new connections, ideas, and understandings it has been possible to form 
through this methodological approach. I have chosen to retain the original chapter 
divisions here, but I would, once again, like to emphasise that I intend this 
conversation to be understood as a flowing, looping continuum, rather than series of 
discrete chapters.  
 
 
Practical Knowledge 
 
The starting point for the opeQLQJFKDSWHURQµ3UDFWLFDO.QRZOHGJH¶, and thus for the 
rest of the conversation, is Merleau-Ponty¶VHPSKDVLVRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHHPERGLHG
basis of being through notions of practice and the corporeal schema. In particular, I 
was interested to explore the concepts of tacit practical knowledge and the 
sedimentation of habit which Merleau-Ponty offers in his philosophy, and to find a 
way of not just understanding these concepts as theoretically viable but, more 
importantly, understanding them in relation to the experience of an embodied practice. 
The voice of the embodied practice of dance was evoked, in this chapter as in the rest 
of the thesis, from my thematic analysis of data from in-depth qualitative interviews 
which I carried out with sixteen professional contemporary dancers. 
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Having briefly reviewed Merleau-Ponty¶V FRQFHSWV RI KDELW SUDFWLFH DQG WKH
corporeal schema, this chapter was therefore chiefly interested in exploring how these 
theoretical concepts about practice might actually play out in practice, and what the 
embodied practice of dance might have to say in relation and in reply to these 
philosophical concepts. Here I HQJDJHG ZLWK GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV RI OHDUQLQJ
remembering and performing patterns of movement and, in particular, with the 
dancers¶ QRWLRQs RI KDYLQJ RU JHWWLQJ D PRYHPHQW µLQLQWR WKH ERG\¶, which I have 
suggested are resonant with Merleau-Ponty¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPD  
 
In presenting this as a conversation, my contention with regard to these dual concepts 
from Merleau-Ponty and dance is that they do not need to be mapped onto each other 
as direct parallels in order to have something interesting to say to each other. In fact I 
have argued that it is the suggestive rather than the rigid nature of the connections 
between Merleau-Ponty and dance that allow this conversation to open up a space for 
new ideas and understandings of the embodied basis of being.  
 
Thus through attending to these resonances between the GDQFHUV¶ concept RI µLQWR
WKHERG\¶and the Merleau-Pontian concept of the corporeal schema, I suggest I have 
been able to illuminate both of these concepts without reducing one to the other; and 
thus that in exploring aspects of the practice of dance, I have also been able explore 
aspects of corporeal schema theory. For example, it is notable that it takes time to get 
DPRYHPHQW µLQWR WKHERG\¶EXW WKDWRQFH LW LV µLQ WKHERG\¶GDQFHUVGRQRWKDYH WR
think about it in order to perform it. I suggest that this allows us to see notions of 
sedimentation and the pre-reflective nature of the corporeal schema played out in 
practice. 
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Furthermore, from the perspective of the other side of the Möbius strip, in bringing 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VWKHRULVLQJRIWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDWRWKHDUHQDRIGDQFH,am able to 
explore new ways of understanding aspects of dance such as why dancers are able to 
LPSURYLVHLQDVW\OHRQFHWKH\KDYHWKHUXGLPHQWVµLQWKHERG\¶DQGZK\WKH\ILQGLW
VR GLIILFXOW WR FRUUHFW PRYHPHQWV RQFH WKH\ KDYH JRW WKHP µLQ WKH ERG\¶ The 
conversational approach therefore allows me to bring philosophy and practice 
together ± without prioritising one over the other ± to develop a richer and more 
nuanced perspective on embodiment than I would suggest is possible from either side 
of a dualist distinction between philosophy and practice or theory and data. 
 
 
Subjectivity 
 
,Q H[SORULQJ µ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶, I have extended the discussion of the corporeal schema 
IURP µ3UDFWLFDO .QRZOHGJH¶ 7KLV FKDSWHU VWDUWV IURP WKH LGHD SXW IRUZDUG E\
Merleau-Ponty that the most fundamental or primary VHQVHRIVHOIRUµ,¶LVUHODWHGWR
WKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDDQGFDQEHFDSWXUHGE\WKHSKUDVHµ,FDQ¶UDWKHUWKDQWUDGLWLRQDO
µ, WKLQN WKHUHIRUH , DP¶ 7KLV SULPDU\ VHQVH RI VHOI XQGHUVWRRG DV D SUH-reflective 
sense of potential for action, comes about for the individual not through the reflective 
VROLSVLVWLF LQWURVSHFWLRQ VXJJHVWHG E\ WKH QRWLRQ RI µ, WKLQN WKHUHIRUH , DP¶ EXW
through active engagement with the world and others. 
 
Merleau-Ponty particularly emphasises the importance of mirroring interaction for the 
IRUPDWLRQ RI WKH FRUSRUHDO VFKHPD RU WKH IXQGDPHQWDO VHQVH RI µ, FDQ¶ LQ HDUO\
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developmental stages. In a way that I have argued is very suggestive for the furthering 
of the conversation between Merleau-Ponty and professional contemporary dance, he 
also maintains that the development of the corporeal schema is as integral an aspect of 
adult life as it is of infant development. From this starting point then, this chapter was 
primarily interested in hearing what the voice of dance had to say about how dancers 
understand their (dancing) selves through interaction with mirrors and others. 
 
0XFK RI WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI PLUURULQJ LQWHUDFWLRQ SUHVHQW LQ GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV RI
learning and performing dance movements echoed Merleau-Ponty¶V LGHDV DERXW WKH
primacy and the interactive development of the corporeal schema in the infant. Indeed 
it is notable that mirrors and mirroring interaction with other dancers are particularly 
important ± indeed often more so WKDQYHUEDOGLUHFWLRQIRUJHWWLQJDPRYHPHQWµLQWR
the ERG\¶ ± in the everyday practice of dance. 
 
I suggest that a sustained, experiential focus of the practice of dance of the kind that I 
have been able to offer in this thesis through in-depth interviews with dance 
practitioners can shed light on how we might understand Merleau-Ponty¶VFRQFHSWRI
the corporeal schema  as playing out in practice. Importantly, then, it is not just 
physical capability that is developed in the dance studio, but dancers also spoke of 
developing or maturing on an emotional or personal level and of developing a greater 
understanding of themselves through the practice of dance. This kind of discussion 
HYRNHVWKHULFKQHVVRIDQRWLRQRIµ,FDQ¶DVDIXQGDPHQWDOVHQVHRIVHOI 
 
From the perspective of the other side of the Möbius strip, it is also important for the 
understanding of dance which I have been able to offer in this chapter that Merleau-
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3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHFRUSRUHDOVFKHPDDOORZVPHWRWKLQNLQWHUms of the primacy of 
an embodied sense of self ± the pre-UHIOHFWLYH µ, FDQ¶. This starting point suggests 
ZD\V RI HQJDJLQJ ZLWK GDQFHUV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI WKHPVHOYHV LQ UHODWLRQ WR PLUURU
images, copying and being copied, and being watched, that would not be available 
from the interview data alone. Dancers emphasise, for example, that mirror images 
can be difficult to engage with as they seem somehow distanced from the immediacy 
of the active body, and this can be explored in theoretical terms by examining how the 
mirror image objectifies the dancer¶s body and produces a feeling of splitting, 
detachment, or alienation. Dancers ± in particular female dancers ± also expressed 
feelings of vulnerability in relation to some situations of being watched which I have 
again argued relates to objectification. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, however, suggests (contra Sartre) that the gaze of the other need not 
be objectifying and alienating where there is mutual intersubjective recognition. Thus 
if you recognise me as another subject like you, rather than as an object in your gaze, 
then I do not feel objectified or alienated. This idea can again be explored in the 
embodied practice of dance where dancers speak of copying and being copied ± i.e. 
mirroring interaction with other dancers ± in very different and more positive terms 
compared to how they speak about the use of mirrors. Thus the conversation in this 
chapter both helps to offer a theoretically coherent explanation for why dancers 
experience this difference between their images reflected by mirrors and by other 
dancers, and suggests how Merleau-3RQW\¶VWKeorising of early developmental stages 
FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGWKURXJKWKHH[DPSOHRIWKHGDQFHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIWKHLUHPERGLHG
practice. 
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Bringing Merleau-Ponty¶V QRQ-dualist ideas about embodiment or body-subjectivity 
into conversation with the active practice of dance also opens up a space for re-
considering the dual(ist) concepts of transcendence and immanence. Merleau-Ponty¶V
conceptualisation of the body as a potential source of transcendence rather than 
immanence is another important departure from the Cartesian tradition in Western 
SKLORVRSK\ ,W EHFDPH DSSDUHQW KRZHYHU LQ P\ DQDO\VLV RI GDQFHUV¶ FRQFHSWV RI
µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH PRPHQW¶ WKDW Merleau-Ponty¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ
between the transcendence of the task-focused body subject and the immanence of the 
body-focussed body subject, may in fact be another unnecessary dualism that cannot 
actually be seen to play out in the practice of contemporary dance. 
 
, KDYH DUJXHG WKDW WKH GDQFHUV¶ FRQFHSWV RI µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH
momeQW¶DUHUHODWHGWRDVHQVHRILPPHGLDF\LQWKHSK\VLFDOSUDFWLFHRIGDQFHZKLFK
we might characterise as uninterrupted transcendence. This can, for example, be 
understood in contrast to accounts dancers gave of experiences where they have felt 
objectified and alienated (either in relation to mirrors or the gaze of others) while 
performing dance and have thus felt a sense of awkwardness and self-awareness that 
inhibits or interrupts the (transcendent) focus and flow of their actions. 
 
7KHFRQFHSWVRI µEHLQJ LQ\RXUERG\¶DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKHPRPHQW¶KRZHYHU VXJJHVW
that this uninhibited immediacy not only has characteristics of (task-focused body-) 
transcendence, but also of immanence. Rather than being future-focused as (task-
focused body-) transcendence is hHOG WREH WKHQ µEHLQJ LQ\RXUERG\¶DQGµEHLQJ LQ
WKH PRPHQW¶ VXJJHVW D IRFXV RQ WKH KHUH DQG QRZ WKDW LV PRUH UHPLQLVFHQW RI
XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI LPPDQHQFH )XUWKHUPRUH µEHLQJ LQ \RXU ERG\¶ DQG µEHLQJ LQ WKH
  320 
PRPHQW¶ VXJJHVW D NLQG RI JURXQGHGQHVV LQ WKH ERdy which includes a heightened 
DZDUHQHVVRI WKHGDQFHU¶VERG\DQGof their own grounding or location within their 
dancing bodies. This awareness of inhabiting your own body is generally taken in 
Western philosophy to characterise the negative states of immDQHQFHDQGµEHLQJ-for-
RWKHUV¶LQ6DUWULDQ%HDXYRLULDQWHUPVZKLFKDUHOLQNHGE\<RXQJIRUH[DPSOHWRWKH
interruption and inhibition of movement. 
 
,QGDQFHKRZHYHUµEHLQJLQ\RXUERG\¶DQGµEHLQJLQWKHPRPHQW¶ are not considered 
to be negative or limiting, rather they are essential to uninhibited, uninterrupted 
movement. I have therefore suggested in this chapter that in bringing Merleau-Ponty 
LQWR FRQYHUVDWLRQ ZLWK GDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWV RI WKHLU HPERGLHG SUDFWLFH LW KDV EHHQ
possible to open up a new space for the re-consideration of the traditional categories 
of transcendence and immanence which truly blurs the boundaries between the these 
dual(ist) terms. 
 
Merleau-Ponty contributes to this by giving us the language to understand the 
GDQFHUV¶FRQFHSWVin terms of philosophical theories of immanence and transcendence, 
and, most importantly, by the philosophically radical move of opening up the notion 
of the body as a potential source of transcendence. It is only when these ideas are 
brought into conversation with dance, however, that we begin to see a truly non-
dualist blurring of boundaries and it becomes possible to think in a new way about 
dancers having a sense of their immediate connection with their own bodies and the 
world that gives them what I have called, rather than an inhibited transcendence, an 
inhabited transcendence: a concept that must be understood as something in between 
the traditional divide between transcendence and immanence. 
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It also became apparent through my analysis of the interview data regarding sense of 
self and alienation, that the experience of dance ± and the feminine experience of 
dance in particular ± may have something to say to Merleau-Ponty about gendered 
embodiment that is not foreshadowed in his philosophical concepts. Thus while 
Merleau-Ponty¶V SKLORVRSK\ GRHV QRW GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ PDOH DQG IHPDOH
experiences of embodiment, my interview discussions suggested that there were 
issues around emotional vulnerability and exposure ± a kind of metaphorical 
nakedness ± that were more salient for females than males in their reflections on the 
practice of dance. 
 
In order to analyse what I suggest is a gender difference between dancers related to 
ZLGHULVVXHVUHJDUGLQJZRPHQ¶VVRFLDOO\-mediated relationships with their bodies (and 
selves), I have turned to the writers Iris Young and Gail Weiss who have engaged 
with Merleau-Ponty¶VZRUNFRQVLGHULQJLWVXVHVDQGOLPLWDWLRQVIRUIHPLQLVWWKRXJKW
Young¶V ZRUN suggests that Merleau-Ponty¶V QRWLRQ RI WDVN-focused body-
transcendence cDQ XVHIXOO\ EH FRPELQHG ZLWK 6LPRQH GH %HDXYRLU¶V JHQGHUHG
conceptualisation of transcendence and immanence, thus explaining why male action 
more often has the transcendent quality  which Merleau-Ponty speaks, while female 
action is often inhibited as she H[HPSOLILHV E\ WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI µWKURZLQJ OLNH D
JLUO¶ (Young, 1990)&ULWLTXLQJ<RXQJ¶VDFFRXQW:HLVVVXJJHVWVWKDW<RXQJ¶V
emphasis on women as inhibiting their actions through a process of self-referral (self-
consciousness that leads to awkwardness in performing the movement) is useful, but 
is in danger of essentialising this process and/or attributing blame to the individual 
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women, as it fails to adequately explore the socially-mediated character of this 
referral. 
 
Bringing dance into conversation with Merleau-Ponty ± and particularly the accounts 
of female dancers ± however, gives me a different perspective from these feminist 
SKLORVRSKHUV0RVWREYLRXVO\IHPDOHGDQFHUVGRQRWµWKURZOLNHJLUOV¶± an idea that 
LVFHQWUDOWR<RXQJ¶VDQDO\VLVRI gendered embodiment ± and are in fact generally as 
physically confident as their male counterparts. What is interesting about dance then 
is not the potential for physical exposure and awkward self-awareness, but the idea 
that the physical practice of dance also entails emotional exposure or metaphorical 
µQDNHGQHVV¶ which could give rise to awkwardness and inhibition with regard to 
performing the dance movements. 
 
These aspects of dance thus allow us to open up a new space for understanding the 
embodied basis of being where the boundaries between the physical and the mental 
and between immanence and transcendence are again seen to be blurred. Dance thus 
has something to say both to Merleau-Ponty¶VJHQGHU-blind account of task-focused 
body-transcendence, and WR <RXQJ¶V IHPLQLVW DSSURSULDWLRQ RI Merleau-Ponty¶V
concepts in her essa\ µ7KURZLQJ OLNH D *LUO¶  It blurs the essentialist gender 
boundaries (and boundaries between physical and mental action and exposure) of 
<RXQJ¶VDQDO\VLVZKLOHUHIXVLQJWRFRllapse male and female experience of exposure 
and inhibition into each other. 
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Intersubjectivity 
 
The blurring of boundaries between physical and the mental or emotional is also 
FHQWUDO WR P\ H[SORUDWLRQ RI µ,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ ,QGHHG Merleau-Ponty suggests that 
by understanding self in terms of the non-GXDOLVWµWDFLWcogito¶± µ,FDQ¶± rather than 
WKHGXDOLVWµ,WKLQNWKHUHIRUH,DP¶, it is possible to dissolve the problem of solipsism 
that haunts philosophy in the Cartesian tradition. 
 
Sense of self is conceptualised by Merleau-Ponty as a practical orientation towards 
the world and others that is played out in (pre-reflective) action rather than requiring 
to be divined through a process of reflective introspection. This is not to say that 
human beings do not have the capacity for reflective thought or a conscious sensation 
of subjectivity, including thoughts, feelings, emotions and intentions. These reflective 
(linguistic) aspects of human existence need not, however, be thought of as logically 
or developmentally prior to the (potentially) visible and publicly available aspects of 
VHOIVXJJHVWHGE\WKHµWDFLWcogito¶RUµ,FDQ¶/LQJXLVWLFFRPSHWHQFHDQGRXUOLQJXLVWLF
grasp or understanding of the world and others is seen as possible through silent or 
vocalised speech, which is, if we understand it to have derived from gesture, in the 
last analysis, ultimately another pre-reflective practical use of the body. 
 
Merleau-Ponty¶VZRUNDJDLQVXJJHVWVWKDWDIRFXVRQHDUO\GHYHORSPHQWDOVWDJHVPD\
be illuminatiQJIRURXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSULRULW\RIµ,FDQ¶RYHUµ,WKLQNWKHUHIRUH,
DP¶ $V ZLWK WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI VXEMHFWLYLW\ DQG WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH FRUSRUHDO
schema in the previous chapter, however, Merleau-Ponty argues for the importance of 
WKH µ, FDQ¶ Whroughout adult life as well as childhood. I suggest that dance is a 
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particularly interesting example for a discussion of the priority of practical orientation 
over introspection in constituting both subjectivity, discussed above, and 
intersubjective communication and understanding. 
 
In this chapter I have engaged with Merleau-Ponty¶VFRQFHSWVRIUHYHUVLELOLW\DQGWKH
transfer of corporeal schema to explore an understanding of intersubjectivity as 
fundamentally practical or bodily. This is signified by the shift from talking in terms 
of intersubjectivity to the use of the concept of intercorporeality. In bringing these 
philosophical ideas into conversation with the experiential accounts of contemporary 
dance from my interviewees, I have then been able to explore how intercorporeality 
might play out in adult life for dancers. 
 
Dancers referred to a tacit understanding between themselves and other dancers where 
they often did not verbalise ± either in their own heads or out loud ± the negotiation 
of, for example, timing, space, weight or balance. Dancers suggested that instead of 
communicating verbally they communicated ± both expressed and received 
µLQIRUPDWLRQ¶ ± through their bodies. Often they were not, in fact, able to µSXW LQWR
ZRUGV¶ZKDWKDGEHHQFRPPXQLcated or they suggested that they did not have time to 
become reflectively aware of it during a sequence of movement. 
 
Intersubjective communication in dance can thus be explored as an often pre-
reflective, practical phenomenon which does not rely on linguistic articulation. 
Dancers did not have to go through a process of reflective introspection to discover 
their own thoughts about balance and timing, but were rather able to express 
themselves pre-reflectively through the practice of dance. Likewise they did not have 
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WR UHIOHFWRQ WKH OLQJXLVWLFDUWLFXODWLRQRIZKDWDQRWKHUGDQFHUZDVµVD\LQJ¶ WR WKHP
but could understand the other pre-reflectively through embodied practice. 
 
Dancing together not only allowed this kind of negotiation regarding balance, weight 
and timing between dancers, but dancers also spoke of a very intimate and personal 
connection or harmony, not reliant on verbal conversation, which could be established 
between two people who danced together. This chapter is based on the contention that 
this experience of dancing together is very suggestive for an exploration of Merleau-
3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHtransfer of corporeal schema where he argues that it is through 
the overlap between our (internal and external) perception of our own bodies and our 
external perception of the body of the other that we are able to gain access to the 
internal sensations, the thoughts, feelings, moods and intentions of the other. 
 
The process of transfer of corporeal schema is considered important in all adult life ± 
not just in dance ± but due to its pre-reflective nature it may be something that most 
people do not reflect on and thus do not consider to be important to their 
intersubjective relations. When we are asked to reflect on how it is that know what 
another person feels or thinks, pre-reflective intuitions of which we are not necessarily 
consciously aware are likely to be over-shadowed by our impression of the 
importance of verbalising these thoughts and feelings. 
 
What is interesting about bringing the adult of experience of dance into this discussion 
RILQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\DVLQWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\WKHQLVWKDWGDQFHUV¶WUDLQLQJDQGWKHQDWXUHRI
their practice means that, as I have observed before, they pay particularly close 
attention to and are particularly adept DWµUHDGLQJ¶WKHERG\RIDQRWKHUGDQFHU,QGHHG
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dancers report, in a way that echoes and illuminates Merleau-Ponty¶V FRQFHSWLRQRI
transfer of corporeal schema, that moving together and paying close attention to the 
RWKHUGDQFHU¶VERG\± or corporeal schema ± allows them to somehow intuit personal 
aspects such as intentions, moods, and feelings in the other dancer without recourse to 
verbal conversation.  
 
Importantly, this type of communication without words not only allows for shared 
experience or communion between adult dancers, but also, more often, allows dancers 
to intuit feelings that are not the same as their own. Unlike the situation described by 
Merleau-Ponty in early stages of infant development, then, transfer of corporeal 
schema in adults cannot be understood as a syncretic sociability where there is failure 
to distinguish the self from others. Rather it is the basis of adult communication of 
this kind that it occurs between to two separate individuals who can understand the 
RWKHU¶VLQWHQWLRQVZithout attributing those intentions to themselves.  
 
It is my contention that the voice of dance allows us to explore the nature and 
importance of transfer of corporeal schema for these practitioners in a far more in-
depth and sustained way than would be possible from the inchoate moments of 
awareness that we may get in our own everyday lives. I am therefore suggesting that 
the dancers are in a privileged position because of their training and practice, in that 
they are more aware of the pre-reflective practical processes that underlie 
intersubjectivity than most other people are. They do not offer the same philosophical 
insights into intercorporeality as Merleau-Ponty is able to do from a philosophical 
position which reflects on the pre-reflective, but they are able to offer a form of 
reflection on the pre-reflective that has been practically necessitated by the practice of 
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dance. As I have emphasised before, it is by bringing these two elements into 
conversation that I suggest we can again find an in-between space for the 
understanding of the embodied basis of being where even the boundaries between 
reflective and pre-reflective may be blurred or understood in terms of the looping 
twisting continuum of the Möbius strip. 
 
My position with regard to the privileged position of dancers to speak to Merleau-
Ponty regarding embodied practice and the pre-reflective is not, however, assured, or, 
I would suggest, a necessary foundation for this conversation. Indeed it is plausible to 
argue that elite professional dancers may be able to articulate aspects of embodiment 
and the pre-reflective differently from other groups, not because they have a 
heightened level of awareness of a phenomenon that is true for all humans, but 
because there is something specific about dance that means that they have a different 
experience from other people. Embodiment and practical orientation to the world may 
actually take a different form for them rather than just a different level of importance 
or salience. 
 
I do not then wish to deny that WKHUHPD\EHDVHQVHLQZKLFKWKHGDQFHU¶VH[SHULHQFH
of their own and other (dancing) bodies may be significantly different from that of the 
non-dancer. I would, however, argue that the success of the argument made in this 
thesis does not rest on the experience of the professional dancer being generalisable to 
all humanity. 
 
Merleau-Ponty¶V SKLORVRSK\ DQG SHUKDSV SDUWLFXODUO\ KLV FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH
body as a source of transcendence has been criticised for what has been suggested is 
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an implicit assumption that the agent in question is healthy and able-bodied and 
perhaps also a white male in his middle years. I am sensitive to this criticism and 
LQGHHGKDYHVRXJKWWRHQJDJHZLWKWKHLVVXHRIJHQGHUHGHPERGLPHQWLQµ6XEMHFWLYLW\¶
as it arose in my data. This thesis has, however, been more concerned with the notion 
of exploration and potential than with the (equally pressing) project of critique, which 
has been addressed more fully in the work of other scholars in this area. I am thus, as I 
have emphasised before, interested in the positive potential of Merleau-Ponty¶V
philosophy and of the practical experience of dance to open up a new space for the 
exploration the embodied basis of being. 
 
I do not therefore believe that the dancers I have interviewed need to speak of 
something essential about the human condition in order to have something interesting 
to say to Merleau-Ponty. Indeed it is the very fact that these two accounts (that of 
dance and that of Merleau-Ponty) are perspectival rather than universal that means 
they are able to have a meaningful conversation where each suggests new directions 
to the other rather than them just being reduced to one voice. 
 
For my own part, however, I do believe that the voice of dance speaks of pre-
reflective aspects of existence that are important to various extents for all of us. I am 
influenced here not only by the way in which the data from my interviews resonated 
in some way with my own experience ± which may be related to my own social 
positioning as able-bodied and white or may be more closely related to my own 
(limited) involvement in dance ± but also by the enduring significance of dance as a 
meaningful social practice across all societies and cultures. 
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Representation 
 
7KH ILQDO FKDSWHU RQ µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ LQ a sense reaches the opposite pole of the 
Möbius strip from my original focus on tacit practical knowledge and habit.  My 
original assertion was that dance should be understood primarily as an embodied 
practice rather than as a meaningful but disembodied text. I therefore sought in the 
opening chapters of this conversation to move away from an understanding of dance 
as something symbolic and emphasised the importance of the practical and the pre-
reflective rather than allowing language and representation the privileged position 
accorded to them in most contemporary philosophy and dance theory. 
 
The aim of the thesis is, however, to explore the embodied basis of being rather than 
just the nature of practical action, and I have made it clear throughout that the 
intention is to blur or dissolve dualist boundaries. My intention has not therefore been 
to limit my discussion to one side of a materiality-representation dichotomy, but 
rather to show that materiality and representation need not be understood as 
dichotoPRXV 7KXV DV KDYLQJ µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ DV P\ ILQDO FKDSWHU VXJJHVWV WKH
thesis aims to show that an understanding of representation can be reached through a 
discussion of embodied practice. The intention is to destabilise and blur the 
boundaries of the dualist categories then, not only by reversing the traditional 
Cartesian priority of mind over matter or representation over materiality, but also by 
showing that the two are intimately connected. They may be thought of as two 
opposite poles on the Möbius strip, but it must also be acknowledged that they blur 
into each other on this looping continuum. 
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Merleau-Ponty¶V HDUO\ ZRUN VXJJHVWV WKDW ODQJXDJH PD\ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV KDYLQJ
derived from gesture and is thus a bodily technique or tool which makes it possible to 
do something in relation to our social environment. Although he then offers a more 
complex account of language in later work influenced by emerging structuralist 
theories, Merleau-Ponty does, however, retain this notion of language as 
fundamentally bodily and related to practical orientation towards the world and 
others. To this, then, is added in later work more complex notions of language in 
relation to the concept of the folding of the reversible flesh of the world which 
underlies the idea seen in the previous chapter of intercorporeality. Language here is 
to be understood as an intermundane space to which we as speaking subjects must be 
open (through our constitution in the reversible flesh of the world) in order to 
communicate. 
 
Merleau-Ponty¶VGLscussion of language also includes some interesting reflections on 
what he explores as a parallel between language and art, in particular painting. This 
chapter of the thesis brings these ideas into conversation with dancers¶ LGHDV about 
how dance is inherently expressive and communicative and can be thought of as a 
language or number of different languages. 
 
0\DQDO\VLVRIGDQFHUV¶ DFFRXQWVRI this embodied µlanguage¶ of dance in terms of 
their abilities to express and understand meaning through dance revealed important 
aspects of the dance-language analogy which echo Merleau-3RQW\¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI D
parallel between art and language. Dancers, for example, suggest that the meaning of 
a work can only be gleaned from an impression of the whole and that individual 
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movements do not have a (relatively) fixed symbolic meaning, in contrast to 
conventional language use. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty discusses art as having its 
meaning contained in the whole using the notion of the Gestalt, and he suggests that 
meaning is not carried in an institutionalised, sedimented form in individual symbols 
in art as it is in language. 
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI DUW LQ WHUPV RI ODQJXDJH DQG WKH OLYHG ERG\ DUH
particularly useful for exploring how dance works as a language, then, while dance as 
an arena where materiality and representation are so closely linked offers a way of 
illuminating Merleau-3RQW\¶VWKHRULHVRI ODQJXDJHDQGHPERGLPHQW I note here that 
that much of Merleau-3RQW\¶V ZRUN RQ ODQJXDJH ZDV HLWKHU DEDQGRQHG E\ WKH
philosopher or left unfinished at the time of his death. I do not then offer a complete 
reading of Merleau-3RQW\¶VZULWLQJVRU LGHDVRQDUWDQG ODQJXDJH5ather I draw on 
WKRVH LGHDV WKDW UHVRQDWH ZLWK GDQFHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHV RI GDQFH DV D ODQJXDJH DQG
explore, again, how the practical experience of dance can offer a sense of experiential 
coherence to Merleau-3RQW\¶V XQILQLVKHG theorisation of language, and how 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V FRQFHSWV FDQ LOOXPLQDWH WKH QDWXUH RI GDQFH DV DQ H[SUHVVLYH DQG
communicative art-form and practice.  
 
Finally I would like to discuss Merleau-Ponty¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIthe function of art ± 
again he refers particularly to painting ± as being to spread a new layer of meaning 
over the silent things of the perceptual world and thus to make us think about things in 
ways we have not done previously. This capacity to make us see the world afresh was 
also key to Merleau-Ponty¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH SURSHU IXQFWLRQLQJ RI SKLORVRSK\
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and lay behind his advocacy of the phenomenological method rather than the more 
rationalist modes of enquiry of the Cartesian tradition (Mathews, 2002:133). 
 
Thus for Merleau-Ponty, this non-dualist form of philosophy (which does not 
prioritise rational thought over experience) and art can be understood as having 
similar functions. While this conversation started by bringing Merleau-Ponty and 
dance together because they were both able to speak to the importance and complexity 
of embodied practice, it therefore ends with the recognition of a new connection 
between these two voices. Dance can speak to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty not 
just from its position as an embodied practice but also from its position as an 
embodied art-form.  
 
,Q µ&RQWH[WXDOLVLQJ WKH &RQYHUVDWLRQ¶ , KDYH TXRWHG 6KHHWV--RKQVWRQH¶V (1981) 
distinction between philosophising/thinking µDERXW PRYHPHQW¶ DQG
philosophising/thinking µWKURXJKPRYHPHQW¶LQGDQFH In these terms, this thesis can 
EHXQGHUVWRRGDVKDYLQJEURXJKWLGHDVµDERXWPRYHPHQW¶± µthe voice of philosophy¶ 
± into conversation with ideas experienced µWKURXJK PRYHPHQW¶ ± µthe voice of 
practice¶. I wish to suggest as I reach the close of this conversation, however, that 
HQJDJLQJ ZLWK WKLQNLQJ µWKURXJK PRYHPHQW¶ QHHG QRW MXVW EH XQGHUVWRRG DV EHLQJ
DERXWDWWHQGLQJWRµWKHYRLFHRISUDFWLFH¶EXWcan also be understood as attending to 
how dance works as an (embodied) art-form. 
 
In concluding this thesis, I therefore invite the reader to consider how we might, 
having reached what can be understood as the far pole of the Möbius strip, follow its 
looping continuum back towards the pole of materiality again, seeing things from a 
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different perspective by focusing on art rather than practice. Having opened the thesis 
with a blurring of boundaries between philosophy and practice, and theory and data, I 
leave the reader with a new blurring of boundaries ± which, I would emphasise, has 
necessarily been there all along ± between philosophy and art: between philosophising 
about dance and dancing as philosophising.  
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